The ISIS Genocide

Crafting American Legitimacy in the Near and Middle East

In March, US Secretary of State John Kerry declared that the Islamic State was guilty of genocide against minority populations in Iraq, including groups of Shia and Yazidi people. This is surprising news. The United States hasn’t formally declared the occurrence of genocide since 2004 in Darfur. And while this might appear to be a simple human rights issue, it may have a broad impact on the geopolitics of the Levant.

There is a reason such declarations do not occur very often, as they require the State Department to navigate a complex network of diplomatic relations to ensure it does not offend its key strategic allies. The difference with the Islamic State: no key American allies like them. They are a perfect chess piece for a foreign policy that seeks to unify allies around a common enemy– an enemy, moreover, that does not regard even the most basic of human rights– and keep them in line for fear of opposing the flow of public opinion.

While it may seem unlikely that such small maneuvers can really impact the complex web of variables inherent to foreign policy, it would be a mistake to shrug off its importance. Small events like these serve to craft legitimacy for the United States and its foreign policy objectives in the Middle East. Further, they serve to gradually erode the legitimacy of states like Russia, which has been criticized for preferring to strike rebel groups other than the Islamic State throughout its ongoing military intervention in Syria.

In fact, the genocide declaration may contribute to two outcomes for Russia. Either they must increase their commitment against the Islamic State, or they receive diplomatic penalties for securing personal interests instead of fighting Daesh. If Russia chooses to increase its contributions against the Islamic State, then the United States benefits from Russian subsidization of the conflict, although this outcome does not guarantee that Russia will reduce its efforts against rebel groups in Syria too. If Russia chooses the second option, it will have long term negative effects on the legitimacy of the Assad regime. With the nuclear deal bringing Iran into the American sphere of influence, Russian allies in the Middle East may experience a gradual divergence in foreign policy. It may be the greatest foreign policy achievement of the Obama administration to secure a stable alliance with Iran and foster detente between the major powers in the Middle East. Once that is achieved, ISIS will take care of itself.

Perhaps more importantly, continued US engagement with the Middle East has demonstrated that we have not given up hope. The cost of two long wars, both in human lives and political capital, have doubtless left the United States cautious in its diplomatic approach to Syria and ISIS. In fact, it has been a major political objective of the current administration to avoid putting “boots on the ground”, and instead to generally rely on special forces and military technologies in its anti-terrorism efforts. The subtle maneuvering of the State Department is in line with this theory, as it demonstrates a gradual effort to craft American foreign policy legitimacy. Such a nuanced approach was largely absent in past involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, and signifies a hopeful change in fortunes for the many who desire long term peace and stability in the Middle East, and accept America’s critical role in the transition.