Beyond NATO: Putin’s Top 3 Strategic Considerations for Ukraine
Visit any major news site right now and you will likely find an article on the front page explaining “why Russia wants to invade Ukraine.” A read through many of these articles will all list the same common reason: Putin wants to send a message to the west that Ukraine is a red line for any NATO activity. After this core issue is explained, articles usually follow a similar routine of explaining Ukraines storied past with Russia,1 Putin’s ideological statements of a slavic culture of “one people,” 2 and end with speculation on western reaction to invasion.3
Like any good decision point however, there are multiple strategic, operational, and tactical level factors that Putin must consider when deciding for or against a winter offensive into its neighbor. Looking further into current analysis, there exists many incentives and deterrents from which Putin must make his decision. The following list looks at three strategic-level considerations other than NATO that Putin is likely debating over when it comes to Ukraine.
- Approval ratings and the 2024 Russian Presidential Election
In the summer of 2020, a referendum was passed in Russia that allows Putin, a two-decade serving President, to continue to “compete” for presidential office until 2036.4 Although Putin has remained ambivalent on his intentions to run in the upcoming 2024 elections, this is likely a tactic from the former KGB officer to expose his opponents and create distance from potential political pre-election attack.5
With 2024 just two years away, Putin’s approval ratings and the 2014 Crimea invasion may be weighing on the Russian President’s mind. In 2018, Putin’s last election race, the president stood on solid ground with 80% approval ratings.6 These ratings were earned nearly 4 years earlier as his Crimea invasion caused Putin’s approval ratings to soar in Russia to an all-time career highs, lingering between 80–89%.7 However, not long after Putin’s latest re-election in 2018 those approval ratings crashed due to internal issues like pension reform.8 These numbers, dipping to as low as 59% in 2020, are even more volatile than his pre-Crimea ratings, which hung at a lowly 60–65% for most of 2013.9
Although President Putin is cleared to lead Russia until 2036, and has kept a strong grasp on power, approval ratings still matter and have played an instrumental role in the past. According to a report from the Institute of Modern Russia, an indepth look at Putin’s approval rating correlates with violent international interventions. The 1999 Second Chechen War, the 2008 Five Day War with Georgia, and the 2014 Crimea annexation all showed a positive correlation with his approval ratings. Afterwards Putin swiftly secured presidential elections and political power.10
Empirical studies and scholarly research conducted on the benefits of using foreign policy interventions to create a national “rally-around-the-flag effect” closes the loop on the enticement for Putin to reignite the conflict in Ukraine. 11 Creating an external crisis and using his powerful propaganda machine to frame Russia in a positive light, Putin stands a good chance to rally his supporters again to a cause that will secure his 2024 presidential re-election.
2. Access to a warm-water naval port for an expanding Navy
Right now Russia is currently occupying the Southern peninsula of Ukraine, Crimea, and already has access to the ports of Kerch, Yalta, Feodosiya, Yevpatoriy, and Sevastopol. This last port has historically tended to Russian naval vessels since the Soviet Union and even before the annexation of Ukraine was partially leased for Russian naval use.12
A full-scale occupation of Ukraine would allow Russia access to many more ports and ship-building facilities, including Ukraine’s four major ports of Pivdennyi, Odessa, Mykolavi, and Chomomorsk. Access to more ports not only allows a larger warm-water fleet, but increased shipping to support Russia’s Syrian ally in the Mediterranean. The continued support of the Assad regime is critical to Russian strategic interests as it currently hosts the only foreign naval base in Tartus.
Russian naval modernization is heading in the direction of a smaller, green-water Navy, with an emphasis on countering regional threats like NATO.13 This force structure is not congruent with a naval force positioned along Russia’s traditional northern ports. Ship construction points to Russian intentions of maintaining ships in warm waters, meaning maintenance facilities, ports, and logistical support hubs all must be increased along with this growing force. For these reasons occupying Ukraine is a strategic necessity. Russian naval emphasis on Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2AD) is also a signal that the Navy expects to take on a role that is in-line with defending newly acquired territory.14
Even with complete access to the Black Sea, Russia must maintain access to both the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits controlled by Turkey to maintain access to the Mediterranean and the world’s oceans. Turkey, once a longtime counterbalance to Russia, has been looking for new opportunities as it loses hope for EU acceptance and turns away from NATO allies through recent Russian military equipment procurement endeavors.15 This potential shift in the geopolitical balance of power provides Russia with the opportunity to develop its naval forces and capabilities with an occupied Ukraine and friendly Turkey.
3. Access to Ukrainian Markets and Resources
In the event that military invasion and occupation does not completely destroy the Ukrainian economy, Russian intervention would force access to Ukrainian markets. After the 2014 annexation of Ukraine, Ukrainian exports to Russia fell a reported 58.7%, and Russian imports to Ukraine fell 61.5% in 2015.16 Although Ukrainian trade does not rank in the top ten imports or exports for Russia, 17 Ukrainian trade is still a central issue for Russian intervention in the country. According to a report from Bruegel, a European economic think-tank, duty-free trade agreement with the EU was a central factor for the 2014 Russian intervention.18
The occupation of Ukraine will grow the Eurasian European Union (EAEU), an economic Russian led alternative to the European Union. The EAEU was established on January 1st, 2015, and contains Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and by occupation Crimea. Ukraine’s markets were essential to the organization’s success. The country’s rejection of its invitation was, according to the New York Times, a “death knell” for the EAEU.19 Rejection may have been the obvious choice at the time for Ukraine, however this choice was sure to spurn the Kremlin. Putin may be tempted to revitalize his dream with the integration of an additional market of 43 million people and access to a more diverse marketplace.20
With the annexation of Crimea and continued aggressive actions against it, Russia is forcing Ukraine further and further into Western Europe’s hands. As trade and security between Ukraine and Western Europe continue to integrate as a result, Putin may rightfully feel that his window of opportunity to regain control of the Ukrainian economy is slipping. Direct military intervention into Ukraine may be Russia’s final option, and last opportunity to seize critical sources of economic power before Ukraine joins NATO or the EU. The referendum passed in the summer of 2020, the same one that permitted Putin to remain on the presidential ballot until 2036, also provides a “provision banning the relinquishing of any Russian territory.” 21 Russia is already using this provision to maintain control over Crimea, yet it may use it moving forward to seize and solidify any spoil the war their forces might plunder in Ukraine.
About the Author
Patrick Griffin is a U.S. Marine Corps veteran, and current graduate student at Harvard University, Extension School, working towards a masters degree in international relations. Patrick holds an undergraduate degree in international affairs from Florida State University, and enjoys reading and writing on international relations and national security topics. Find more by Patrick Griffin at https://medium.com/@p.griffin.
Endnotes
1. Sugden, Joanna. “What does Russia want with Ukraine? Tensions between Putin and NATO explained.” Mint, 29 January 2022, https://www.livemint.com/politics/news/what-does-russia-want-with-ukraine-tensions-between-putin-and-nato-explained-11643444247703.html.
2. Sugden, Joanna. “What does Russia want with Ukraine? Tensions between Putin and NATO explained.” Mint, 29 January 2022, https://www.livemint.com/politics/news/what-does-russia-want-with-ukraine-tensions-between-putin-and-nato-explained-11643444247703.html.
3. Wall Street Journal. What Does Russia Want With Ukraine? Tensions Between Putin and NATO Explained, 30 January 2022, https://www.wsj.com/articles/russia-ukraine-putin-nato-11643121821.
4. Neuman, Scott. “Referendum In Russia Passes, Allowing Putin To Remain President Until 2036.” npr.org, National Public Radio, 1 July 2020, https://www.npr.org/2020/07/01/886440694/referendum-in-russia-passes-allowing-putin-to-remain-president-until-2036?t=1643664943063.
5. Al Jazeera. “‘I haven’t decided’: Putin tight-lipped over 2024 re-election bid.” Al Jazeera, 17 December 2020, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/12/17/i-havent-decided-putin-tight-lipped-over-2024-re-election-bid.
6. Putin approval rating Russia 2021.” Statista, 17 January 2022, https://www.statista.com/statistics/896181/putin-approval-rating-russia/.
7. Putin approval rating Russia 2021.” Statista, 17 January 2022, https://www.statista.com/statistics/896181/putin-approval-rating-russia/.
8. Dobrokhotov, Roman. “Why Putin’s approval rating is falling | Vladimir Putin.” Al Jazeera, 13 July 2018, https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2018/7/13/why-putins-approval-rating-is-falling. Accessed 30 January 2022.
9. Putin approval rating Russia 2021.” Statista, 17 January 2022, https://www.statista.com/statistics/896181/putin-approval-rating-russia/.
10. Volkov, Denis. “Putin’s Ratings: Anomaly or Trend?” Institute of Modern Russia, 23 December 2014, https://imrussia.org/en/nation/2135-putins-ratings-anomaly-or-trend.
11. Marra, Robin F., et al. “Foreign Policy and Presidential Popularity: Creating Windows of Opportunity in the Perpetual Election.” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 34, no. 4, 1990, pp. 588–623.
12. acobsen, Katherine. “Tensions boiling in Crimea’s warm-water port | Features.” Al Jazeera, 10 March 2014, https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2014/3/10/tensions-boiling-in-crimeas-warm-water-port.
13. Brimellow, Benjamin. “Russia’s Navy Is Betting Big on New, Smaller Warships With Missiles.” Business Insider, 1 April 2021, https://www.businessinsider.com/russian-navy-betting-big-on-new-smaller-warships-with-missiles-2021-4?r=US&IR=T & Gorenburg, Dmitry. “Russia’s Naval Strategy in the Mediterranean.” marshallcenter.org, George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, July 2019, https://www.marshallcenter.org/de/node/1189.
14. Gorenburg, Dmitry. “Russia’s Naval Strategy in the Mediterranean.” marshallcenter.org, George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, July 2019, https://www.marshallcenter.org/de/node/1189.
15. Erdogan: Turkey could buy more Russian S-400s despite US warnings.” Al Jazeera, 27 September 2021, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/9/26/erdogan-turkey-could-buy-more-russian-s-400s-despite-us-warnings.
16. Litra, Leonid. “Ukraine: Perspectives on Eurasian integration — European Council on Foreign Relations.” European Council on Foreign Relations, 8 June 2016, https://ecfr.eu/article/essay_ukraine_perspectives_on_eurasian_integration/.
17. Ukraine and Russia explained in maps and charts | Infographic News.” Al Jazeera, 28 January 2022, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/1/28/ukraine-and-russia-explained-in-maps-and-charts-interactive.
18. Dabrowski, Marek, et al. “Ukraine: trade reorientation from Russia to the EU.” Bruegel, 13 July 2020, https://www.bruegel.org/2020/07/ukraine-trade-reorientation-from-russia-to-the-eu/.
19. MacFarquhar, Neil. “Russia and 2 Neighbors Form Economic Union That Has a Ukraine-Size Hole (Published 2014).” The New York Times, 29 May 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/30/world/europe/putin-signs-economic-alliance-with-presidents-of-kazakhstan-and-belarus.html?_r=0.
20. MacFarquhar, Neil. “Russia and 2 Neighbors Form Economic Union That Has a Ukraine-Size Hole (Published 2014).” The New York Times, 29 May 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/30/world/europe/putin-signs-economic-alliance-with-presidents-of-kazakhstan-and-belarus.html?_r=0.
21. Neuman, Scott. “Referendum In Russia Passes, Allowing Putin To Remain President Until 2036.” npr.org, National Public Radio, 1 July 2020, https://www.npr.org/2020/07/01/886440694/referendum-in-russia-passes-allowing-putin-to-remain-president-until-2036?t=1643664943063.
