The Importance of Preserving Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge
Reports that the U.S. committed to selling F-35s, our most advanced fighter jet, to the UAE are concerning.
I welcome the official announcement of normalization of relations between Israel and the United Arab Emirates, as well as between Israel and Bahrain. Normalization has been a long-sought, bipartisan goal of the United States, and I support it.
But reports that the United States committed to selling F-35s, our most advanced fighter jet, to the UAE to seal this deal, concern me. Reports that the President and Prime Minister Netanyahu made this deal without security experts on both sides reviewing the details together feels downright negligent, and definitely breaks with how these sales have been handled in past decades.
From 2015–2017, in my capacity as Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense, I was responsible for the U.S.-Israel defense relationship, along with the rest of the Middle East, Russia, Europe, and Latin America. In this same capacity, I was responsible for helping ensure that any sale to the Middle East didn’t threaten Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge (QME) — something that had been a long standing policy of every U.S. administration since the Johnson administration, and was codified in U.S law in 2008. I was in regular touch with the Israelis on a whole range of security issues, but the sale of new weapons systems to the Middle East was of utmost interest to the Israeli Ministry of Defense.
By law, the State Department must include in its proposal to Congress of any new arms sale to the Middle East, a certification that the sale will not adversely affect Israel’s qualitative military edge. In my years working these issues, I never saw a certification take place without painstaking, detailed and usually classified negotiations that got to the heart of Israel’s defense capabilities. These steps are necessary based on Israel’s tiny size and lack of strategic depth. Unlike in the U.S., a single, significant strike on a country approximately the size of New Jersey could be catastrophic for the country, so they handle their security very differently than we do.
This is what makes news of the sale of the F-35 difficult to understand. I reached out to former Israeli Ministry of Defense contacts — the very individuals who negotiated with us on issues related to QME — and none of them knew of any substantive discussions on the sale. Instead of the standard process of military experts discussing capabilities leading to discussions on the political level, it appears the political leaders simply cut this deal without the security experts weighing in. This is particularly egregious for the Israeli air force, given that Israel only received its first F-35 in 2016, and sale of F-35s to Arab nations would leave it evenly matched in this particular capability. Prime Minister Netanyahu, who most think of as deeply hawkish when it comes to Israeli security, has feigned “objection” to the sale, but if he held serious concerns I have no doubt they would be scuttling the deal. As a national security professional it is hard to understand Netanyahu’s agreement to the deal for anything other than politics.
To legally prevent a sale, both chambers of Congress can pass a veto-proof joint resolution. But that’s a high threshold to reach. For example, the House and Senate passed three joint resolutions opposing Saudi Arms sales — which President Trump promptly vetoed in July 2019. Given Prime Minister Netanyahu’s acquiescence, I doubt we’ll see formal opposition.
But, long beyond either Netanyahu or President Trump, it’s important that we understand that the sale has potential long term, strategic consequences for Israeli security.
