Of land, air, and sea bridges

Robert Caruso
4 min readAug 27, 2014

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Iran cannot be considered a credible partner in Iraq. America also cannot cede Kurdistan to Iran for any reason.

I’ve been over this before, but it is critical policymakers and body politic acknowledge this reality.

https://twitter.com/TaraFatehi/status/504455634016686080

The Kurds are willing and capable, require no combat training, and only want resupply. This does not require deep thought—they’re the best partner you could ask for, strategically and tactically. And they’re ruthless.

Erbil will be a valued strategic partner not for decades but for centuries, if we do this properly. The United States has nothing to teach the Kurds; quite the contrary, they have much to teach us. All of it timely.

Arming Peshmerga in the vicinity of Erbil is a good place to start, but it isn’t enough. The United States should move swiftly and aggressively to match the operational tempo, agility and resourcefulness of its adversaries. Tehran has already begun to arm Peshmerga via their proxy in Baghdad, and is petrified the US will do the same while pushing for independence.

The US should capitalize on both ISIL and Tehran’s fears by fully equipping Syrian, Iranian and Iraqi Kurdish groups to go on the offensive.

It is estimated that over five million Kurds live inside Iran. This affords Western intelligence agencies a large talent pool from which to recruit as well as direct kinetic operations against Shia groups in and outside of Iraq. Functioning as an ethnically viable human intelligence ‘trawler’ as well as a highly effective maneuver force, Syrian, Iranian, and Iraqi Kurds can dramatically expand the operating space presently afforded US forces.

https://twitter.com/ghoshworld/status/504364350564745220

To sustain these forces, it will be necessary to establish forward operating locations along the Kurdistan border with Iran and Syria. These are dissimilar from forward operating bases in that they are austere, and do not require or lust for a massive cadre of gardeners, merchants, even personal trainers (Afghanistan, and Iraq back in the day) Burger Kings (Afghanistan) and salsa nights (all bases, seemingly).

Not here. Mission focused, mission capable, eyes on the prize.

DoD photo — United States Marine Corps personnel constructing a plywood structure. These makeshift barracks and headquarters can be built in under 96 hours.

Emphasis would be placed on nimble, expeditionary refueling and logistical tails to support expeditionary, geographically dispersed strike elements in an austere environment. 

This is a natural mission for a Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force, which would operate on the Syrian border augmented by Air Force, Navy, and Army conventional forces—namely EOD and aircrew. These soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines would work in coordination with a joint special operations task force on the Iranian border, partnered directly with the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan.

Two task forces, two missions, under the umbrella of a joint task force led by a respected 4-star (pg 18), similar to what Ali Khedery has proposed.

Together, these blended elements—conventional forces, special operations forces, national intelligence agency personnel, a reconstituted Free Syrian Army, and Peshmerga at all four quadrants of Kurdistan—can perform direct action missions, capturing and killing ISIL leadership, and aggregating vital intelligence. A secondary mission set for the non-US members of these elements should be interrogating captured members of ISIL and Iranian proxy groups, preferably in a lawful manner.

Operating in concentric circles moving outwards from Erbil, vetted and equipped Kurdish paramilitaries could conceivably enter Syria and even Iran in pursuit of extremist elements, backed by US airpower—just not drones, which are not survivable in the airspaces listed above.

Training and equipping this constellation of Kurdish groups would have immediate strategic significance. Kurdish participation is critical to combating extremist influence not just in Iraq but also Syria and Iran. Political and military engagement will continue in this region long after this administration leaves office—my children will hopefully not enlist, but probably serve in a diplomatic enclave in or around what is now Iraq in 2085. This is not inconceivable whatsoever.

Soon, America will lose Afghanistan’s airbases and Iran will reach nuclear capability and marauding Salafi’s will be the least of the world’s problems. When that happens, the West will need strategic basing independent of supposedly friendly nations—Qatar and Turkey, among others—and new land and sea bases on the Gulf, the Black Sea, the Med and the Caspian.

A land bridge connecting the Black and Mediterranean Seas to Georgia and an independent Kurdistan, coupled with an air bridge to Azerbaijan to the east and Cyprus to the west, affords the United States total access. It cuts both Qatar and Turkey out of the equation—the Combined Air Operations Center should’ve never been in Qatar to begin with, nor CENTCOM FWD.

Kurdistan is marching steadily towards independence, from Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Turkey. This should be encouraged and supported from every corner of the American government, from USAID and the Department of State to the Pentagon and the Department of Commerce.

Who are we, the United States—a nation that owes our very national identity to a similar stunt we pulled with the British empire—to stop them? To abandon the Kurds now serves no one except our adversaries, who would very much to take Erbil for themselves. He who supports Erbil, controls the Middle East. I’m not quoting anyone, just looking at a map.

America can stand tall with the Kurds, fight radical Islam, and contain Iran but it must act fast — and think strategically. And it all starts with basing.

image via Le Monde

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Robert Caruso

Robert served in the Department of State and Department of Defense in both the Bush and Obama administrations.