As calls get louder to ban the Chinese-controlled ByteDance/TikTok due to U.S. national security and child safety concerns, it is interesting to look at ByteDance/TikTok’s Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA) 2022 filings and those of their outside consultants to see the who, what, where, and why of their US federal lobbying efforts.
What I found interesting in the 2022 LDA reports were: 1) the lack of the required listing of the “specific lobbying” issues the outside consultants are working on. For example, one outside consultant (being paid $110,000 per quarter) listed under specific lobbying issues, “Issues related to internet technology and learning-enabled content platforms” — not very specific; 2) the amount ByteDance/TikTok spent on lobbying (approx. $4 million in the first three quarters of this year — impressive); and 3) the discrepancy between ByteDance/TikTok and its outside consultants on the question 19 of the LDA, the listing of “Foreign Interest.” ByteDance/TikTok and some of their consultants check the box “none” to the specific question, “Interest of each foreign entity in the specific issues listed on line 16 above.”
At least two of TikTok’s outside consultants answered this same question yes, including one who stated: “Client is wholly owned by ByteDance Ltd which is owned in part by ByteTeam Ltd. Both foreign entities have interests similar to the client.”
The same outside consultant also answered: “yes” in their 2022 LDA Registration filing representing Bytedance/TikTok to the question of whether or not there is any “Foreign Interest” in the client. “ByteDance Ltd (owns 100% of ByteDance Inc.; 100% of TikTok Ltd); ByteTeam Ltd (owns approximately 21% of ByteDance Ltd).”
I leave it to others to decide whether TikTok’s or their consultant’s filing is accurate. But it does point to the need as to why ByteDance/TikTok and their outside consultants should be filing Department of Justice Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) reports instead of LDAs.
As stated on the Department of Justice website, “FARA is an important tool to identify foreign influence in the United States and address threats to national security. The central purpose of FARA is to promote transparency with respect to foreign influence within the United States by ensuring that the United States government and the public know the source of certain information from foreign agents intended to influence American public opinion, policy, and laws, thereby facilitating informed evaluation of that information. FARA fosters transparency by requiring that persons who engage in specified activities within the United States on behalf of a foreign principal register with and disclose those activities to the Department of Justice. The Department of Justice is required to make such information publicly available.”
As defined, A “foreign principal” can be a foreign government, a foreign political party, any person outside the United States (except U.S. citizens who are domiciled within the United States), and any entity organized under the laws of a foreign country or having its principal place of business in a foreign country.
But here are the questions. If there is no “foreign principal” interest in the outcome ByteDance/TikTok lobbying activities, then why are Members of Congress, DoJ, the FBI, and an FCC Commissioner raising national security concerns? Why are there ongoing discussions with the Biden Administration’s national security team on how to “fix” TikTok’s national security problem?
TikTok’s new tagline is “it starts on TikTok.” The American people have a right to know what “it” is, that “starts on TikTok,” and FARA filings will give the American people that insight.
