Oliver Eriksson
Sep 6, 2018 · 2 min read

Fascinating. I may be completely off base here but I had a couple questions. Although I like that there is a strong incentive for participation in governance by token holders to ensure reduction in price of amgu, surely this could become problematic in a period of hyper growth? I know you didn’t factor in speculation, but to illustrate through a ridiculous usage scenario, it is theoretically possible that the network grows so fast during a given year that so much MLN is burnt that your money supply gets unattractively small from a perception perspective (obviously the token is highly divisible etc but people just like dealing with whole numbers) and the price of an amgu in fiat terms suddenly becomes uncompetitive thus stunting growth. The obvious solution would be to instead hold 6 month then monthly then daily votes…but how quickly you can reasonably expect MLN holders to participate in governance clearly has a human limit. So, I was wondering if it would be interesting to explore how to make the relationship between MLN and amgu more dynamic?

Perhaps some sort of dynamic pricing within a certain range based on the current price of MLN in stable coin terms. Then governance could decide on the acceptable price range that keeps Melon competitive (and move that up over time) whereby users could have a reasonable ranged expectation of what the cost per Melon action is in a currency they understand interacting with. Price discovery would be another issue although the MLN holders could presumably decide on a price feed oracle for DGX, DAI or even USD etc.

    Oliver Eriksson

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