Foreword

This brief foreword exists to provide a preliminary historical background to the current state of Military Police (MP) operations and demonstrate the Integrated Policing (IP) initiative’s strategic alignment within the Office of the Provost Marshal General (OPMG) guidance. This foreword serves as a foundation to those who are not familiar with the circumstances leading to the present state of policing and is easily detached in order to trade depth with brevity and provide utility to a broader variety of publication outlets.

Historical background

Due to increasing operational requirements in the post 9/11 era, Major Commands (MACOM) charged with base support, and more specifically organic MP units, were unable to simultaneously fulfill installation support requirements while deploying in support of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). Following the establishment of the Installation Management Agency (IMA), several initiatives were implemented in order to free MP from installation support and refocus those personnel on expeditionary requirements. In 2004 alone, “IMA implemented a multi-phased Contract Security Guard Program across 40 installations. This provided up 4,000 military police (from installation gate guard duty) for the fight” (IMCOM 14, 2010). Such initiatives continued following the subsequent creation of Installation Management Command (IMCOM) in October 2006. This reallocation therefore required Garrison Commands to task the Directorate of Emergency Services (DES) with management of Department of the Army Civilian Police (DACP) and Security Guards (DASG) in the execution of daily policing operations. With DES assuming policing authority on Army installations, MP units were concentrated within Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) cycles and consistently deployed in support of the GWOT. Following the eventual decrease in OPTEMPO, MP units returned and were refocused on the installation policing mission.

Strategic alignment

Guidance regarding the Integrated Policing initiative was provided directly through the MP Force Strategic Plan (STRATPLAN) 2020. Within this strategic framework, OPMG designates Objective 5.2 “Assess integration of DES, PMO, and MP staff” in which MP and Emergency Services personnel are to “assess and evaluate cross-staff efficiencies to reduce or eliminate wasteful redundancy and increase shared effectiveness across these operational staffs, also evaluate organizational constructs and manning to streamline operations and business processes, promote integration, and implement efficiencies.” (OPMG 35, 2012) With this initiative nested within OPMG guidance and decisive to executing base support operations, necessary movement began to kick-start the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) towards integration.

Introduction

The purpose of this article is to briefly describe eight significant “lessons learned” from a staff officers point of view regarding the implementation of an integrated policing strategy. The intent is to add perspective and contribute to the current discussion involving professionals from IMCOM, more specifically Army-wide garrison DES, as well as the U.S. Army MP Corps who all continue to share recent experiences while working towards a common mission of base support and a collective goal of improving installation emergency response.

In the current environment of competing requirements, increasingly limited training opportunities, and constrained resources, military leaders are being forced to “do more with less” in order to maintain unit readiness. Consequently, IP creates an unparalleled opportunity for MP to develop and sustain mission essential task proficiency through the execution of installation policing as a mission set rather than a monotonous tasking, while simultaneously providing a more capable MP force. Therefore, MP leadership must continue to pursue IP strategies in order to capitalize on the unique ability of MP to refine skill sets unconstrained to training scenarios, but through execution of concentrated and integrated daily policing operations.

It is important to note that this list represents only a fraction of the overall “lessons learned” as a result of IP implementation and is in no way exhaustive. Moreover, it would be misleading to suggest that as a result of IP implementation, DES and MP now employ a flawless policing model. Rather, both organizations are still in the process of adapting to the newly embraced structure while continuing to take pragmatic steps towards refinement.

Background

First, it is necessary to provide a brief overview of the background surrounding policing operations and what set the stage for eventual implementation of Integrated Policing. The demand for IP was twofold, in part through internal desire from Battalion (BN) and DES elements determined to improve organizational efficiencies and the effectiveness of base support operations, and also through the direction provided by the MP STRATPLAN 2020. With DACP and DASG still fulfilling the daily installation requirements, MP reintegrated within the existing DES structure and assumed a supporting role. The direct result was organic MP units serving as force providers to the Provost Marshals Office (PMO) under DES. With the eventual downsizing of civilian contracts, MP continued to serve as force providers while DACP and DASG leadership maintained policing authority. Given this support relationship, Mission Command of Police Operations remained within DES while BN MP were provided to execute daily policing and Access Control Point (ACP) duties. This resulted in part to a degradation of MP installation policing competency at all levels and created inter-organizational friction between leadership from both entities. With separate priorities as well as separate planning and staff operations, both organizations continued to work independently while moving towards separate goals.

OPMG’s recommendation to dual-hat the Senior MP Commander as the Director of Emergency Services served as a momentous step towards reintegration of DES and BN elements. While this proposal has unique impacts according to installation and unit construct, in this particular instance it placed the MP Battalion Commander as Director. The now concurrent title of Commander and Director forced both organizations to reexamine the existing separation and adapt to a newly developing organizational structure. Despite this significant step towards reintegration, both entities continued to operate independently, often competing for the Commander/Director’s time rather than pursuing a single, concerted effort.

Despite this initial disorganization, BN and DES leadership continued to work towards bridging the gap and made several important improvements towards integration. The catalyst of integrated policing success involved the issuance of a BN Policing Mission Command order, which redefined and solidified the mission command relationship between both elements in order to eliminate MP responsibility without authority. This order not only transitioned company commanders from the previous task of managing MP force provider pools, but rather assigned them the role of serving as policing and ACP mission commanders. Therefore, the Battalion Commander now held mission commanders responsible for operational outcomes rather than maintaining a solely quantitative focus of MP readiness. As a result of this new task organization, both entities began to reinvigorate efforts towards synchronization. Not to suggest that this order rectified all identified deficiencies, as the damaged relationships that resulted from a lack of DES involvement will be discussed later. Regardless, this effort seemed to echo COL Rob Dillon’s article titled Putting the Police Back in Military Police which states that, “If police are to mature as a profession, they must concern themselves more directly with the outcomes of their efforts” (Dillon 15, 2011).

Integrated Policing Defined

In order to better describe integration efforts, a brief overview of IP is necessary prior to discussion of implementation and lessons learned. As previously mentioned, the current state of policing consisted of the mission being impeded by disjointed staffs, lack of company ownership of assigned Areas of Operations (AOs), and unaligned BN- Brigade Combat Team (BCT) cycles. Designated key tasks included the consolidation of BN/DES elements, establishment of a clear unity of command for contingency and policing operations, maintenance of Mission Essential Task List (METL) proficiency, and synchronized training with BCTs to allow for combined arms operations. The intended end state was integration of policing efforts, assets, and staffs. The approved Course of Action (COA) included many notable changes to the status quo, which provided both advantages, and inevitable disadvantages, to policing operations.

The creation of a joint staff was the first essential step in order to better consolidate BN/DES elements into a single base support effort. Through a joint battle rhythm, BN targeting operations were implemented and are executed through targeting meetings and Police Working Groups (PWG) in a bi-weekly sequence, with companies first nominating targets within their AOs and resources being allocated through the PM. The PWG then serves as an opportunity for target approval through employment of the Computer Statistics (COMPSTAT) model while simultaneously bringing subject-matter-experts (SMEs) together from BN/ DES as well as civilian police agencies to create a common operating picture for all local policing stakeholders.

Beyond improvements such as the development of a joint battle rhythm, Integrated Policing further refined the PWG. Not to be overlooked, the realization of PWGs at the company level provided an essential step towards IP success. While time and space will not permit a full review of PWG implementation, it is important to identify the significant efforts undertaken by company leadership to provide valuable and consumable police intelligence paired with a synchronization of policing efforts across the installation. Policing and ACP mission commanders sought out and incorporated SMEs as well as looked to empower BCT PMs who fill the crucial role of conduits for all policing matters in their footprints. Common practices within the PWG framework included the execution of named policing operations, identification of Named Areas of Interest (NAI), nomination and approval of specific crime targeting and associated metrics through employment of Problem-Oriented-Policing (POP) initiatives, and implementation of information operation campaigns in high crime areas. As a result, the PWG enabled united policing elements to develop courses of action to deter, detect, and deny crime within NAIs in order to provide a safer community for Soldiers, Civilians, and their Families.

Ownership of company assigned Areas of Operations (AO) began through the division of the installation into four AOs with consideration to BCT alignment, analysis of historical trends in MP calls for service, and equitable division of geographical areas. The resulting AOs included ACPs, housing areas, schools, Mission Essential Vulnerable Areas (MEVA) and brigade footprints, each with unique communities, crime, and policing requirements. The patrol distribution plan was also updated in order to reflect the AOs, alongside the roles and responsibilities of MP supervisors. Area Supervisors remain responsible for all policing within their AO, with Patrol Supervisors and MP Duty Officers providing oversight for the installation. While the Provost Marshal remains responsible for control of all policing efforts, company elements are now empowered to identify, target, and influence crime trends within a defined AO while being enabled through SMEs within DES and PMO.

Increased opportunity for proficiency training is afforded through reorganization of CO training cycles. By eliminating the cyclical rotation of companies through ACP, Policing, tasking support, or collective training cycles individually, IP allows for more consistent proficiency across mission essential tasks. As the previous model designated companies to conduct a single mission for an extended period of time, IP mandates that companies conduct three cycles consisting of policing/ACP operations, collective training, and individual training/ task support at the platoon level simultaneously. Rather than MP executing a single mission essential task bi-annually, the new cycle arrangement allows for platoons to rotate internally and conduct all three cycles within the same six month period. Furthermore, by ensuring that a minimum of four platoon elements are freed from installation support and conducting collective training, the BN maintains the ability to rapidly alert, marshal, and deploy these assets in support of a operation at any point in time.

Prior to IP the BN executed internal company cycles unaligned from Division training cycles. While this allowed companies to cycle through mission sets, it often denied the ability for MP to train with habitually aligned BCTs. While request for brigade support was often fulfilled, the period of collective training prior to the culminating event was frequently hampered by unaligned cycles. Therefore, the BN recalibrated to BCT training cycles in order to provide additional opportunities for synchronized training. As a result, MP COs are able to fill a force protector role within an assigned BCT footprint on the installation while simultaneously maintaining the ability to serve as an enabler during the brigade’s Combat Training Center (CTC) rotation. With this quick synopsis of integration efforts, the process of implementation can be further explained.

Integrated Policing Implementation

With regard to implementation, joint MDMP and rehearsals aided the successful launch of IP as a combined venture with mutual support from both entities rather than a single sided initiative. Going beyond the conventional application of MDMP, a clear intention was made to incorporate not only battalion/company MP leadership but also various levels within DES and the PMO. This effort to consolidate SMEs in order to collaborate on the crucial steps of COA development, analysis, and comparison were imperative to forming a realistic, integrated framework. The first undertaking following mission analysis was the redefining of task organization as well as command and reporting relations between both entities. This was only accomplished through gathering all key players involved in one room in order to conduct an objective evaluation of the current construct. Additionally, while reoccurring meetings may appear monotonous and time-consuming to fellow MP units pursuing implementation, they are likely an absolute necessity in order to maintain momentum and synchronization. Beyond solidifying command relationships and the formalization of fast and efficient reporting, execution of joint MDMP set the conditions for future success and collaboration.

Following COA approval and orders production, a joint brief and Rehearsal of Concept was vital in preparation for the actual implementation date. Not only did this rehearsal bring leadership across both organizations to a single place and time, but it allowed the Commander/ Director to provide refined intent and guidance to all involved prior to execution. This step allowed for all parties to voice concerns, refine the plan, and work together to mitigate risk during the transition period. Lastly, it would be misleading to suggest that implementation was a simple, unabated process that occurred rapidly and required little outside support. Rather, integration was only possible through the compilation of multiple crucial factors over time, to include the correct leadership, necessary autonomy from higher elements, and sustained unit readiness. Hand in hand with implementation of an IP strategy came several significant “lessons learned,” which remain relevant for additional integration efforts. As previously mentioned, the included list is in no way exhaustive and represents only a portion of takeaways, as model refinement is currently ongoing.

Lessons Learned

1. “Admit Previous Deficiencies and Continue Movement”

The first lesson of IP implementation revolved around the fact that both BN and DES needed to reconcile past differences and begin moving towards common ground once again. As mentioned above, one of the significant shortfalls that continued to negate the developing of an organizational relationship was the Policing Mission Command order. While this order had made significant strides towards improving base support operations, its implementation ultimately resulted in friction between both elements. The genesis of this enmity was due in part to a general disagreement over the desired end state regarding policing authority on the installation as well as a perceived lack of collaboration on integration efforts. The fact remains that when multiple organizations lack leadership providing similar direction, little will be collectively accomplished. This scar tissue became apparent with the initiation of MDMP towards integration, in which members presented legitimate concerns and remained cautious during the initial steps. While unintentional, this friction required recognition by both elements and instilled a desire to avoid similar outcomes. It was through this shared determination that joint MDMP became a successful and productive enterprise.

An additional element of this lesson is that MP, and more specifically MP company and field grade officers, must take a deep breath and admit, regardless of the previous circumstances, that we possess an internal lack of SME knowledge as a professional policing force. As COL Dillon stated, “Military Police performance..in comparison to industry standards..is weak in the professional element of expert knowledge in the area of policing” (Dillon 19, 2011). Not to suggest that MP are collectively incompetent and remain unable to effectively perform policing duties as part of the base support mission, but rather that due to previous OPTEMPO and competing requirements we lack proficiency comparable to civilian agencies. While not attempting to oversimplify this issue, the first step remains to admit this deficiency and begin movement towards a solution. Consequently, an additional benefit of IP that must not be overlooked is the ability for policing SMEs from BN, DES, and local agencies to systemically converge in order to create shared understanding.

2. “Developing a Joint Staff is a Necessity and is Not Instantaneous”

The effort to develop a joint staff must be seen as decisive to streamlining policing operations. While past decision processes such as changing the patrol distribution plan remained a relatively isolated process, the new “joint staff” required additional interaction and communication in order to identify and mitigate second and third order effects. As inevitable in bureaucratic institutions, the reality of organizational growth will undoubtedly decelerate information flow at times and, if left unchecked, has the potential to impact decision making. However, the advantages of possessing an efficient, capable, and truly unified staff working to empower the Commander will likely outweigh the disadvantages. Secondly, this effort must be seen as absolutely necessary in order to effectively execute base support operations. Not only does a joint staff streamline operations, but it also allows increased interaction between civilians and MP working towards a common goal, which in turn builds mutual trust and support.

It is important to note that a joint staff is not truly “joint” immediately following implementation, but rather is developed over time through a deliberate and sustained effort from both entities. This lesson became apparent following the initial implementation period in which both elements took calculated approaches towards refinement of cross-staff efficiencies. For example, if an incident requires additional MP beyond the current force arrayal, DES and BN operations must rapidly and collectively surge combat power. This synchronization must remain constant, as a purely reactionary collaboration will result in failure to quickly adapt to the operational environment. While both elements must execute staff functions in accordance with OPTEMPO, it is essential that they move in unison towards common goals and end states through practices such the employment of a meaningful joint operational schedule. The reality remains that it is the responsibility of the joint staff to ensure shared understanding across both organizations.

3. “MP Must Conduct Policing Rather Than Provide Policing Support”

As demonstrated prior to the Policing Mission Command order, the reality of policing responsibility without authority undeniably results in ineffective operations. While the overconcentration of MP professionals within the combat support mission spectrum is understandable due to high OPTEMPO and competing requirements, this trend must be mitigated and eventually reversed. COL Dillon suggests that MP at times may be viewed as illegitimate as they “are least prepared to apply this area of expert knowledge because their home-station jurisdiction to practice and exercise this same knowledge is being reduced to bring in DACP experts” (Dillon 20, 2011). MP must begin to develop and regain SMEs experienced in installation policing operations. Not only does this experience need to be fostered with MP leaders at all levels, but especially through empowered Commanders who remain responsible for mission accomplishment rather than providing a force pool.

The first step in rectifying this deficiency is to redefine roles and responsibilities across both organizations. Possessing an in-depth knowledge of internal systems, processes, and people prior to any restructuring effort will allow for more productive outcomes. For example, rather than continue to operate independently, DASG/ DACP and MP worked towards combining efforts with regard to policing, training, and administrative requirements. Not only did this reorganization free manpower, but also increased the number of first line supervisors with expanded responsibilities in an effort to empower AOs and establish a clear unity of command. Furthermore, as the most efficient task organization will not likely be readily apparent during initial integration efforts, this endeavor must also be coupled with increased and continued communication among the joint staff.

4. “Challenge “Us vs. Them” Mentality and Recognize Value Added”

Yet another crucial lesson of IP implementation is to directly recognize and challenge the “Us vs. Them” mentality that exists between “green (MP) and blue (civilian police/ contractor) suiters”. Integrated Policing directly challenges this mindset through execution of a joint battle rhythm and mutual cooperation on a day-to-day basis. Whether this emotional friction is a result of reorganization, past differences, or a combination of other factors, this mentality both directly and indirectly inhibits operations at multiple levels. The underlying concept is that BN and DES personnel are employed for the same goal of protecting the local community, regardless of employment source. This mindset resonates with the adage that “if no one cares who gets the credit, there is nothing we can not accomplish”.

It is also imperative to recognize the extreme value that DES personnel bring to the table, as these individuals provide essential continuity and possess policing expertise that typically exceed MP professionals. Additionally, MP should not only attend relevant DES meetings, but should also invite DES professionals to attend internal meetings if beneficial to both parties. Not to suggest that this mentality will be countered by additional battle rhythmic events, but rather that a natural competition for the Commander/Director’s time is inevitable and may be mitigated though further organizational integration.

5. “Focus on Empowering Soldiers”

While it is important that staff become increasingly integrated, it is arguably all for naught if the value is not delivered to the patrol level. A key focus of IP must remain as empowerment of MP, and more specifically, Squad Leaders serving in a Patrol Supervisor capacity. One example of such a shortcoming can be demonstrated through the use of a bi-weekly Intelligence Summary (INTSUM), which provides a brief criminology snapshot of the reporting period and identifies potential trends. While this useful tool is utilized at various levels of the BN and DES, its function is somewhat diminished at the patrol level. This could be a result of lack of information flow, clarity, relevant actionable intelligence, or lack of perceived benefit.

The reality is that if intelligence mechanisms are not reaching Patrol Supervisors and in-turn fail to be utilized at guard mount to enable patrols in pursuit of POP initiatives, the value of such mechanisms are extremely diminished. Rather than continue in a cycle of adopting new statistical illustrations, perhaps the answer lies in the utility of the data being collected. Regardless, policing efficiency boils down to maintaining proactive patrols that possess the necessary knowledge and have leadership determined to seek out creative solutions. Regardless, efforts must remain focused on facilitating the Soldiers responsible for daily mission execution.

6. “Demonstrate MP Value in order to Enable BCTs”

Additionally, IP fosters a mutually beneficial relationship between brigades, their PM cells, and the MP assigned to their footprint through day-to-day interactions. Systemic problems such as equipment theft can be collectively targeted, which in turn free patrols from monotonous response and helps to maintain brigade readiness. The advantage of this alignment cannot be overstated as MP are able to more effectively target crime on the installation, pursue METL proficiency through combined arms training, and demonstrates increased MP utility to brigade leadership. Therefore, company leadership provided capability briefs at the onset of IP in order to build a rapport with BCT leadership. The ability for companies to continually provide platoon level support at a minimum quickly demonstrated value and flexibility to brigade commanders. As a result, the BN began planning and coordination for three CTC rotations simultaneously. Genuine effort applied towards empowering BCTs will likely translate to increased MP function and the enablement of combat power for decisive action.

7. “Bracing for Impact can Impact Day-to-Day Operations”

One of the more straightforward and distinct lessons of IP implementation surrounded the simple fact that change is inevitable and as is the growing-pains experienced with any new initiative. More importantly, the over-anticipation of adverse reactions can negatively impact current operations if left unchecked. With the application of the new integrated structure, leadership from multiple levels began to prepare for the repercussions of transition. This mentality was echoed down to the lowest level, which in turn resulted in initial backlash surrounding the dropping of unaltered routine tasks rather than difficulties arising from an inadequate plan. The underlying point is that leaders and their organizations must remain focused on accomplishable tasks rather than what remains out of their control. While organizational restructuring inevitably contains initial negative consequences, the basic tenet that calls for face-to-face leader interaction continues to ring true in order to mitigate shock stemming from change.

8. “There is No Perfect Policing Model, But Creative Solutions Can Get Us Close”

Finally, the continual need for innovative policing solutions stemming from MP professionals is apparent following the implementation of Integrated Policing. It is important to mention that despite significant scholarly efforts within the field of criminal justice, a universally acceptable paradigm for policing still does not exist. As with various law enforcement agencies employed across the United States, many have developed unique policing strategies applicable to their respective counties, cities, and towns. The same is true with regard to MP doctrine. Therefore, while the referencing of civilian policing models can provide significant value to installation policing models, the clear distinctions that exist between an installation community and that of a civilian population cannot be ignored. This reality should reassure MP professionals to pursue new, unique, and adaptable approaches to policing. Creative and realistic solutions can only be developed and applied through innovative leaders who remain focused on empowering from the Soldier up, while working towards a common goal of community protection.

Conclusion

While MP are and will inevitably continue to be called to fulfill roles increasing in scope and complexity in the near future, an IP strategy allows for increased proficiency development and pursuit of solutions scalable to larger problem sets to be practiced at home installations. As COL Eugenia Guilmartin states, “Instead of leveraging combat or crime-fighting models for training international police forces, perhaps military leaders should look at policing in small towns and rural areas on and off military installations for examples.” (Guilmartin 42, 2015) The value of an IP strategy can be demonstrated by the continued and concerted effort pursued by MP, DES, and local police agencies towards refinement of policing operations in order to provide a safer community for Soldiers, Civilians, and their Families.

In conclusion, MP leadership must continue to take pragmatic steps towards improvement of IP strategies in order to capitalize on the unique ability of MP to refine skill sets through execution of concentrated and integrated policing operations. With the current development of MP STRATPLAN 2025, it is vital that the discussion surrounding refinement of BN, DES, and PMO integration remains at the forefront of the MP Corps strategic goals.