The Governing Philosophy of Counter.Fund

How is Counter.Fund going to be governed? What are the principles behind its governance structure? By Pax Dickinson and Anthony Demarco.

In Part 1 of this series, I explained how Counter.Fund was conceived and described the problems it’s intended to solve. Today in Part 2, I’ll talk about the governance goals we decided on and the high-level choices we made in order to meet those goals.


I. Governance Goals

In designing the governance structure of Counter.Fund, we needed to structure a system to meet a very particular set of goals:

  1. The crowdfunding platform must be dedicated to right-wing content creators and must offer communal benefits and protection from any loss of income caused by SJW attacks.
  2. The political organization should follow corporate governance models including a unitary executive, an internally selected board, and electoral power vested through share proportionality.
  3. A party House of Lords chosen via a selection process designed for organizational stability and longevity, as well as resistance to entryism from unfriendly persons.
  4. Incentive alignment such that party delegate influence (and therefore power share) is directly based on the total funds donated to them by the community.

In order to fund both Party operations and objectives, 10% of each donation is earmarked for Operations (spending governed by the Party Chairman) and 10% is earmarked for Party Funds (spending governed by the House of Lords). The justification for such a large Operations fee is that, unlike nominally open platforms, Counter.Fund will not benefit from economies of scale, so the high percentage ensures smooth operation. The Operations 10% covers payment processing fees, customer service, hosting, and development of the Counter.Fund website and its parliamentary governance software.

II. Governance Philosophy

Counter.Fund is not a democracy or a dictatorship. Counter.Fund is a Revealed Aristocratic Republic.

Counter.Fund is a Republic in that members of the House of Lords represent their “constituents” (funders) in all party matters.

At first glance, this may seem suspiciously like democracy. After all, anyone is free to donate money to their favored candidate in an effort to elect them to power. However, there are fundamental differences between the Counter.Fund republic and a democracy.

Firstly, we are not one-person-one-vote. Instead, a donor’s imparted influence is proportional to all donations party wide. This guarantees what Nassim Taleb terms “skin-in-the- game,” in that funders must make payment commensurate with the influence they seek and so are unlikely to act gratuitously. The entry barrier to party membership is trivial, but the barrier to significant political power is nearly insurmountable.

More importantly, however, is that this structure of voting creates a significant disruption layer between rank-and-file party members and Influencers themselves. Mid-tier Influencers can expect tens of donors at the least. Each donor will only be a small percentage of a Influencer’s accumulated influence, and donors will be mainly anonymous. Influencers, therefore, will not be beholden to their donor’s whims (outside of egregious acts against right-wing ideology, doxing rightists, etc.)

Counter.Fund is Aristocratic because eligibility to the House of Lords is restricted to Influencers who have been vetted and approved by the existing leadership in recognition of demonstrated real-world value.

In aristocratic regimes, political power is reserved for a small subsection of the populace, chosen by ability and trustworthiness, whether demonstrated genealogically or meritocratically. Of course, we have no hereditary titles (yet), but what we do have is considered human judgment, as embodied by the Chairman. The Chairman is charged with the vetting and selection of all Party delegates, creating a closed power ecosystem modeled on the Chairman’s preferences. As initial Chairman, I have a clear ideological bent, I am well known in the community, and I am well incentivized to select Influencers for party longevity. Allowing me to personally seed the initial set of Influencers is a tremendous bulwark against the institutional decay that accompanies more open platforms.

Counter.Fund is Revealed because the choosing of the House of Lords is a function of value provided to the party members, as represented by the amount of direct funding received by the Influencer. In other words, the leadership of our aristocracy derives from the revealed preferences of our party members.

The structure of Counter.Fund is not a pure dictatorship because one of our main goals is organizational longevity. Dictators, no matter how great or wise, cannot forestall the decay that usually follows their reigns, as unworthy successors battle each other for chunks of sovereignty. Instead, our governance structure is designed with an eye towards the future. Thus, while the chairman selects the Influencers, the Lords are elected because they best provide value to both Party Members and other Influencers. At any given time, the Counter.Fund House of Lords will represent the best value creators in the Party, regardless of past reputation or horse-trading of favors.

The revealed nature of our aristocracy is also our best protection against entryism by hostile parties. One important way to prevent entryism is to create a buffer between Party membership and leadership. By vesting the power of naming Influencers to the Chairman, and restricting Lordships to Influencers only, entryism becomes extremely difficult.

Even the most dedicated communist would need to take months, if not years, developing a reputation of being reliably right-wing and providing content that right-wingers want to not only consume but also financially support. Meeting this hurdle would still only offer a chance of being chosen by the Chairman, where then even more reputation building, especially among low-level Influencers, will be required. Eventually, even if an entryist made it into the House of Lords, they would still only have a single vote and would assuredly remain fringe at best.

Any coordinated attack aiming at pumping in donations to acquire multiple Lordships would be prohibitively expensive, from both a time and money perspective. It would also require budding entryists donate to an organization antithetical to their goals for months on end with only a slim chance of success.

For more information about Counter.Fund, visit the Counter.Fund website.

Continue with Part 3: Counter.Fund Lordship Election Mechanics