A transgender person is at odds with her/his/themselves because of the way they perceive themselves, in relation to themselves and what they know their inner truth is. They aren’t transgender because people judge them for being male/female and they want to fit the standard other people put up.
This definition goes against the notion of ‘gender as social construct’, as it assumes there’s an inner (and perhaps transcendent) gender-being that precedes and excludes the personal history; society and its set of norms, expediencies and judgments. According to this definition, we can conceive a biological male transgender feral child that somehow acts like a woman on her own, or, a transvestite individual in a pre-clothing primitive society without any gender dress code.
Transgenders, even when their condition may be proven to be biologically determined, have to first judge themselves, their inner disposition with regard to the norms of any given society, and only after doing so may assume the corresponding gender roles, manner and presentation (Transvestites wholly depend on the existence of set dress codes, so the order has to be reversed)
An inner truth cannot solely create the gender or its representation, there has to be an interaction. They can only be transgender if they are judged to cross over existing social norms, and there will still be standards to adopt even for transgenders.
Moreso, they will be judged for trying to be who they are.
Or, they will be judged for acting according to their predispositions. If one justifiable predisposition is sexual orientation, couldn’t another one may be aesthetics (this is why I have included transvestites in my question), or, the disposition to satisfy others? Could you justly (and justifiably) regulate these dispositions? If not, could you judge their manifestations?
Could you assume mutual exclusion of these predispositions? Couldn’t they exist at the same individual with varying degrees of influence, or a consistent confluence? Could we determine and impose a ‘first among equals’ without a moralistic view?
Transgender people are what they are.
Lil’Kim might not have changed herself if she didn’t perceive the rest of society — and the men in her life — as hostile to her darkness.
This admission of possibility is what I was after. In all probability, she might be conforming to the standards of an unjust society and social order, the mere possibility of this perception might be taken as another signifier of an existing condition, not its explanation. This is already a valid case against inequality and discrimination; there’s no further need to prove the actuality of this possibility, especially in the person of Lil’Kim.
The stimulus for a transgender’s change is internal, not external. Lil’Kim’s stimulus is entirely external, by her own admission.
Stimuli need response, response needs disposition or conditioning of a subject. Lil’Kim is a subject, we may know empirically what she may be reacting to; we may guess theoretically how she may be reacting, but we cannot know (even in the light of her own admission or denial) why she is reacting the way she is reacting.
The author of the original piece assumes that she can corner an individual into social conditioning against nature to make a case of social inequality, the same can be applied to the author: she might be cornering people to extract admissions, confessions and thereby passing judgments in absentia (not of the defendant but also of the moral law), to achieve an impression within the context and the rule of the same inequality.