How would Winston Churchill handle North Korea, Iran and Russia in 2019–2020?
Part 2 — Churchill on North Korea (Young Churchill, 1892–1904)
Note to readers: This article builds on the introduction and background previously published here.
Given this background, how would young Churchill understand the North Koran situation? To begin, let’s define “the situation” by distinguishing, as Churchill would, between the North Korean people, the leadership, its infrastructure, military capabilities and the geographic placement of the country.
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, henceforth North Korea) is an autocratic state, a dictatorship ruled by a single family, the Kims, in succession since 1948. North Korea has successfully developed an array of basic nuclear weapon capabilities and exercises absolute and indiscriminate power over a population of 25 million that is largely destitute. They are also a socialist regime that has enjoyed very close support and relations with the Soviet Union, now with Russia, as well as with Iran, China and a host of other autocratic nations.
As of the 1990s, extensive financial embargoes and sanctions have been placed on North Korea in an attempt to force it, at first, to abandon its pursuit of Nuclear weapons, and since their acquisition in the late 2000’s, to relinquish its ICBM and Nuclear Weapon tests and programs altogether. In the eyes of the United States, North Korea has been characterized for decades as a rogue nation, part of the axis of evil, a direct threat to US allies Japan and South Korea, the Philippines, Hawaii and an indirect threat to the US Mainland via its long range ICBM programs. Over the past 30 years, US presidents have attempted both harder and softer strategies in dealing with North Korea. US President Trump has also tried his hand at resolving the North Korean situation, a resolution that in his eyes equates to total denuclearization of North Korea.
Churchill would learn a great deal about the Korean people, their history as a unified Korean nation and the rule they have been under since 1948. He would study the geopolitics of the region, going back to the start of the 20th century and the battles between Korea, Russian, Japan, China. The people of North Korea would be, in Churchill’s eyes, people who have been severely disadvantaged by a myriad of factors and deserving of a better future. He would perceive them as he did the people of India in the late 19th and 20th centuries, a nation of over 300 million who could be helped only with the leadership, financial support and guidance of the British Empire. In the case of North Korea, this support would take on a different guise, with some similar, yet more time-appropriate underpinnings.
North Korean leadership would be described by young Churchill using the aphorism of a spoiled, physically large, rich and largely friendless child who plays alone with his vast array of toys and seeks attention by exhibiting fits of anger and temper tantrums. This child analogy may seem out of place when speaking of a nuclear capable, ruthless dictator and regime who have killed hundreds of thousands of their own countrymen and continue to starve their population at this very moment, while enjoying a life of solitary luxury. It is employed solely to assist in the psychological positioning that Churchill would perhaps employ, a simplified and easy way to comprehend a persona that allows to more easily understand and determine how best to engage.
The national civilian infrastructure would be seen as outdated and in disrepair, insufficient to sustain a population similar to that of Canada, and in desperate need of rectification in order to support growth beyond the poverty stricken reality it currently enabled for the masses. The military (with one of the largest standing armies these days) would be seen as a formidable threat with great manpower and offensive abilities but without the strong technological, financial, logistical infrastructure to ensure long term, high levels of sustained performance in a prolonged offensive battle. Geopolitically, Churchill would see North Korea as uniquely placed, at the physical intersection of Russia, China and Japan, and therefore as an important strategic venue from which to wield power. This would help explain to him, at least in part, the current (and highly diverse) Russian, Chinese and American views on North Korea.
As young Churchill weaves these elements together to form his understanding and analysis of the current situation, it may appear as follows: a proud and power-hungry dynastic leadership which perceives great threat to their control when external, primarily Western values and influences are introduced. As such, the best way for this regime to maintain control is to subdue the people and to maintain low levels of mass prosperity, as in this manner people’s primary focus is on survival, not growth, which may lead to challenges to authority and loss of power.
While Churchill would absolutely not condone such an approach, given his value system, he would likely understand its place from the perspective of the North Korean leaders. The tremendous investment in military strength, at the expense of the people per se, is a necessary step for leadership to maintain their integrity and control over the nation. By maintaining a common fear and perceived threat from external Western forces, the expenses and hardships are seen as justifiable, even at great sacrifice. Given this perspective, the entire North Korean system, people, military organizations, civilian systems, education and social systems would view the world as dangerous.
Young Churchill’s approach therefore, would likely build on his experiences in India, and within South Africa fighting the Boers. Churchill would propose an Imperialistic type pathway for North Korea, “Imperialism Lite”. This process does not seek regime change and the institution of an external, overarching paternalistic leadership structure, but rather focuses on financial investment in its people, its civilian infrastructure, while providing assurances of security that do not seek to undermine the regime. In his mind, while the Western democracy system may be the optimal path for sustained moral and financial success of a nation, he would recognize that there to be no short term benefit of forcefully introducing such elements into the North Korean framework.
Churchill would recognize that a great deal of trust is lacking, but could be fostered by leveraging financial investment into the country together with a reduction of broad sanctions, while instituting directed investment controls to ensure that the finances are spent on civilian projects. In his view, this would be a long term investment, one that seeks to focus on gradual progress at a civilian level, and contain the opportunity to radically shift local and regional geopolitical realities and military alliances in order to bring about important change to a starving nation and a highly contentious and risky situation. In Churchill’s mind, guided investment would be the solution, as it was for India and the other colonies.
What are the implications of the nuclear and ballistic missile threat that much is made of today? What would Churchill’s position be on these? In Churchill’s eyes, these would be perceived as largely defensive tools that exist primarily in order to retain the position of the regime. Churchill would view provocations by the regime, in the form of nuclear and missile tests (with some occuring August 2019), as attempts to seek global attention via threats, thereby forcing engagement and consideration. So far as they do not result in true direct threats and harm to other parties, Churchills’ stance would be to “allow the dog to bark”, so long as it does not bite, while directly tying investment progress to such actions. He would believe that when the regime and the people start to drink, so to speak, from the well of a new North Korean style of prosperity, there will be far less incentive to play the role of belligerent regional neighbor.
This analysis is based on the perceived lens that young Churchill would employ, but does not discount his considerations that the regime will certainly not, at all times, respond in kind to this form of an approach, a financially led one, and instead adopt an even more belligerent stance towards Western, Imperialist nations. To ease this concern, Churchill would likely propose the use of third parties such as the Chinese or Russians to lead the effort and assuage, at least to a degree, these concerns.
Young Churchill would establish clear guidelines for the conduct of this long term investment-first strategy, which include mutual recognition of the rights of both Korea’s to choose their own paths of existence, to avoid regime change efforts, and to secure their nations from regional threats. Churchill would also seek to establish a regional alliance council to help govern the key elements of the Korean initiative, primarily as a forum for all parties to raise concerns and seek support, without dominance of the United States (such as in the UN security council), and in a forum where North Korea feels it is respected and equal.
If we were to question this path and suggest that it be more aligned to that of the late 1930’s to 1940 Neville Chamberlain, rather than Churchill, two factors dissuade from this conclusion. First, Young Churchill did not yet have the depth of military and political exposure that the elder statesman possessed even before he was appointed Prime Minister in 1940, some 36 years later than the end of the period upon which this analysis is based (the young Churchill). In his frame of mind, the Empire had a role to play in relieving the suffering of nations, and it had the correct formula to achieve such results. Second, even young Churchill would not, I contend, see the North Korean situation as endangering the future of Western civilization, which was the reality he encountered when he confronted The Ottomans, Germany and Austria during WWI, and then Hitler in WWII. In his younger frame of mind, the belligerence would be the cry of a financially poor national, led by a very proud, ruthless, dynastic, fearful local regime seeking to have their security needs met, not a global threat to peace on earth and as such could be dealt with using a financial-diplomatic array of tools.
Young Churchill was not as politically savvy nor as battle worn as the older version who faced down the Axis forces of WWII and saw his nation through its darkest hour. Yet, the younger Winston can be viewed as a morally driven man whose values and belief in the goodness of man always guided him. Although his paths were not always successful, they were the ones he undertook with great comfort, confidence and conviction.
Statesmen would be wise to follow Churchill’s likely roadmap to achieve measurable progress within this important conflict. As of Summer 2019, we witness a diplomatic stagnation in the North Korean situation, with intermittent acts of belligerency by a North Korean regime wishing to remind others that it is still a meaningful presence in a region that is plagued by an escalating trade war between the two largest economies, China and the United States.
Next: Part 3 — Churchill on Iran
About the Author
Simon Brightman is an Adjunct Professor at the University of Ottawa, Telfer School of Management. His research interests include global strategy, data analytics and Artificial Intelligence driven decision making in government, international organizations, as well as private corporations.
Simon has lectured and taught technology commercialization, innovation, product validation and product development for over 12 years in private, public and academic organizations. He has served in various executive roles leading data analytics product technology firms in the USA and Canada, including Head of Data Strategy & Open Banking at TransUnion (Credit Reporting Agency), Vice President at Panvista Analytics (a US wearable geo-location analytics firm), Head of Agile & Product Management at Points.com (Nasdaq traded, leading global loyalty e-Commerce provider to Airlines & Hotels), Senior Manager at KPMG (program management), presently a Senior Partner with Global Data Insights (data analytics advisory & investments across Fintech and other xTech domains).
Simon holds a BSc. in Computer Software & Business Management, an MBA in Technology Management as well as a Masters in International Relations (Global Strategy & Decision-Making) from Cambridge University. Connect with Simon on Linked in
