All valid points. One challenge of reviewing well-edited, succinct books is that they’re hard to further summarize. I focused more on how his arguments pertained to the counter-terror/asymmetric warfare fight.

The author doesn’t ignore the fact that technology clearly does provide genuinely new capabilities. Your Berlin Airlift example, or the dramatic maturation of precision weaponry between Desert Storm & OEF/OIF, both illustrate that reality. However, I’d bet that in both cases, terrain features that were irrelevant beforehand gained new significance in light of the specific capabilities and limitations of new technologies (GPS-guided munitions & more advanced transport aircraft, respectively). Some terrain features can substantially degrade the effectiveness of GPS, or enhance the effectiveness of GPS jammers. Now, they matter a lot.

A large part of his argument also relates to the cost/benefit ratio of projecting military force overseas. Transportation is pricey, and that’s just the beginning… $2 billion a year for air conditioning in Iraq/Afghanistan? In terms of return on investment in distant military operations, you reach the point of diminishing returns very quickly.

Using drones to zap an AQ senior leader every few months is a good “buy” that actually will degrade/disrupt that organization. Building nation states in the Arabian peninsula? Perpetual military presence in the South China Sea? Not so much.