The Taiwan War could break out sooner than expected, potentially in 2025.

Profound Musing
13 min readOct 21, 2023

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Why is China in a hurry to take Taiwan? Why would the US seek the onset of this war? What is the duration Taiwan can hold off against the Chinese military? How would China’s victory or defeat affect the world? In the north of China, there is a life-sized city model that serves as a training ground for Chinese soldiers. They have been practicing invasion scenarios at this site for the past 9 years, and this building is a replica of the presidential palace in Taiwan’s capital, Taipei!

A few months ago, American General Mike Minihan sent a message to his team: “I hope I’m wrong, but my instincts tell me we’ll be at war in 2025…”. He supports his claim by referencing the timing of the Taiwan and US elections, implying it’s a strategic window for China to initiate its assault.

Last year, another American general, Gilday, wrote that a Chinese attack in 2023 could not be ignored.

Are these predictions from American generals innocent and unbiased? Certainly not. When the US wants a war to break out in a certain region, they express concerns about it. They spread these concerns through generals and senators, effectively conducting a perception operation to make the people in that region accept the idea of war. They then supply weapons to the countries in the region to disrupt their trust relationships.

Do not interpret this observation as paranoia or a conspiracy theory. The consistency of US foreign policy remains unchanged. As expressed by Eisenhower’s Secretary of State, J.F. Dulles: “…The issue is to get to the edge of the precipice without getting into the war. If you are afraid to get to the edge of the precipice, you lose…”

Successful instances of this policy involve Beijing and Moscow’s exit from the Vietnam War, facilitating Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, and the Soviet (Russian) army’s intervention in Afghanistan.

A similar scenario in Taiwan would not be surprising. For example, the US could announce that it will 1) provide nuclear weapons to Taiwan, 2) provide very powerful conventional missiles, or 3) officially recognize Taiwan. While they may not follow through, these actions can generate urgency for China. If these steps are genuinely taken, taking Taiwan would become a dream for Beijing.

Now, let’s consider why the invasion of Taiwan by China is seen as ” For instance:

Harm 1: Taiwan produces approximately 92% of the world’s most advanced semiconductors. If a war breaks out, a new and much larger chip crisis is guaranteed. Industries from automobiles to cell phones, satellites to guided missiles, and more would face difficulties.

Harm 2: Nearly one-fifth of China’s population lives in three provinces within 150 km of Taiwan. In the event of war, Taiwan could strike China with ballistic missiles. For example, hitting the Three Gorges Dam would result in 40 million Chinese people, hundreds of cities, and vast agricultural lands being submerged. Even China wouldn’t easily recover from such a disaster.

Harm 3: About 90% of the world’s largest ships pass through the Taiwan Strait, and hundreds of aircraft are constantly flying over the region. Even if they could choose a longer route through Indonesia, it would increase shipping costs by half a billion dollars per month. Furthermore, war would drive up shipping insurance premiums. If China’s ports, the world’s factory, were blocked by this war, prices of manufactured and semi-manufactured goods would rise globally. A new wave of global inflation would be inevitable.

According to a 2016 RAND study, while a year-long war could reduce America’s GDP by 5–10% and China’s by 25–35%, there are even more critical issues to consider.

First and foremost, Taiwan is a unique country for the whole world. From smartphones to computers, fighter jets to satellites, robots, and missile defense systems, microchips are required for both civilian and military products. Not all of these chips are of the same value. The most important ones are the semiconductor chips that are 10 nanometers (one billionth of a meter) or smaller. These chips are crucial because they can fit billions of electronic components into a space of just a few square millimeters in the most advanced small devices.

Taiwan produces two-thirds of the world’s semiconductors and 92% of high-quality microprocessors. All of this production is handled by a single company.

TSMC, with a market capitalization of $523 billion, is the world’s 9th largest company. This figure exceeds the GDP of many countries.

What’s even more remarkable is that TSMC, the company producing these special chips in Taiwan, uses machines worth hundreds of millions of dollars, produced by only one company, Dutch ASML. The Netherlands, under pressure from the United States, banned the sale of these machines to China.

This means that for Beijing to establish a factory on par with TSMC, it would need to invest 10 to 20 years in research and development, primarily to catch up with ASML. ASML’s machines use very special optical components that only the German company Zeiss can produce.

If Beijing were to invade Taiwan and seize these factories, it would jeopardize U.S. defense capabilities. Many high-tech products, including F-22 fighter jets, depend on these chips. These chip factories could easily be sabotaged. It would take many years for Beijing to obtain the necessary parts and technical knowledge from Europe and the United States to repair and resume production.

Taiwan’s monopoly on microchips is a concern for both Beijing and Washington. To change this situation, Washington has made agreements with companies like Intel, and investments of nearly $100 billion are planned. China is following a similar path and has plans to invest $150 billion to establish an alternative microchip industry in Taiwan.

In fact, many Taiwanese companies had invested in China due to cheap labor. Tensions escalated due to changes in Taiwan’s leadership, American pressures, and the placement of nuclear weapons at the American base in Guam.

In 2017, there were only two reported incidents of Chinese warships violating Taiwan’s territorial waters. This number increased to 71 in 2018, 600 in 2019, and a significant 3,987 in 2020. In other words, despite economic opportunities, more people see war as a solution.

The Beijing government often emphasizes that it wants to resolve the Taiwan issue peacefully but also mentions that military options are on the table.

In a potential Taiwan war, one of the most important targets is the chip factories, but the matter doesn’t end there. China, despite its vast territory, lacks access to oceans controlled by the United States, much like Russia. Pay attention to the American bases that encircle China, especially from the sea. These are vital trade routes for Beijing; it both sells goods and imports 60% of its oil through these routes.

Look at the region surrounded by South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia, known as the “First Island Chain.” The depth of the water is 70 to 200 meters. This means that without the United States knowing, Beijing can’t even deploy a submarine into the ocean. For China to truly become a superpower, it needs to break free from this “American lake.” In other words, even without chip factories, taking Taiwan would be necessary. If Beijing takes Taiwan, it gains access to ocean depths of thousands of meters without American pressure.

The significance of Taiwan and the South China Sea is not limited to this. The region is rich in both fish and energy resources. While fishing may seem unimportant after chips and global logistics, for Beijing, which has a rapidly growing population and imports a significant amount of food, this issue is as strategic as oil.

China regularly publishes maps, which its neighboring countries from the sea protest. Most of the Southeast Asian countries, which are mostly US allies, have somewhat strained relationships with Beijing for this reason. These countries cannot stand up to Beijing on their own, but in the event of a war, they will likely align with the US because of these maritime disputes.

If the US can instigate a new war to protect the decaying and rusting petrodollar machine, the system’s lifespan could be extended by 40–50 years. If Beijing is humiliated in a war, the BRICS team will suffer a blow. The US aims to achieve two goals with one action.

War poses significant risks for Beijing, but if they succeed, they could claim dominance over a substantial part of the Pacific Ocean. The US will lose the trust of its allies in the region; the Philippines, Malaysia, and others may adopt a “neither fish nor fowl” policy with Beijing, and some US bases in the region may be closed due to Chinese pressure.

Some developments we have observed in the last 10–15 years suggest that the US is preparing for a Pacific war triggered by the small but sure steps towards the occupation of Taiwan. For example, LCS warships.

The US Navy’s cruisers and destroyers, which date back to the Cold War era, were originally designed for open ocean warfare. A naval battle in Southeast Asia takes place among thousands of islands such as the Philippines and Malaysia, within 100 km or less from the coast. What does this mean? High-speed boats, fast attack ships with missile launch capabilities, small submarines, sea mines, ship-based and air-launched anti-ship missiles, and drones pose a significant threat to US naval power.

Hence, the US is developing low-radar-visibility coastal warships capable of launching helicopters and supporting commando operations (known as LCS: Littoral Combat Ships).

In addition, it is worth noting that $50 billion in public support is planned for the establishment of chip factories similar to those in Taiwan in the US, and three major projects have already begun. So, in response to the problems mentioned earlier, the US is making some preparations.

On the other hand, time is running against Beijing due to China’s aging population. Delaying the occupation of Taiwan means a decrease in the number of young people capable of fighting. There are also some opportunities for Beijing to hurry: due to the Ukraine war, the already limited ammunition stocks of the US have further decreased, and NATO’s vulnerability in this regard has become apparent. With today’s stocks, the US’s capacity to support Taiwan may not exceed a few weeks. But if Beijing waits a few years to attack Taiwan, the US will increase its stocks; it will prepare its army and allies for a long and intense Taiwan war.

Another opportunity that China should not overlook is the issues with the US military’s air and sea supply capacities. Some of the tanker aircraft in the US Air Force are 50 years old, dating back to the Vietnam War. China is only 300 km from its own shores, while the US is thousands of km away. Even if the US uses its allies in the region, the distances are huge, and naval warfare requires immense fuel logistics. The US has started the construction of some fuel depots in the region. If China attacks before these are completed, it will gain a significant advantage.

So, is the Chinese army prepared to invade Taiwan and indirectly confront the US military? It’s not easy to compare a Chinese army that hasn’t been to the front since the 1979 Vietnam War with the US army, which fights all over the world every year. However, the regular increase in Beijing’s defense budget and the number of ships in its navy surpassing the US Navy are remarkable. (But they are still behind in tonnage.)

Let’s examine the defense expenditures of the two countries: Washington’s budget is nearly four times that of Beijing. But be careful: there are hidden items in China’s defense budget: coastal defense, military R&D, satellites, and militia forces. According to experts, when adjusted for purchasing power parity, China’s defense budget is 80% of that of the US.

Moreover, while the US military operates in over 1,000 bases worldwide, the Chinese military is focused on Taiwan and Southeast Asia.

So far, we’ve discussed the causes of the war and its global implications. So, what happens if the war starts? How many troops should China land on the shore? How will Taiwan resist?

The Taiwanese military consists of 130,000 active-duty troops and 1.5 million reservists. From historical wars, especially amphibious operations, we know that China would need to land 3 to 5 times the number of troops along Taiwan’s coast.

Taiwan has limited suitable shorelines, with cities immediately behind them that facilitate defense. Moreover, crossing the 300 km-wide Taiwan Strait would take roughly 10 hours. China’s current amphibious forces consist of 40,000 troops, far below what would be needed. The army’s amphibious logistics capacity falls short, and landing ships would need to make multiple trips without being sunk or destroyed.

Additionally, Taiwan experiences a typhoon season from July to October. Crossing the Taiwan Strait with small ships and safely landing vehicles and troops would be impossible. In other words, launching a surprise attack would be very challenging.

In summary, the Chinese military cannot launch a surprise amphibious attack. The amassed troops and armored vehicles on the coast can be observed via satellites, and Taiwan would go on alert. Moving the 300,000 to 500,000 Chinese troops needed to suppress Taiwan’s 130,000 soldiers could take days or even weeks.

Furthermore, assuming Taiwan doesn’t defend itself, i.e., it doesn’t use mines, submarines, anti-ship missiles, etc., in an ideal scenario, Peking’s perspective, this would be a suicide attack. Taking these factors into account, this would be like a suicide attack for Beijing. Looking at losses in amphibious operations like those in Sicily and Normandy, we see around a 20% casualty rate. During those times, it was possible to keep the operation hidden until the last hours.

The only way to overcome this challenge would be to start with a move similar to SEAD/DEAD operations in American war doctrine, which is to suppress Taiwan’s air (and naval) defenses. China will use the 5,000 missiles it has for this purpose. Official data states that they had this many ballistic missiles in their arsenal in 2020; it may have increased.

In other words, Beijing will send every flying object at its disposal, such as kamikaze drones, decoy/target aircraft, and hypersonic missiles, to Taiwan in a very short time. This would eliminate strategic targets like air defense (HSS), radars, jet bases, command centers, energy infrastructure, and more.

At the same time, Taiwan’s HSS locations would be identified, and it would ensure the depletion of ammunition. This intense attack would also clear the coasts suitable for amphibious operations. Of course, it wouldn’t be surprising if coastal cities were wiped off the map. Why?

If China has learned from Russia’s mistakes in Ukraine, it knows that it can’t enter Taiwan as a savior. Initially, the Russians sent the police, and even gendarmes with plastic shields, for what they called “special operations.” If China starts with this kind of romanticism and wants to protect cities, it won’t win the war.

Because Taiwan is such a small island, it’s impossible for the Taiwanese to keep their military bases hidden.

In the Chinese Air Force, there are 235 H6 bombers; each of them can carry six cruise missiles. In a very short time, they can launch 1,518 cruise missiles at Taiwan’s targets.

Yes, these attacks would be very destructive and would likely increase the hatred and resistance of the Taiwanese people. But there aren’t many Taiwanese calling out, “Come save us.” China needs to understand what it wants in this war. If it believes that the people on Taiwan, whom it considers part of China, are waiting to reunite with the mainland, it won’t strike hard at first, and it will end up like the Russian army in front of Kiev.

Countries that give their armies contradictory objectives in a war always lose. What’s the objective? Destroying X, Y, Z targets? Regime change? Occupation? Annexation? Policing operation or counterterrorism? Arresting and putting people on trial? This must be CLEAR.

In the east of Taiwan, there are islands belonging to the Philippines and Japan, and they are less than 200 km away. Some of them have US bases or are under construction.

So, if ships or aircraft from China were to start attacking Taiwan, American forces could theoretically arrive on the island at the same time; at least, technically, the situation allows for that. However, the United States could use these bases for logistical support rather than for an attack.

Therefore, it would make perfect sense for China to blockade Taiwan by sea. The U.S. could send aid until the war begins, but if the blockade is successful, that option is closed.

Many experts write that China’s amphibious capacity is limited to 40,000 troops, but Beijing has been converting civilian trade ships into military vessels for quite some time. Additionally, let’s remember that China has the world’s largest fishing fleet. In case of necessity, some of these boats, numbering over 500,000, would also be used to transport soldiers.

It may seem absurd at first, but during the 1982 Falklands War, the British transported thousands of troops to Argentina using passenger ships. In the Dunkirk Dynamo operation during World War II, 340,000 soldiers crossed a 72 km wide sea route with 850 boats.

The Chinese could send some of these small boats without soldiers or equip them with electronic warfare tools to deceive. No matter how robust Taiwan’s defense is, it will collapse under such an intense assault.

It seems normal for the Chinese military to establish bridgeheads with these tactics. In response, the Taiwanese military may be preparing for a protracted guerrilla war that could deter Beijing. Short-range rocket-firing drones acquired from Turkey suggest this. After the initial success of the Chinese occupation, the Taiwanese will likely fight street by street and house by house.

Now, let’s turn to the weaknesses of the armies: Beijing has rapidly built warships in recent years, but it lacks enough naval bases. Even worse, it lacks naval personnel. Unlike NATO navies, where multiple crews take turns on a ship, ships in the Chinese military can sit idle due to a lack of personnel.

This may not seem very important for the occupation of Taiwan, but if the war spreads towards the Philippines and Malaysia, there will be a large-scale East Pacific war, and Beijing may come into conflict with the U.S. Navy (indirectly or otherwise). In this case, the personnel shortage will turn into a strategic weakness.

The weakness of the Taiwanese army lies in platform and munition supply. Taiwan is modernizing the weapons it has and has accelerated production. But it’s not enough. There is a sense of panic, and they have started importing whatever they can get their hands on. But…

There’s a significant amount of weapons and ammunition that they paid for but couldn’t get due to the slow production of the selling company. Additionally, the Taiwanese military, like the Chinese military, lacks combat experience. Taiwan’s defense capacity, especially in terms of the air force, is frequently questioned.

American experts are providing training and consultancy to Taiwan, but as we’ve seen in Ukraine, sometimes Americans can suggest unconventional tactics to an army that lacks air superiority.

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