On the 28th of July 2010, Airblue Flight 202 slammed into the Margalla Hills near Islamabad, Pakistan killing all 152 people on board. It is the deadliest plane crash in Pakistan. What investigators looking into the crash discover is a deadly divide in the cockpit that ultimately doomed Flight 202.
7.41 am (local time): Karachi, Pakistan
An Airblue A320 with a registration number of AP-BJB takes off from Jinnah International Airport in Karachi, Pakistan. The aircraft is operating Airblue Flight 202, bound for Islamabad, the capital city of Pakistan.
In command of the aircraft is 61-years-old Captain Pervez Iqbal Chaudhry. He has 25,497 flight hours, of which 1060 hours are on the aircraft type.
Assisting him is 34-year-old First Officer Muntajib Ahmed. He has 1837 flight hours, of which 286 hours are on the aircraft type. He is a former F-16 fighter pilot in the Pakistan Air Force.
In the cabin are 146 passengers and 4 flight attendants, all of whom are headed for Islamabad.
The company operating the flight, Airblue, is a Pakistani low-cost airline that was formed in 2004. The airline became very popular and eventually became the second-largest airline in Pakistan.
8:58 am: near Islamabad, Pakistan
About an hour into the flight, the aircraft commences its descent into Islamabad, Pakistan.
Minutes later, the radar controller at Islamabad informs the crew of Flight 202 to they are to land the aircraft on runway 12 using a circling approach procedure. The First Officer requested a right downwind for the approach, but this request was denied by the controller due to low clouds. The controller instructs them to do a left downwind for the approach.
To be clear, the circling approach with a left downwind does not involve an actual circle. The aircraft will intercept the instrument landing system (ILS) guidance to the runway 30. The aircraft then executes a 45-degree turn to the right. The aircraft will then fly in this direction for 30 seconds. The aircraft will then fly parallel to the runway at the minimum circling approach height. After flying past the threshold of the runway, the aircraft will continue to fly in this direction for 20 more seconds. The aircraft will turn perpendicular to the runway and start descending again. The flaps will be deployed by the crew before the end of this segment of the procedure. The aircraft will slow down to approach speed and turn towards the runway. The aircraft will complete the final approach and land on runway 12.
A right downwind involves the aircraft turning in the opposite direction to the other side of the airport.
Half an hour later, the crew is cleared to descend to 3900 feet for the circling approach to runway 12, utilizing the ILS for runway 30.
A minute later, the crew inquires to the tower controller, “How’s the weather right downwind?” The controller replied that right downwind was unavailable and that only the left downwind procedure for runway 12 was available.
Meanwhile, the weather at the airport was not ideal for a visual approach. The weather was quite hazy resulting in a visibility of just about 3.5km. It was quite cloudy with rain also reported. The weather should not pose a particular hazard for flight as demonstrated by the landing of an aircraft just minutes later.
Then, the tower controller suggests to the crew to fly a bad weather circuit. A bad weather circuit is a procedure designed to ensure that the aircraft stays visual (can see) with the runway during an approach to land. There is no response from the crew.
2 minutes later, alarmed by the fact that the aircraft was flying just 1 nautical miles from a no-fly zone (top middle in above approach chart), the controller immediately instructs the aircraft to the left.
Then, the tower controller radios to the crew, asking if the crew is visual with the ground on the insistence of the radar controller. The First Officer replied 6 seconds later, “Airblue 202, visual with the ground.” This would be the last communication with the flight.
At 9:41 am, controllers in Islamabad lost contact with Flight 202.
Eventually, the inevitable reality became apparent. The plane had crashed into the Margalla Hills more than 8 nautical miles north of Benazir Bhutto International Airport in Islamabad. All 152 people are killed in the disaster. It is Pakistan’s deadliest air disaster.
The search-and-rescue operation was chaotic. According to the BBC, there was barely any cooperation between the various agencies involved in the rescue. Firefighting equipment could not be used to extinguish the flames die to the hilly terrain. Eventually, the blaze at the crash site was put out by the rain.
Investigators from the Civil Aviation Authority Pakistan (CAA) was delegated by the government to investigate the crash of Flight 202. They are assisted by their counterparts from Germany, the US and France.
The cockpit voice recorder (CVR) and flight data recorder (FDR) were found in relatively good condition and were sent to the facilities of the Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses pour la Sécurité de l’Aviation Civile (BEA) in France.
The investigators inspected the wreckage of Flight 202. From the inspection, there was no evidence of an engine failure or other significant mechanical issues and the crash appeared to have happened during a normal approach.
Next of all, they turned their attention to the crew. The post mortem of the captain revealed that there were no significant substances of concern in the first officer. A post mortem of the first officer was impossible as the body of the captain had been collected by Airblue management before the arrival of the investigators.
Investigators are now at a dead end. What caused the crash?
About a month after the crash, data was retrieved from the black boxes. The investigators finally have something to rely on for information.
What the investigators discover on the CVR is shocking.
During the climb to cruising altitude after take-off from Karachi, Captain Pervez had been testing the knowledge of First Officer Muntajib in a snobbish tone and using harsh words. This was contrary to company norms and procedures. Captain Pervez continued doing so until about an hour after take-off. This likely curbed the initiative of First Officer Muntajib to challenge his subsequent mistakes and violations.
During the descent into Islamabad, Captain Pervez had ordered First Officer Muntajib to feed 4 unauthorized waypoints into the flight management computer. He planned on using them for the approach to Islamabad.
The waypoints are PBD-8 to PBD-11. This was in preparation for a visual approach using a right hand downwind. In the approach briefing, he stated his plan to go to the end of the downwind leg and then turn abeam (at right angles) to go to CF in the above map. ‘CF’ is defined as a distance of 5 nautical miles from the threshold of a runway that does not utilize a published instrument approach.
However, during the descent, the crew was informed that the right downwind was unavailable due to procedural limitations at Islamabad. Captain Pervez became worried about low clouds and bad weather on the left downwind.
Then, as we said before, the aircraft began descending from its cruising altitude towards Islamabad. First Officer Muntajib requested a right downwind but was denied the request by the controllers in Islamabad.
Subsequently, the crew discussed PBD-10 and PBD-11 in the map above. The crew then was cleared to descend to 3900ft for the circling approach to runway 12.
Minutes later, the crew inquired regarding the weather on the right downwind, to which the tower controller replied that only the left downwind was available.
Minutes later, Captain Pervez stated his intentions to descend to 2000ft but was reminded by First Officer Muntajib that it was below the minimum descent altitude (MDA) for the area. The crew then levelled the aircraft off at 2500ft, and the aircraft started heading at a constant heading towards RN VOR (as indicated in the above approach chart). A VOR is an aid that sends signals to assist an aircraft to navigate.
Just seconds later, the controller in Islamabad confirm landing of PIA Flight 356. This flight was operated by a competing airline. This likely put pressure on Captain Pervez to land the plane at all cost.
The aircraft then flew over RN VOR. The crew commanded a turn to the right in the autopilot as per procedure. This was done quite late as the crew spotted the runway too late. Moments later, the crew selected the altitude as 2300ft and the aircraft descended to the selected altitude. This violated the MDA of 2510ft in the area.
Captain Pervez then asked First Officer Muntajib to activate the secondary flight plan which consisted of the 4 unauthorized waypoints inputted earlier.
As stated earlier, the controller suggested that the crew fly a bad weather circuit. Captain Pervez had ignored the suggestion and said, “Let him say whatever he wants to say.” It is likely that at this point, Captain Pervez wanted to fly a PBD-based approach unknown to the controller.
Then, Captain Pervez voiced his desire to fly on NAV mode based on the PBDs but the aircraft continued flying on HDG mode based on the current heading. First Officer Muntajib asked him, “Okay sir, but are you visual?” Captain Pervez replied, “Visual hein! Ok!”
A minute later, at more than 3.5 nautical miles from the runway centreline and abeam the threshold of the runway and on a heading of 352 degrees, a turn to 300 degrees was commanded on the autopilot. Then, the autopilot’s mode was switched to NAV mode.
Then, as mentioned earlier, the flight flew 1 nautical mile south of a prohibited area near the airport. The controller immediately ordered the flight to turn left to avoid the no-fly zone. Just seconds later, the first ground proximity warning system (GPWS) warning sounded in the cockpit. The GPWS sounded, “Terrain ahead,” implying that the is terrain ahead that needs to be avoided.
First Officer Muntajib then said to Captain Pervez, “This, Sir, higher ground has reached, Sir, there is a terrain ahead, Sir, turn left.”
By now, Captain Pervez has become very jittery in his speech. He was frustrated and confused, as shown by his speech.
At this point, the tower controller in Islamabad then radios to the crew, requesting to know if the crew are visual to the ground. This was done due to insistence from the radar controller. First Officer Muntajib then asks Captain Pervez, “Kia batauon, Sir. (What should I tell him, Sir?)”
The crew responded 6 seconds later, “Airblue 202, visual with the ground.”
First Officer Muntajib then asked Captain Pervez, “Sir, terrain ahead is coming.” Captain Pervez then replied, “Han ji (Yes), we are turning left.” The heading knob that controls the heading the aircraft was being rotated to the left. However, the aircraft was not turning. This was because the autopilot was still operating in NAV mode and was flying towards PBD-11. To switch to HDG mode, the knob needed to be pulled. The pilots did not request help for information of their location from the controllers despite having lost situational awareness.
Finally, the mode of the autopilot was changed to HDG mode. However, since Captain Pervez had turned the heading knob frantically without looking at it, the heading knob was set to 086 degrees instead of the 300 degrees desired. As a result, the aircraft turned right instead of left. This brought the aircraft closer to the Margalla Hills.
To add to the already horrible situation, alarms began sounding, “Terrain ahead, pull up.”
Due to the unprofessional handling of the plane by Captain Pervez, the aircraft was in a dangerous situation. At this point, First Officer Muntajib should have taken over control from Captain Pervez and assisted him. However, due to the humiliation as a result of Captain Pervez testing his knowledge earlier in the flight, he did not do so. First Officer Muntajib remained passive and merely reminded Captain Pervez about what was to be done.
First Officer Muntajib then said to Captain Pervez twice in rapid succession, “Pull up, Sir. Pull up, Sir. Sir, pull up.”
The throttles controlling the engines were pushed up to increase the thrust of the engines. However, they were not pushed to TO/GA position which is required by procedure. The selected altitude was changed to 3700ft and the aircraft started climbing. The aircraft was still turning right, flying closer and closer to the Margalla Hills. 6 seconds later, the throttles were moved back down to CLB detent and the selected altitude was reduced to 3100ft.
Seconds later, First Officer Muntajib once again says to the Captain, “Sir, pull up, Sir.” In his panic, Captain Pervez had continued turning the knob without looking at the knob. This time, the knob was set to 025 degrees. The aircraft turned to the right. Frustrated, the captain said, “Left turn kiun naheen ker raha yar? (Why isn’t the aircraft turning to the left?)” This indicates that he was very anxious.
Then, the autopilot was disconnected and Captain Pervez applied full left side stick input and 6 degrees left rudder input. The aircraft finally started turning left. The altitude of the aircraft at this point was 2770ft and was increasing.
During the last seconds of the flight, the flight climbed to a maximum of 3110ft. As a result, of the aforementioned inputs, the flight banked 52 degrees to the left. As a result, the aircraft pitched down and the airspeed increased. The autothrottle compensated for the gain of speed by reducing the thrust of the engines. The aircraft started descending at a high rate.
Captain Pervez then started making nose-down inputs. The aircraft’s nose started dropping from 15 degrees nose up.
A GPWS warning sounded in the cockpit, “Terrain terrain.”
First Officer Muntajib said to Captain Pervez, “Terrain, Sir.” By now, the aircraft’s pitch was 4.6 degrees nose down. Captain Pervez eventually started to make nose-up inputs. The aircraft’s nose started increasing again.
A final GPWS warning sounded in the cockpit, “Pull up.”
First Officer Muntajib then said to the Captain, “Sir, we are going down, we are going do-” He never finished his words.
At 9:41 am, Airblue Flight 202 slammed into the Margalla Hills 8 nautical miles from Islamabad Benazir Bhutto International Airport and exploded. All 152 onboard the aircraft perished instantly.
Now, the investigators finally have a complete picture of what led to the crash of Airblue Flight 202. It all began with Captain Pervez berating his first officer and testing his knowledge. During the approach to Islamabad, Captain Pervez committed many violations. First Officer Muntajib, humiliated by what had occurred earlier in the flight, did not speak up regarding these violations. Ultimately, the effects are clear. The plane crashed into the Margalla Hills near Islamabad, killing all 152 onboard the aircraft.
In its final report, the CAA of Pakistan concluded that the pilots had violated various rules which should not have been broken. The crew lacked crew resource management (CRM) and failed to show professional skills to get out of the dangerous situation which they got themselves into.
The following is a statement from the final report by the CAA that sums up all that has been mentioned above:
Airblue crash has been finalized as a case of Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT), in which aircrew failed to display superior judgment and professional skills in a self created unsafe environment. In their pursuit to land in inclement weather, they committed serious violations of procedures and breaches of flying discipline, which put the aircraft in an unsafe condition over dangerous terrain at low altitude.
The crash of Airblue Flight 202 demonstrates the importance of following procedures and showing CRM in the between crew members. Ultimately, this was what led the aircraft to crash in the first place. This is an important lesson that should be learnt to prevent such crashes from occurring in the future.
In memory of the 152 people who expected to arrive in Islamabad that day.
I was inspired to write this article after reading articles by Admiral_Cloudberg. I highly recommend reading his series on plane crashes as they are very interesting. Thank you!
