100 years after Wilson’s 14 points
Trump’s America and the return of isolationism
History always has something to say, after all men are rather predictable in their behaviour. Of course, the famous claim about the recurrent nature of history is a matter of great debate among scholars. Those who opposed the cyclical repetition of history argue that history is progressive and are confident that mankind could actually change in better. However, the aim of this text is not to deal with such a vast intellectual dispute, but to draw a comparison with the past in order to achieve a better understanding of the present. This comparison does not automatically imply the same results: it is simply a way to describe historical trends and contribute to public discourse with a different perspective.
Back to 1918
One hundred years may seem a lot of time for our hyper-fast contemporary society, but, from the point of view of history, it is a relatively short time. So, a century ago European nations were bitterly fighting each others in a world war and the US had entered the conflict just the previous year due to the German unrestricted submarine warfare. At that time Woodrow Wilson’s presidency was concerned more about justifying the war and providing the public some good reasons for fighting rather than actually winning the war, since attrition warfare was exhausting Central Empires’ resources. Moreover, Wilson had just won a second presidential mandate thanks to the campaign slogan “he kept us out of war”.
The entry into world war I, although generally favored by public opinion, remained something really difficult to accept for American society: even if Wilson’s administration avoided to fight a war alongside with Tsarist Russia (due to the February revolution), the diffusion of the secret talks between UK, France and Russia at the beginning of the war about the division of Ottoman empire into spheres of influence caused much embarrassment. In fact, such realpolitik war goals strongly clashed with the progressive and democratic nature of American society at the time, perfectly embodied in the political figure of Woodrow Wilson. So, 150 advisers were instructed to produce a document through which translating American liberal ideas into coherent war aims.
14 Points
“The good Lord only had ten!” (Le bon Dieu n’en avait que dix).
That was the sarcastic comment of French prime minister George Clemenceau, which was highly significant of the general skepticism by which US allies received the idealism of Wilson’s statement. However, the 14 points were effectively the basis for peace terms negotiated during the Treaty Versailles, nevertheless the points often conflicts with previous war agreements.
The 14 points were the maximum expression of Wilsonian idealism and a sort of manifesto of a liberal oriented foreign policy, pervaded with the burdensome aims of forbidding secret diplomacy, ensuring freedom of seas, promoting free trade, reducing armaments, affirming the self-determination right of nations, fairly adjusting colonial possessions and establishing a League of Nations for the final goal of world peace.
Behind such ideas, which have anyway inspired much of the post-WWII international system, it is evident a great amount of optimism and trust in the goodwill of states. Modern scholars now define Wilson’s thought as Utopian liberalism and even the most convinced liberal recognizes the risks connected with such ambitious objectives.
History did not take long to smash Wilson’s illusions: the two-thirds vote needed for the ratification of treaty terms were almost impossible to obtain with a Senate controlled by Republicans, many of which strongly opposed the limitations posed by the League of Nations. Further, the deterioration of Wilson’s health conditions badly affected the President’s political action, reducing much American claims in the Peace conference compared to European allies. The missing presence of US in the League of Nations represents one of the most ironic episodes in recent history and without any doubts a great personal failure for Woodrow Wilson.
Isolationism and the roaring twenties
The last 2 years of Wilson’s presidency were characterized by his incapacity of exercising President’s duties due to his dramatic health conditions. During that period American society experienced a radical change: the post-war depression, social agitation, political terrorism, widespread crime and the red scare, all contributed to an inward looking sentiment, often characterized by explicit xenophobia and intolerance for migrants, accused to be responsible for importing dangerous ideologies in the USA. Isolationism was considered the best solution to all these problems. 3 Republican Presidents succeeded Wilson until Roosevelt’s election in 1932. The post-war economic crisis was quickly overcame by American economy which entered in the so-called roaring twenties, a decade characterized by an astonishing rate of economic growth, so great to trigger the Great Depression through an overproduction crisis.
From a political point of view, 1920s represent a peculiar historical situation: the most powerful economy appeared unwilling to exercise its role in the international arena and tended to be genuinely disinterested of foreign affairs. The great international instability of interwar years largely depended by the American refusal to bear responsibilities for international order and to succeed United Kingdom in the role of guarantor of liberal system. Instead, Wilson’s policies of low tariffs were quickly replaced by protectionist measures. Further, immigration was drastically reduced and regulated by Republicans which succeeded to Wilson.
It is worth recalling that the interwar years were characterized by many changes due to the modernization of society, basically in those years mass society was born and before the 1929 crash US experienced an early form of consumerism.
The natural rejection of Wilson’s foreign policy underlines the fact that the tendency to be domestically focused appears to be the easiest choice for US politics in times of crisis. It took a second war world and much more sufferings for the US to accept its responsibilities in the international system.
Wilson’s revenge and the post-WWII order
Wilson’s vision of world and his liberal ideas had a great revival after the end of WWII: the creation of United Nations and the establishment of Bretton Woods system were perfectly coherent with Wilson’s 14 points, though there was a greater awareness of the need to avoid excessive idealism.
So for the last 70 years US foreign policy had been inspired by liberalism, even if with different degrees. In fact, both Democrats and Republicans embraced interventionist policies oriented by the active promotion of liberal principles. The Cold War played a great role for the complete abandonment of any isolationist tendency: the existential threat perceived in the American society was the main justification for the deep involvement in foreign affairs. Republicans transformed themselves from isolationist and protectionist proponents to liberal hawks, mighty guardians of free trade with the habit of carelessly resort to armed forces for affirming freedom and democracy. Such liberal hard line continued even after the collapse of USSR and it was evident during George W. Bush administration, whose foreign policy consisted of waging two wars in Iraq and Afghanistan to confront the terrorist threat. However, these wars were one of the most powerful demonstration that democracy cannot be promoted by the use of force, which, inter alia, should be rather obvious. Not by chance following interventions motivated by liberal and humanitarian concerns in other parts of world limited themselves to air warfare, avoiding any kind of land operation (as in the 2011 Libya intervention). Furthermore, the view of ISIL soldiers riding on American Humvees, stolen to Iraqi army (with many other vehicles), should remember us that without territorial control and a real monopoly of the use of force no effective state could exist. Without any doubts, a strong state is a requirement not only for democracy but also for some degree of domestic order- Hobbes docet. Therefore liberal objectives should be evaluated in an appropriate way in order not to disrupt the stability of a state; this unintended outcome is one of the most recurrent risks in interventionist doctrine, which could surely claim noble motivations but whose remedies often caused more harm than benefits.
The return of isolationism
The tendency of a gradual disengagement in American foreign policy appeared during the second mandate of Obama presidency. A more prudent approach was the result of a reflection over the difficult legacy left by Bush administration in Iraq and Afghanistan: the disappointing results obtained by the direct involvement in those countries and the high human and economic costs of such conflicts persuaded Mr Obama to avoid mistakes of the past and being more domestically focused. Even if in his first mandate the presence of Hilary Clinton, as a secretary of state, with her hawk reputation about interventionism, strongly affected foreign policy. Libya intervention in 2011 was highly supported by the secretary of state (according to Obama, it was the worst mistake of his administration) and under her initiative the US supplied Syrian rebel factions with armaments, greatly contributing to the escalation in the Syrian civil war. It is indeed true that the nature of interventions championed by Hilary Clinton was rather different from the way Bush administration conducted its war on terrorism: US restrained from any kind of invasion and land operations for the control of territory, relying only on air forces, logistical support to local groups and limited use of special forces. This chance in strategy was essentially motivated more by economic concerns rather than confidence in better outcomes: the complete reliance on local groups for land operations, whose cohesion and good faith should had not be taken for granted, often implied long and bloody stalemates, in which US obtain to prevent the major party to win at the cost of preventing any party to win. By the way, president Obama was awarded with a Nobel prize for peace in his first year of presidency, basically a gamble on a good guy, while President Wilson won the Nobel prize in 1919, thanks to his ineffective but numerous efforts for world peace.
Donald Trump’s election changed everything, but just with words. Trump’s foreign policy follows the path indicated by last Obama administration. Gradual disengagement has continued, although there were also firm actions in foreign policy: the use of chemical weapons against Syrian rebel by Assad was punished with a missile raid on Syrian military bases, the military activities in South Korea was considered necessary to persuade Kim Young Un to negotiate and the sanctions on Iran were imposed again. In addition, the reality of Russiagate hindered the normalization of US and Russia relations so much advocated by Trump in his campaign. Finally, it is not still clear how much Trump’s inclination to make verbal attacks via Twitter could be considered an effective way to conduct foreign affairs, certainly it is an extremely cheaply one.
Apart from these cases Trump’s slogan “America First” was clearly a manifesto of the return of an isolationist sentiment in American society. Globalization, migrations and technological change have posed serious threats to middle and low classes, causing income inequality to dramatically grow in the last decades. After almost 100 years since Wilson’s 14 points and 70 years of liberal order, American citizens have considered isolationism a valid option, maybe the easiest for them. The difference is that now US is deeply involved in an international system where is still the hegemon power, so a self-interested approach could exploit such position for gaining advantages, US could act as a predatory hegemon, as it effectively did sometimes in the ‘70s.
The return of protectionism was something unthinkable just some years ago. Trump’s massive tariffs are aimed especially at reducing the huge trade deficit with China and to defend US technological primacy. In a certain sense such measures are instrumental to foreign policy goals, Trump’s strategy is to put pressure and persuade other actors to negotiate bilateral trade deals which must respond to American concerns over certain issues; for example China has been suspected of improper practices and intellectual theft against American firms.
Indeed a trade war is harmful for everyone but US risks much less than other countries: exports represent a minimal part of US GDP and the last rates of growth of US economy are so positive that the FED had to raise rates not to overheat economy. Isolationism is practical for US, even if it implies some economic costs, due to a 300 hundred million market, high human, physical and financial capital. About protectionism economists incredibly agree on its harmful effects, which is an acknowledge fact, but they reasoned only on absolute gains and not relative gains: they do not usually consider a mercantilist discourse as valid and tend to regard economics as self-sufficient and isolated. A state may find convenient to pay an economic cost in order to inflict a greater cost on the economy of a dangerous competitor to maintain its relative advantage. Certainly, from a purely realist point of view, such political use of economics makes more sense for US interest than the recent American military operations around the world.
Finally, isolationism has also strong cultural implications. After having exported mass culture and consumerism during and after cold war, American culture finds itself under attack. It may appear quite contradictory that globalization could have negative consequences also in American society, since there is a general belief that identifies globalization with an Americanization of the world, but this identification is rather superficial: globalization is just a process, it has no fixed nature per se.
The recent migration flows are one of the most problematic facets of contemporary global world, as latter political cataclysms in developed countries suggested. Although America is a country made great by migrants, cultural differences between ethnic groups increased the social conflicts due to growing inequalities. Communities face more difficulties to maintain cohesion, tolerance and a common identity. Even in Europe where EU integration has been promoted for more than 50 years, concerns over national identities has led many countries to adopt stricter migration policies. In the past USA had been able to absorb various immigration waves, but current economic patterns are drastically different: education and high-skilled workers are much more required by labor market while low-skilled workers struggle to find jobs. With such barriers to enter into labor market, integration is much more difficult for new migrants. Not surprisingly the severe patrolling of Mexican border has been carried out by all administrations of the last decades, Trump policy in this sense is nothing exceptional apart from the harsh words of the President.
The historical comparison
In conclusion, the comparison between current isolationism and the one of the roaring twenties could not be absolute for obvious reasons. 100 years ago the international system was completely different, the US deliberately decided not to be bound to the League of Nations and consequently American foreign policy was much limited. Despite these differences, it is still possible to find some analogies: the adverse effects of technological change over society, an aversion toward foreigners in domestic society, a general disinterest by the public of foreign affairs and a booming economy.
It is always useful trying to analyze contemporary situations borrowing concepts from history. Obviously it is fundamental to consider structural differences in the context to avoid daring judgements. Lastly, it is surprising the almost perfect timing of history which raise issues so similar to those of a century ago.
