Thanks for reading, David.
Berny Belvedere
51

I understand your series is a philosophical overview. I did not mean to suggest that you personally are making the argument. Indeed, just in this article you present two separate accounts of morality tied to a god.

It is also worth acknowledging that you are not presenting philosophical arguments for God’s existence. Rather you are just observing arguments concerning morality. I also suppose it was lazy of me to simply claim question begging. Surely in the case of the moral argument for God’s existence, such a response seems to be question begging. 
 
 If God does not exist, objective moral values and duties do not exist. Objective moral values and duties exist. Therefore, God exists.”
 
 To say that God does not command the good because it is good or that something is good because he commanded it but rather that God commands something because he is good makes the argument “If God does not exist, then God’s values and duties do not exist. God’s values and duties exist. Therefore, God exists.” i.e. begging the question.
 
 What I am trying to say is that the response doesn’t really answer the question. Is God’s nature good from some objective standard or is good defined by God’s nature? If the first, than what is good (or moral) must have a foundation aside from God and if the latter then the good (or moral) is subject to God’s nature. I don’t mean to burden you with defending a position you didn’t present or perhaps don’t espouse but am curious if you are aware of reasonable responses to this concern. 
 
 I don’t find Divine command theory persuasive. In my opinion it could be a reasonable account for morality, I just don’t see how it could be for objective morality. “Grounding something in God is subjective, in a sense, but it is also constitutive of reality as a whole.” I am not really sure I follow, what explanatory value or relevance does the concept of a God add to morality in an objective sense?
 
 “…this way makes right and wrong a fundamentally subjective enterprise (since God is a person), but it’s not subjective in the significant or relevant sense.” I suppose I am suggesting the opposite, if objective morality is somehow contingent on a God then such morality is not objective in a significant or relevant sense. 
 
 Just to clarify, I am not arguing that God is or isn’t necessary for morality, nor am I saying that morality is or isn’t absolute. I am suggesting that it seems divine command theory and objective morality are not compatible.

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