A little while ago, I wrote an article on how immigration attitudes have changed since Brexit. I found evidence of a positive shift in attitudes across the board — voters are more positive about the economic and cultural impact of immigration, and less likely to name it as one of the most important issues facing the country than at any time in the past 15 years.
One very good question has been raised repeatedly to me since I wrote the article: aren’t people only worrying about immigration less, or appreciating it more, because they expect Brexit to deliver greater control and reduced immigration? This is a very plausible line of thinking, so I have dug around some more in the British Election Study data to see whether the evidence supports it.
We can break the question down into two smaller questions:
1. Do people believe there will be (a) more immigration control and (b) lower immigration levels after Brexit?
2. Are positive shifts in attitudes to immigration concentrated among those who expect greater control and/or lower immigration?
The first graph below speaks to question 1. The answer is yes — most people do expect greater control of immigration after Brexit (70–80% expect “some”, “a lot” or “complete” control), and lower immigration levels (roughly half expect migration levels to fall). The belief that greater control is coming is perhaps unsurprising, given that there is now a well established link in voters’ minds between the European Union and uncontrolled immigration , reinforced by the Brexit campaign and by the Brexit negotiations since, in which the Prime Minister has made achieving control of immigration a key priority. Given the widespread expectation of greater control, it is also un surprising that most expect reduced immigration — that is the outcome most want to see from the exercise of greater control.
While expectations of control and reduction are widespread, however, the actual changes voters anticipate are relatively modest — only around a third expect the government to have “a lot of” or “complete” control of immigration, and only a small minority expect immigration to be “much lower”. What is more, expectations of immigration cuts have diminished since the referendum vote — the share expecting any fall in immigration has fallen from 60% to 50%, while the share expecting a large fall in immigration has halved from 17% to 8%. Voters expect a modest increase in migration control, and a modest fall in migration numbers. That is potentially good news for the government, as a modest increase in control will be much easier to deliver, and a modest fall in migration has already happened since Brexit.
How about the second question? Are the positive shifts in migration attitudes to immigration driven by a belief that greater control is coming? The British Election Study evidence, shown in the second graph, suggests not. Here we split out views about immigration by expectations about future migration control. The positive shift is roughly the same among those expecting strong control, moderate control and little or no control. While those who expect greater control are more negative about immigration, this is a pretty constant difference over time. Expectations of greater control are higher among those who were most negative about immigration in the first place (which makes sense — you’re more likely to want something controlled if you don’t like it), but the post-Brexit shift in attitudes is no different among this group than others.
What about expectations on numbers? Is the positive shift in migration attitudes post-Brexit concentrated among those who expect a bigger drop in migration. As our third graph below shows, the answer is once again “not really”. The post Brexit positive shift in attitudes is very similar among those expecting immigration to go up (dashed blue line), those expecting it to stay the same (solid blue line) and those expecting it to fall a little (solid black line) . Again there are big differences in views between these groups, but they predate Brexit and are stable post-Brexit. The small minority who are expecting a big drop in immigration (dashed black line) are distinctive — but not because they have seen a larger positive shift but for the opposite reason: their very negative views of immigrants haven’t changed at all.
What conclusions can we draw from this? Firstly, the belief that voters expect Brexit to deliver some change on immigration is well grounded — a large majority expect some increase in control of immigration, and a smaller majority expect migration inflows to drop. However, these expectations are relatively modest — some control, not total control; some drop in numbers, not a drastic drop in numbers. This is good news for the government, as it would suggest that the modest and incremental changes that are the most easily achievable outcome from Brexit negotiations need not come as a disappointment to most voters.
Secondly, the positive shift we have seen in migration attitudes is not contingent on these expectations. There is a similar positive shift in views of migration among those who expect control to increase, and those who don’t; among those who expect migration to fall, and those who don’t. The shift in attitudes is broad based, and on this initial analysis at least, not really related to views about what future migration policy will look like.
It is possible, however, that these different segments of the population are arriving at the same destination — more positive views — by different routes. Perhaps the positive shift is contingent on change among those who expect it, even if similar and unconditional shifts have occurred among others. We can’t tell from this initial analysis.
Another possibility is that there are some broader underlying factors encouraging everyone to take a more positive view of migration — for example, reduced negative coverage of the issue in the media, more awareness of the need for migrants in key parts of the economy or greater awareness of the costs of migration control due to stories such as the “Windrush” crisis. Broad based drivers of change would seem more plausible given the lack of structure to the shift in attitudes but as yet we don’t know for certain. More research needed!
