Tracking the Somali Institute for Chinese Studies
A Case Study on Chinese Influence Operations targeting English-Speaking Africans on Twitter
Despite everything they claim, China is at war. Not yet one of bombs, bullets and missiles, but still unmistakably, a war. It is fought online, promoting political environments beneficial to the Chinese state. While many look at the Belt and Road initiative as their landmark influence campaign, instead we should be watching the ever increasing network of social media accounts pushing propaganda to the masses. Where BRI is largely only visible to politicians, analysts and business-people, centralised platforms like Twitter, Facebook and their various offshoots have become crucial vectors for influencing targeted civilian populaces. This is due to its unparalleled access to international audiences and the difficulty private companies face in regulating their constant firehose of content.
Since April, I have been watching one Twitter account in particular: The ‘Somali Institute of Chinese Studies’ (otherwise known as SICS), an independent think tank based in Somalia, providing “reports & expert commentary about China’s politics/economy/society”, though in reality, none of this is true. Instead, it sows disinformation, promotes Chinese influence and actively works to degrade trust in Western media and institutions. Incidentally, these same characteristics make it an interesting insight into ongoing Chinese information operations. I’ll cover this insight, and the trends I’ve noticed later in this article.
First though, I want to try to prove its origins, or rather disprove the origin they claim. As a supposed ‘think tank’, I would expect it to have a website, or at least some other form of online presence, especially considering how active it is on Twitter. For reference, data retrieved using TruthNest found that the account posts upwards of eight times a day. Despite this, they don’t link to an off-platform site and Google search results show either the wrong organisation, or back to the original Twitter account. Reverse image searching of its profile picture yields similar results, and they are completely absent from the Somali Ministry of Commerce’s business registry. In short, this means outside of that account, it does not exist as an organisation.
We can also disprove their claim about being based in Somalia. Using a combination of OSoMe’s now-defunct Botometer, and TruthNest, we can see the average dispersal of posts across a 24 hour period, in turn, allowing us to compare it with relevant time zones. The below graph shows data taken from April 27, 2023 and uses East Africa Time (EAT), the timezone used in Somalia.
The data suggests that were it based in Somalia, the majority of posting begins at 7 p.m., peaks at 1 a.m. and eventually stops at 6 a.m. While not proving that someone inside China is running the account, this is wildly inconsistent with what posting would look like if they were based in Somalia, disproving another significant claim; it also brings up the question, why would the operators of the account choose to lie about otherwise trivial details?
To answer that, we need to look at the concept of authority bias. By positioning themselves as a research institution within the region, SICS is able to take advantage of our authority bias, a cognitive mechanism making us more likely to trust those we perceive as having authoritative knowledge on a subject. Audiences who have already bought into views supporting the contents messaging can justify their belief in disinformation by attributing it to supposed ‘expert analysis’, even without proof. SICS uses a false origin to appear more well-informed and trustworthy. This doesn’t mean they solely target such audiences, in fact, by offering a direct contrast SICS contributes towards the erosion of trust in Western institutions even in previously unaffected audiences, though often to little effect.
Unfortunately, there isn’t an easy fix to this. Cognitive biases are not inherently bad and there are plenty of instances where trust in institutions is essential to public safety, such as in medicine. Complete scepticism is unhealthy, as we have seen within the anti-vaxx movement, which evolved from scrutiny into misinformation. There is a fine line between trusting too much, and trusting too little, a line that I don’t know enough about to comment on. In place of that, I’ve linked some resources on authority bias, one is a fairly short article, the other is a much more in-depth academic paper. I recommend giving them a read if the topic interests you.
In short, lying about a piece of content’s origins, and taking advantage of psychological biases, acts as another layer to make accounts like SICS more effective at consolidating disinformation narratives in both pre-existing, vulnerable audiences and . The question must be asked then, what are those narratives?
I have spoken about almost everything except the content itself. I think it is worth noting here that many of the themes I am going to cover can be found over and over across all manner of pro-CCP media, from state television, to paid influencers. As Twitter splinters, the ability to recognise common disinformation narratives in the wild becomes increasingly important in identifying new sources, and the actors behind them.
Of these common disinformation narratives, denial of genocide in Xinjiang may be one of the most prevalent across Chinese backed outlets, to the point where I actively look for such posts. Even official embassies have posted such content on their websites. The frequency with which it is mentioned is likely down to its prevalence in counter-CCP activism. To be an effective influencer abroad, China needs to quash claims of domestic wrongdoing.
“Chinese Muslims of the Uyghur ethnicity are full of patriotism and love for country” (Archive)
“Forced misinformation! Another example of narrative framing!” (Archive)
“After a total investment of $27 billion last year in the Xinjiang tourism industries — the Chinese gov is forcing the Uyghurs to accept jobs in the tourism industry” (Archive)
For reference, the below links are from China Daily (Reportedly run by the Chinese Central Propaganda Department).
US disinformation campaigns on Xinjiang: A playbook of “thief crying ‘stop thief’”
China’s UN envoy rejects accusations over abuse of ethnic minorities
There are consistent anti-western undertones, though alone, this doesn’t make something disinformation or part of a coordinated influence effort. Instead, it is the framing of such content, replacing US involvement with Chinese involvement. Rejection of US aid and the benefits of trade with China are both prominent in their earlier content.
Beyond this, it also frequently comments on political events from around the world. Earlier, I mentioned that SICS can provide insight into ongoing information operations, which is only possible because they aren’t overtly affiliated with the Chinese state. Unlike other platforms (i.e. CGTN, Xinhua), they can make statements without it being seen as an official narrative. In the 5 days following the outbreak of conflict between RSF PMC and the Sudanese Army on 15 April 2023, they posted 28 tweets mentioning Sudan often accompanied by comments on western influence in Africa. These received fairly high traction, similarly to other accounts’ coverage of events around that time, though in their case it allowed them to further promote their content to East African audiences. From 7 April 2023 to 19 April 2023, they gained 275 followers. More recently, they have been posting about protests in France, using the hashtag ‘#FranceRiots’, and since early July, have frequently touched on Japan’s plan to discharge nuclear wastewater into the Pacific ocean. In both cases, elements of these events have been exaggerated to portray nations as either more chaotic, or intentionally dangerous, than they actually are.
In one case, SICS shared a video showing a rhino walking down an urban street, claiming it was released from the Paris zoo by protestors. In reality, the video, originally posted by an environmental activist on Instagram, is from 2019 and was taken near Chitwan National Park in Nepal.
So, where can we go from here? We’ve disproven their origins, looked to understand how they use people’s inherent biases to their own ends and the types of narratives they then promote. Before access to the Twitter API was closed, I downloaded SICS’ following list. Despite being 5 months outdated (Having been recorded on 8 April, 2023) and missing over 3000 new followers, it is still valuable to look into further. For instance, it shows they are followed by at least 29 Chinese officials, including the Chinese ambassador to Somalia, the Director of the Department of West Asian and North African Affairs and the Director of the Information Department of the Chinese MFA. It is also interesting to note that 106 accounts list their locations inside China, despite the platform being banned on Chinese internet. Given the prevalence of VPNs and the fact that as we’ve seen, this kind of self-reported information can be false, the accurate figure is potentially lower. However, many of those accounts still promote state-narratives, meaning the likelihood of them opposing Chinese internet regulation is low.
The spreadsheet also lists a number of interesting accounts including Ben Norton, a prominent “journalist” notable for his anti-western bias, Jerry’s China, a western influencer based in China who supposedly ‘debunked’ the Uyghur genocide in Xinjiang, and Iyoba, an anonymous influencer prevalent in East African audiences. These three deserve their own articles, but their presence shows how ingrained SICS is in the anti-West Twitter sphere and how large its influence is relative to its size.
If you’re interested, the spreadsheet can be found here.
This account isn’t alone in what it does. In the process of documenting SICS, I came across 4 other accounts, the largest of which has around 980 followers (As of 6 Aug 2023). Chinese disinformation outlets and influencers continue to promote the narrative that neocolonialism is a purely Western phenomenon, when in reality, nations in the Global South continue to face attacks on their national sovereignty originating from more powerful actors, notoriously Russia and China. More needs to be done to build digital resilience within targeted communities, though these efforts continue to face issues around regional instability, often themselves exacerbated by localised mis/disinformation campaigns and cultural divides.
Only by addressing the underlying issues and circumstances within communities, can we progress towards the development necessary for a more free and democratic world, resilient to these kinds of disinformation campaigns.
If you have questions about my research, please contact me at “rosa.noctis@proton.me”.
Thank you for reading :)
