Social Science, Psychology, and Physics Envy

There is a common assumption that true scientific laws have no exceptions. These would be the basic laws of physics, for example. They hold over all time and space, in any situation, in regards to their subject matter. Laws that don’t meet this standard might be called ceteris paribus laws, that is, all things being equal, this is what will happen. In other words, under these particular conditions, we can predict that a certain outcome will take place.

This view of laws has some problems with it. First of all, there is a lot of worry in the social and human sciences to be more “scientific.” This oftentimes boils down to the sentiment that, “we need to be more like physics and establish some laws.” The reality of the matter, though, is that even in physics, the most fundamental laws are actually abstractions and idealizations, which ignore many factors that are truly present in reality. First of all, with something as “simple” as the motion of physical bodies, there is oftentimes a degree of complexity that makes actual prediction computationally impossible. So, we simply must abstract and idealize, which means ignoring actual factors and forming our laws based on others.

Now, it is thought that we can have laws about each of these different causes, for example, gravity, electromagnetism, etc. and then we can figure out the summation of forces at work. But, as Nancy Cartwright says:

“When different kinds of causes compose, we want to explain what happens in the intersection of different domains. But the laws we use are designed only to tell truly what happens in each domain separately.”

We certainly can intervene in these different areas of nature, but nevertheless, our laws each pick out solely a limited domain of reality and ignore others.

Another important point is that, in the case of more simple, classical types of linear causation, we can get away with such abstraction and idealization, to a degree. But a fundamental property of complex systems like human beings, is that they are nonlinear, dynamic systems that are swarming with feedback loops. It is not only that A causes B, or vice versa, but that the state of A and B (and C and D and E, ad infinitum) are all influenced by one another at various stages in time and space. As Steven Horst states:

“In physics, if you succeed in creating a laboratory situation in which you have eliminated the influences of electromagnetism, mechanical, strong and weak forces, you are left with gravitational interaction in its pure and native glory. In an idealized situation, gravity in fact behaves ideally. But if you isolate an element of a feedback system like the brain from the rest of the system, you do not get its ideal behavior, but radically abnormal behavior or no behavior at all. If you cut out a monkey’s lateral geniculate body, you don’t get the behavior of the LGN in its pure and native glory, but merely a morsel of monkey brain sushi.”

The implications for our view of science of such complex, dynamic, non-linear systems, which human beings are the prime example, are profound. Many have recognized the meaning of such systems. Ironically, it is the natural scientists and mathematicians who have realized the shift and began to create new intellectual and scientific approaches in light of it. Philosophers of science have also worked hard to disabuse us of the naive views of scientific law. Yet, many social and human scientists of a naturalistic bent continue to labor under an older, naive conception of science.

Therefore, since even physics is not “like physics”, we can stop worrying so much about pursuing a naive naturalism and physicalism in the social and human sciences. No need to bother figuring out if our terms relate to natural kinds if the basis of our ontology in the natural sciences is so pluralistic and piecemeal to begin with.The take-home message is this: by recognizing such a paradigm-shift in our view of what science and scientific law is, and realizing the complex nature of what we’re studying, we can let go of a lot of the old worries and debates about what we should be doing.

None of this is to discourage science. On the contrary, it is to advance science by evolving our conception of it.

References

Cartwright, Nancy. 1983. How the Laws of Physics Lie. Oxford University Press.

Horst, Steven. 2000. Laws, Idealization, and the Status of Psychology. (Submitted for oral presentation to SPP 2000 program).