Russia: The Kremlin Steps Up Its Baltic Charm Offensive

In the wake of the July 8–9 NATO Summit in Warsaw, Moscow has responded in several ways to NATO’s efforts to enhance its ability to defend the Baltic countries as could be required under NATO’s Article 5.

Predata’s monitoring of Russian government-associated Twitter accounts and activity on Russian-language Wikipedia pages indicates that Moscow has become more active with regard to the Baltic region since the NATO Summit (see below). While Predata’s signal for NATO peaked around the summit, the Russian signal for the Baltics has increased relative to that for NATO in the period since — with the most important signal driver being activity on the Twitter accounts for the Russian embassies in Estonia and Latvia.

Predata monitoring of Russian embassy Twitter accounts since the beginning of the year (see below) suggests that Moscow’s primary focus is on influencing the Baltic countries to adjust their policies in ways that are more accepting of Russia’s regional posture. Comparing Russian embassy Twitter engagement with the populations of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania with similar efforts in Finland, Poland, and Sweden (the other countries invited to Moscow in September) reveals a significantly greater propaganda effort against the Baltic countries. Activity is not the same as impact, but there is little evidence that Moscow plans to back down in pressing its position with the Baltic states.