Why does Ben White take so long on throw-ins?
And other details you might have missed in Arsenal’s least-noticed set-piece
To avoid this becoming another hefty read, a very quick intro. The headline question has plagued me for a while, and led me down the set-piece wormhole of throw-ins and how Arsenal utilise them in general; you’ll rarely seen throw-ins (especially non-Delap ones) cared for, being the runt of the set-piece litter, so hopefully this can shine a bit more light and love onto them. I’ve split the resultant discussion into 5 core components, starting with the specific players and ending with a more general gameplan, so feel free to pick and choose what you’re interested in or take it piece by piece (as they can be mostly digested independently of one another). Enjoy!
Why does Ben White take so long on throw-ins?
So looking at the first question now — what is Ben White doing? Firstly, to remove chance of confirmation bias, he definitely does take longer than most, but not to a truly insane extent. Whilst numbers are difficult for this, (and frankly a bit unimportant due to time consumption on set-plays being far more of a ‘feeling’ than just the objective seconds) in Wyscouts 11 second clips for ‘Attacking throw-ins’, we will very often see Ben White already being moaned at by the opposition and occasionally the ref at the start of these clips. Despite this, White has been booked just twice for throw-in timewasting this season, once at Brentford, once at home to Nottingham Forest, both while leading, meaning that whilst we know he takes his time, he clearly knows what the general referee limit is for these sorts of things in most cases given he is yet to receive his 5-card ban.
Whilst Tomiyasu also engages in this habit (ahem, Crystal Palace anyone?), White is far more culpable of those on the RHS. My general theory for why this is has a few prongs.
First, White’s throws are low, and often bounce before the receiver — if going forwards at least — so require a fair amount of player movement to allow us the route for these throw-ins to be successful (see below with Ødegaard moving to create the lane to Saka). Tomiyasu’s throws meanwhile are far ‘loopier’ and tend to go above opposition and often longer, slightly removing the need for players to create space, as markers and blockers can be negated easier. It’s also important to note that in general potential receivers come a lot tighter to White than they do to Tomiyasu — partially I imagine due to the throwing range and type from above, and partially due to a general idea that White is far better at controlling in tight spaces than Tomiyasu if the ball has to come back his way. With this sort of suffocation, player movement becomes far more vital and White is essentially beholden to the lane being opened for him by everyone else — making this less of a White issue and more of an everyone issue (didn’t love writing that).
When going backwards meanwhile, there is a lot of focus on conglomerating players in front on him, clearing the home route to enable White’s flatter throws to come off with minimal chance of interception. This is also a nice way for Arsenal to set-up well for a possession phase deeper in the opposition half, which works better and better the deeper the throw is. White will look for agesssss at Saka et al, before quickly switching to an open Saliba who is anywhere from 40 yards up to about 60–70, where he can establish a good presence in the opposition half. This is the equivalent of a short corner in throw-in terms, and we see this more and more as we approach the final third (where it arguably becomes more valuable to establish a first-line presence in possession).
It’s also definitely true that this is time management, as we see later in losing gamestates e.g. West Ham in The Bobbins. In these moments, White goes longer and throws faster, suggesting that the modal action of ‘sitting on the ball’ is a useful outlet for dictating the tempo of build-up (hard to judge this practice so far though, which is a good thing honestly).
Side note — this may be partially why Arsenal struggled a bit vs Newcastle. In the throws there, any receiver is being pressed relentlessly, meaning it’s still effectively building on their terms, damaging the impact of any tempo control.
Further regarding tempo, the irritation this causes especially away from home cannot be understated. Ben White is a total bastard (in-game), and so utilising him in all set-piece aspects to get under the skin of opposition and opposition fans is perfect, and very effectively at unsettling structures and mentalities. This is much more pseudoscience I’m aware, but this is essentially saying ‘No, we’ll be taking this at our pace, thank you very much’, and the act refusing to be beholden to opposition hype is a mature one. With this and the above in mind, whilst it certainly seems like a Ben White Thing, this reeks of ‘Arteta Mentalidad’ and Jover’s detail-oriented planning with White’s strengths being purposefully maximised.
Is the left-hand side similar, and if not, why the hell not?
The question naturally follows is ‘is this a wider tactic that holds on the left, if this is Jover and Arteta’s doing more than the players?’, and the answer is I guess sometimes? But unsurprisingly this is personnel-based much like the RHS.
With Tomiyasu as LB, the tactic is occasionally similar as he goes long and high still, but in general the throws are taken with far more urgency on this side — especially when further towards halfway/own half. A lot of this is to do with Zinchenko honestly, whose immaculate control makes it fairly simple to get Arsenal out of the tight jam they partially enforce on themselves — Arsenal allow themselves to be more ‘boxed in’ with Zinchenko and White, which is a big display of confidence in their fundamentals (not saying Tomiyasu doesn’t have this, but there is a fairly big drop off from their work to his in tight spaces). Whilst the tightness around White is partially due to player movements being key and White’s reduced range, for Zinchenko it is more to engineer a specific pattern: Zinchenko -> midfielder 1/2 touch -> Zinchenko -> Gabriel/Saliba
And for some proof of White’s skill in tight spaces while we’re here:
The players are positioned and the CM always moves with respect to this lane, making sure to offer that outlet which Zinchenko invariably finds — see Ødegaard vs Wolves. It looks lovely, and is basically only possible because Zinchenko’s a technical demon. As a result of this regulated pattern, there is far less need to wait for significant player movement — it just needs a LW/L8 pinning forwards, probably Gabriel pinning a marker backwards, and then typically Ødegaard or Rice to break free of their marker to then return the pass and allow us to build.
I theorise that this is partially personal preference, where Zinchenko is just a full time tempo dictator and likes to instigate play, whereas White in general is more laidback, but this is purely vibes-based intuition and should be taken with a VVD post-LFC v MUFC amount of salt.
Do we have any go-tos for our throw-ins?
Beyond this generalised left and right dynamics, Arsenal do have some more specific set-plays, much like the Zinchenko one, and this makes me want to go back in time to bully Nicolas Jover at school because dear me this is so nerdy.
Continuing on the left-hand side, in recent weeks we’ve been establishing a far-corner throw presence, typically as a result of Martinelli gunning it at opposition fullbacks. The images below show the setup we’ve been using when in these:
Breaking this down then. Martinelli (far right) will pin opposition markers by sitting deep to the end touchline, which is his favourite space, meaning the opposition are limited in how tightly they can enclose the thrower. The striker meanwhile, Trossard here, sits on the edge to maintain this circle of freedom for both the thrower and any other movement that can happen — pinning ~3 himself. The DM — Jorginho here — moves further forward — to establish this space and maintain a nice separation in markers. The L8 is then sat closer to the thrower to both pin the RW and act as an outlet option, with the RB coming over to give a deeper option/counterpresser.
The result of this is variable depending on how shit-scared the opposition are. Burnley were very scared, and so this was grasped as an opportunity to skip the midblock and force them into their deeper block, with Saliba retrieving nice and high up. Sevilla meanwhile decided to keep it cosy around the thrower (being Tomiyasu here), and so Yasu does what he does and goes high and long to a waiting Martinelli who can then attack the box
Moving to both sides now, another oft-used tactic is honestly quite funny. Shown here with Saka and White, the play requires a player not intending to take the throw to collect the ball, whilst the real thrower establishes themselves on the line. The ball is then passed from player to thrower on the line, and almost immediately returned to the other player as he becomes active when entering the pitch. Despite being aggressive foul-throw bait, this is super useful for gaining territory in the final third, as it stops the winger being locked up when having to earn themselves space, and also increases the pace of attacks near the ‘action areas’ which is ideal.
The third and perhaps most effective tactic Arsenal run is roughly in the same area as the second, perhaps a little bit further adrift from the goalline. The principle is that a runner (the regulars here are the winger or Ødegaard) to come short inside the defensive ‘circle’, only to then drift back round along the goalline, moving behind the marker and what people would assume is ‘out of the danger zone’ for a thrower in this sort of area: no short possession, and at the whim of the CB if we go long. As this loop is happening, thanks to the width (which CB nor FB will follow to), the throw can go directly into the path of the runner, for a threatening possession inside the box — between 18- and 6-yard lines — where the attacking unit can look to take advantage of the far-side runners now in a bunch of space as a result of the natural gravity of a throw-in.
This acts as a nice combination of a couple of Tetaisms we see in general play. First is the confidence to get the wingers/playmakers on the touchline and running towards net, which makes defending a massive pain in the ass and gives a bunch of angles for passing as the defenders are sucked towards the own net — Martinelli especially is prone to this type of run. Second is the famous ‘pass into the path’ that gained specific hype from its core role in the White-Saka relationship, which we also see with Ødegaard’s short corner tactics from before, enabling the runner onto the front foot and not ‘battling’ the inertia of the ball.
There have been instances where it doesn’t quite work, see Trossard in the clip below, where the timing is slightly off and the player receiving back-to-goal: this essentially kills the momentum this throw is meant to generate, but it’s a rare miscommunication. A goal or two should’ve also come from this, notably against City in the strongest argument for Gabriel Jesus RW we may ever have (below).
The tactics here are fundamentally annoying for a defending team, wherein operating on assumed plays opens up a lot of space for alternatives or isolations: if you cover the byline curve of Ødegaard, Saka and White are in a 2v1. If you cover that, then Saliba is afforded more space to approach higher up and establish an even higher first line presence. If you cover this then Rice or the striker can drift over and offer quick 1–2s which White and Zinchenko are both very capable of. The only one feasibly stoppable is the Saka handoff, and even this gives the Ødegaard run a deeper starting position (and therefore more effectiveness at shifting the LCB).
As I said, Nicolas Jover is a massive massive nerd.
But Jover’s just a coach, so who runs all of this on the pitch?
As much as I can give Jover credit, this is inherently a more player-controlled situation than the corner, and so the team requires leaders to… well, lead these plays. Unsurprisingly, Martin Ødegaard is responsible for nearly everything in these. His movement is always intelligent and well-timed, ensuring avenues remain open through his manipulation of markers and space, and he is constantly faking in and out to afford himself a couple of yards here and there — which is fairly vital given how tightly players can sit to the thrower. It’s no surprise either that receipient choice is nearly all on him, with his constant pointing signalling when to ‘return home’, if the Saka lane isn’t opening up enough to accommodate the flatter throws from White for instance — see part 1 of this piece.
Rice is also instrumental for this in his lighthouse role, and is strong at hollowing his way into a midfield gap afforded to him by Odegaard etc., or at generating his own space as in Zinchenko’s throws above, usually by actually launching his markers with a good old-fashioned shove. Kai is growing in influence at the moment too, not a surprise given his whole thing is space, but in general his micromovements and drifts are always inch perfect to allow lanes to open up or Saka to receive where he’s able to actually, well, do anything.
What’s the overall strategy (if there even is one)?
Moving up from our specifics into team-wide instructions then, how are throw-ins placed within the team’s overall game model?
In general the idea is to try get a controller on the ball from the situation. We don’t often see them as great progression or creation options barring the very specific scenario of the goalline loop, and Arsenal currently don’t have a long thrower to generate threat a la Brentford (a suboptimal approach according to John Muller, but this suits our game model way better than % chances into the box). This is primarily why most throw-in situations end with Saliba/Gabriel on the ball, as rather than committing to playing forward at all costs, throws serve as a way of collecting territory and settling into the rhythm of build-up: a very important trait in Arteta’s Arsenal.
This isn’t to say quicker throws are off the table, as these are often taken advantage of when the time or space are afforded for them (see GJ vs Luton, and below — side note: I find it hilarious we basically only score that goal because Kenilworth Road isn’t a ‘modern’ stadium, and hence the ball can’t end up 6 banks deep in the standard rounded seating. For all the talk of Luton’s stadium making it difficult for us, we benefitted from it just as much as them in this tie), but as Arsenal’s game is increasingly less transitional, opposition are far more settled in their defensive positions allow for quick ‘box them in lads’ scenarios. Dynamic situations appear usually through concentration dips (see the Saka-White hand-off play from earlier).
It’s worth noting that there are 4 games where Arsenal abandoned this general philosophy, going longer whenever possible or going shorter for someone to hoof it, suggesting there is an opposition consideration in the set-piece tactic at even a throw-in level. The 4 games were: Brentford A (Bobbins), City H, Lens A, Newcastle A.
This looks to be a consideration of physicality foremost, with 3 of these teams being ‘big beefy boys’, especially so at home — and in situations where they were going to press intently whenever possible. Newcastle and Lens due to atmosphere and size of tie, Brentford because they played vs children and second-stringers. A large % of the longer-throw focus was a result of shorter throw attempts enticing a bullying press often forcing a return to their own half, and so the solution therefore to be to launch it beyond where this wasn’t a dangerous problem. I don’t particularly agree with this — I think Newcastle was perhaps a good deviation to try rob them of the front-line pressure they would’ve liked in the first half — Brentford and Lens were trying to rob Arsenal of their rhythm in these games, and so to just… agree to let that happen doesn’t sit well with me.
City are a slightly different animal given their lineup wasn’t especially ‘beefy’, but it’s that typical suffocating pressure that means opposition don’t particularly want the ball on the floor in areas that suit City (i.e. with someone controlling it from the air). This was also a game where Arsenal were aiming to utilise Havertz and his “dooells”, so going longer and higher in an attempt to secure a second ball whilst dodging the press also makes sense. I very much see Arsenal doing the same vs Liverpool given their strength in pressure and high turnovers (9.7 PPDA, joint 2nd itl, 157 high turnovers, 7th itl, only 9 less than Arsenal, per The Analyst), but perhaps the lack of Tomiyasu will hamper its effectiveness, as it did in 3 of the games here.
Conclusion
In general, the club exhibits a similar level of detail focus in their throws as in their corners LINK, but as throw-in goals are far less likely (John Muller notes AFC’s short throws last season gave an +xGD difference of <0.01 on average, with long throws adding ~0.015 but with massive variability) they typically get less of the attention, despite being a vital part of establishing our game-model on a match. Teams that offset these minor pieces of Arsenal’s game model are often rewarded — see Newcastle and Lens with this, Chelsea and Spurs on corners — demonstrating how holistic the system is, and how vital Jover is within that. Every move, every opportunity, is crucial in how the side looks to dominate games now, so next time you want to moan at Ben White staring into blank space with the ball cocked above his head, consider that this may be exactly what Arteta wants.