The Twilight War: The Secret History of America’s Thirty-Year Conflict with Iran
by David Crist

Chapter 10
“Arms for the Ayatollah”

On the morning of June 18, 1985, Major General Colin Powell, the senior military assistant to Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, sat at his desk in the plush, expansive defense secretary’s suite on the outside ring of the third floor of the Pentagon. A number of classified documents were stacked in Powell’s in-box for Weinberger, the most sensitive delivered by couriers using locked pouches. One document immediately caught Powell’s eye — a top secret “eyes only” draft National Security Deci­sion Directive from the White House. These directives were some of the most important documents produced by the government. Intended for the presi­dent’s signature, they laid out U.S. foreign policy and served as principal guides to focus the entire U.S. government. The cover letter was signed by National Security Adviser Bud McFarlane and entitled “U.S. Policy Toward Iran.”

What McFarlane proposed was a drastic change in American policy
toward Iran. “Dynamic political evolution is taking place inside Iran,” McFar­lane began. “Instability caused by the pressures of the Iran-Iraq War, economic deterioration and regime infighting create the potential for major changes in Iran. The Soviet Union is better positioned than the United States to exploit and benefit from any power struggle that results in changes in the Iranian regime.” The future presented a picture of growing unrest that gave Moscow a golden opportunity to exploit the turbulence. The strategic buffer provided by Iran protecting Persian Gulf oil would be gone, effectively opening up the entire region to Soviet control. It was a dire prediction and a grave strategic threat to the West if the United States did not develop a new strategy.

Rather than containing Iran as Weinberger advocated, the national secu­rity adviser proposed détente. McFarlane recommended using allies to sell Iran weapons as a means of undercutting Soviet leverage and in the process currying favor with “moderate” elements within the regime. This could pull Iran back into the Western fold and array it against the Soviet Union.
Since this was well above Powell’s pay grade, he dutifully sent the docu­ment in to Weinberger, writing on a small white buck slip with his letter­head, “SECDEF, This came in ‘Eyes Only’ for you. After you have seen recommend I pass to Rich Armitage for his analysis.”

Cap Weinberger was appalled. He had never forgiven the current regime in Tehran for seizing the U.S. embassy and holding the hostages for 444 days — an event he viewed as a national humiliation. “The only moderates are in the grave,” he thought. Now this man in the White House is trying to say we approach them in the spirit of forgiveness and based on the assumption there were some sort of fanciful pragmatists around Khomeini? “It was non­sense.”1 Weinberger sent the document back to Powell, scrawling across his military assistant’s white paper, “This is almost too absurd to comment on. By all means pass it on to Rich, but the assumption here is: 1) Iran is about to fall, and 2) we can deal with them on a rational basis. It’s like asking Gad­dafi to Washington for a cozy chat.”

Armitage had the same reaction to the draft directive as his boss. “Bullshit,” he said, cutting to the quick.

What no one realized in June 1985 was that McFarlane’s proposal would embark the United States on a foreign policy path that would lead to the big­gest scandal of the Reagan administration, Iran-Contra. Profits from secret arms sales to Iran were siphoned off to fund pro-American guerrillas fighting the leftist government of Nicaragua. Three government investigations with multiple indictments followed before the independent counsel finally wrapped up the last one in 1993, after a last-minute string of pardons by outgoing president George H. W. Bush ended the affair. In reality, Iran-Contra was actually two separate issues: one the attempt by the Reagan administration to resupply anticommunist guerrillas in Nicaragua, and the other the sale of weapons to Iran in the vain hope of releasing seven American hostages being held by Hezbollah as a precursor to renewed diplomatic relations with the Islamic Republic. The two efforts merged in the White House under a self- righteous marine lieutenant colonel named Oliver North.

On the afternoon of July 3, 1985, David Kimche, the director general of the Israeli foreign ministry and a close friend to Israeli prime minister Shimon Peres, stopped by Bud McFarlane’s office in the West Wing just down the hall from the Oval Office. After the usual pleasantries about the hot, humid Washington weather, Kimche asked to talk to McFarlane alone. McFarlane respected the Oxford- educated Kimche, who had a distinguished career with the Israeli intelligence service, Mossad. The two men had worked together two years before during the U.S. intervention in Beirut, and McFar­lane found him highly intelligent and a kindred spirit on their views of the Middle East. When the other staff left the room, Kimche said, “You know, Mike Ledeen came and asked us whether we had any judgments about an Iranian opposition movement. We told them we do.”

Michael Ledeen was a loquacious, self- appointed Italian expert with con­tacts in the Middle East whom the National Security Council kept on retainer. In the 1970s, he served as the coach for the Israeli national bridge team and had developed good contacts there with senior government offi­cials. National security adviser Robert McFarlane took advantage of this and frequently sent him there as a messenger for the White House.

“A year or so ago,” Kimche said, “we began talking with Iranians who are disaffected. We believe we have made contact with people who are both will­ing and able, over time and with support, to change the government.”
Kimche described an Iran close to collapse, with internal dissent rising. But the pro-Western moderates inside the government needed outside sup­port, especially from the United States. To show their bona fides, they offered to release the American hostages in Lebanon, likely in exchange for some military equipment. “They are confident they can do this,” Kimche ended. It seemed almost too good to be true — a potential opening with Iranian mod­erates who could possibly steer Iran back toward the United States, in addi­tion to the release of the Lebanon hostages.

McFarlane mentioned Kimche’s proposal to President Reagan a few days later. “Gosh, that’s great news!” Reagan responded. He instructed McFarlane to explore the matter further.

Kimche’s proposal was nothing new. The Israeli ambassador to Wash­ington, Moshe Arens, had suggested a similar plan to use weapons to influ­ence the Iranian government in October 1982. The Iran-Iraq War had put the two allies on opposite sides of the conflict. Despite Iran’s support for Hezbollah, Israel viewed Saddam Hussein’s Iraq as the greater of the two enemies. The Israeli government strongly opposed the Reagan administra­tion’s effort to secretly support Iraq and allow third-party countries to pro­vide weapons. During the days of the shah, Israel and Iran had good relations, and many senior Israelis still harbored ideas of Iran’s being a natural ally against their common Arab foe. Israel repeatedly lobbied Reagan administra­tion officials to endorse its arms-selling scheme as a means to improve rela­tions with Iran.

In the summer of 1985, agents working on behalf of the United States surreptitiously shipping arms to the Nicaraguan resistance stumbled on a warehouse in Lisbon, Portugal, with Israeli weapons headed for Iran. When confronted, a senior Israeli replied that they had not technically violated the ban on weapons to Iran because the arms were being shipped by a private company, with each aircraft dropping off arms also returning with Iranian Jews. The Israeli government permitted this because it would build credibil­ity with moderate elements in the Iranian military that might grow strong enough to establish a more reasonable Iranian government. Now Kimche approached McFarlane to propose this same idea.

Israel’s contact within the Iranian regime was Manucher Ghorbanifar. Born in Iran in the early 1940s, this self- described export-import business­man made a comfortable living by peddling his services to various intelli­gence agencies, including the shah’s Savak and Israel’s Mossad. Short, stocky, with thinning hair and a round face, he had a forceful personality and the manner of a polished used-car salesman.

In 1984, he approached a U.S. Army intelligence officer working in the Middle East, who in turn passed him off to the CIA’s Tehfran operation in Frankfurt. Ghorbanifar claimed he had information about the recent kidnap­ping of William Buckley, the Beirut CIA station chief, and even more impor­tant, knowledge of a plot to assassinate candidates in the upcoming American presidential election. The CIA administered a polygraph to Ghorbanifar. He failed on every significant question. In June, the CIA station in Frankfurt administered another lie detector test to Ghorbanifar, but he failed that one too. Langley concluded he could not be trusted and issued a “burn notice,” which notified all U.S. intelligence agencies to avoid using Ghorbanifar as an intelligence asset.

On Thursday, July 11, Ledeen met for lunch with Adolph “Al” Schwim­mer, an Israeli arms merchant and adviser to Prime Minister Peres. Schwim­mer told Ledeen that Ghorbanifar had access to the highest levels of government in Tehran. In exchange for the seven hostages in Lebanon, Ghor­banifar proposed that the United States allow Israel to sell Iran around a hun­dred TOW antitank missiles. The swap of armaments for hostages would lead to improved relations with Khomeini’s regime. Ledeen liked the idea, writing McFarlane that the TOW missiles were part of that process, “a demonstration of good faith and a sample of what would happen if Iran agreed to a rap­prochement with us.” As the proposal came from the most senior level of the Israeli government, McFarlane did not look at the recommendations with too critical an eye. One hundred antitank missiles, he thought, certainly would not change the balance of power in the Iran-Iraq War, and if it secured the Lebanese hostages and provided an opening with moderates in the regime, McFarlane believed the gains outweighed any risks.

President Reagan was supine in a bed at Bethesda Naval Hospital, just outside Washington in suburban Maryland, recovering from the removal of a cancerous polyp in his colon. McFarlane went up to the president’s room. Reagan sat up in his bed, tired but in good spirits. After discussing some new issues on arms control with the Soviets, McFarlane laid out the Israeli proposal. Reagan brightened at the prospect of releasing the hostages and said he understood why Iranians would want to overthrow Khomeini. Rea­gan encouraged his national security adviser to continue pursuing the Israeli opening.

Next, Kimche flew to Washington and met with McFarlane. Was the United States going to sell Iran the weapons? If not, Kimche pressed, “What if we [the Israelis] provide the weapons?” This passed the cost off to Wash­ington but avoided placing the Americans in the awkward position of directly providing weapons to Iran. If Israel did this, Kimche wanted assurances that the United States would backfill their stock of TOW missiles.

With Reagan back in the White House recuperating from his surgery, on the morning of August 6 he met with his senior advisers in the second-floor residence. The assemblage sat at the far west end of the long main hall­way in a comfortable, yellow-painted sitting room, beneath a large half-moon window overlooking the press office and the long white portico leading to the West Wing and Oval Office. Reagan, dressed in his bathrobe, presided over the meeting, sitting on a red flowery-patterned chair. McFarlane opened with a rundown on his meeting with Kimche and the Israeli offer to ship the TOWs in lieu of the United States, provided “we” backfill their missiles.

Weinberger immediately opposed the idea. “I don’t think it’s legal.” He went on, “Even if a third party shipped the missiles, it still requires notifica­tion of Congress.” As far as an opening for Iran, he said, “Nothing indicates that there has been any slight change in the virulently anti-Western, anti- American attitude of those in charge of Iran.” He added ominously, “It would open us up to blackmail by any one of those who knew.”

Shultz and Weinberger detested each other and were often at loggerheads over policy, but in this instance they found common cause. Shultz agreed with Weinberger’s conclusions. After carefully examining the idea, he con­cluded it would seriously undermine our public diplomacy to isolate Iran, and despite the pronouncements of this being a precursor to an opening with Iran, it looked to Shultz like a straight- out arms- for- hostages deal.

While Bill Casey did not attend that meeting, he was the one man who supported McFarlane. The CIA director shared similar concerns about Soviet influence in Iran and the prospects for wooing Iran with weapons. On May 17, 1985, CIA national intelligence officer Graham Fuller reinforced this view in a memo to Casey suggesting that the Iranian arms embargo might work against U.S. interests by moving the Iranians, who were desperately seeking arms on the world market to carry on their war with Iraq, toward a closer relationship with the Soviet Union.

To Casey, what the national security adviser proposed simply rehashed the CIA’s current tasking from the 1981 presidential finding, which required him to build conduits inside Iran to influence the regime. After four years, access still plagued his agency. While they had developed their spy network in the country, it remained primarily composed of midgrade military officers and bureaucrats. They did not penetrate the veil of secrecy that surrounded the Islamic Republic. The true decision makers around Khomeini remained elusive. If the Israelis thought they had some new contacts that might help the CIA fulfill this mission, Casey supported them. Casey also worried about the fate of William Buckley, the CIA station chief held hostage by Hezbol­lah, whom he had encouraged to go to Lebanon in the wake of the 1983 embassy bombing. That spring, reports began filtering back to the agency that the Iranians were torturing Buckley. If the Israelis thought that Ghor­banifar might succeed in freeing Buckley, why not give it a try?

President Reagan did not make a decision that morning but called Mc-Farlane into the Oval Office several days later. As McFarlane later described it, “The President brooded quietly for a few moments. He pressed his finger­tips tighter reflexively and stared at the carpet. Finally he looked up: ‘Well, I’ve thought about it, and I want to go ahead with it. I think that’s the right thing to do.’ ”

The idea of an opening to Iran had long appealed to the perennially opti­mistic president. During his first term, Reagan signed three letters on White House stationery, each delivered by a different country’s foreign minister, to the Iranian government, urging them to improve relations with the United States. While he had received no response, he believed the two religious countries remained natural allies against the Soviets, with a common cause in Afghanistan. The plight of the seven American hostages bothered Reagan. A naturally compassionate man, Reagan frequently let his heart, rather than his brain, govern his decisions.

“The president always talked about the hostages, and at times it seemed that it was his greatest priority,” Poindexter said later. “But the two dove­tailed together. We would have tried reaching out to the Iranians even if we did not have the hostages.”

On August 20, 1985, an Israeli-chartered 707 aircraft landed in Tehran with a pallet load of ninety-six U.S.-made TOW missiles. No hostages emerged from Lebanon. Ghorbanifar, who accompanied the shipment to Iran, claimed that Revolutionary Guards had seized the missiles on the tarmac and absconded with them; the weapons had failed to reach the desired moderates. During a contentious meeting in Europe, Ghorbanifar explained that the United States needed to send the second batch of four hundred TOWs in order to gain the release of one hostage. After a phone call between Reagan and McFarlane, Reagan agreed to ship the second batch of missiles.

Early on the morning of September 15, another Israeli-chartered aircraft landed in the northwestern Iranian city of Tabriz loaded with 408 missiles. This time, Ghorbanifar came through. The Iranians offered to release one hostage, and the United States could decide which one. McFarlane and Casey wanted Buckley, but through Ghorbanifar the Iranians relayed that Buckley was “too ill” to be released. Buckley had, in fact, been dead for nearly three months. McFarlane then requested Reverend Benjamin Weir, in part because his family had been outspoken critics of the administration’s attempts to free the hostages. Thus far, 504 TOW missiles had yielded one hostage.

In anticipation of the possible hostage release, the Joint Staff began work­ing on a contingency plan to secure the released Americans in Beirut and safely transport them out to Cyprus and back to the States. The nuts and bolts of working out the details within the National Security Council fell to forty- two- year- old Marine Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North. Charismatic and energetic, North was a decorated and respected Vietnam veteran. He arrived at the White House in 1981 as one of several military officers assigned to an unadorned room on the third floor of the Old Executive Office Building adja­cent to the West Wing. North would likely have gone on to a successful mili­tary career, but the excitement and power of his NSC position seduced him, and he extended his tour at the White House, now in its fifth year. North, as the CIA’s Robert Gates noted, had the deserved reputation as the “go-to guy to get things done.”

Ghorbanifar lied about a great many things, but the Israelis knew he had real access to senior officials in the Iranian government who desperately wanted American weapons. All of Iran’s military equipment had come from the United States. After six years of war and an American-led arms embargo, chronic shortages existed in the stocks of munitions and spare parts needed to keep its war machine operating. With Iraq’s superiority in airplanes and tanks, missiles to counter these were especially important. While the Iranian government remained committed to winning the war and spreading the rev­olution, splits developed within the government between pragmatists and purists over approaching the West, including the United States, for the needed military hardware. A confidant of Ayatollah Khomeini’s, speaker of the Iranian parliament Hashemi Rafsanjani, led the realist camp. A corrupt but skilled political survivor who would later enrich himself by cornering Iran’s pistachio exports, he had commanded the army earlier in the war. He had no qualms about trading with the Great Satan in order to win the war. If that led to improved relations, so be it. Prime Minister Mir-Hossein Mousavi supported Rafsanjani. An architect before the revolution, the stern Mousavi came more from the leftist body of the Islamist movement. He shared Rafsanjani’s views and advocated working with the Israelis, although he seemed guided more by the pressing needs of war than any opening with the West.

On the other side of the divide sat the appointed successor to the supreme leader, Ayatollah Hussein Ali Montazeri. A liberal by Iranian standards, the learned theologian from Qom staunchly supported the revolution, but he believed in a more liberal government, one in which an Islamist jurist pre­sided in a multiparty limited democracy. He later clashed with Khomeini over the heavy-handed tactics used to suppress opponents, especially the mass executions ordered by Khomeini in 1988. But in spite of his democratic per­sona, he had no interest in any rapprochement with the United States. He maintained his own armed militia, headed by the brother of his son-in-law, Mehdi Hashemi. A thuggish dogmatist, Hashemi had served time in jail during the shah’s rule for killing prostitutes and homosexuals. He remained totally dedicated to Montazeri and worked to export the revolution to Leba­non through Hezbollah.

Ayatollah Khomeini learned of the secret dealings with the Americans and Israelis after the shipment of the second batch of TOW missiles. He sided with the pragmatic Rafsanjani. What McFarlane had missed and Ghor­banifar had obfuscated was that a “moderate” wing never existed in Iran. Every faction leader knew of the dealings, and the supreme leader endorsed them. For Khomeini, it was never about a strategic opening but rather about beating Iraq and spreading the revolution. He had no compunction about turning America’s own weapons on their maker.

Enticed, the Iranian pushed for more arms. Ghorbanifar’s shopping list included advanced air-to-air missiles, Harpoon antiship missiles, and an improved variant of the American-made Hawk antiaircraft missile, which he falsely claimed Iran needed to counter Soviet Bear bombers that repeatedly violated Iranian airspace. It was the type of argument that might appeal to the Cold War hawks in the administration. To sweeten the pot for the Americans, Ghorbanifar introduced Ledeen to Hassan Karoubi, whom Ghor­banifar claimed to be the leader of the “middle way,” as he termed the sup­posed moderate faction within the Iranian government. Karoubi claimed to be a close adviser to the supreme leader, spending three days a week at Kho­meini’s home. He was the type of senior official that McFarlane hoped to contact. While McFarlane balked at selling some of the more sophisticated weapons, Reagan authorized eighty Hawk antiaircraft missiles to be sent to Iran via Israel.

On the evening of November 22, Duane Clarridge awoke to a call from Oliver North. “Look, I’ve got a problem, and it involves Portugal. I need to see you right away.” North and Clarridge were friends, occasionally meeting for a drink at a bar called Charley’s Place in McLean, Virginia. A few hours after the phone call, the two men met at Clarridge’s office at CIA headquar­ters. North explained that he needed Clarridge’s assistance in facilitating an Israeli delivery of oil drilling equipment to Iran. In truth, the plane was car­rying the Hawk missiles. It was to land in Portugal, where the missiles would be transferred to another, neutral aircraft before being flown to Tehran. But Israel had sent the aircraft without obtaining landing rights, and the Portu­guese government suspected the plane carried more than oil drilling equip­ment and prohibited the aircraft from landing in Lisbon.

To avoid Portugal, Clarridge ordered aircraft from a CIA proprietary company, St. Lucia Airlines, to fly the missiles directly from Israel to Tehran. The plane, flown by a West German pilot, landed in Tehran in the wee hours of November 25. On the tarmac to meet the jet was no less than Prime Minister Mousavi. The smaller CIA aircraft could carry only eighteen mis­siles, and the Israelis had sent an antiquated version replete with Hebrew markings and the Star of David stenciled on each missile. Mousavi went bal­listic. He called Ghorbanifar, who in turn called Ledeen. Near hysterical, Ghorbanifar yelled repeatedly that the United States had cheated them. The Hawk debacle should have ended the entire Iran arms affair. Instead, it only convinced those who supported it of the need for the United States to take a more direct role in the arms transfers.

On Saturday, November 30, 1985, President Reagan had finished prun­ing a large walnut tree in the front yard of his ranch in California, when a letter addressed for his eyes only arrived. Bud McFarlane was tendering his resignation, stating the long- standing Washington rationale of wanting to spend more time with his family. In announcing McFarlane’s departure to the press five days later, on December 4, President Reagan quipped prophetically: “I should warn you that I’ll probably be calling on you from time to time for your wise counsel and advice.” Reagan announced that McFarlane’s deputy, Navy Vice Admiral John Poindexter, would be the new national security adviser, the fourth man to hold the position thus far in his administration. Poindexter was unquestionably brilliant. He’d graduated first in his class at Annapolis before going on to earn a doctorate in nuclear physics from Caltech in 1964. An incessant pipe smoker, he displayed a quiet and reflective de­meanor. But Weinberger believed Poindexter was out of his element as na­tional security adviser: “He possessed no strong credentials in foreign policy.” Poindexter had done an effective job at managing the NSC staff, however, and had proven to be a loyal subject to the White House. He also shared his good friend Bill Casey’s disdain for congressional meddling in foreign affairs.

Poindexter and Reagan had discussed the Israeli arms- transfer debacle in November. Both agreed that the Israelis had fouled up the shipment. The solution would be for the United States to take a more active role. On the morning of December 7, both Pearl Harbor Day and the day of the annual Army-Navy game, Reagan met again with McFarlane, Shultz, Weinberger, Poindexter, and CIA Deputy Director John McMahon, filling in for Casey, who was in New York being treated for cancer. The meeting degenerated into a remarkably freewheeling exchange between the president, Shultz, and Weinberger. Shultz made an impassioned argument against dealing with ter­rorists. “We need to put this operation aside,” he said. “The operation should be stopped. We are signaling to Iran that they can kidnap for profit.”
Reagan turned to Caspar Weinberger. “What do you think?”

“Are you really interested in my opinion?” the defense secretary responded, knowing full well that the president knew he had opposed the idea from the outset.

“Yes,” Reagan replied, without amplification.

Weinberger echoed Shultz’s comments and proceeded to blast continuing the Iranian contacts. The Iranian regime remained viscerally anti-American. “This will undermine Operation Staunch and our entire effort to contain Iran. We will lose all credibility with our allies. There are legal problems here, Mr. President, in addition to the policy problems. It violates the Arms Export Control Act, even if done through the Israelis. It violates our arms embargo against Iran. It is illegal.”

Frustrated by Weinberger and Shultz’s strenuous objections, Reagan replied, “Well, the American people will never forgive me if big, strong President Reagan passed up a chance to free the hostages over this legal question.”

“Then, Mr. President, visiting hours are on Thursday,” Weinberger responded sardonically.

Reagan vacillated. Weinberger’s handwritten notes taken during the meeting reflect that the president believed any weapons would go to moder­ate elements within Iran and not to the Revolutionary Guard. At the end of the meeting, Weinberger believed his rare cooperation with Shultz had car­ried the day with the president. Upon his return to the Pentagon, his military adviser, Colin Powell, came in and asked how it went. Weinberger replied with a slight grin, “I believe the baby has been strangled in its cradle.”
But Reagan remained reluctant to give up on what appeared to him to be the only thread of hope to secure the release of the hostages. Despite all the broken promises, the arms deals had secured the release of one of those held in Beirut; Reagan simply could not bring himself to admit there was little the United States could do to influence Hezbollah.

“No one outside of the White House believed that there were moderate Iranians we could work with,” Poindexter recalled. “My view, and I think the president agreed with me, was that we should try.” Bill Casey concurred. “It’s risky,” he told the president, “but most things worth doing are.”

Rather than strangling the Iran baby, the NSC under Poindexter gave it new life. On January 17, 1986, Reagan signed a new finding of covert action. It tasked the CIA with taking charge of the arms-transfer effort. The goal remained unchanged. Reagan wanted to strengthen moderate elements within the Iranian government “by demonstrating their ability to obtain req­uisite resources to defend their country against Iraq and intervention by the Soviet Union.” Rather than use Israeli weapons, the United States would sell the TOWs or Hawks directly to Iran through the Israelis, who in turn would transfer them to Ghorbanifar’s intermediaries in Tehran.

The CIA director brought in retired Air Force Major General Richard Secord to help facilitate the transfer of American weapons to Iran. An arms peddler, Secord was also providing weapons to the Contras for both Casey and North. The release of the hostages was listed as a tangential benefit in the finding, but this aspect remained paramount in Reagan’s mind. As the presi­dent noted in his diary about signing the finding prior to heading to Bethesda for a physical: “Only thing waiting was NSC wanting decisions on our effort to get our five hostages out of Lebanon. Involves selling TOW anti-tank mis­siles to Iran. I gave a go ahead.”

Ghorbanifar relayed a new request from his contacts in Tehran. The Iranians wanted intelligence about Iraq. McMahon had gone over to the White House to see Poindexter and voice his strong objection to provid­ing Iran with any intelligence. “Providing defense missiles was one thing,” McMahon argued, “but when we provide intelligence on the Iraqi order of battle, we are giving the Iranians the wherewithal for offense action.” This could cause the Iranians to win the war, with “cataclysmic results” for the United States. Poindexter did not dispute this, but countered that it was an opportunity that should be explored, adding, “A map of Iraqi order of battle is perishable anyway.”

That afternoon, North met with the CIA’s Robert Gates, John McMa­hon, and Tom Twetten to discuss what type of intelligence to provide Iran. Gates called over a secure phone to Charles Allen, an experienced CIA officer assigned as the national intelligence officer for counterterrorism, requesting that he work with some analysts in the Near East Division to put together some limited intelligence for Iran. The request, Gates stated, was coming from the White House, but he emphasized to Allen to make sure that the intelligence provided “would give no significant advantage to the Iranian military.”

The next day, Allen handed Gates a map laying out the disposition of Iraqi forces along the Iranian border, including the locations of Iraqi division headquarters and key military installations. To try to mitigate the damage, it showed details of one Iraqi division’s front line in central Iraq, well away from the decisive southern front near Basra. A few days later, it was passed to Ghorbanifar and then into the hands of the Iranian military, who used the windfall to launch a night attack that drove the Iraqi forces back a mile and a half. Iraq had to commit its corps armored reserves to restore the front line, which it managed to accomplish but at the cost of over one thousand casual­ties. Iran was also given the complete order of battle of Iraqi ground and air forces, the information coming from the unwitting Defense Intelligence Agency.

The CIA’s rank and file distrusted Ghorbanifar. Charlie Allen met with Ghorbanifar at Ledeen’s home on January 13 to ascertain the Iranian’s true knowledge of the Iranian government. Allen concluded that the Iranian businessman was a “cheat and a crook.” This feeling was shared by the head of the Iran desk, Jack Devine, who requested another polygraph. Ghor­banifar failed again on thirteen of fifteen key questions regarding his access and the accuracy of his statements about the Iranian government. But the CIA director remained committed to the enterprise. Ghorbanifar might be exaggerating his influence within the Iranian government, but if he could provide any credible access to the government, it was worth the risk. “Well, maybe this is a con man’s con man,” Casey countered. And with that the operation went forward.

With the president’s finding, an unhappy Weinberger directed Powell to work with the army to transfer four thousand TOW missiles to the CIA. Powell coordinated the delivery with the vice chief of staff of the army, Gen­eral Maxwell Thurman.31 On February 15, an unassuming white aircraft with “Southern Air Transport” adorning its fuselage picked up the first batch of five hundred TOW missiles at Kelly Air Force Base, near San Antonio, Texas, and flew them to Israel. There, a ground crew transferred the TOWs to an Israeli plane for the final leg to Iran, arriving on February 17. Ten days later, a second installment of five hundred TOWs arrived at the joint military- civilian airport at Bandar Abbas. Despite one thousand missiles sold to Iran, not one hostage emerged from the back alleys of Beirut.

North and Poindexter, however, remained optimistic. On February 25, Ghorbanifar arranged a meeting at the Sheraton Hotel in Frankfurt between North and an adviser from Prime Minister Mousavi’s office, Mohsen Kangar­lou, accompanied by an Iranian Revolutionary Guard officer, Ali Samii, and two senior Iranian military intelligence officers. Two days of talks ensued, with the Americans pushing for the release of the hostages and a very suspi­cious Kangarlou advocating for the United States to provide Iran advanced air-to-air missiles for its fleet of F-14 fighters. North gave the Iranians the CIA-produced map of Iraqi units positioned along the central front and repeatedly tried to impress upon them the threat posed to their country by the Soviet Union, hoping it would strengthen the possible cooperation between the United States and Iran in the Cold War. The meeting adjourned with both sides agreeing to another high-level meeting on the Iranian Persian Gulf island of Kish.

North sent an upbeat e-mail to McFarlane’s home classified computer: “While all this could be so much smoke, I believe that we may well be on the verge of a major breakthrough — not on the hostages/terrorism but on the relationship as a whole.”

“Roger Ollie,” McFarlane replied to North’s e-mail. “Well done — if the world only knew how many times you have kept a semblance of integrity and gumption to U.S. policy, they would make you Secretary of State.”

Nothing in this tortuous affair developed as planned. The meeting at Kish never materialized. Now Ghorbanifar demanded an array of even more weapons be sent to Iran. This included 240 different spare-part items for Hawk missiles, air-to-air missiles, and sophisticated Harpoon antiship mis­siles. North accepted this request and worked out a convoluted scheme whereby money, hostages, and weapons would be exchanged in a series of sequential operations, but this too failed to move beyond discussions.
Casey decided to augment North and assigned the CIA’s elder Iran ana­lyst, George Cave, to the Iran initiative in March 1986. Casey had argued that they needed an experienced operations officer fluent in Farsi. Cave held a dim view of Ghorbanifar, having witnessed his failed polygraph test in Janu­ary, and was incredulous that the Israelis had vouched for him.

Cave flew to Paris and met with Ghorbanifar and the new Israeli inter­locutor, Amiram Nir. In his mid-thirties, good-looking with thick curly black hair, Nir briefly served as a military correspondent on Israeli television before casting his political lot with the Labor Party. In 1984, Peres elevated him to adviser on counterterrorism. In this capacity, he worked closely with Oliver North during the Achille Lauro hijacking and, in the fall of 1985, played a supporting role for Kimche in working with Washington on selling weapons to Iran. Nir’s role would be to keep the Americans using Ghor­banifar.

Cave pulled Nir aside and asked, “Have you fully vetted Ghorbanifar?”
“Yes, he’s trustworthy,” Nir answered, but Cave remained unconvinced.
Knowledge of both the presidential covert action finding and the subse­quent arms shipments remained tightly held by the NSC and the CIA. Wor­ried that the NSA might uncover the details of the arms transfers, Oliver North wanted access to any intercepted communications limited, and ordered the agency’s director, William Odom, to exclude both Shultz and Wein­berger. To North’s annoyance, Odom refused. “I work for the defense secre­tary and the president, not Bill Casey or Ollie North,” the stubborn Odom replied. He had the pertinent intercepts hand carried to Powell. “Weinberger knew of each transfer within a few days by the signals intercepts.”

Odom considered offering the same information to Secretary Shultz, but the secretary of state refused. He vigorously opposed the arms deals, and the less he knew, the happier and better Shultz felt. But his department certainly knew of the gist of the dealings. Assistant Secretary of Defense Armitage spoke daily to his counterpart at State, Arnold Raphel, about the significant developments from the intelligence reports on the secret dealings with Iran.

Odom thought the entire idea was foolhardy. In Weinberger’s office one
afternoon, the two men discussed the arms-for-hostages operation. “You
know this is going to leak, and I hate to say it, but it is going to cause a great
crisis,” said Odom. “Why don’t you go over and convince the president to call it off. There is no chance it will succeed.”

“Bill, I’ve tried,” a frustrated Weinberger replied. “He just can’t be
convinced.”

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff William Crowe remained the one
man in the dark on the shenanigans. He accidently discovered the affair in
July 1986. His executive assistant, Lieutenant General John Moellering, had
attended an NSC meeting in which North let slip a reference to Iranian arms sales. After the meeting, he and Rich Armitage drove back to the Pentagon
together.

“What was that reference to Iran and arms?” Moellering asked.

“You don’t know what they’ve concocted? When we get back, come up to
my office and I’ll fill you in.”

Moellering promptly told Crowe, who confronted Weinberger.

“I was against it,” shrugged Weinberger, “but the decision had been
made and the president wasn’t going to change his mind. I saw no point in
bringing you in.”

In April, Ghorbanifar appeared to achieve a breakthrough. He returned
from Iran and proposed a meeting in Tehran with senior Iranian officials,
including a meeting with the speaker of the Iranian parliament, Rafsanjani,
and Prime Minister Mousavi as part of a final exchange of weapons for
the hostages. Initially, Cave and North were to fly first to Tehran with Ghor­
banifar to lay the groundwork for the larger meeting with McFarlane.
Ghorbanifar offered use of a Lear jet and a house to stay in in Tehran. But
Poindexter overruled this as too risky, perhaps fearing news would leak before McFarlane’s more important meeting.

North sent a memo to Poindexter: “I believe we have succeeded. Thank God — he answers prayers.”

At eight thirty in the morning on May 25, 1986, an unmarked Israeli
aircraft piloted by the CIA touched down at the airport in Tehran. The U.S.
delegation consisted of Bud McFarlane, Oliver North, George Cave, NSC staff member Howard Teicher, Israeli Amiram Nir (pretending to be an American), and a CIA communicator who provided secure communications for the entourage back to Poindexter in Washington. Their plane carried one pallet of Hawk missile parts, with another aircraft filled with twelve more pallets standing by in Israel to be sent the minute the hostages were released. An Iranian airport guard ushered the group into a VIP lounge. Here they waited for someone to appear, content to make polite small talk with the Iranian base commander, who entertained them with an air show using some of his F-4s, having recently received a shipment of spare parts from the West.

In fact, the U.S. visit caught the Iranians completely by surprise. Despite the agreement and having relayed the day of McFarlane’s arrival, the Iranians did not really think the Americans would come. When the Revolutionary Guard heard of this strange delegation’s appearance in Tehran, they sent men over to the old U.S. embassy to examine the personnel files. They scanned them and could find no one named McFarlane or North, but did see a George Cave. So they agreed to meet with the Americans.

More than an hour later, Ghorbanifar appeared with Kangarlou in tow, both men looking harried. Ghorbanifar made an excuse about the Americans arriving early and escorted them to several old cars that would serve as their humble motorcade. They drove to the old Hilton Hotel — now called Inde­pendence Hotel — where the Revolutionary Guard had hastily cleared the entire top floor for the unexpected American delegation. A secure message transmitted to the White House regarding their arrival stated, “We have been treated politely, though heavily escorted by Revolutionary Guard types who are also physically and technically surveilling our rooms.”

The first meeting began at five p.m. Three Iranians arrived, none of whom appeared to be either polished or senior officials. The Iranians opened with a litany of grievances and American transgressions. Regardless, McFar­lane put that aside and began with rehearsed remarks designed to get the negotiations moving.

President Reagan had asked him to do what was necessary to find com­mon ground for discussions in the future, to try to find common ground for cooperation, McFarlane told the Iranians. The United States had no desire to reverse the Iranian Revolution and was willing to work with the government.

Very quickly, however, it became apparent that the two sides were operating from completely different views on what had been agreed to. The United States expected the hostages to be released immediately, and before any more Hawk missile parts arrived. The Iranians thought that the United States intended to provide them a vast array of weapons and spare parts, with the hostages to be released at a later date. It became apparent to Cave that Ghorbanifar had promised the Iranians much more in the way of weapons than the United States would ever agree to. Ghorbanifar had lied to both sides.

In a message sent to Poindexter, McFarlane relayed his view of the Ira­nian government: “It might be best for us to try to picture what it would be like if after a nuclear attack, a surviving tailor became vice president; a recent grad student became secretary of state; and a bookie became the interlocutor for all discourse with foreign countries. While the principals are a cut above this level of qualification, the incompetence of the Iranian government to do business requires a rethinking on our part of why there have been so many frustrating failures to deliver on their part.”

When McFarlane threatened to leave, the Iranians promised him a meet­ing with an official of greater stature. A short time later, a member of the parliament and a senior political adviser to Rafsanjani, Hadi Najafabadi, arrived on the fifteenth floor of the old Hilton Hotel to meet with the Ameri­cans. A short, bearded man, Najafabadi immediately impressed the delega­tion. A mullah who had taken off his turban, he was several cuts above the other Iranians: confident, Western educated, cultured, and able to converse in excellent English.

McFarlane repeated why they were in Iran and his hopes that this would create the beginning of a renewed friendship and a strategic opening between the two nations. He stressed the threat of the Soviet Union to Iran. He told them that the United States knew about a planned Soviet invasion and that the Soviets had already conducted two rehearsals. The United States had a high- level source, a Soviet major general named Vladimir, who confirmed the Soviet intentions. This was pure fabrication, concocted on the plane ride over, but it drove home the theme the United States wanted to leave with the Irani­ans: that Moscow, not Washington, posed the greater risk to Iranian security.

McFarlane handed over to Najafabadi a slickly produced packet of in­telligence developed by the CIA on Soviet forces arrayed along the Iranian border. He then informed the Iranian that the Soviets had recently told their rival, Saddam Hussein, that they would do everything in their power to keep Iraq from losing the war. McFarlane conveniently left out that American pub­lic diplomacy was doing the same thing for Iraq.

Najafabadi agreed with McFarlane’s assessment of the Soviet threat. He also impressed upon his American counterpart the risk his own government took in meeting with the Americans. It all looked hopeful. McFarlane cabled Poindexter with a slightly optimistic message: “Have finally reached a com­petent Iranian official. . . . We are on the way to something that can become a truly strategic gain for us at the expense of the Soviets. But it is going to be painfully slow.”

Najafabadi added new conditions set by Hezbollah for the hostages’ release. This included Israeli evacuation of the Golan Heights, monetary com­pensation, and release of seventeen Shiite prisoners who had been arrested for participation in a massive series of bombings in Kuwait in July 1983. The American delegation convened out on a balcony to avoid the presumed micro­phones in the hotel rooms. No one could be sure whether the Iranians were simply trying to extract more concessions or had difficulties controlling their surrogates. McFarlane stuck to his instructions from Poindexter. He insisted on the hostages’ release first and no new preconditions.

On Tuesday, May 27, talks continued. The two sides wrangled over send­ing the Hawk spare parts immediately or an immediate release of the hos­tages. Late in the afternoon, a conciliatory Najafabadi arrived bearing “good news.” The Lebanese captives had dropped all their demands except release of their colleagues in Kuwait. He then pleaded for the United States to immedi­ately send the spare parts to Iran. The Americans could not deliver on this, but drafted a proposed statement they hoped would satisfy the Iranians, say­ing the United States would “work to achieve a release and fair treatment for Shiites held in confinement.” It did not, but talks continued well into the next morning. They were like two parties haggling in the bazaar. McFarlane threatened to leave if all the hostages were not returned, and Najafabadi and the other Iranians offered two hostages immediately in return for more mis­sile spare parts. After a phone call with Poindexter around one thirty in the morning, McFarlane gave the Iranians until four a.m. to free all the hostages. If they did, an aircraft carrying the remainder of the Hawk spare parts would arrive in Tehran at ten a.m. If not, the U.S. delegation would leave. The Ira­nians balked, pleading for more time; McFarlane gave them until six thirty. When no hostages emerged, the U.S. delegation ate breakfast and packed up to go to the airport.

A visibly exhausted Najafabadi again asked for more time. “The hostages are not in our control.”

“You have our position,” McFarlane replied. “When you can meet it, let me know.”

Privately, the Americans worried the Iranians might try to hold them hostage, but the real threat came from opponents of the talks within the regime. News spread of the arrival of McFarlane and the Americans. Not everyone liked it. Mehdi Hashemi organized a mob to go and get the Ameri­cans. At about eight a.m., his mob of vigilantes formed and began moving toward the hotel. Kangarlou came into the hotel and yelled at Cave, “Get everyone up. You need to leave immediately!” The Iranians brought three nondescript jalopies and they drove McFarlane’s group by backstreets to the military side of the airport. Had Hashemi succeeded, Reagan would have had his own hostage crisis.

Just as Cave boarded the aircraft, a senior Revolutionary Guard intelli­gence officer, Feridoun Mehdi-Nejat, approached Cave and begged him to stay a few more days. The two intelligence officers had warmed to each other during the three days of talks. “Let’s stay in touch,” he told Cave. Cave nod­ded in agreement.

As he prepared to board the plane, McFarlane told one of the Iranians that this was the fourth time they had failed to honor an agreement. “Our lack of trust will endure for a long time. An important opportunity has been lost.” With that the cabin door closed and the four- engine 707 taxied down the runway, taking off at 8:55 a.m.

President Reagan followed the McFarlane mission closely. After being informed of the failure of the mission, President Reagan wrote in his diary, “It seems the rug merchants and the Hisballah [sic] would only agree to 2 hostages. Bud told them to shove it, went to the airport and left for Tel Aviv. This was a heartbreaking disappointment for all of us.”

The failure of the meeting in Tehran should have ended the affair. McFar­lane recommended as much to Reagan when he back- briefed the president upon his return to Washington. Reagan refused to concede defeat. Ghorbani­far and Nir continued to encourage the policy, and they found a willing accomplice in North, who zealously continued to work the scheme.
On July 26, Hezbollah released Father Lawrence Jenco, the director of Catholic Relief in Lebanon, after 564 days in harsh captivity. Ghorbanifar had promised the Iranians the remaining twelve pallets of Hawk missile parts when they ordered Jenco’s release. For William Casey, this validated Ghorbanifar. “It is indisputable,” he wrote, “that the Iranian connection actually worked this time.” Casey attributed this success to Nir sitting on Ghorbanifar. Casey, while not pleased with the deal Ghorbanifar had arranged, recommended continuing with the arms deliveries as a means of securing the release of more hostages. Absent from the director’s arguments was any mention of the strategic opening to counter the Soviet Union that he had so firmly advocated since the spring of 1985.

Jenco carried with him a videotape from another hostage, David Jacob­sen, criticizing Reagan for not doing enough to free the hostages. Reagan took this personally; he anguished over the hostages’ plight and bristled at the accusation that he or his administration was not doing enough to secure their release. On July 29, Reagan called Father Jenco to convey his regards, extending him an invitation to visit the White House, which he did in what Reagan called “an emotional experience” on August 4. Moved by Father Jenco, Reagan approved sending the remaining twelve pallets of Hawk mis­sile parts to Iran. They arrived from Israel on August 4. The entire operation had now degenerated into purely an arms-for-hostages arrangement.

Poindexter believed the United States needed a new conduit into the Ira­nian government. Frustrated, he wanted a second channel to cut out Nir, the Israelis, and Ghorbanifar. Poindexter authorized North to seek a new opening shortly after the Tehran meeting. After considerable effort by North’s team, they met with Ali Hashemi Bahramani, a nephew of Hashemi Rafsan­jani and a Revolutionary Guard officer with a distinguished combat record against Iraq. Bahramani was smart and well versed in Western politics and Middle Eastern affairs. He advocated better relations with the West and showed his desires by frequently visiting Europe. On August 25, Bahramani met in Brussels with Secord and an Iranian expatriate working with Secord, Albert Hakim. This second channel was not well received in Israel, but the nephew of Rafsanjani promised better access to the Iranian regime, without all the double-talk of Ghorbanifar.

On September 19, Bahramani and two Revolutionary Guard officers, including Feridoun Mehdi-Nejat, whom Cave had met with McFarlane in Tehran, arrived in Washington for an extraordinary meeting with the Ameri­cans. The supreme leader had personally approved Bahramani’s visit, and it required considerable effort on the American side, with North coordinating with both the FBI and the CIA to get the Iranian delegation into the United States. But on that day, the nephew of the Iranian speaker sat in Ollie North’s office in the Old Executive Office Building next to the White House.

Two days of talks followed. The two sides found common ground on a number of issues. Bahramani echoed American concerns about the Soviet Union and offered a captured Soviet-built T-72 tank to examine. His govern­ment wanted strategic cooperation with the United States, he said, and he proposed forming a joint committee between the two nations to resolve their differences.46 The first task set for the joint committee would be to work out establishing commercial arrangements. After this was in effect, perhaps six months later, the two nations would reestablish diplomatic representation. Bahramani proposed ways the two nations could support the mujahideen in Afghanistan. He offered to establish a base inside Iran to facilitate the flow of American weapons to the mujahideen. One of the senior Revolutionary Guard officers stunned Cave. One day he said he was pleased that the Ameri­cans had started to provide advanced Stinger missiles to the mujahideen, since Iran had just acquired ten of them from their own sources in the muja­hideen, later determined to be Ismail Khan.

Bahramani brought a laundry list of weapons and parts. This included the ever popular Hawk missile parts and ten thousand rounds of advanced, extended-range artillery ammunition for their U.S.-manufactured howitzers. North reassured Bahramani that they could ship much of this as soon as the hostage issue was resolved. While the Iranian demurred on achieving their release, both sides generally agreed to the premise of a tit-for-tat exchange of hostages and weapons.

North provided the Iranians with a CIA-prepared annotated map, replete with talking points discussing the general location of Iraqi forces behind the front lines, as well as some additional information on Soviet forces. But rather than give them anything based upon imagery, the units were placed on a commercially available, fifteen-year- old map of Iraq.

George Cave and the younger Bahramani developed a friendly rapport. During one meeting with Cave, Bahramani laid three letters on the table in front of Cave, each a copy of one of the letters signed by Reagan urging better relations. “Did you really send these letters?”

“Yes,” Cave answered, surprised that the Iranians apparently did not realize their authenticity. Bahramani then asked Cave for American assistance in bringing about a cease-fire with Iraq, before adding that they wanted to launch one last offen­sive to take Basra.

“Well, what are you going to do if you take Basra?” Cave asked.

“Of course we will declare an independent Shia state for Iraq with Basra as the capital!” he answered without hesitation. “He was too young and naive to realize he was saying too much,” Cave later chuckled.

After the first day of talks, North gave the Iranians a private tour of the West Wing. The group wandered across the street from the Old Executive Office Building and into the side entrance to the White House proper. They walked past the hallway leading down to the White House Situation Room and up to the next floor, past the Cabinet Room and the Roosevelt Room. There Bahramani and his two Revolutionary Guard companions gazed into the Oval Office, prevented from entering this American sanctum only by a felt rope.

Both North and Cave thought the meetings had gone well. North wrote to Poindexter, “We appear to be in contact with the highest levels of the Ira­nian government.” North exuberantly compared Reagan with Theodore Roosevelt, who received the Nobel Peace Prize for ending the Russo-Japanese War in 1905. “Anybody for RR [Ronald Reagan] getting the same prize?”

When the Iranians left, Cave went to Poindexter’s office. The CIA veteran believed Bahramani to be earnest in his desire for better relations. “I think we will get two or three hostages out,” he reported. Cave thought that this chan­nel might just lead to the diplomatic breakthrough the president craved.

Talks continued in October. Once again, they broke down into a series of exchanges: five hundred TOW missiles for one hostage. Then the United States would approach the Kuwaitis about releasing at least some of the sev­enteen Iranian-backed terrorists held in their jail for the bombings in 1983. Then another five hundred TOWs would be sent to Iran, followed by at least one more hostage. Then the United States would consider sending artillery ammunition and provide more intelligence on Iraq, with Iran promising to do its “utmost to secure the release of the remaining hostages.” On October 28, 1986, the first batch of five hundred TOW missiles arrived in Iran. Five days later, the Lebanese released hostage David Jacobsen.

In September and October, three more Americans were kidnapped in rapid succession — likely to replace the ones released — off the streets of Bei­rut: Frank Reed, Joseph Cicippio, and Edward Tracy. More than a year of providing weapons to Iran had yielded three hostages released, and three hos­tages taken — a net gain of zero with the terrorists in Lebanon.

The day after Jacobsen’s release, the Lebanese magazine al-Shiraa ran a story about McFarlane’s secret mission to Tehran. While inaccurate in several important details — such as the date of the meeting — it exposed the back-channel meetings between Iran and the United States. Cave suspected Ghor­banifar had leaked it, since he remained friendly with all the political rivals in Tehran. But the clear culprit was Ayatollah Montazeri. In October, author­ities had arrested Mehdi Hashemi for kidnapping a Syrian diplomat. In retal­iation, his supporters leaked the details of the secret dealings to embarrass Khomeini.

The next day, Rafsanjani admitted the McFarlane visit during a speech marking the seventh anniversary of the takeover of the U.S. embassy in Tehran. He revealed that the Americans brought a “key-shaped cake to be a key to resumed relations,” adding, “but the kids were hungry and ate the cake.” As Weinberger had warned over a year earlier, the Iran arms sales had leaked, starting a feeding frenzy in the media.

The Reagan administration initially denied and obfuscated. On Novem­ber 6, during an immigration reform bill signing in the Roosevelt Room just across the hallway from the Oval Office, a reporter asked, “Mr. President, do we have a deal going with Iran of some sort?” Reagan responded with the first of several misleading statements: “No comment.” Then he cautioned the press about engaging in speculation “on a story that came out of the Middle East, and that to us has no foundation — all of that is making it more difficult for us in our effort to get the other hostages free.”

On November 10, Reagan met with his senior foreign policy team in the Oval Office to discuss the Iranian arms revelations and what they should tell the public. It would be the first airing of the details of the arms deals and the first senior-level meeting on the topic in nearly a year. Despite the grave looks around the room, President Reagan characteristically tried to keep the mood light; he and Vice President Bush exchanged some reasonably raunchy jokes. The meeting began with Poindexter providing an overview of the last year, the presidential finding signed in January and the arms sales that had ensued. Both Weinberger and Shultz expressed surprise upon hearing of both the presidential finding and the extent of the arms transactions with the Iranians. “I did not know of that,” Shultz pointedly told Poindexter. In the case of the secretary of state, it was a true statement, but Weinberger knew about most of the details from the NSA intercepts provided by General Odom. Shultz lambasted the entire Iranian overture: “The Israelis sucked us up into their operation so we could not object to their sales to Iran,” he said, then adding, “It is the responsibility of the government to look after its citizens, but once you do a deal for hostages, you expose everyone to future capture.”

Reagan remained in denial. “We did not do any trading with the enemy for our hostages. The old bastard [Khomeini] will be gone someday, and we want better leverage with the new government. Actually,” Reagan added, “the captors do not benefit at all. We buy the support and the opportunity to persuade the Iranians.”

Neither Reagan nor Poindexter wanted to reveal all the details, as it would only hinder the release of more hostages and endanger those in Iran who had cooperated with the operation. Weinberger cautioned that “we have given the Israelis and the Iranians the opportunity to blackmail us by report­ing selectively bits and pieces of the total story.”

At 8:01 p.m. on November 13, President Reagan addressed the nation from the Oval Office in a prime-time speech. “Good evening,” he began. “I know you’ve been reading, seeing, and hearing a lot of stories in the past sev­eral days attributed to Danish sailors, unnamed observers . . . and especially unnamed government officials of my administration. Well, you’re going to hear the facts from a White House source, and you know my name.”
An indignant Reagan continued, “The charge has been made that the United States has shipped weapons to Iran as ransom payment for the release of American hostages in Lebanon, undercut its allies, and secretly violated American policy against trafficking with terrorists. These charges are utterly false.” He laid out in broad terms the transactions with the Iranians, focusing solely on their role as a strategic initiative with Iran to end the Iran-Iraq War and as part of a larger containment strategy against the Soviets. He had authorized sending McFarlane to Iran when negotiations appeared promising, comparing this trip to Kissinger’s secret trip to China as part of that diplo­matic opening. The president bristled at the rumors that the United States had provided “boatloads or planeloads” full of American weapons to Iran to spare the hostages. Reagan admitted, though, that the United States had provided a small amount of “defensive” weapons, but these modest deliveries, taken together, could easily fit into a single cargo plane.

At best, Reagan told the American public half-truths. An underpinning of the entire overture with Iran centered on hostages, most especially with the president. While Casey and McFarlane saw it through the lens of a strategic influence in Tehran, Reagan’s private discussions and personal diary myopi­cally viewed the negotiations as an effort to free the hostages, with the by-product being better relations with the mullahs. In the last six months of the North- led effort, it had degenerated into a purely arms- for- hostages deal, personally approved by President Reagan. Whether the president deliberately lied or was merely self- delusional remains debatable, but the United States had not only negotiated with a declared terrorist regime, but sold senior officers of the military arm of the Islamic Revolution — the Revolutionary Guard — planeloads of advanced weapons that could easily be used for offensive action. They had even provided them a tour of the White House.

The ramifications of the arms-for-hostages affair were not confined to Washington. The supreme leader’s handpicked successor, Ayatollah Monta­zeri, stridently opposed any dealings with the United States. He publicly called for the execution of all those who had met with the Americans. Since Khomeini had sanctioned those activities, he defended their actions as a necessity based upon the pressing needs of the war. The two religious leaders exchanged a series of letters in which their disagreement aired before the Ira­nian public. Khomeini removed Montazeri as his successor and ordered the execution of Mehdi Hashemi and several of his followers, despite pleas for clemency by Montazeri.

With the covert opening fully exposed, Reagan ordered the State Depart­ment to take charge of any new talks with the Iranians. Charles Dunbar, a Foreign Service officer ignorant of any of the previous discussions with the Iranians, joined George Cave to meet with Feridoun Mehdi-Nejat on Decem­ber 13 in Frankfurt. Dunbar stuck to his instructions. The strategic concerns regarding the Soviet Union that had led to the arms transfers remained unchanged. However, there would be no further arms transfers and no nor­malization of relations while Iran continued to countenance hostage taking and supported terrorism. Mehdi-Nejat tried to ingratiate himself to the Americans. Iran remained committed to continuing the strategic opening. He pressed for the United States to abide by earlier discussions regarding providing more weapons and advocating for the release of the Dawa terrorists held in Kuwait in exchange for Iran using its influence to get hostages released. The two parties had finally reached an impasse.

Dunbar returned to the States; Cave stayed in Europe to visit his grand­children. On December 14, Cave received a call in his hotel room. On the other end was Mehdi-Nejat. He urgently wanted to meet with Cave the next
morning. Cave agreed, as the two men had become friendly over the past
year.

Mehdi-Nejat said he had talked with his superiors (although Cave sus­
pected he’d spoken to a senior Iranian in Frankfurt). “Tehran is most anxious to push forward and is interested in how fast the State Department can draw up a plan.” The United States had promised TOW missiles, intelligence, and cooperation in getting rid of Saddam Hussein, Mehdi-Nejat argued. He urged Cave to check back with Washington again, since it had reneged on these commitments.

Despite his long-standing objections, Secretary Shultz did not want to
end the Iranian channel. Mehdi-Nejat had consulted with Rafsanjani, and
there were some indications that the Iranian foreign minister was interested in working through this conduit. Shultz did not want the CIA involved, so he ordered Cave off the detail. Dunbar planned to meet with Mehdi-Nejat again in Geneva on December 27, to again reiterate that the channel remained open to pass messages, but the days of providing arms and intelligence were over.

On December 19, Odom dutifully brought Weinberger the intercepts
related to the meeting and the State Department’s secret contacts. Wein­
berger was livid. He immediately sent a nasty memo to the White House: “I
had assumed that we were finished with that entire Iranian episode and so
testified to Congressional Committees during last week. I was astounded,
therefore, to learn after my testimony, that the United States ‘negotiators’
were still meeting with the same Iranians.” Angry at Shultz for not telling
him about the meetings, he wrote, “I would very much have appreciated an
opportunity to present to the President arguments as to why we should not
continue dealing with these channels in Iran.”

Shultz backpedaled and objected to Weinberger’s hostile tone. But the
defense secretary had finally succeeded in killing the Iranian weapons-for­
hostages baby.

In popular lore, the Iranian arms dealings have been portrayed as rogue
policy pursued by the national security staff due to an inattentive presi­
dent. In truth, the arms-to-Iran initiative continued a five-year-long strategy, one deeply rooted in Cold War fears of revolutionary Iran falling under the Soviet sphere. While the U.S. government publicly tried to isolate Iran, Reagan ordered the CIA to surreptitiously develop contacts within the Ira­nian government in a quiet attempt to steer Iran back to the West. Its chief architects — Robert McFarlane, John Poindexter, and William Casey — viewed providing weapons as just another means to find a pragmatic faction to work with inside the Iranian government. As Poindexter wrote in an op-ed piece in the Wall Street Journal at the height of the scandal, he firmly believed that cultivating such a group, over time, would break down the deep mutual suspicion that permeated both sides. Iran again might serve as a bulwark against Soviet expansionism. In the process, it would help release the Ameri­can hostages in Lebanon and curb Iranian terrorism. Reagan agreed, scrib­bling on a copy for Poindexter, “Great. RR.” Instead, it degraded into a swap of weapons for hostages, a political scandal. Public officials in both Washington and Iran had been badly burned by the revelations. The real legacy of the Iranian arms affair was to scuttle any hope of rapprochement for the next two decades.

Buy The Twilight War