Germany has a new left-wing political party, and its name is the “Sahra Wagenknect Alliance” (BSW). It is unusual as the party is named directly after its leader and its political values differ from the traditional leftist politics of Germany and Europe. Nevertheless, the most interesting aspect of this new party is that it has genuine prospects of syphoning votes from the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD), and becoming a formidable force outside of German political orthodoxy. This prospect is credited to polls that show an average of 14% of Germans support the BSW, and half of AfD voters might consider switching their support. This doesn’t necessitate the BSW gaining that percentage of seats, and an October poll found that only 3% of voters are considering supporting the BSW. The next federal election is also in 2025, and as Harold Wilson said “a week is a long time in politics”, so anything can change.
Nonetheless, Wagenknecth’s formation of the BSW has clarified a significant section of German politics. That clarity is how a substantial portion of German voters feel about the country’s situation and the reality of why voters support parties described as radical and separate from political orthodoxy by acting as anti-establishment parties. The context for this is portrayed in the rise of left-wing Die Linke (The Left) and the right-wing AfD.
Die Linke exploited opposition to the dominant centre-left Social Democratic Party’s (SPD) embrace of neoliberal policies, and was a successful protest party. Voters in eastern Germany who are partial to its history as a socialist republic during the German Democratic Republic (GDR) also lent their support to Die Linke. However, since its peak in the 2009 election, it’s been faltering in its electoral efforts. The party displayed growing disunity as it was divided over whether to support Merkel’s policy of accepting refugees and migrants, and the growing prominence of identity politics subscribed to by its younger members. Notably, it was Wagenknecht who led the anti-immigrant faction and maintained criticism of identity politics in left-wing politics. An appetite for Die Linke’s leftist platform also died down when Angela Merkel’s grand coalition governments with the centre-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and SPD adopted some of their policies such as implementing a minimum wage. This was most evident in the 2021 federal election when it only won 39 out of 736 seats.
The right-wing nationalist AfD became the formidable force it is when it won 94 of 709 seats in the Bundestag during the 2017 federal election with 12.6% of the vote share, making it the third-largest party. This was credited to growing opposition to the Merkel government’s migrant policy and frustration with centrist governance. After it lost some seats in the 2021 election, it is now polling extremely well with Politico showing that 22% of Germans are considering voting for the AfD. It also made gains in state elections in Hesse and Bavaria, when 18.4% and 14.6% of voters lent their support to the AfD respectively. The party is controversial, and it’s considered far-right as its members have been critical of Germany’s apologetic attitude towards its past and some members overtly subscribe to Nazism, with one member being arrested over his “Sieg Heil” victory salutes.
Despite this controversial nature, it still polls high and has genuine prospects of overtaking the SPD if trends continue. This rise is due to widespread frustration over the cost of living crisis, labour shortages, and failed energy reforms. German sanctions on Russia have also strangled deliveries of natural gas, resulting in it purchasing American gas instead. These crises are being presided over by the three-party coalition government between the SPD, Greens, and Free Democratic Party (FDP), and the only other moderate opposition party is the CDU. All said parties are establishment and regular participants in the political orthodoxy of centrist consensus when governing. Consequently, with Die Linke’s languish, the main non-establishment party has caused all protest third-party votes to head towards the AfD.
The rise of the AfD poses a concern for the political establishment, and they refuse to work with the AfD due to their far-right tendencies. Understandably so, considering the tragic past of Germany with fascism and far-right politics. Regardless, all establishment parties ignored why the AfD was rising by not solving the issues facing the German people, and the eventual result was a swelling of support for the AfD. Conversely, Wagenknecht consolidating and organising her base delivers this clarity on why Germans are actually supporting the AfD, not because they’re far-right fascists but because they desperately need a party that’s radical enough to challenge the orthodoxy that exacerbated their issues.
Wagenknecht is defined in a variety of ways, such as a left-wing conservative, anti-immigration socialist, and old East German leftist rhetoric. She’s certainly critical of the modern left’s identity politics and is anti-immigration. The BSW itself supports restricting immigration, advocates for deglobalisation, ending military aid to Ukraine, negotiating a settlement with Russia over the war in Ukraine, and opposes green politics. She also described Gaza as an “open-air prison” in light of the ongoing war between Hamas and Israel. Wagenknecht has also moderated her stance on the market economy, stating she supports a fair economy, not a socialist republic like East Germany.
A major standpoint of Wagenknecht is her direct opposition to the current state of Die Linke. She describes Die Linke as becoming too left-liberal and more concerned with a left-lifestyle instead of actual left-wing politics. Her description of Die Linke’s progressives has been: “too focused on diet, pronouns, and the perception of racism” as opposed to “poverty and an ever-growing gap between rich and poor” according to the New York Times. Her criticism of immigration is derived from what she believes is overwhelming Germany’s welfare and education systems. She also criticises aid to Ukraine, considering the billions of euros being spent to send weaponry and how it’s induced an energy crisis.
This brand of conservative left-wing populism has a strong appeal to AfD voters since they’ve been the ones most opposed to German support for Ukraine, and as aforementioned turned to the most salient anti-establishment party. Wagenknecht is also a popular figure, appealing to eastern voters who still romanticise over the past, and has a consistent track record of a cohesive left-wing ideology that refuses to align with modern leftism.
There is still scepticism and fairly so. The BSW is yet to be electorally tested, in either state and European elections of 2024. It might win seats but there’s no guarantee the BSW will overtake the AfD, and by the 2025 federal elections it might achieve great success or possibly not enter the Bundestag at all depending on how long support for them lasts. Even if they do enter the state legislatures and Bundestag, it’s unclear whether any party would be open to cooperating with them, or if they’d even need the support of the BSW for a coalition majority. It’s also important to note how the BSW polls at approximately 10%, albeit some aggregate a higher number, by no means is it the majority of German voters.
The state of Germany still needs improvement, with the economy lagging and none of its crucial reforms passing. It’s easy to label Wagenknecht’s values as controversial, but that label is given through the lens of how politics in not just Germany but the West has gotten used to liberal discourse. Germany is used to centrism and moderate consensus and like most Western liberal democracies, even the social democrats embraced neoliberalism with Gerhard Schroeder’s government. Eventually, there’s not enough innovation and the establishment grows desensitised towards the reality of the situation: reforms aren’t fast enough and at least a quarter of Germans won’t back this system.
Ultimately, there are many things Wagenknecht clarifies: the German appetite for anti-establishment politics, the reality of why the far-right became so popular, how a fourth of Germans really feel about the state of the country, and why the modern left and liberals are having such a tough time. Germans, and perhaps Europeans as a whole who don’t align with her shouldn’t just criticise or reject her politics, but instead consider her rise as a blessing in disguise as the concerns of voters unaligned with political orthodoxy grow louder. Such a blessing could be in real issues gaining increased attention, and a reminder that many voters don’t only vote for a party because of their ideology, but because they vote within their own interests, both social and economic.
