One Meridian Plaza Fire Philadelphia, PA. 1991 — A Case for High Rise Sprinklers

I. INTRODUCTION

On the evening of Saturday February 23, 1991 at 8:27 pm, a fire located at One Meridian Plaza (Meridian Bank Building) was reported to the Philadelphia Fire Department. The high-rise building stood 38 stories tall. Upon arrival of this structure fire, Philadelphia Fire Department (PFD) found a well-developed fire on the twenty-second floor with the unusual circumstance of the fire dropping down one floor to the twenty-first floor through a set of convenience stairs. Heavy smoke had already entered the stairways and floors immediately above the twenty-second floor. The initial fire attack was severely hampered by the complete failure of the building’s electrical system and by low water pressure. (Routley et.al, 1991)

The fire raged on through the night, growing in intensity as the combination of fire science and low water pressure worked against the crews fighting to gain control over the inferno. Eleven hours after it began, the fire was declared defensive and all fire crews were pulled out of the high-rise structure and nineteen hours after it started the fire was called under control when ten sprinkler heads stopped the blaze in its tracks on the thirtieth floor of the thirty-eight story One Meridian Plaza high rise building.

The final response numbers to One Meridian Plaza was twelve alarms, fifty-one engine companies, fifteen ladder companies, eleven specialized response units and over three hundred total firefighters. Three firefighters from Engine Company eleven died on the twenty-eighth floor when they became disoriented and ran out of air in thick smoke conditions and twenty-four additional firefighters were injured.

In the U.S., the National Fire Protection Association defines a high-rise as being higher than seventy-five feet or about seven stories. This historically significant high-rise fire was pivotal in the development of upgraded and improved building fire codes for high rise buildings in the United States and identified areas for improvement of the strategies and tactics of fighting fires in high rise structures.

This case study details the events and circumstances on the evening of Saturday February 23, 1991 into the morning hours of Sunday February 24th

II. THE BUILDING

Built in 1969, One Meridian Plaza is a thirty-eight story (two underground and thirty-six above ground) high rise building located at the corner of Fifteenth Street and South Penn Square in downtown Philadelphia. (The eighth tallest at the time of the approximately five hundred Philadelphia high rises.) Two of the thirty-eight floors are mechanical only floors (12 and 38). One Meridian Plaza is rectangular in shape and two hundred and forty-three feet high, ninety-two feet wide providing twelve thousand and seven hundred square feet of floor space per story and a total of almost eight hundred thousand total square feet. The steel framed structure was completed in 1973 and had concrete floors poured over metal decks and all structural steel and floor assemblies was sprayed with fireproofing material. The construction type was classified by The Philadelphia Department of Licenses and Inspections as Type 1B. This type of construction requires three-hour rates building columns, two-hour fire rated horizontal beams and floor/ceiling systems and one-hour rated fire corridor and tenant separations. Shafts, including the three stairwells (east, west and center) and the elevator hoist ways, are required to be two-hour fire rated construction while roofs must have 1-hour fire rated assemblies. The center and west stairwells were equipped with single six-inch standpipe risers (the east stairwell had no standpipe) and were fed by two seven hundred and fifty GPM fire pumps located on the basement and on the twelfth floor. (Routley et.al, 1991)

III. THE FIRE

A. Initial Report

Smoke detectors activated on the twenty-second floor of One Meridian Plaza at 8:23 pm. At the time of the initial alarm there were only three people in the building, an engineer and two security guards. The engineer took the elevator to investigate the alarm while one of the security guards answered a call from the alarm company. The security guard advised the alarm company that the alarm was being investigated and subsequently, the fire department was not notified of the alarm at this time. The engineer reached the twenty-second floor and when the doors opened, he experienced heavy smoke and heat. Unable to reach the elevator control buttons, the engineer became trapped and used his portable radio to call the security desk to ask for assistance. Security guard one was able to recall the elevator to the lobby as a result of instructions given to them by the engineer using Phase II firefighter safety feature on the elevator. Security guard two was on break on the thirtieth floor, heard his radio transmission and exited the building via the stairway. Security guard two reported smoke in the stairwells as he hastily descended. Guard one notified the alarm company that there was, in fact, a fire on the twenty-second floor once the engineer was safe back on the ground floor in the building. Meeting the engineer and security guard one at the ground floor security guard two realized that the fire department had not been notified yet. The first call to report this fire was made to Philadelphia 9–11 by a passerby on a pay phone at 8:27 pm, just seconds before the alarm company made their initial call to the fire department. (Routley et.al, 1991)

B. Initial Philadelphia Fire Department Response

Philadelphia FD 9–11 dispatched a first alarm at 8:27 pm consisting of four engine, two ladders and two battalion chiefs. Engine forty-three was the first to arrive and reported heavy smoke and flames from one window “approximately mid-section of the building” at 8:31 pm. Battalion Chief Five was first commander on the scene and ordered a second alarm at 8:33 pm. The initial attack team was ordered to take the elevators to floor eleven and then walk the stairs from that point. (Routley et.al, 1991)

C. Early Problems Encountered

As the initial attack crew reached the eleventh floor and exited the elevators, total electrical power failure occurred in the entire building, as a result of intense fire penetrating the electrical room enclosure. This should have initiated the emergency back-up generator, but it failed to produce power and so, at that point, the building was without power of any kind for what would end up being the entire duration of the event. Multiple efforts to restore power to the building and/or generator failed. This loss of power proved to have major impacts on firefighting operations. Firefighters were working in complete darkness with only battery powered lights available for visibility. The next problem encountered was that the doors to access all the stairwells were locked. This caused a delay in initiation of firefighting actions because fire crews had to enter the stairwells by forcing the doors open. While this is not as major of a problem as the electrical failure or lack of water pressure, it did create an initial delay in access, increased of personnel required to simply access the stairs and started the increased effort and wear on the fire crews.

Elevators being unavailable resulted in all firefighting equipment having to be hand carried up twenty-two flights of stairs and any relief for exhausted crews had to scale these same twenty-two flights of stairs and so they were, themselves, exhausted before even beginning any firefighting activities. (Routley et.al, 1991) As one battalion chief worded it, “fresh crews meant firefighters who had just completed a twenty-two-story climb. Eventually a staging area was established on the twentieth floor and crews were rehabbed at that location and rotated every fifteen minutes due to the extreme intensity of operations resulting in air bottles being depleted quickly.

Water supply was inadequate as a result of pressure reducing values (PRV) on the standpipes that were installed to prevent rupture in the water system. This common feature on fire department high rise water supply systems was set by a technician with special field adjusting tools at a discharge pressure of sixty psi which was insufficient to supply the 1 ¾’, one hundred psi attack lines the fire department were using to fight the extreme heat of this intense and steadily growing fire. The discharge pressure from the hoses was estimated at only twenty to forty psi after elevation and friction loss. Even attempts to use fire department pumpers to supplement the standpipe systems and boost pressure failed directly as a result of the setting on the pressure reducing valves (PRV). As a result of this inadequate water pressure, the fire continued to steadily grow in intensity and eventually shattered windows which rained glass and debris around the exterior of the building below. The fire raged out of the windows of the twenty-second floor and through the process of auto-ignition and radiant heating from the flames licking up the side of the high-rise structure caused floors twenty-three and twenty-four to quickly become involved. All efforts to boost water pressure continued to fail, again as a direct result of the pressure reducing valves (PRV) and their improperly set psi. It took several hours for a system technician knowledgeable in the adjustment of these PRV’s to arrive at the fire scene and make needed adjustments on several of them in the stairways. Additional alarms were requested in this time bringing the total response of the Philadelphia Fire Department to five alarms. (Routley et.al, 1991)

D. Three Firefighters Killed in the Fire

Philadelphia Engine eleven was assigned to open a door or hatch at roof level (floor 38) to allow accumulated heat and smoke to escape. The crew of one captain and two firefighters started up the stairway from the twenty-second floor. The crew later radioed that they had left the stairway and were disoriented on the thirtieth floor in heavy smoke conditions. Engine eleven captain requested permission from command to break one of the exterior windows to relieve the smoke conditions they were experiencing. Soon after this radio transmission, one of the firefighters off Engine eleven radioed that “the captain is down.” Permission was given by incident command (IC) to break an external window for ventilation and a search for the firefighters was initiated via a search team from two search teams, one from below and another search team in a helicopter that landed on the roof and deployed from the thirty-eighth-floor rooftop helipad. Upon reaching the thirtieth floor, the roof team conducted an extensive search for the disoriented Engine eleven crew but were unable to locate them. The search continued floor by floor until an eight-team search crew became disoriented and ran out of air in the heavy smoke conditions on the thirtieth-eighth floor. This crew was located by the team that had landed on the rooftop by helicopter and were transported back to ground level via helicopter and treated for smoke inhalation. The helicopter search for the original disoriented firefighters resumed and continued until the search had to be suspended due to thermal drafts and decreased visibility inside the building, both a result of the ongoing and growing fire. The helicopter crew at this point attempted an external search of the massive high rise using their search light. At 1:17 am, they located broken glass in a window on the southeast corner of the twenty-eighth floor, an area that was not visible from other surrounding streets. A search team was again dispatched, this time to the twenty-eighth floor, to conduct a search and at 2:15 am the three members of Engine eleven (Captain David P. Holcomb, 52 Firefighter Phyllis McAllister, 43 and Firefighter James A. Chappell, 29) were found unresponsive just inside the broken window on the twenty-eighth floor, not the thirtieth floor as they had communicated. At the time of their discovery on the twenty-eighth floor, the fire was free burning on the twenty-fourth and twenty-fifth floors and beginning to extend to the twenty-sixth floor. Captain Holcomb and his crew were removed to a medical triage area on the twentieth floor where resuscitation efforts were attempted unsuccessfully. The crew members were pronounced deceased on the scene as a result of smoke inhalation, approximately three to four hours after their trouble call. (Routley et.al, 1991)

F. Firefighting Tactics After the Deaths

The Philadelphia Fire Department at this point had been battling this fire at One Meridian Plaza for approximately seven hours. They had no power in the building and so were forced to not only work in the dark, but also had carry all needed firefighting equipment up twenty-two plus flights of stairs. Additionally, there was insufficient water pressure to fight the continually growing inferno. The firefighters were exhausted, likely scared and emotional after the loss of three of their firefighters and additionally nearly losing eight more. Their efforts were only falling further behind the fire as each minute passed. Command made an extreme decision to hand lay five-inch supply line up the west stairwells and charged them using ground level fire hydrants in order to attempt to get the water pressure needed on the fire floors for an effective attack on the flames. This task was completed at 2:15 am. With the five-inch supply lines in place, at 2:21 am, Philadelphia FD One Meridian Plaza command sounded a twelfth alarm with the goal of placing another five-inch supply line in the east stairwell. That task was completed. Then, at 4:55 am, a third five-inch supply line was ordered in stairwell number three, the center one. The efforts to lay this third supply line was discontinued at 6:00 am as a result of a sprinkler contractor arriving on the fireground and starting a process to manually adjust the pressure reducing valves (PRV) on the standpipe and sprinkler system connections that were so greatly impeding the firefighting efforts. While this finally provided the needed pressure for effective fire streams the fire at this point was impossible to control or even contain with manual hose streams. (Routley et.al, 1991)

The accumulation of nine hours of intensive but losing firefighting efforts had taken its toll on everyone present on the fire ground. Additionally, the incident command staff had concerns about the stability of the high-rise structure itself after heavy fire involvement for this period. A structural engineer on scene and structural damage observed by firefighting units operating in and around the building led to the belief that there was a possibility of a structural pancake-style collapse of the fire damaged floors. With this information in hand and bearing in mind the loss of three firefighters already, the status of the crews who had been operating for up to eleven hours at this point and the lack of progress against the fire despite having finally secured adequate water pressure, Philadelphia Fire One Meridian Plaza fire command made the tactical decision to pull all firefighters out of the building. The order to evacuate the building was given at 7:00 am on Sunday February 24, 1991. At the time of evacuation, the fire was under control on the twenty-second, twenty-third and twenty-fourth floors (likely due to simply burning all available fuels) but continued to burn on floors twenty-five and twenty-six and was continually spreading upwards. Heavy smoke conditions persisted all the way to the top of the structure. The evacuation was complete at 7:30 am. Portable master streams were placed in adjacent buildings directed at the fire still raging at One Meridian Plaza. These were the only remaining active firefighting efforts as the fire was too high for the reach of elevated master streams to reach.

In total, the twelve alarms, fifty-one engines, fifteen ladder trucks, eleven specialized units, over three hundred total firefighters (estimated actual number of three hundred and sixteen), eleven hours, twenty-four injuries, eight firefighters nearly killed and worst of all three Philadelphia firefighters dead battling this blaze. The building was written off with the tactic to allow it to burn to the top and eventually burn out. Firefighting efforts were reduced to minimal while crews were left exhausted, confused and heartbroken at the loss of their colleagues. (Routley et.al, 1991)

G. Plot Twist — Automatic Sprinklers

As the fire continued its ascent toward the top of One Meridian Plaza and crews on scene were waiting for it to reach the summit while preparing for the potential of a collapse (which would have set off a whole new round of problems) this story of defeat took an interesting turn. Incident commanders noticed on the building’s floor plans that there were sprinklers installed on floors thirty and thirty-one. They wondered if those sprinklers may be enough to extinguish the fire when it arrived. The flames ascended and consumed the twenty-fifth floor, the twenty-sixth floor, the twenty-seventh floor, the deadly twenty-eighth floor (where Capt. Holcomb, Firefighter McAllister and Firefighter Chappell were found unresponsive earlier in the morning) and the twenty-ninth floor into the afternoon of Sunday February 24th until finally reaching the thirtieth floor. IC had fire engines on scene in place to supply the fire department connections (FDC) that would provide the needed water for the dry pipe system sprinklers. The pressure reducing valves were now set to the proper psi after the technician arrived and made the needed adjustments. Those on the fire ground that day were shocked and relieved, the fire service was changed and the building codes were about to be re-written when they witnessed that presence of sprinklers on the thirtieth floor at One Meridian Plaza (installed by the occupant of that floor voluntarily since the building did not require sprinklers nor did the high-rise building fire codes in 1991) halted the fire in less than one hour. Not only did the sprinklers extinguish the fire and stop the vertical spread to the last remaining eight floors but floors thirty through thirty-eight suffered no fire damage and were only moderately damaged by heat and smoke. Most of the contents, in fact, on these floors were salvageable.

The One Meridian Plaza fire was declared under control at 3:01 pm on Sunday February 24, 1991. The National Fire Academy (NFA) National Fire Protection Administration (NFPA), United States Fire Administration (USFA), State Fire Marshall’s Office, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH). Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) and other investigatory agencies stated what would be almost a year-long investigation into the fire.

III. FIRE CAUSE AND THE CHAIN OF EVENTS

A. Cause Determination

“Fire officials say a pile of oil-soaked rags left by an office renovation crew started the February 23rd fire that killed three firefighters in a high-rise office building. The city’s fire commissioner, Roger M. Ulshafer, said the crew had been refinishing woodwork in a vacant office on the twenty-second floor of the high rise, One Meridian Plaza. When they finished for the day, he said, the workers left twenty-five pounds of rags soaked with linseed oil in a heap on the floor. Ulshafer said the linseed oil generated enough heat to ignite the rags, which then ignited containers of other solvents left nearby. The city fire code requires combustible materials to be stored in fire-proof, covered receptacles.” (New York Times, 1991) The fire damage estimates were in the tens of millions.”

B. Top Ten Major Problems Experienced and Lessons Learned

When operating at the scene of any fire there are inherent dangers, risks and problems that present themselves naturally and in some cases each time a fire occurs. Certainly, the problem of heat and smoke are always present though often in manageable. (such as at one story residential room and contents fire or a car on fire) These problems could be viewed, in the risk management context, as high risk but high frequency. (tasks that are risky but are done often and so a degree of expertise exists) Smoke, flames and heat in the course of a fire that many departments may be more accustomed to handling are manageable problems though problems none the less. When a department deals with these issues combined with non-others presenting themselves, then their ability to handle this fire is high. However, when facing and dealing these high risk, high frequency issues and other problems also present themselves, the situation’s complexity increases exponentially.

The complexities faced at this event multiplied and compounded as the fire progressed and new problems presented themselves. Here are the issues that The Philadelphia Fire Department in whole and specifically the incident commander (IC) that night faced; (Green, 2011).

1) Delayed Notification

For every minute a fire burns, it doubles in size. This fire burned long enough to present itself in the form of heavy smoke and heat to the security guard who investigated the initial alarm. There was a four-minute delay after that discovery before the fire dependent dispatcher was notified. Philadelphia Fire Department arrived on the ground floor of the building eight minutes after discovery means it had time to grow to eight times the size that is was when the security guard had to scramble for his life after the elevator door opened.

· Lesson Learned: Standards and codes were changed requiring immediate notification of the fire department upon receiving an alarm.

2) Building Size

Battling a fire on the ground floor of a structure is difficult enough but when you add the vertical height and footprint of a high-rise structure to the mix, then the complexities are far greater. Even when fighting a fire is progressing smoothly, if even one other situation arises, the scene can quickly deteriorate. This fire was located twenty-two stories above ground meaning the fight had to be taken vertically two hundred and twenty feet up.

· Lessons Learned: Pre-incident planning to include location and access to site maps, electrical schematics, floor plans, HVAC information and other relevant information is essential in fire department preparedness for high rise fire response.

3) Loss of Electrical Power

In residential and small commercial buildings, firefighters will routinely disconnect electrical power due to the possibility of electrocution. In high rise fires however, electrical power is necessary in order to;

a. Efficiently get crews and equipment to upper floors

b. Provide sufficient visibility, especially at night

c. Power firefighting tools as needed.

The loss of power and failure of emergency back-up generators so early in this event led to the need for firefighters to climb more stairs than usual and severely hampered not only the speed of the firefight, but the efficiency of the crews once they had completed scaling the stairwells. This immediately required at least double the number of firefighters. Additionally, firefighters relied on battery powered flashlights as their only source of light in areas that were already void of visibility due to heavy smoke conditions. (Green, 2011)

· Lessons Learned: Annual inspection of electrical system and their redundancy systems by a certified technician mandated is now by standards and codes.

4) Locked Stairwell Doors

This problem proved to more of an inconvenience than a major problem, but none the less presented one of a series of hurdles that fire crews faced at this fire throughout the event. Some reports suggest that the time required to breech each door was up to twenty minutes though I could not verify this information. This clearly would have pushed this issue past a simple inconvenience and well been considered a major problem as the fire continues to grow in both size and intensity. (Naum, 2011)

· Lessons Learned: Lock boxes with keys to access all parts of a building should be accessible to fire department personnel.

5) Improperly Set Pressure Reducing Valves (PRV) Hampered Water Pressure

Water pressure was a major problem once the firefighters reached the fire floor and had all needed equipment in place to begin the fire attack. The sixty-psi pressure set on the standpipes was not enough to supply the one hundred psi 1 ¾” hose lines being used by the firefighting teams. The volume of fire by the time firefighters initiated an attack necessitated larger diameter (two and a half or three inch) handlines but they were unable to even effectively charge the smaller one three quarter inch as it was. Eventually, five” supply lines had to be hand carried up twenty-two flights of stairs to provide needed water pressure. (Green, 2011)

· Lessons Learned: Codes and standards established to ensure proper pressure settings and annual inspection of standpipe and sprinkler systems.

6) Firefighters Became Disoriented and Required Assistance

In the risk management context, nothing falls more into the box of “high risk, low frequency with no discretionary time” (HR/LF/NDT) than a firefighter (or in this case firefighters) calling a mayday or in some way being in a situation of needing assistance for a potential life safety problem. (Graham, 2012) A fire scene that is otherwise going smoothly can be turned upside down and become extremely chaotic if a firefighter experiences a need to call a mayday.

This necessitated the need for crews to be dispatched to search and rescue the disoriented crews. An eight-man team was sent to the reported location of the lost firefighters on the 30th floor and they, themselves because disoriented and low on breathing air. The result was a helicopter roof-top rescue of the eight-man rescue team and continued search for the original three missing firefighters from Engine eleven by other search teams. (Routley et.al, 1991)

· Lessons Learned: Schematics of the building, pre-incident planning, improved fireground accountability and understanding of fire chemistry and physics could aid in preventing crews from being placed in situations that require mayday activation. Additionally, personnel training on mayday procedures to include recognition and avoidance of deteriorating conditions should be a part of all fire department training programs.

7) Firefighters Perished During the Firefight

It is one thing to deploy Rapid Intervention Teams (RIT) to assist a firefighter. It is another thing all together when the deployment of the lifesaving RIT fails to help the firefighter(s) in need before it is too late. These rescue crews spent a significant amount of time, energy, emotion and resources looking for the three lost fire crews. The blow to the morale when word spread that they were located but were non-savable is immeasurable. This occurred at a time in the morning (five hours onto the event) when crews were exhausted, against the proverbial ropes and they needed a win. This news had to be crushing to their will to carry on, but carry on they did, for another six hours.

· Lessons Learned: Prevention of firefighter LODD and injury is essential in a fire department’s training program. Awareness of incident safety procedures and efficiently written and strictly enforced standard operating guidelines (SOP) is a key element to keeping firefighters safe.

8) Lack of Pre-Incident Planning

There were limited plans available to Philadelphia Fire Department incident commander at the onset of the fire event. Building owners later provided detailed plans to the incident commander as the incident progressed through the morning. (Naum, 2011)

· Lessons Learned: As a part of any fire department standard operating guidelines (SOP) pre-incident planning of target hazards should be written into the yearly duties of fire department personnel at all levels, but especially the company level crews.

9) Auto-Exposure Fire Spread

The intensity of the fire caused windows to be blown out from the heat and allowed the flames to run vertically as the primary means of fire spread. (Naum, 2011)

· Lessons Learned: Building codes written as a result of One Meridian Plaza Fire that address preferred construction materials for high rise buildings.

10) Lack of Sprinklers

At the time of the fire at One Meridian Plaza, there were only nine of the thirty-eight floors with working fire sprinklers. Building codes did not require sprinklers to be installed at the time of this fire and so the few floors that did have them was because the occupant of those floors installed them voluntarily. The fire was stopped on the thirtieth floor which was the first to have working sprinklers over the location of twenty-second floor fire origin. (Naum, 2011) Other floors to have sprinkler installed were: basement, concourse, upper concourse, lobby, fifteenth floor, thirtieth floor, thirty-first floor, thirty-fourth floor and thirty-fifth floor, and thirty-seventh floor. (Routley et.al, 1991)

· Lessons Learned: Building codes and NFPA standards written and updated as a result of One Meridian Plaza Fire that address the need and required maintenance of all standpipe and sprinkler systems within a high-rise structure.

C. Post Fire Data

The devastating fire at One Meridian Plaza destroyed floors twenty-two through twenty-nine and damaged floors twenty-one and thirty through thirty-eight. In total over one hundred and forty thousand square feet of office space was lost resulting in an estimated direct property loss cost of an estimated one hundred million dollars. The building sat empty and abandoned during the years of litigation that followed. Seven years after the fire, in 1998, the entire building was declared a total loss and a year after that, in 1999, the building was demolished. Due to the proximity of other buildings, it was not able to be imploded and so had to be dismantled piece by piece at an estimated cost of one hundred and twenty-five million dollars. Additionally, an estimated four billion dollars (billion with a “b’) in civil litigation has been paid out to building occupants and others affected by this blaze since that night. (Routley et.al, 1991)

III. BUILDING CODE IMPROVEMENTS

A. Codes and Standards

The fire at One Meridian Plaza prompted changes in the local standard operating guidelines (SOG) for Philadelphia and any department in the United States that was paying attention to the problems experienced and subsequent lessons learned as a result of this fire.

The National Fire Protection Agency (NFPA) Released an Alert Bulletin in May of 1991 suggesting that all standpipe systems including sprinklers be inspected periodically. Today that inspection is mandatory on a yearly basis by a qualified technician.

The National Fire Protection Agency (NFPA) rewrote their sections;

- 13 Standard for the Installation of Sprinkler Systems

- 14 Standard on Instillation of Standpipes and Hose Systems

Notable changes the International Building Code (IBC) and NPFA Standards are:

(NFPA Standards thirteen and fourteen). (IBC 2006).

a. Standpipes with PRV appropriately set and retrofitting of all high-rise buildings with sprinklers was recommended by NFPA and the International Building Code (IBC) mandated sprinklers in all high-rise buildings (over seventy-five feet in height).

b. Fire Department shall be notified immediately upon activation of any fire alarm.

c. Smoke detectors shall be connected to the building’s electrical system.

d. Self-closing doors to common areas.

e. Wet-pipe systems in all buildings that exceed two hundred and seventy-five feet.

f. Testing of electrical system yearly.

g. Provide fire department personnel with access to keys for all parts of a building.

These stricter standards and codes in the twenty-eight years after One Meridian Plaza fire have resulted in a dramatic decrease in the number and severity of fires and the number of deaths in high rise buildings. As of 2017, an average of roughly forty people die and another five hundred and twenty are injured each year in the United States as a result of fires in high rise buildings. Most of the fire casualties are in apartment buildings that still do not comply with the code requirements for working sprinkler systems. (Keating, 2017)

Robert Solomon, head of the Building and Life Safety Code Division at NFPA, feels like you should ask one question when considering a move into a high rise, “does it have a modern automatic sprinkler system?” Solomon suggests that if it does, you should be safe and goes on to say, “we have a really good track record with our high-rise buildings in the last twenty to twenty-five years. The first requirements for apartment-building sprinklers went into effect in the mid-1970s. Over time, the rules enforced better systems. Now any death in a building with a sprinkler is so rare that it gets special review. We probably have zero fatalities in a high-rise building in the U.S. that’s protected with an automatic sprinkler system,” he said. “It’s zero or approaching zero.” (Keating, 2017).

Fires, like One Meridian Plaza, that have resulted in the complete destruction resulting in demolition of the building have only occurred in the United States twice since this fire in 1991. The first was the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City on April 19, 1995 as a result of an intentional act of terrorism and The World Trade Center North and South Towers on September 11, 2001 again as a result of an intentional act of terrorism. The codes implemented as a result of this event are working. The incidents of injuries and deaths are going down, the actual occurrences of fires past the incipient stage in high rises are also on the decline.

(Keating 2017)

B. Cost to Install Sprinklers

The cost to install a sprinkler system in a building varies based on size and age of the building.

The cost of sprinklers in a newly constructed building is relatively inexpensive, just one to two dollars per square foot. To retrofit a sprinkler system, the cost doubles to about two to four dollars (sometimes more) per square foot. If you are talking about a high rise, the average square foot per floor is roughly twenty thousand square feet or twenty to forty thousand dollars per floor for new construction and roughly forty to eighty thousand dollars per floor for retro-installed systems. Considering that high rise buildings are over six stories, that equates to a starting point of sprinkler installs on a new building at one hundred and twenty to one hundred and forty thousand dollars. To retrofit an existing building would cost, on the low end, two hundred and forty to four hundred and eighty thousand dollars. (Fireline, 2019)

This is sounds very expensive and it certainly is, but consider these facts:

a. The cost of a new build commercial building can vary from one hundred to two hundred dollars or more per square foot. So, the extra one to two dollars per square foot seems affordable in context and a smart investment.

b. The fine for not complying with building codes is fifty to one hundred dollars per occurrence, per day. With that information, it costs between eighteen to thirty-six thousand per year. However, if a business is seen as blatantly disregarding the code, they can face legal action from the county’s district attorney and have their business closed until compliance is gained. (Jasper, 2014)

A properly installed and maintained sprinkler system also comes with reduced insurance premiums since the liability to the insurer goes down significantly when sprinklers are present. If all of this doesn’t convince you then consider the simple fact that sprinklers are proven (as we have seen in this case study) to save lives and property. Remember too, the civil suits that resulted from the One Meridian Plaza fire totaled over four billion dollars! (Jasper, 2014)

IV. CONCLUSION

If there is one singular lesson to be learned from this landmark fire, it is that properly placed, installed and maintained automatic sprinklers are by far the most effective and reliable means at our disposal to protect any structure but especially high-rise structures. Ten sprinkler heads were successful in not only controlling but extinguishing, in less than one hour, a fire that the entire Philadelphia Fire Department, with all their equipment, apparatus, tools, knowledge and resources could not gain control of in over nineteen hours. Worst of all, this lesson cost the lives of three of their brave men. Philadelphia firefighters on this scene were confronted with an impossible situation and did a commendable job in their attempts to battle this inferno. The loss of their brother firefighters will never be forgotten by the members of their department or any firefighter in the United States fire service. It is incumbent on us, as firefighters, to learn the lessons of that night. We must take the lessons forward in order to primarily improve the prevention of such fires but if needed, to be better equipped with the knowledge of this event at our disposal so that we may better mitigate a similar situation.

The fire at One Meridian Plaza will always be looked upon as the turning point for improvement of the NFPA standards and IBC building codes for standpipe and sprinkler systems as it relates to high rise structures. This event illustrated clearly and in a real-world environment the value of sprinklers in a way that left no doubt. To be effective, however, standpipe and sprinkler systems must (as current standards and building codes indicate) be properly designed, properly installed and properly maintained. This includes yearly inspections by a qualified contractor. If these standards are not followed the results, as was demonstrated in this case study, can reach the level of total devastation.

This case study was done with the memories of those lost at One Meridian Plaza on the morning of Sunday February 23, 1991 in mind.

Captain David P. Holcomb, 52

Firefighter Phyllis McAllister, 43

Firefighter James A. Chappell, 29

This project is dedicated to these three men for the lessons they gave their lives to teach us.

V. QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Describe what link (or links) in the chain of events at One Meridian Plaza could have been removed to improve the opportunities for a better outcome?

2. How can the stricter building codes, that have come as a result of this fire, be enforced?

3. What improvements in your own fire department’s standard operating guidelines (SOG) could improve response and reduce the chance of similar problems from occurring at future high-rise events?

4. Who was to blame for the failures at One Meridian Plaza?

5. Based on what we have reviewed, how can fire departments best prepare to fight fires in high rise events?

6. If you were the incident commander on this fire that night, what would your order of priorities be and what would be your initial actions be?

7) Knowing then what we know now, if you were the incident commander of this fire what would your order of priorities be and what would your initial actions be?

7a. How are your priorities and actions different from question 6?

8) How many high-rise buildings are in your city?

9) Do you know the location of the Fire Department Connections (FDC) at the high-rise buildings in your city?

10) Are the high-rises in your city equipped with wet or dry pipe standpipes and sprinkler systems?

It is recommended that you explore the answers to questions 8–10 on site of high rises in your city. Take photographs and interview building personnel to learn as much as you can about each building in order to be better prepared if an event were to occur there. Put yourself in the position of those on scene at One Meridian Plaza and answer these vital questions as if you were the IC and the circumstances of our case study were occurring in the building you are in. Find the answers in your building of how to correct these issues.

APPENDICES

A. Alarms and Assignments (FIPT 107, 2018)

· 1st/Box Alarm Assignment — Box 495–15th & Chestnut Streets

o Squirt 43, Engine 1, Engine 20 (Water Supply-LDH)

o Engine 11 (3 firefighter line of duty deaths from this company)

o Ladder 9, Snorkel 5, Medic 7, Battalion Chief 5, Battalion Chief 4

· 2nd Alarm Assignment:

o Squirt 8, Engine 10, Engine 24, Engine 44, Engine 13 (Lobby Control)

o Ladder 23, Ladder 1, Medic 13, Battalion Chief 3 (Lobby Officer), Battalion Chief 11

o Division (Deputy) Chief 1, Air Unit 2

· 3rd Alarm Assignment:

o Engine 49 (Water Supply-LDH), Engine 40 (Water Supply-LDH), Engine 60

o Battalion Chief 1, Chemical Unit 1, Chemical Unit 2

· 4th Alarm Assignment:

o Engine 5 (Water Supply-LDH), Engine 29, Engine 16, Engine 3 (Water Supply-LDH), Engine 34 (Water Supply-LDH)

o Snorkel 2, Medic 21B, Medic 25B, Battalion Chief 8, Air Unit 1

· 5th Alarm Assignment:

o Engine 33, Engine 27, Engine 53, Engine 25, Ladder 11

o Car 1 (Chief of Department), Light Wagon 1

· 6th Alarm Assignment:

o Engine 12, Engine 22, Engine 50 (Water Supply-LDH), Engine 59

o Medic 3, ES-10 (Decontamination Trailer)

· 7th Alarm Assignment:

o Squirt 57, Engine 63, Engine 14, Engine 28 (Water Supply-LDH)

* 8th Alarm Assignment:

Engine 61 (Water Supply-LDH), Squirt 9, Engine 56, Engine 41

Ladder 13, Medic 16, Medic 1

Battalion Chief 2, Battalion Chief 10, Car 6

· 9th Alarm Assignment:

o Engine 38, Engine 66, Engine 45, Engine 68

o Ladder 18, Tower Ladder 6

o Battalion Chief 1102 (Call-Back for Battalion Chief 2)

· 10th Alarm Assignment:

o Engine 72, Engine 18, Engine 7, Engine 2

o Ladder 25

· 11th Alarm Assignment:

o Engine 71, Engine 35, Engine 103 (Reserve), Engine 119 (Reserve)

· 12th Alarm Assignment:

o Engine 125 (Reserve), Engine 181 (Reserve), Engine 36, Engine 52 (Water Supply-LDH),

o Engine 180 (ARFF-Reserve-LDH),

o Engine 19 (Water Supply-LDH)

o Ladder 14

o Rescue 1 (reactivated company for incident)

o Medic 15, Medic 14

o Battalion Chief 13, Battalion Chief 9, Division (Deputy) Chief 1A

B. Floor Plan of One Meridian Plaza 22nd Floor

C. One Meridian Plaza Exterior

C. Exterior View of One Meridian Plaza on February 23, 1991

REFERENCES

1) Routley, J.G. Chubb, M. and Jennings, C. (December 18, 1991). “High-rise Office Building Fire One Meridian Plaza Philadelphia, Pennsylvania” (PDF). United States Fire Administration Fire Investigations Program. Federal Emergency Management Agency and United States Fire Administration.

2) Eisner, H and Manning, B. (August 1, 1991) One Meridian Plaza Fire. Fire Engineering, Issue 8, Volume 144.

3) “Philadelphia Tower Set Ablaze by Rags, Commissioner Says”. (April 11, 1991).

“The New York Times.” Section A, Page 22.

4) Green, D. (January 11, 2011). Remembering One Meridian Plaza. “Carolina Fire, Rescue, EMS Journal.” https://www.carolinafirejournal.com/Articles/Article-Detail/ArticleId/1215/Remembering-One-Meridian-Plaza

5) Graham, G. (July 27, 2012). High Risk/Low Frequency Events in the Fire Service. [Video Capture] https://youtu.be/Og9Usv82CdU.

6) Naum, C.J. (February 23, 2011) One Meridian Plaza Fire; 20 Years Ago. “Buildings on Fire.Com” https://buildingsonfire.com/one-meridian-plaza-high-rise-fire-twenty-years-ago

7) Fornell, D.P. (August 1991) Operational Lessons Learned from One Meridian Plaza. “Fire Engineering Magazine”

8) FIPT 107 Group Project (May 15, 2018) Case Study One Meridian Plaza. [Video File] Retrieved from https://youtu.be/T2fxbfJy32k

9) National Fire Protection Agency (NFPA) (May 1991) One Meridian Plaza Philadelphia, PA February 23, 1991 Fire Investigation Report. NFPA Alert Bulletin №91–3 May 1991.

10) International Building Code (IBC). (2006)

11) Keating, D. (June 15, 2017) Risk of High-Rise Fire Deaths in U.S. has Dropped. “The Washington Post.” https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2017/06/15/risk-of-high-rise-fire-deaths-in-u-s-has-dropped/

12) Fireline (August 2019). Estimating the Cost of a New Fire Sprinkler System. https://www.fireline.com/blog/estimating-cost-new-fire-sprinkler-system/

13) Jasper, D. (July 15, 2014). SPRINKLER FIRE CODES: WHAT’S YOUR RESPONSIBILITY AS A BUSINESS OWNER? https://www.orrprotection.com/mcfp/blog/fire-code-for-sprinklers-whats-your-responsibility-as-a-business-owner