Vlad Meets Bill and George: American Unilateralism, Color Revolutions, and the Failure of Presidential Diplomacy (1999–2009)
This article covers Vladimir Putin’s relationship with the American Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush and the deterioration of Russian-American relations over the period of 1999–2009. It is the twelfth article in the series “Vladimir Putin, Global Corruption, and the Road to the 2016 American Election.” While it is not necessary to read the previous entries, it is recommended.
The first article provides a brief history of Russia’s intelligence services and a definition of “Disinformation” and “Active Measures.”
The second article describes Vladimir Putin’s early life and his experiences as a KGB Officer in Russia and East Germany.
The third article describes how elements of the KGB laundered billions of dollars of Communist Party money into the West as the USSR collapsed.
The fourth article describes the rise of the post-Soviet oligarchic system and the role Eurasian organized crime played in facilitating it.
The fifth article covers Putin’s tenure as Deputy Mayor of St. Petersburg and his enduring relationship with organized crime.
The sixth article covers the organized crime and intelligence service links to the Bank of New York money laundering scandal.
The seventh article covers Vladimir Putin’s rise to the Russian Presidency and the mysterious and controversial September 1999 Moscow Apartment Bombings.
The eighth article covers the mysterious series of political assassinations and terrorist attacks that convulsed Putin’s early reign.
The ninth article covers how Putin consolidated the “vertical of power” at home through taming the oligarchs and controlling televised media.
The tenth article covers how Putin seized control over Russia’s strategic resources and uses them to pursue his interests abroad.
The eleventh article covers how Putin and the Kremlin use the spread of corruption abroad to further their strategic interests.
This article is an excerpt from my book, While We Slept: Vladimir Putin, Donald Trump, and the Corruption of American Democracy, available here.
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The deterioration of Russian-American relations to the point that Putin felt embittered and emboldened enough to target the 2016 presidential election unfolded over many years and across successive American administrations of both parties.
Bill Clinton and George W. Bush attempted to forge a strong personal relationship with Putin. However, the magnitude of global events and conflicting geostrategic imperatives proved too immense to be overcome.
The impact that the Global War on Terror and policies such as pre-emptive war and regime change had on Putin’s strategic calculus cannot be overstated. After a brief period of cooperation following the September 11th attacks, the US invasion of Iraq marked a downturn in the relationship from which it would never fully recover.
US-supported “Color Revolutions” that broke out on Russia’s periphery struck at the heart of fears and resentments regarding the disintegration of Russian authority that Putin had nursed since his KGB days in Dresden.
By the time Barack Obama took office, it was hoped that the two countries could at least cooperate on vital areas of mutual interest.
This was not to be.
The Arab Spring and a NATO bombing campaign in Libya again stirred Putin’s deepest fears. These fears were realized when Russians poured into the streets of Moscow in 2011 to protest election irregularities.
Putin pinned the blame for the protests in Moscow squarely on the American Secretary of State: Hillary Clinton.
Putin believed that the United States diplomatic and intelligence establishment was targeting him personally for regime change. Finally, Western support for the Maidan Revolution in Ukraine and the overthrow of its pro-Kremlin government was the straw that broke the camel’s back. These events set the stage for Putin’s most daring act yet.
Vlad Meets Bill and George
Towards the end of his last term, Bill Clinton met then-Prime Minister Putin on September 12th, 1999 at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum held in Auckland, New Zealand.
It was Putin’s second encounter with the American President. Years earlier, Clinton had visited St. Petersburg as Mayor Sobchak’s guest. Deputy Mayor Putin made sure that the trip proceeded safely and securely. Though Clinton complained to the secret service that he had been “kept in a goddamn cocoon,” the trip took place without incident.
Putin and Clinton’s meeting in New Zealand took place while Russia was in crisis. The question of Yeltin’s successor hung over the Russian political establishment.
Three days before the meeting, explosives leveled an apartment building in Moscow. The Second Chechen War, which Putin used to ascend to the Presidency, was underway.
Putin was treated to Clinton’s famous charm. A believer in personal diplomacy, Clinton tried to form a bond with Putin.
Despite their mostly warm rapport, Putin deflected the concerns Clinton raised. Clinton expressed reservations to Putin about the conflict in Chechnya. Putin listened politely but demurred.
The events unfolding in Chechnya were an invasion of Russia, Putin argued, framing the war as part of a global conflict against Islamic terrorism.
Back in Moscow, Putin had told American diplomats that Osama Bin Laden had made several trips to Chechnya. While plausible, the American government was unable to verify its accuracy.
Bill Clinton visited Moscow on June 3rd, 2000. After a private dinner of cold boiled boar, baked ham and cabbage and goose with berry sauce, Clinton and Putin listened to a jazz tribute to Louis Armstrong conducted by a Russian band leader.
Putin complained to Clinton that after becoming the President he was having trouble finding Judo sparring partners.
They engaged in an ultimately fruitless discussion about missile defense. Putin argued the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty was an essential part of global stability. While they were able to sign a symbolic joint principals documents, the issue remained an open source of contention.
Clinton last met Putin at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel in New York on September 6th, 2000, where Clinton came to realize that, despite being polite, Putin was running out the clock until the next administration.
The American presidential campaign was in full swing, with Vice President Al Gore going head-to-head with Texas Governor George W. Bush. Putin became visibly intrigued when Clinton provided his personal analysis of the upcoming election.
The vote, Clinton explained, was going to be extremely close and he predicted it would come down to a handful of states, in particular Florida. Clinton’s analysis proved prescient and after a ruling by the Supreme Court the disputed election of 2000 was won by George W. Bush.
Like Clinton, Bush sought to establish a friendly relationship with Putin.
The night before his first trip to Europe as President, which included a meeting with Putin in Slovenia, Bush brought together five outside experts on Russia.
The meeting was attended by Vice President Dick Cheney and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice. Rice, the first African-American woman to hold the position, had studied Russian at Moscow State University and served as a Russian policy expert for Bush’s father, President George H.W. Bush.
Former U.S. diplomat Tom Graham argued that the greatest task facing Russian-American relations was managing Russia’s decline as a world power.
Michael McFaul, a professor at Stanford and expert in democratic transitions, suggested that the most important task was to integrate Russia into the liberal democratic order and support its development of democratic institutions.
Bush listened attentively, and told the gathering that it was important to have Russia on America’s side because one day, “we all would be dealing with China’s rise.”
Putin then launched into a verbal assault on Pakistan, explaining that it was supporting Islamic extremists including the Taliban in Afghanistan and the terrorist organization al Qaeda.
In December of 1996, al-Qaeda’s second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri had been arrested while trying to enter Chechnya and had spent six months in FSB captivity before being released in May of 1997.
The extremists, Putin complained, were being funded by Saudi Arabia, and if nothing was done it would lead to a catastrophe. “I was taken aback by Putin’s alarm and vehemence and chalked it up to Russian bitterness toward Pakistan for supporting the Afghan mujahideen, who had defeated the Soviet Union in the 1980s,” Condoleeza Rice wrote later.
“Putin, though, was right: the Taliban and al Qaeda were time bombs that would explode on September 11th, 2001. Pakistan’s relationship with the extremists would become one of our gravest problems. Putin never let us forget it, recalling that conversation time and time again.”
Bush asked Putin about a story he had read in an intelligence briefing. The born again Christian Bush had read that Putin’s mother had given him a cross that had been blessed in Jerusalem.
The story went that when Putin’s dacha had burned down, the cross had miraculously survived the fire. Putin dramatically re-enacted the scene when the fire fighters presented him the undamaged cross. It was, Putin said, “as if it were meant to be.”
“Vladimir,” Bush replied, “that is the story of the cross. Things are meant to be.”
The story made a big impression on Bush. It is doubtful he knew at the time that Putin’s dacha had been part of the Ozero Cooperative.
Not everyone in the meeting was as impressed by the story. Rice later wrote that she never knew what to make of the story, and had a difficult time seeing a former supporter of the atheistic Soviet Union as a religious man.
“I looked the man in the eye,” Bush said at a press conference later that day after being asked by a reporter whether he trusted Putin. “I found him to be very straightforward and trustworthy. We had a very good dialogue. I was able to get a sense of his soul.”
9/11, the Iraq War, and the Color Revolutions
The September 11th, 2001 terrorist attacks were the seminal moment of Bush’s Presidency and lead to a brief high point in the US-Russian relations.
That afternoon in Moscow, Putin was rushed into a conference room by security aides. Images of black smoke pouring from gaping holes in the World Trade Center streamed across a television.
Two years earlier, in the wake of the Moscow apartment bombings, Putin warned in the pages of The New York Times that Americans could one day face terrorism of a similar kind.[1]
“What can we do to help them?” Putin asked Sergei Ivanov.
He attempted to get in touch with Bush, the first world leader to do so, but the American President was unavailable, at that moment being whisked away on Air Force One to a secure location in Louisiana.
Ivanov received a call from his counterpart in Washington, Condoleezza Rice, who had just been rushed down to a bunker over fears that the White House was a target. Putin took the receiver.
“Mr. President,” Rice said, “the President is not able to take your call right now because he is being moved to another location. I wanted to let you know that American forces are going up on alert.”
“We already know, and we have canceled our exercises and brought our alert levels down,” Putin replied. A Russian military exercise simulating nuclear war with the US had been scheduled to take place that day. “Is there anything else we can do?”
Rice thanked Putin and amidst the chaos a brief, hopeful thought crossed her mind: the cold war really is over.
Putin hoped to link the Russian war in Chechnya with America’s Global War on Terror. He told Bush he would use his influence in the former Soviet republics of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan and provide them with the Kremlin’s permission to serve as supply lines for America’s invasion of Afghanistan.
Russia had a painful history with Afghanistan and no love for the Taliban. Russian generals briefed their counterparts in the American military, sharing their experiences. Material was provided to the Northern Alliance, the Taliban’s indigenous military foe.
“My God,” Putin shouted in English less than a month later as he stepped into the Oval Office. “This is beautiful.”
The night before Taliban forces had fled the Afghan capital Kabul. The next day, Bush and Putin traveled with their wives for a visit at Bush’s ranch in Crawford, Texas. Putin and his wife stayed in Bush’s guest house and ate barbecue.
No amount of personal bonhomie, however, could change fundamental dynamics between the two nations.
Three weeks after their visit to Texas, America withdrew from the ABM Treaty. To Russian eyes, the move destabilized the nuclear balance of power.
A year later, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia were invited to join the NATO alliance. The encroachment of the world’s most powerful military alliance was seen in Moscow as another strategic setback.
After what appeared to be a lightning quick victory in Afghanistan, Bush and the neoconservatives in his administration set their sights on Iraq.
Putin joined much of the rest of the world in opposing an American invasion. He not only disputed the American claim that the country was in possession of weapons of mass destruction, but firmly believed that only a despot the likes of Saddam Hussein could hold the country together.
Remove Saddam, Putin believed, and you not only destabilize Iraq but the entire region.
The Iraq War was a milestone in the deterioration of Russia’s relations with the West and the United States in particular. As Iraq disintegrated into chaos and civil war, Putin resented the fact that Bush had dismissed his warnings.
The war shaped his views of American intentions abroad, leading him to believe that the policy of regime change, whether overt or covert, was a permanent goal of the American political and security establishment.
Events on Russia’s periphery threatened to further destabilize the relationship.
In November of 2003, massive protests in Tbilisi had led to the peaceful ouster of Georgia’s last Soviet-era President. The Rose Revolution was the first of the Color Revolutions, which swept through multiple states across the former Soviet Union.
Almost exactly a year later, the Orange Revolution in Ukraine led to the collapse of the Kremlin friendly regime in Kiev. Like Georgia, events in Ukraine were driven by widespread, popular demonstrations in the streets.
The 2004 Ukrainian election between Viktor Yuschenko and the Kremlin’s preferred candidate Viktor Yanukovych was rigged through a far reaching campaign of fraud and falsification involving the corrupt apparatus of the state supporting Yanukovych.
Voter rolls were filled with the names of the deceased supporting Yanukovych’s Party of Regions. Telephone intercepts revealed that the Yanukovych campaign had tampered with the Ukrainian electoral commissions server to falsify election results on a mass scale.
In a showing of mass solidarity and indignation, Ukrainians refused to take the theft of an election sitting down. Tens of thousands took to the streets in Kiev, congregating in the Maidan, the city’s central square.
Ukrainains erected tents across Maidan square and demonstrations reached into the hundreds of thousands. Protestors adopted the color orange, the color used by Yushchenko’s campaign.
Read my extensive description of the politics of Ukraine and the events that lead to the Orange Revolution here.
All told, one in five Ukrainians participated in the Orange Revolution. While the Ukrainian Central Election Commission initially declared Yanukovych the victor, nearly every major Western government and institution refused to recognize the election results.
On November 28th, Yanukovych gave a verbal order to deploy Interior Ministry internal troops to disperse the protestors but they turned back when the military informed them that they would defend the protestors.
Eventually, the parliament voted to not recognize the legitimacy of the Yanukovych government and on December 3rd, the Ukrainian Constitutional Court invalidated the results of the election and called for another round of voting.
On December 26th, a new round of voting took place, and Viktor Yuschenko was elected President.
The Orange Revolution was a stinging defeat for Putin and fundamentally shaped not only his views and actions vis-a-vis Ukraine, but towards the West as well. The stunning turnaround should have spelled Viktor Yanukovych’s political demise.
To help resuscitate his career, Yanukovych found a virtuoso turnaround artist, PR genius and master of the political dark arts all wrapped in one, someone who reimagined his look and feel as a candidate: Paul Manafort, the future chairman of the Trump campaign.
Read my article series on Paul Manafort’s activities in Ukraine, starting here.
Bush and Putin’s interpretation of the events in Georgia and Ukraine could not have been further apart. Following 9/11 and the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, Bush spoke in almost messianic terms about spreading freedom and democracy in the world.
Putin was horrified by what he saw as chaotic, popular coups secretly guided by the invisible hand of Western intelligence agencies hoping to encircle Russia and eventually dismember the Russian state itself through cleverly manipulated popular uprisings.
In this context, Putin viewed Bush’s Freedom Agenda as a ploy to promote American interests at Russia’s expense.
Though Bush had gone to great lengths to maintain a warm personal relationship with Putin, he made his way into the medieval Bratislava Castle to meet with Putin he was determined to press him on the state of democracy in Russia.
Putin’s project to centralize power and muzzle the free press had not gone unnoticed in Washington. Bush, himself an oil-man, had friends who knew the Russian oil tycoon Mikhail Khodorkovsky personally and were appalled by his arrest and the hostile state takeover of his company Yukos.
Bush brought up these issues during a private meeting with Putin, causing it to degenerate into petty arguments.
“I think Putin is not a democrat anymore,” Bush told the Slovenian Prime Minister a few weeks later. “He’s a tsar. I think we’ve lost him.”
NATO Enlargement, War in Georgia and the Last Days of George W. Bush’s Presidency
At the tail-end of his Presidency, George W. Bush’s last face-to-face interaction with Putin took place in Beijing, during the ornate opening ceremonies to the 2008 Summer Olympics.
Russian-American relations had fallen to a new low in the post-Cold War era. As Bush and Putin attended the Olympic festivities, meant to convey a powerful symbol of the peace and comity between nations, a hot war between Russia and its smaller southern neighbor Georgia, an American ally, was in the process of spiraling out-of-control.
A year earlier, Putin had used the setting of the Munich International Security Conference to throw down the gauntlet. After years of perceived American slights and the arrogant dismissal of Russian security interests, Putin’s frustrations finally boiled over.
America’s regime change wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and its support for the Color Revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine, had convinced Putin that the United States was a force for instability in the world and a direct threat to his regime in Russia.
“Today we are witnessing an almost uncontained hyper use of force — military force — in international relations, force that is plunging the world into an abyss of permanent conflicts,” Putin told the gathering. “[T]he United States… has overstepped its national borders in every way. This is visible in the economic, political, cultural and educational policies it imposes on other nations. Well, who likes this? Who is happy about this?”
Two events in 2008 greatly contributed to the decline in relations between Russia and the United States and set the scene for the Russo-Georgian War.
Against Russian wishes, the United States and a raft of EU countries recognized the independence of Kosovo from Russia’s historic ally Serbia.
At NATO’s 2008 Bucharest Summit, though they were not offered official membership action plans, the alliance vowed that Georgia and Ukraine would one day be offered membership.
Internal debate on this matter within the alliance was vociferous, with the United States supporting full NATO membership for the former Soviet states and Germany and France opposing it as too antagonistic to Russia.
Putin, who had been invited to attend the Summit in Bucharest, made Russia’s opposition to what they saw as NATO encroachment into what the Kremlin viewed as its traditional sphere of influence.
Putin described the “appearance of a powerful military bloc” on Russia’s borders as a “direct threat,” and that “the claim that this process is not directed against Russia will not suffice… National security is not based on promises.”
In the wake of the bloodless Rose Revolution, Georgia’s new leader Mikheil Saakashvili had gone to great lengths to position himself on the vanguard of the Bush Administrations Freedom Agenda.
His efforts were a mixed bag, while Saakashvili did attempt to reign in corruption, eliminate elements of the bureaucracy and introduce economic reforms, he also oversaw a reduction in the freedom of the press and violently cracked down on protestors.
Saakashvili, whom Putin and Russians saw as little more than an American stooge, also poured money into the Georgian military, which had joined the “Coalition of the Willing” that fought with the United States in Iraq and engaging in joint training exercises with the US military.
The breakaway provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia had been a bone of contention between Georgia and Russia since the dying days of the Soviet Union. Nominally independent, each were home to Russian peacekeeping troops.
Georgia had always considered them renegade regions. Russia, though it officially recognized them as being part of Georgia, was at the same time further entrenching its influence.
This, along with Sakaashvili’s modernization of the Georgian military, set the stage for a potential violent conflict.
The threat of war was on then Secretary of State Condolleezza Rice’s mind as she touched down in Moscow to meet with Putin. She had already privately warned Sakaashvili that, given circumstances on the ground, Georgia could not count on a NATO military response.
After being made to wait in her hotel for two hours passed their scheduled meeting, Rice was sheparded to an unplanned meeting with Putin at Meiendorf Castle, a presidential retreat 40-minutes outside of Moscow.
Upon her arrival, Rice was stunned to see the entire Russian National Security Council sitting at a large rectangular table around Putin.
“I’ll bet you’ve always wanted to see what this was like,” Putin said, subtly referencing Rice’s background as a Russia specialist.
The Russians were celebrating the birthdays of the Security Council’s secretary Igor Ivanov, and deputy prime minister and Putin’s handpicked future successor to the Presidency Dmitri Medvedev.
Putin had decided to adhere to the Russian constitution’s two term limit and after a lengthy search for a successor had decided on Medvedev.
Though it was not yet entirely clear to Western policy makers, Medvedev would ultimately act as little more than a figure head. Real power would remain with Putin.
Rice, who described it as a “bizarre encounter,” sat through a raucous, alcohol-soaked meal that was punctuated by frequent vodka toasts. The wine being served was from Georgia, which Rice found notable as Georgian wine had just been officially embargoed by the Russian state.
During the meal, the Russians cracked crude jokes at the expense of the “Gruzini,” a Russian term for Georgians.
At one point, Putin feigned concern for the inmates at Guantanamo Bay and made facetious comments about the war in Iraq.
Sergei Ivanov, noting that the Orange revolutionaries in Ukraine had run into political difficulties, pointedly asked the Secretary of State, “How’s your beacon of democracy looking now?”
Secretary Rice eventually prevailed on Putin to meet in a separate room to discuss matters with her alone. After a brief, cordial discussion about matters relevant to the bilateral relationship, Rice brought up the deteriorating situation in Georgia.
The mood in the room darkened as she stated that the US was concerned about Russian rhetoric around the issue and warning that any potential Russian move against the country would adversely impact Russian-American relationship. Putin reacted aggressively, standing over Rice in a posture she interpreted as designed to intimidate her.
“If Sakaashvili wants war, he’ll get it,” Putin snarled. “And any support for him will destroy our relationship too.”
Rice, unintimidated, stood as well, and repeated Bush’s message. In heels, Rice reached a height of 5’11’’, three inches taller than the Russian President, who didn’t like having to look up to a woman.
“Sakaashvili is nothing more than a puppet of the United States,” Putin replied. “You need to pull back the strings before there’s trouble.”
Putin finished the conversation pointedly. “We could talk for ages about this, but that’s the point I want you to understand. If Saakashvili starts something, we will finish it.”
“He can be scary,” Rice said of Putin to Ambassador Bill Burns as they made their way back to the hotel from dinner through the dark Moscow night.
Though he kept his silence then, Burns wrote years later, “This was not the Russia I had left a decade earlier, flat on its back and in strategic retreat. Surfing on historically high oil prices and nursing fifteen years of grievances, convinced that the United States had taken advantage of Russia’s moment of historical weakness and was bent on keeping it down, Putin was determined to show that he was making Russia great again and we better get used to is.”
By the time Bush sat next to Putin at the Olympics opening ceremony in Beijing, Russian and Georgian forces were already engaged in combat. Bush’s security advisor had alerted him to the Russian military advance hours earlier, while he was waiting in line to greet Chinese President Hu Jintao. Putin stood in line a few steps ahead of Bush, but Bush thought it an appropriate setting to engage in heated diplomacy.
There was also the delicate matter of Medvedev, who has ascended the Presidency. It was still unclear at the time to Western leaders just how much power he actually possessed.
Back at his hotel, Bush had a heated phone conversation with Medvedev about the events unfolding in Georgia, arguing forcefully that Russia should not escalate the fighting. Medvedev replied that Sakaashvili was a war criminal.
Bush brought Georgia up directly with Putin when they sat next to one another that evening. Conscious of the fact that they were on camera, they kept their voices to a low even if the tension was high. Bush, fearing that Russian forces make drive all the way to Tbilisi, warned Putin that if Russia didn’t pull its forces out of Ukraine if would face international isolation.
Putin, echoing Medvedev, responded that Sakaashvili was a war criminal.
“I’ve been warning you Sakaashvili is hot-blooded,” Bush told Putin.
“I’m hot-blooded too,” Putin replied ominously
“No, Vladimir,” Bush said. “You’re cold blooded.”
Back in Washington, Bush held a meeting with Vice President Cheney and top cabinet officials to discuss Georgia, whose forces were being battered by the Russian military.
Cheney and his advisors argued that the United States needed to support Georgia. The question was raised as to military action should be considered to achieve American objectives in the region.
National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley, who felt such a course would be too risky, wanted everyone in the room to be formally on the record on where they stood regarding the use of military force to support Georgia. He raised the question formally at the gathering. None of the principals advocated for the use of military force.
The conflict in Georgia, and deteriorating Russian-American relations in general, would be a problem for the next administration.
A month after the conflict in Georgia broke out, the global economy was plunged into a crisis after the uncontrolled collapse of Lehman Brothers in the United States led to a market crash on Wall Street. The contagion from America’s subprime mortgage crisis spread across the world.
Though Russia initially thought it would avoid the worst of the downturn, ultimately their economy was severely impacted as well.
In the lead up to the crisis, the American government sponsored enterprises (GSE) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which played a key role in the US housing finance system, were under severe stress.
The Chinese, who were the largest external holders of Fannie and Freddie securities, were deeply concerned.
During the same Olympics in which Bush confronted Putin, a senior Chinese official informed US Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson that they had been approached by the Russians with a proposal to coordinate simultaneously dumping their GSE holdings, forcing the US to bail-out the mortgage giants and driving Wall Street into further turmoil. The Chinese demurred, but Paulson nonetheless found the report “deeply troubling.”
The next article will cover Putin’s sour relationship with US President Barack Obama and his Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.