Hope, Despair, Hope/Despair — The three tactical systems that defined Arsenals 2015–16 season.
The season is almost over and the overall consensus among Arsenal fans and neutrals is that the Gunners have yet again flattered to deceive. This is largely true. This season clearly offered the club its best opportunity to end the much maligned league drought. With most of the big guns under-performing (City/United) or imploding (Chelsea and early season Liverpool), from a squad quality standpoint the league should have been comfortable for Wenger and his men. Of course Leicester City and a well drilled Spurs (hurts to say it, but it’s true) had other ideas. There are multiple reasons that have been bandied about by the press, pundits, ex-players and the footballing cognoscenti for this year’s familiar failings. Not signing a world class striker or backup for Coquelin, tactical naivete, lack of leaders and in game management, Arsene’s inability to motivate the team to perform when it matters most and the often used “bottler mentality” that fans of other teams like to bestow upon us. I could probably do a blog post about each of the reasons offered and the one thing that links them all, the manager. However, I’ll save those for the off season, we’re here to talk tactics and on that note -
From a tactical standpoint this was probably the most versatile season that I have ever seen in the Wenger years. Arsene Wenger is a purist, he believes in an overarching footballing philosophy and allows players to express themselves within it, relying on their individual quality to score and keep out goals. Unfortunately, in the modern game the philosophical approach only works if you have elite players across the backbone of your team like a Barca or a Bayern. Even they, when required step out of their philosophical comfort zones to work within a system. For a team like Arsenal that has three obvious world class players in Ozil, Sanchez and Cech this approach is simply not sustainable. To his credit Arsene did adopt the horses for courses approach last season in the big games to some success, he persisted with the same approach this season which resulted in convincing victories against United, Bayern and City. He was however unable to come up with adequate tactical adjustments against teams in the league that preferred to sit deep and counter. Arsenal would regress to the mean of sterile domination and sideways passing followed by conceding goals to counter attacks. We were beaten by the stick we used to beat the bigger teams.
Over the course of the season there were three clear systems that Arsene employed which resulted in varying degrees of success. Let’s take a look under the hood –
Hope — The Coqzorla Axis Continued:
Apart from the opening day defeat to West Ham, Arsenal picked up right where they left off from last season. A back four of Bellerin, Mertesacker, Koscielny and Monreal supplemented by a midfield base of Francis Coquelin and a re-purposed Santi Cazorla. Up top Arsene made a few tweaks. Alexis on the left (when he became available) along with Ozil as the playmaker and Aaron Ramsey on the right. Olivier Giroud plowed a lone furrow up top. There were a few raised eyebrows with Ramsey’s role on the right but it soon became apparent that this brought an element of balance to the eleven that just wasn’t there with a conventional winger. Ramsey played the Wayne Rooney/Dirk Kuyt role on the wings, utilizing his energy reserves to provide defensive support infield and on the wings, he made Bellerin look very good defensively during the initial parts of the season. He also provided the space Bellerin needed to get forward and bolster attacks. On the left Oxlade-Chamberlain started the season with moderate success but was soon replaced by Alexis who was fresh (ironic) off a Copa America win. Nacho Monreal covered the left flank pretty much on his own defensively and impressively. The real stars of the show however were Francis Coquelin and Santi Cazorla. They worked because they were perfect foils for each other. Mertesacker and Koscielny work well because they each do what the other cannot, sure they can each get caught out sometimes but for the most part it is a successful center half partnership. The same applies to Coqzorla, Coquelin’s mandate was simple, tackle or intercept and then lay the ball off to Cazorla or one of the center-backs to start an attack. That’s right, center backs, there’s a reason why Per has one of the highest pass completion rates for any player in the league, he is incredibly good at playing the first pass into midfield often to Cazorla or whoever is on the right wing.
Cazorla on the other hand adapted to the “6” role like a fish to water. Blessed with mesmerizing close control and the ability to use both feet to a level where you can’t really tell which one is weaker (who else have you seen take free kicks with either foot?) he also demonstrated a willingness and ability to tackle often and successfully. What made him successful going forward was his ability to (a) either find Ozil between the lines, (b) play through balls into the channels for the wingers or full backs to chase or (c) carry the ball into the final third himself. Most deep lying playmakers can do (a) and (b) to varying degrees of success. How many can you name that can do all three? This is why players like Verratti and Thiago Alcantara are so sought after, and this is why a lot of coaches and player rate Jack Wilshere so highly (laugh all you want, you’ll see). Cazorla’s triple threat also allowed Ozil to stay up the pitch where he’s at his most dangerous and drift out to the flanks as one of Ramsey or Sanchez cut in to create triangles with the full backs.
From an attacking standpoint Giroud started the season but was soon replaced with Walcott once Alexis came back into the team. The Chilean and the Frenchman have yet to dovetail with each other. The often stationary Giroud usually denies Alexis space to operate in, Walcott with his movement and ability to run in behind opens up space in front of the opposition defense for Alexis and Ozil to thrive in and we saw this to good effect in the United and Leicester games. To his credit Giroud did put in some very effective cameos, most notably against Bayern. And that really is the best way to describe him, he is the perfect Plan B but an average Plan A. The Arsenal were a well oiled machine, with an odd blip till Wenger was forced to change his setup due to injuries to Cazorla and Coquelin.
Despair — Flimsy Flamsey:
Is there anything more Arsenal-esque than a long term injury to Francis Coquelin, the one player who we did not have adequate cover for. Cazorla’s double whammy ensured that Arsene was forced to reshuffle his formation. The back four remained the same with Gabriel getting a few games due to rotation and short term injuries and generally doing a decent job. Ramsey was moved to the center where he prefers to play alongside future billionaire biotech mogul Mathieu Flamini. Walcott played on the left with Joel Campbell and Oxlade Chamberlain sharing duties on the right. Alexis finally paid the price for playing non-stop for the past two years and pulled a hamstring. Giroud was restored to his center forward position. The question was how would the Gunners get through the tricky winter period before Arsene dipped into the transfer market to sign Mohammed Elneny as midfield cover without the Flamini and Ramsey partnership being exposed. They actually did quite well especially in the City game before being found out.
Aaron Ramsey is a good player, he is incredibly fit, has a good long passing range and makes some fantastic late runs into the box. What he is not is a ball carrier or blessed with the dribbling ability of a Cazorla. This makes him increasingly susceptible to being pressed, the late runs that he makes are great when they come off but usually leave a lot of exposed room behind him. This is a logical conclusion but the right midfield partner can usually mitigate such a situation by intelligent positioning to prevent counter attacks. Mathieu Flamini is not that man. Flamini is a 5/10 player, on a good day he is a 6.5. He cannot intercept, usually mistimes tackles and only really makes up for both these deficiencies by standing in front of the back four as a traffic cone, a hindrance that needs to be sidestepped and which allows time for other players to get back into position. He is the footballing equivalent of a speed bump.
In addition to this, the Flamsey axis also exposed any defensive security Arsenal had on the right wing and the inside right channel. Campbell and the Ox can and did track back when they played, the problem is that neither could do the dual job that Ramsey did of providing support infield as well. Arsenal were repeatedly opened up on counter attacks, with attacks originating in the space left behind Ramsey as he made a run forward and penetrative balls played into the half-space between Per and Bellerin who was often caught up the pitch. This usually led to Per being blamed for being too slow and he eventually paid the price by being dropped, but in most of these cases the fault would lie with Flamini who instead of pressing the attack initiator would retreat with the center backs and in front of them thereby just delaying the inevitable. A perfect example of this is the goal Harry Kane scored at the Emirates. It is also not surprising that Ozil’s decline in form began during the same period. Now that there was no Cazorla to feed him vertically he was forced to drop deeper to collect the ball and unable to carry it up the pitch with much success, out-muscled by central enforcers for the most part. Alexis returned but could not replicate his early season form. He is an extremely right footed player and when he is not at fully fit it becomes very easy to double team him zonally when he tries to cut in. Giroud and Walcott too both suffered losses of form in this setup. The tipping point for this system came with the defeat to United. Arsenal were out-pressed and outplayed by a young United side that really should have been dispatched with ease.
Hope/Despair — Ctrl+Alt+Elneny
With Arsenals season in tatters, Arsene rebooted the system. Switching to a 4–3–3 to regain control of midfield. Coquelin came back from injury and was joined by Mohammed Elneny who had spent much of his time on the bench since joining the club. The third midfield position was up for grabs and although Aaron Ramsey started as the third midfielder in this system he was soon replaced by the effervescent Alex Iwobi. Iwobi is the closest thing to a Santi Cazorla in this team. He may not have the magical feet of the Spaniard but can carry the ball very effectively, can pass and finish. He also has the most sought after trait in football today, ability to find space between the lines. It’s refreshing to see a young crop of intelligent footballers breaking through in the Premier League. Marcus Rashford has the same ability and so does Delle Alli. You look at these kids and see a wisdom beyond their years. They still have a long way to go to sustain their good starts but the talent is there in bags. Anyway, I digress. Gabriel replaced Per as Arsenal sought to play a high line and a fit again Danny Welbeck came back to help the team start pressing high up the pitch. Alexis moved to the right and Ozil had a free role as Welbeck often started on the left and drifted in. It was also not uncommon to see Iwobi on the left flank as he built attacks from the left side of the midfield three. So there you have it, an unconventional 4–3–3 predicated on high pressing and rapid movement.
It worked almost immediately. A good performance against Spurs was followed by easy wins against Everton and Watford. The system precipitated Alexis’s return to form, playing on the right allowed him the option of either cutting in or going down the line. When you can do both the opposition full back can’t orient towards one side because of a fear of over-committing, this makes it easier for a player like Alexis to beat him in a 1v1 situation. It also brought Alex Iwobi to the forefront with the youngster being able to showcase his goal scoring and creative abilities. The biggest positive though was the form of Elneny, a classic Wenger signing in that no one had ever heard of him but after just a couple of games you could see why we signed him. Great sense of positioning, immaculate short passer, always available to receive the ball and a good defender. Doesn’t possess the tackling abilities of a Coquelin but makes up for it by closing down passing lanes and intercepting the ball. He’s also very good in the air, winning aerial duels is midfield is an often undervalued skill in the modern game. His most impressive quality though is his ability to keep the ball moving, he doesn’t hold onto the ball too long and always knows who to pass to even if it just results in a slightly better field position. In this respect he is a lot like Mikel Arteta and its fair to say he will be the Spaniards eventual replacement when he leaves at the end of this season. A word too for Welbeck who did a superb job beginning the press and moving defenders out of position with his tireless movement.
The problems in this system were exposed against West Ham and Palace. Although it could be argued these draws were a result of bad team selection there were some clear indicators of issues on the wings. Iwobi, Sanchez and Ozil could have prevented all three crosses into the box. Koscielny all but called them out after the game stating that defending crosses is a team effort and not just down to the defenders. It’s the first time I’ve seen an Arsenal defender express his frustration publicly, they usually follow Arsene’s line of collective blame. Against Palace, Gabriel had to move out of position to keep pace (more like a light jog) with Bolasie, no one tracked back to help him out. These two games effectively consigned Arsenal to the race for the top 4.
In the game against West Brom, Arsenal reverted to a 4–2–3–1. With Ramsey and Elneny as a double pivot. Arsenal ran out easy winners with Ramsey putting in a solid performance largely facilitated with an intelligent controller alongside him. Ramsey’s best performances have come playing alongside Arteta and it is no surprise he enjoys combining with the versatile Elneny.
So what is the best system for Arsenal to play for the rest of the season and beyond? As you can see each system played in 2015/16 has its share of advantages and limitations. The answer actually lies further up the table and around Europe. If Arsene is to stay and see out his contract he will have to change his philosophy based approach to a more fluid system based approach and tweak it according to his opponents more frequently. There is a reason why Spurs were able to take a long term injury to Jan Vertonghen in their stride, why Nacer Chadli and Erik Lamela can rotate without any detriment to the team dynamic, why Joshua Kimmich can play in place of Jerome Boateng and it doesn’t affect Bayern, why Juventus can reshuffle their backline without any catastrophic consequences. The foundations for these teams are system based, players slot in and out as parts but the machine continues to function optimally. Arsene has shown a willingness to adapt but he essentially needs to change his ideals completely to be successful at the highest level in the modern game. Unless that happens I suspect we will continue to see a whack-a-mole approach to his tactics for the remainder of his career.
(P.S. — Laurent Koscielny and Nacho Monreal are the only two players who slotted seamlessly into all three tactical setups. Monreal would probably shade Arsenal’s player of the season if we weren’t so in love with Ozil)
-Sid
