Epistemological Art
Art as a philosophical inquiry
“to see’ is a verb of epistemic success, every seeing involves identification of kinds of objects or appearances, which means seeing them as similar to others of that kind” (Kenny, Cottingham and Hacker, 2010, p.355). Simon Cunningham’s taxidermy Duckrabbit (2007) is a hybrid of a duck and a rabbit created in response to the celebrated image employed by Ludwig Wittgenstein. The artwork consists of the head of the rabbit, positioned as though the animal is looking up, with a duck’s beak attached at the back. Wittgenstein believed there were two uses of the word ‘see’, the first being a claim to ‘see a likeness’ and the other to be ‘seen as’ (Kenny, Cottingham and Hacker, 2010, p. 355). He gives the analogy of ‘seeing a likeness between two faces’, “I observe a face, and then suddenly notice its likeness to another. I see that it has not changed; and yet I see it differently” (ibid). Wittgenstein notes that resemblance can obscure our perception, “we see with the mind as well as the eye” (Cunningham, 2012).
From first glance Duckrabbit (2007) may only appear as a duck however, as we notice the resemblance to a rabbit we are then ‘seeing a likeness’. The ability to notice similarities to each animal however, does requires prior knowledge; I must already know what a duck and rabbit look like individually (Boyle, 2009, section 46). The iconic image highlights the contrast between knowledge of an aspect (resemblance) and seeing it (the definition of the object). Even if human perception may appear interpretive, it does not change the form of the object. It is the unfolding ontology of ‘seeing’ that marks Duckrabbit (2007) as an epistemic artwork.
The word epistemology derives from the Greek “episteme”, meaning knowledge (Horrigan, 2007, p. vii). Epistemic philosophy therefore, concerns the creation and dissemination of knowledge and the knowable (ibid). It seeks to understand the nature of knowledge and how it resonates with similar concepts: truth, belief and justification (Horrigan, 2007, p. ix). According to epistemology, there are two ways that knowledge can be acquired; a priori and a posteriori. A priori is knowledge attained from independent experiences whereas, a posteriori is knowledge learnt from known facts or historic events (Horrigan, 2007, p.44).
The relationship between art and epistemology has acted as the catalyst for debate for centuries (Worth, n.d.). Knowledge obtained from art are a-priori or non-empirical due to the nature of the work being an experience and the response being subjective. Although aesthetics is an important part of art, epistemic artwork is more concerned with the concept; epistemic images are “images that contain more than just the visible, but also a processed higher understanding of the world: in short, knowledge” (Klinke, 2014, p.1). Epistemic art, highly conceptual by nature, problematizes the nature of the image. This essay will explore artistic strategies of inquiry into knowledge.
Epistemological artwork is extremely ambiguous as it raises questions about meaning and challenges our perception on reality. This type of work threatens our acquisition of general knowledge but offers no definite answers, which can in turn be extremely controversial; as later shown in Craig-Martins An Oak Tree (1973). For example, the correct way to view Duckrabbit (2007) is inconclusive, it poses two ways of ‘seeing’ and thus questions our perception but gives no answer. Vija Celmins’ To Fix the Image in Memory (1977–82) is a twenty-two-piece sculpture that consists of eleven stones and eleven replicated stones cast in bronze and painted identically to match the original natural forms (Celmins and Lingwood, 1996, p.76). The problematic unresolved questions displayed in this piece are not dissimilar to those in Duckrabbit (2007). Celmins also supplies us with a concept of ‘seeing’ and both pieces draw on the idea of an illusion but in a slightly different senses. To Fix the Image in Memory (1977–82) masks the illusion behind a bronze façade, we think we see the image as a stone however, we are actually only seeing its ‘likeness’. Celmins explores perception and belief as she aims ‘to create a challenge for your eyes’ (MoMA, 2006). It is clear that there is a philosophical endeavor that goes into the idea of looking and making as Celmins’ bronze castings sit mockingly beside the original forms (Celmins and Lingwood, 1996, p.78). Are Celmins’ casts epistemic objects?
Celmins’ ‘looking and making’ technique shares similarities to the famous idea of Plato’s theory of the forms; everything, in his postulation, is made ‘in the image’ of a form, all objects are merely copies (Dancy, 2004, p.i). Plato explained his theory of the forms through The Allegory of the Cave. However, it is the shadows in the story that appear most relevant to Celmins’ work. The Allegory famously begins with the description of the prisoners and the cave. The prisoners are shackled in one position unable to turn their heads. Behind the prisoners is a fire that casts shadows of statues and carvings (Plato. and Cornford, 1945, p. 227). The shadows are what the prisoners believe to be reality, like the bronzes casts, although they are merely a representation of the outside world or a true form (ibid). Eventually, one of the prisoners from the cave escapes and is forced to realise that he had believed in a distorted perception (Plato. and Cornford, 1945, p.228). Celmins’ work puts reality and belief side by side warning us of the problem of illusions.
An illusion is a misinterpreted sensory experience much like To Fix the Image in Memory (1977–82). Illusions appear threatening as they undermine empirical knowledge thus causing skepticism (O’Brien, n.d.). It is often difficult when there are two types of ‘seeing’ to comprehend which one is being experienced. Gestalt, a psychology term meaning ‘unidentified whole’ elaborated into a theory in the 1920’s. This theory concerns visual perception as it attempts to describe how the mind organizes visual elements into groups or ‘unidentified wholes’ (Gestalt Theory, 1900, p.3). However, when we have an illusion that shares such specific similarities such as Celmins stones, it is likely that our mind will subconsciously place the stones and casts into the same visual group. In turn this would increase skepticism. A problem is now posed as our perception is being threatened which naturally forms questions surrounding the work, including its origin and purpose. Very clearly, the work displays consummate craftsmanship in their creation but this should be understood as the vehicle and not the content of the work. These stones are, in effect, philosopher’s stones, objects of epistemological speculation.
The discussion concerning the ‘designer’ of the stones is then provoked; can it be said that both sets of objects have designers? Does one designer bare more intelligence? The philosophical questions that arise are not dissimilar to the analogy of the watchmaker by William Paley, made in the teleological argument; a study of natural objects and their apparent purpose (Paley, Eddy and Knight, 2006, p. xvii). Paley gives the analogy of a watch discovered on a heath; the watch could not have accumulated naturally, unlike the stone (ibid). Therefore, it must have an intelligent designer. The watch is thought to be too intelligent and purposefulness to not have a designer however it can also be argued that natural occurrences, such as the creation of the world are too precise and purposeful to be arbitrary. Celmins uses both the original forms and the bronze casts allowing us to critique and compare. We know Celmins is the designer of the bronze cast stones however, this leads us to question the creator of the natural original stones. Does this then give To Fix the Image in Memory (1977–82) religious connotations?
Religious themes in art has always been present; a third of the paintings in the National Gallery have religious connotations, most of which derive from Christianity (The National Gallery, London, n.d.). However, it was Michael Craig-Martin’s controversially captivating An Oak Tree (1973) that contained uncanny similarities to epistemic art and its problematic nature.
Placed on a small glass shelf like those found in a bathroom (Craig-Martin, 2000, p.119) stands An Oak Tree (1973). The artwork consists of a glass of water that has undergone a ‘unique’ and ‘conceptual’ transformation into an oak tree under the supervision of Craig-Martin. For the purpose of this artwork the glass of water is not identifying as itself in order to help represent the ontology (Craig-Martin, 2000, p.119). Underneath the intellectually alluring ‘glass of water’ is a plaque containing an interview/conversation between Craig-Martin himself and curator Jonathan Watkins. The interview begins with Craig-Martin giving a description of the work, “What I’ve done is change a glass of water into a full-grown oak tree without altering the accidents of the glass of water” (Craig-Martin, 1973). He goes on to expand his meaning of ‘accidents’ (colour, feel, weight and size) and argues that the work does not symbolize an oak tree but in fact now holds the substance of an oak tree, aside from its appearance. Epistemic objects are constantly being materially redefined (Craig-Martin, 2000, p.118), “they acquire new properties and change the ones they have. But this also means that objects of knowledge can never be fully attained, that they are, if you wish, never quite themselves.” (Knorr, 2001, p.190)
An Oak Tree (1973), which was initially displayed first in the Rowan Gallery in 1974, is one of Craig-Martins most celebrated works, as Damien Hirst insisted: “That piece is, I think, the greatest piece of conceptual sculpture” (Connolly, 2007). It is clearly heavily inspired by Marcel Duchamp and his Fountain (1917), a conceptual icon from the twentieth century who rejected painting due to his belief that art had become anti-intellectual and restrictive (Craig-Martin, 2000, p.129). Craig-Martins work tests the limit of conceptual art by using mundane objects to serve a greater purpose. “The ability to believe that an object is something other than its physical appearance indicates and requires a transformative vision” (Manchester, 2002). The seeing and knowing formed from this is where conceptual thinking stems from (Craig-Martin, 2000, p.118)
If Craig-Martin has not just simply ‘re-named a glass of water’, is it just it’s aesthetics that are preventing us from the truth? To appreciate Craig-Martins work it is vital that we step out of the context of general perception; “I try to get rid of as much meaning as I can. People’s need to find meanings, to create associations, renders this impossible” (Michael Craig-Martin, 1968–1989, p.73). Creating associations is subconscious and subjective, however the individual associations that are made are not always cohesive or correct. It is the associations that cloud the objective way to view Craig-Martin’s method. In the Analogy of the Cave, Plato uses the escaped prisoner as a representative of Philosophers with a deeper understand of the world (Plato. and Cornford, 1945, p. 227). Once the escaped prisoner returns with knowledge beyond what is believed to be empirical, the other prisoners refuse to listen (ibid). Is Craig-Martin prompting us towards an insight into something that perception is blind sighting us from? Or he simply mocking religion and art?
The epistemological oak tree undoubtedly interrogates our perception of knowledge and challenges faith as well as playing on the concept of skepticism (Ranalli, n.d.) similar to Celmins’ To Fix the Image in Memory (1977–82). An Oak Tree (1973) consists of familiar objects such as the glass of water and a bathroom shelf, that are already laced with associations. The Gestalt Theory would suggest that these items have been categorized in terms of context to make it easier for the brain to comprehend (Gestalt Theory, 1900, p.3). However, due to the objects being used outside of their generic associational context, the viewer may begin to feel skeptical; Craig-Martin argues that association by perception subtracts from any other meaning (Craig-Martin, 2000, p.118). The interview that accompanies the work also appears to undermine our knowledge further as the artist claims to defy the laws of physics by changing one object into another. Although we know that the artist cannot have achieved what he is stating, his concept still threatens empirical knowledge, so how can we be sure? Cartesian Skepticism seeks to explain how knowledge of a higher world is possible since we simply cannot know (Ranalli, n.d.). How is it that Craig-Martin is claiming to have achieved something of a higher power? Is it even possible for us to attain that level of knowledge?
It is thought that religious believers will argue for the existence of God regardless of the fact that their argument may be weak; the more they argue the more watered down the argument becomes. Their faith is so strong that their ‘argument’ will never be undermined (Schmucker, 2013). In Antony Flews ‘Reason and Responsibility’ (1968) The Parable of the Invisible Gardener was published. The parable concerns two explorers who come across a clearing in the jungle consisting of flowers and weeds (Mitchell, 1978, p.114). One of the explorers believes that there must be a gardener but no gardener was ever seen. The explorer goes on to state that “Perhaps he is an invisible gardener” (Flew and MacIntyre, 1955) and they begin to take every precaution to catch the gardener. However, they still have no luck. The believer is still not disheartened and claims “there is a gardener, invisible, intangible, insensible to electric shocks, a gardener who has no scent and makes no sound, a gardener who comes secretly to look after the garden which he loves” (ibid). The Skeptic then disputes the believer asking what remains from his original point inquiring how his gardener differs form an imaginary gardener (Mitchell, 1978, 115). The parable claims that religious believers shift their argument so much that the claims they are without foundation; indeed, they are barely statements at all. Flew calls this the ‘death of a thousand qualifications’ (Jacobs, 2008, p.23).
The transformation of the water to an oak tree is based on the act of transubstantiation, the Catholic belief that the bread and wine becomes body and blood of Christ while remaining as its original form (Craig-Martin, 2000, p.119). To religious believers the transubstantiation appears completely rational in the context of the Eucharist. However, Craig-Martins artwork poses the same concepts as transubstantiation but has been heavily criticised by some for being ‘unreasonable’. With a religious upbringing Craig-Martin believes that faith is a fundamental part of the functioning of this artwork (Craig-Martin, 2000, p.119). Transubstantiation and An Oak Tree (1973) both claim the same miraculous results and both are incompatible with empirical knowledge; the difference, of course, is that one is widely accepted and protected by religious believers.
There are claims and embedded religious connotations made by Craig-Martin in the interview with Watkins that interrogate religious beliefs. There is a fine line between Craig-Martin’s work and blasphemy; “It seems to me that you are claiming to have worked a miracle. Isn’t that the case?” (Watkins, 1978). Although it may appear that Craig-Martin is challenging the attributes of God assigned by religious believers, the answers are so abstract that no real clarification is given. Even though Craig-Martin is not specifically claiming to have the attributes of God, are his actions bold enough to suggest otherwise? Transubstantiation can only be performed by priest who have been given the power to perform this miracle by God. The act is clearly deemed to be a miracle meaning that it has been recognised to be beyond human capability (Levine, 1989, p.134). This goes back to the parable of the invisible gardener; religious believers will always appear to have an argument or an excuse for religion whether it appears logical or not. Is the work, then, merely a cheap parody? In short, no. The work seeks seriously to explore issues of epistemology and the issue of ‘faith’ in relation to its meaning.
Joseph Kosuth’s 1965 installation One and Three Chairs (1965) presents the knotty problems of semiotics, the study of signs and symbols and their use or interpretation. The work comprises a three-piece instillation put together by Kosuth, consisting of an object, a photograph of the object and a dictionary definition of the object (Haden-Guest, 1998, p. 25). This formulaic artwork was replicated by Kosuth who continuously changed the subject however, only ever replaced them with other familiar objects: a shovel, hammer, lamp and a photograph which included a photograph of the photograph and a definition of the word ‘photograph’. The objects act as a projection merely to enable his point thus uncovering the ontology.
In One and Three Chairs (1965) the chair becomes the subject and object of the artwork. The chair represented as an object, is placed against a wall. To its left hangs the dictionary definition of the chair and on the right, a photograph of the chair which is accurately sized (Haden-Guest, 1998, p. 25). Kosuth is questioning our association to the chair; is the way we perceive and recognise what a chair is shifted through it being an object, a photograph or a written definition? His work also authenticates the problematic nature and evident difference between language and perception.
Kosuth’s work undeniably presents the concept of semiotics by using three different signifiers (forms) to express the same word. The two main models of what constitutes as a sign were put forward by Linguist Ferdinand de Saussure and philosopher Charles Peirce (Chandler, 2004, p. 17). Saussure put forwards a two-part model of a sign. His definition of a sign consisted of a ‘signifier’, the form of the sign and the ‘signified’, the concept which it represents (Chandler, 2004, p. 18). Pierce claimed that signs consisted of three parts: a representation, an object and an interpretant or more simply symbol, icon and index (Chandler, 2004, p.33). The symbol is a type of sign that has has been attained through habit for example the word ‘play’ and the sign of a triangle have no necessary connection however through its conventional purpose the two correlate. An icon is simply a sign that looks physically similar to its representative. An index concerns the direct connection between the word and sign for example, smoke is an index of fire. A sign would be placed inside one of three categories, each judged independently on its relationship between the sign itself and its meaning (Chandler, 2004, p.36).
Saussure argued further that there were no real suggestions between the signifier and the signified for example, the word ‘chair’ has no actual relation to the object, the essence of a chair could be carried by any string of letters (Chandler, 2004, p.20). Peirce’s definition of symbols is something that is learnt or has become normalised. To Peirce, names of objects that are not onomatopoeic fall into this category. Kosuth uses three representations of a chair, that we can categories according to: symbols, icons or index. The photograph of a chair and the object can both be an icon and an index as they are physically similar and have a direct connection to a chair. However, the definition of the object is a very different type of sign; it can be placed under ‘index’ due to its direct connection and arguably ‘symbol’. However, they are all symbolic of the same idea therefore is the concept of symbols arbitrary? How can we capture everything about an object in one symbol? Kosuth is trying to show us that there cannot simply be one symbol per object. The object has so many different representatives that one symbol is not enough. Can an object have more than one symbol? Wouldn’t one symbol always represent the idea better? In short, no. There is no ‘correct’ answer to which of Kosuth’s chairs demonstrates a symbol best simply because the answer is subjective. The ideal representation of a sign to some may be the object itself while others seek a description.
Does Kosuth’s work require prior knowledge of objects? Is Kosuth touching on the idea of ‘forms’? Plato believed that we have knowledge of objects in the physical world from innate knowledge which is inherited from our contact with the forms before we enter the physical world (Kraut, 1992, p.213). For example, we can know a table through it’s physicality: it is solid, has a surface top, has a certain amount of legs and is usually made from a certain material (ibid). However, it is the essence of a table that we have prior knowledge of; what it is to be a table. The ‘essence’ of an object is what makes a chair a chair despite all its physical variations (Kraut, 1992, p.203). If all objects have an essence, then how we perceive the symbol of a chair is irrelevant. Kosuth uses a very basic chair as the object and photograph. Its aesthetics are so generic that it cannot encompass or represent all chairs thus deeming it arbitrary.
While being concerned with semiotics, Kosuth explores how language can differ or become complex when discussing tangible and intangible things. One and Three Chairs (1965) only discusses a tangible object however if Kosuth applied the concept of love to his ‘artistic fomula’ the logistic complications of discussing intangible things would be apparent. Kosuth believed that if we could understand words like ‘chair’ there was the possibility of replacing them with words that convey an abstract meaning (Haden-Guest, 1998, p. 27). The problematic nature of discussing abstract concepts meaningfully occurred in the verification principle. Human language can be used for tangible objects however; language has its limitations (Fieser, 2000, p.228).
One and Three Chairs (1965) includes the definition of a chair. The language within the definition has quite specific lexis to a chair, ‘seat with a back’, ‘arms’, ‘seat for an office’. However, some of this language can also be used to discuss other concepts such as human anatomy. The point is, without knowing the context, can we still distinguish the concept of a chair? Wittgenstein believed that we are all part of the language game; one of his most famous ideologies first put forwards in his book: Philosophical Investigations, 1953. The language that we individually use can only be understood in the context of the game (Blair, 2006, p.129). For example, whilst playing monopoly (a board game), the language used within the game will only be meaningful to the participants; outside the game the words are useless. If language is misinterpreted the words cannot be understood in their truest form and therefore, to Wittgenstein, language is only meaningful in context (Blair, 2006, p.131).
Magritte’s Ceci n’est pas une Pipe (1968) also poses the problems of semiotics. In 1968 the surrealist painter used paint to explore the vexed philosophical issue of the relation between words, image and object, much like Kosuth (Foucault, 1983, p.17). Magritte painted The Treachery of Images (1966) which included Ceci n’est pas une Pipe (1968); a painted pipe that dominates the center of a beige canvas with the script ‘Ceci n’est pas une pipe (“This is not a pipe”) (ibid). The philosophical problem of Magritte’s work is that the image of an object can never be the object itself. An artist observes objects in order to make work however, if the objects are already copies of the true forms, then the artwork couldn’t be an accurate representation of the original form. Plato claimed that artists are already twice removed from ideas and thus can only achieve a likeness (Plato: “Politeia” 597a-598a).
In discussing producing a ‘likeness’ we are obliged to revisit Plato’s theories of the forms and more specifically The Analogy of the Cave and Dualism (Blakesley and Brooke, 2001, p.4). Dualists believe that true forms cannot embody physical forms and therefore everything in our world is merely an imperfect copy. The ‘physical’ and the ‘intellectual’ can be perceived equally, but cannot be equality itself (Calef, n.d.). For example, “we perceive beautiful things but not Beauty itself” (ibid). Magritte ‘explains’ that we can appreciate the idea of a pipe but we cannot know the pipe itself from the painting. The pipe is seen as ‘a representation of a pipe, once removed from its referent, the object to which it refers.’ (Blakesley and Brooke, 2001, p3); Plato’s statement regarding artists being twice removed again becomes relevant.
Ceci n’est pas une Pipe (1928–1929) is also a symbol in itself. Like Kosuth, Magritte tackles semiotics using words, an image of a pipe and the object of a canvas (Foucault, 1983, p.5). In this case the signifier (form) is the pipe and the signified is the concept of all pipes. Magritte has selected a very generic pipe as a signifier and unlike Kosuth, only offers one example of a sign. In order for the pipe to be an ‘icon’ (a sign that looks similar to its representative) it must have physical similarities but there are so many variations of a pipe that cannot correlate with Magritte’s generic image. The generic nature of the pipe does not display a likeness to all pipes making the symbol arbitrary. As we then compare the pipe to an ‘index’ sign (the direct connection between the word and sign) under the impression that ‘all pipes can be smoked’ we are faced with the problem that Magritte’s pipe cannot be smoked because it is merely a painting. It becomes apparent that Ceci n’est pas une Pipe (1968) offers us nothing more than the essence of a pipe as it cannot be symbolic; it is merely an illusion.
Although we may not divide our attention to detail equally between both the text and the image, Magritte uses a combination of words and imagery in his work. Could one exist without the other? The single statement, does not have much significance outside its context due to its ambiguity and the pipe although it still holds the properties against being a pipe, cannot articulate its point thus the the two must coexisting. Magritte uses the sentence ‘this is not a pipe’ to prove a point of limitations. Do we gain any knowledgeable through this sentence? Apophatic theology, also known as Negative theology concerns making statements about what an object is not (Coward, Foshay and Derrida, 1992, p.2). This theology was put in place in order to allow statements to be made about intangible concepts i.e. God. Human Language is only suited to discussing physical objects which limits language greatly. The verification principle, put forwards by AJ Ayer, believed that statements regarding subjective concepts were all meaningless because they couldn’t be empirically verified. (Fieser, 2000, p.228). One way around this problem was to make statements about what it is not, rather attempting a description (ibid). It was thought that we could gain knowledge through the process of illumination. Is Magritte initiating a similar theory by turning his sentence into a negative?
Carsten Höller Soma (2010) was first displayed at the Hamburger Bahnhof in Berlin. In a converted railway station separated into two halves, the exhibition was temporarily homed to twelve reindeer. Occupying the two sand-filled pens in the center of the exhibition, six reindeer always remained in each pen. Placed between the two pens is Höller Double Mushroom Clock (2010) a collection of enormous fiberglass sculptures of the notoriously hallucinogenic mushrooms. These range from the iconic red and white polka dot mushrooms known as amanita muscaria to other species such as Puffball and King Bolete (Ré, 2016, p.23). Attached to either end of the clock are two large branches to help the reindeer to retain healthy antlers however, as they push against the branches they also rotate the ‘clock’ (ibid).
The reindeer are not the only animals in this exhibition. Höller’s masterpiece includes two steel cages, which each home five canaries’, suspended over the reindeer pen along with two glass cases containing two field mice each (one black and one white) and two clear boxes with a regularly replaced housefly. It is an intrusion of sensations from the canaries to the smells of the reindeer which draws on the philosophical study of the ontology. Soma (2010) also has a ‘scientific’ basis. The animals are all consistently separated into two evenly divided groups that are displayed side by side which induce a comparison. It is the apparent consistency of symmetry that first encourages the idea of the exhibition as an experiment. There is a definite hierarchical structure within Soma (2010). Viewers are limited to oversee the exhibition from raised pathways and raised platforms that overlook the converted station. The participants that are willing to spend the most money get the best experience, an over night stay, completing the hierarchy.
There are two definitions of the word soma the first being, ‘the body as distinct from the soul, mind or psyche’ and the second ‘an intoxicating drink prepared from a plant and used in Vedic ritual, believed to be the drink of the gods’ (Oxford Dictionaries, 2016). It was the ancient Aryan people that prepared the ritual drink during the Vedic period however, to this day there are many theories regarding its botanical ingredient. During this period, Soma was considered as a god, a plant and as the early equivalent to Amrita: food of the immortals (Leonti and Casu, 2014, p.374) Höller is testing the hypothesis of ethnomycology: the study of the historical use of fungi. Gordon Wasson, a renowned mycologist, put forwards his ontology of amanita muscaria (the hallucinogenic mushroom) in his book, Mushrooms Russia and History 1957. Wasson believed that the hallucinogenic plant was the psychoactive ingrediant of Soma (Ré, 2016, p.23). It was historically believed that the mushrooms would transport the mind, allowing us to see ‘beyond life’ and to travel backwards and forwards in time (Wasson and Wasson, 1957, p 207). Wasson even went as far as to claim that through this experience we could know God (ibid). Thus, making amanita muscaria mushrooms objects of epistemology. Höller’s clever choice of reindeer is in response to Wasson’s belief that the animals filter and purify the hallucinogenic (Ré, 2016, p. 26) which gives the collection of reindeer urine purpose. Amanita muscaria originates from the Siberian north where it was believed that shaman consume the mushroom when performing rituals enabling them to access the ‘spiritual’ world while curing and making diagnostics (McNamara, 2006, p.5).
Everything in Soma (2010) is in two halves, representing the binary belief system. The field mice are a very simple but obvious example of this query into choice. The definition of binary means ‘involving two’ or ‘a whole composed of two’ (Dictionary, 2016). Höller has specifically displayed two mice per unit, one mouse is black and the other white. Black and white are opposing concepts that have an embedded relationship. Derrida, a French philosopher put forward his views of binary opposition in his book Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences (1966- 1978). This simply suggests there are only two ways of thinking (Pooke and Newall, 2008, p.141). It implies that any word or concept contains both a positive and its opposite: ‘man’ and ‘woman’ (ibid). When we are asked a question of gender the answer can only be either man or woman. These words are related by concept and cannot exist alone. This method of thinking concerns a factual logic; it is either hard or soft, black or white. Similarly, Höller’s work either concerns the intangible or it does not. He believes that the hallucinogen can inform knowledge. Binary opposition would suggest that it either does or it doesn’t. However, not all methods of thinking can be binary as it is narrow minded approach that doesn’t allow for many other modes of thinking, such as the concept of intuition; understanding a concept through instinct.
Höller’s exhibition is designed to appear as a laboratory with the underlined possibility of uncovering the botanical ingredient of Soma. It is assumed that half the reindeer were explicitly given access to the hallucinogenic mushrooms but Höller leaves it unclear as to which half has had hallucinogens and which has not. This approach leaves us with a binary and dualistic perspective when observing the two sets of reindeer. Although Höller has a background in science, he found methodological freedom through art which fueled this experiment (Ré, 2016, p.27). The methods and dates were therefore left ambiguous a written conclusion of his results was never released.
Two refrigerators full of amanita muscaria mushrooms and reindeer urine samples which are locked during the day inform further the idea of a scientific experiment. The samples and strategically placed equipment induces skepticism about the concept of Soma (2010). It is extremely unclear as to what is being tested. Is Höller testing the purification of the hallucinogen in the samples of the urine or does this experiment concerned the hallucinogenic effect on the behavior of the animals? The collection of urine was consistent however, the samples were never labeled appearing arbitrary and careless after the laborious method of this ‘experiment’. Soma (2010) offers the unique experience to stay over night. The hallucinogenic mushroom cabinet is unlocked and unattended, allowing participants free access. Is Höller luring in participants through temptation? The access to the cabinet is seemingly ‘forbidden’ which already induces interest and wonder. In comparison with to the parable of the Garden of Eden, Höller acts as the serpent coaxing participants to try the forbidden fruit. However, instinctive knowledge informs us that there is uncertainty and danger thus making us skeptical.
With amanita muscaria comes the promise of ‘experiential enlightenment’ (Ré, 2016, p.24). Is it this idea of an altered mind or ‘seeing beyond’ that Höller is trying to show us? We are so afraid of the unknown and skeptical towards anything that threatens perception that we choose to remain naïve. This draws on a resemblance to the escaped prisoner in The Analogy of the Cave returning to tell the other prisoners what he has discovered (Plato. and Cornford, 1945, p. 227). The prisoners simply are not interested. If we decline the idea of the hallucinogen are we denying knowledge? Höller doesn’t preach his ontology without experience. A large body of his work consisted of experimenting with the hallucinogens from taking the narcotic to their aesthetics. His earlier works include Muscimol (1996) a video instillation of himself allegedly intoxicated by the mushrooms and Down Mushroom Room (2000) large fiberglass amanita muscaria mushrooms hung from the ceiling similar to the mushrooms in Double Mushroom Clock (2010). Doubt and uncertainty appear to be recurring themes within Höller’s work which often take on the form as a laboratory situation, participatory sculptures and “influential environments (Pousette, 2015, p7) such as Soma (2010). Höller’s work demands to be felt and appreciated in full through a unique and personal experience (ibid).
Inspired by Wasson’s concept of the hallucinogen being the missing ingredient of Soma, Höller is deeply interested in the illusive state and a different way of ‘seeing’. It was historically believed that these mushrooms could transport the mind to see beyond ‘the norm’ and therefore enabling us to reach God (Wasson and Wasson, 1957, p 207). To Höller these mushrooms are epistemic objects. Soma (2010) successfully creates a semi illusive environment with reindeer and giant mushroom prompting the idea of a hallucinogenic experience. When the mind begins to hallucinate it creates a seemingly real perception of something that is not actually there (Dictionary, 2016). It was believed that that these hallucinations have correlations to experiences with God. Are these experiences just illusions: a misinterpreted sensory experience? Or is it possible that they are important epistemological sensory experiences.
The experience from hallucinogens appear of an intangible and ineffable nature. Intangible experiences have no physical presence and are difficult to understand due to the limitations of our language and its incapability to describe non-physical concepts. If the experience claims to be one of religious value, we are then faced with the criteria of a religious experience. According to philosopher Richard Swinburn there are five types of religious experiences: public, private, visions, numinous and conversion (Swinburne, 1979, p.295). The ‘religious’ experience would be placed into a category depending its nature. For example, if the experience claims to be a vision did it brings knowledge: an intellectual vision, strengthens faith: an imaginary vision or was there an external present: a corporeal vision (ibid). Höller’s work doesn’t claim to be religious nor does it concern language however, instead it represents its ontology through a visual and conceptual experience thus escaping these specific problems.
The contrasting ways of ‘seeing’ bring us to the statement “I saw it but I did not perceive it” (Celmins and Lingwood, 1996, p.76) which sums up the problematic nature of epistemological art. Although it is deemed problematic it is also an important philosophical endeavor into knowledge of the highest form. It is by knowledge that we know ourselves; a hybrid of perception and knowledge that entices and disenchants. Epistemology can take the form of any object, it has no limitations. From ready-made objects like Craig-Martins An Oak Tree (1973) and Cunninghams Duckrabbit (2007) to sensory experience displayed by Höller in Soma (2010) it is clear that epistemology continues as a theme among modern artists. Allowing us to show and be shown new ways of seeing and understanding. To be fully immersed in a space, a painting, a time that could not exist otherwise. Epistemic art is a beautifully poetic combination of knowledge and art. Does this therefore deem epistemological art to be the most important form of art?
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