Lack of Maintenance and Disregard for Industry-Recommended Safety Procedures May Have Contributed to Death on Adventureland’s Raging River

“The operator shall plan for prompt retrieval of patrons from [rides] that will not operate.” Iowa code 62.7(5)

On July 3rd, Michael Jaramillo was riding the Raging River rapids ride at Adventureland in Altoona, Iowa with his family. When their raft capsized, Michael and his brother David were unable to release their seatbelt restraint, leaving them trapped and drowning as their parents shouted for help.

Michael died, and while David continues his recovery at the hospital he has been left blind and able to communicate only via gestures.

In the aftermath of this tragedy, Adventureland’s lawyer, Guy Cook, has seen plenty of interview time with reporters while consistently beating the same drum:

“Tens of thousands of boats have been launched on this ride,” says Guy Cook, an attorney representing Adventureland, “Never ever has a boat tipped over or capsized in this 40 years. So that tells us number one, the ride is safe number two something different had to had happen on this day.”

A more recent story revealed allegations, from a guest whose family got off a malfunctioning raft moments before the Jaramillo family boarded, of having experienced flooding as well as hearing a grinding noise during their ride.

Cook again asserted his disbelief, saying “if you stay in your seat and the weight is evenly distributed regardless of whether a bladder is fully inflated, it’s very difficult to see how a 1,700-pound boat flips over … That’s why it would appear there was some other factor at work on this day.”

Preliminary results from state inspectors suggest a partially deflated bladder, a large rubber inner tube the raft sits in for bouyancy, may have contributed to the accident. The raft the Jaramillos boarded had earlier that day been pulled from the ride for maintenance on a deflated bladder before being promptly returned to service. The raft had been back on the ride for less than two hours when it capsized.

Cook dishonestly presents as a near impossibility something that has happened numerous times on similar rides: a capsized raft, and riders trapped underwater by their seatbelts.

While guests being unable to release their seatbelt and drowning in an overturned raft is an extremely rare occurrence on rapids ridea, it is beyond doubt that the potential is well known within the amusement industry.

In 1999, a series of accidents on rapids rides over the course of a single season saw dozens of people injured and prompted The Hartford Courant to declare “Rough Times for Raft Rides.” A woman died at Six Flags Over Texas when she was unable to escape from her seatbelt.

Premier Parks, which had recently purchased Six Flags, faced extensive public scrutiny on the safety of their rides.

Another park involved in those 1999 accidents, VisionLand in Birmingham, Alabama (now Alabama Splash Adventure) would see a raft capsize twice more in the next decade. Overturned rafts have occurred at high profile parks from Hersheypark to Kings Dominion:

After a few years of relatively trouble-free operation, one morning in late September the white water hit the fan – one boat caught up to another one before the waterfall. With the trough too narrow to allow two loaded boats side by side, one was pushed into the wall and up the side of the trough where it spun, went vertical and flipped completely over.

It was a terrifying situation – six guests were trapped upside down in seat belts under about three feet of rushing water. The tower one operator saw the accident and slammed the e-stop, which stopped the pumps and immediately dropped the water level. A “code one,” life or death situation (one of only a handful in KD history) went out over the radio.

The potential dangers on rapids rides have been apparent enough to amusement park operators for long enough that the industry’s largest trade association, the International Association of Amusement Parks and Attractions (IAAPA), released a Safety White Paper advising on their safe operation.

Among its recommendations are:

• “Surveillance system and PA coverage with no spots lacking coverage around the ride trough system.”
• “Comprehensive review of water rescue and ride evacuation procedures.”
• “Staff trained in safe water rescue and adequate numbers of staff available in a timely manner to conduct or assist in water rescue.”
• “Access pathways and access points to the flume trough system reviewed, including themed and tunnel features as part of the water rescue plan.”
• “Control and management of access into this area reviewed, including evacuation and rescue access and the timing from operational positions to reaching emergency equipment, fencing and access gates.”
• E[mergency] stop and intended effect on water movement tested.

Adventureland CEO Michael Krantz should be aware of IAAPA if not because of its influence then because his father, Jack Krantz, was once its President. When Amusement Today, an amusement industry trade publication, introduced a sort of “Hall of Fame" Legends title in 2009, Jack Krantz was posthumously given the inaugural award.

In fact, Michael is an “avid member" of IAAPA according to this newsletter congratulating him on being named the 2015 “Executive of the Year in Amusement Park Management.”

The newsletter does not say who granted this award and searching reveals nothing about its existence at all.

With these safety recommendations from the United States' lead amusement park trade association in mind, we can see exactly why Guy Cook is focusing so narrowly on the condition of the raft that overturned: to minimize the park’s liability and distract public attention from the numerous departures from established safe operating procedure.

These violations reveal themselves not in any investigation but through the first-hand accounts of Adventureland staff and emergency responders arriving at the scene.

While Cook wants to focus attention on the one issue which has a genesis that could be indiscernible or out of the park’s control, it may be that the critical failures which caused Michael to drown were entirely within the park’s knowledge and control, and much more potentially dangerous than a faulty raft.

While anything between an Act of God to intentional misuse could have resulted in the raft overturning, other conditions that ultimately contributed to the severity of injuries in the incident have only one potential source: Adventureland’s total lack of operational safety systems on Raging River.

Four minutes without oxygen are enough to cause permanent brain damage. Longer, and death starts to become probable, and only gets more likely with each passing second. This extremely small window in which park personnel can intervene to save victims is what guides many of the safety considerations recommended by IAAPA.

A rider who passed by the capsized raft and called 911 saw no staff monitoring the rapids:

Rico said he noticed a man screaming in the water who he believed to be the children’s father.

"He was yelling for help, and he seems he was kind of, you know, in pain. He’s yelling, you could see some marks on his face and his arm that he got, you know, bruised up a little bit," Rico said.

Rico said many people didn’t have their phones on a water ride, but his phone was in his backpack near him on the raft. He pulled it out and called 911.

"There are no staff by the river. It’s just empty out there. You know, there is no one watching the rafts. So, you know, we couldn’t get a worker to help us until we reached the end of the ride," Rico said.

After the Jaramillos' raft capsized and some of the guests were able to escape and begin screaming for help, their cries were initially mistaken by a crew setting up fireworks for the usual sounds you hear at a thrill park. After multiple boats passed, the workers began to understand what was happening and called 911.

It was only then, as dispatch radio lit up with calls for ambulances to Adventureland, that any part of the park’s security and medical teams knew of guests in need of rescue.

Despite an ongoing investigation providing some insight on the partially deflated condition of the raft, major questions are yet unanswered.

Why, when Polk County Dispatch directed first responders to the scene, did park emergency personnel respond saying they were unaware of an emergency at the park?

Why was an emergency gate closest to the accident scene chained shut when ambulances arrived?

How did Raging River’s operators first discover what was happening, and how did they report it?

But the most perplexing mystery for enthusiasts of amusement rides, who know how they work and by extension how safe they are, is why the section of trough where the Jaramillos' raft capsized never fully drained.

An emergency stop of the ride’s systems, which a state inspector confirms had been activated, should have drained all the water on the course into the ride’s 1,000,000 gallon reservoir.

Any stoppage of the pumps, emergency or otherwise, should do so. Being one long downhill course surrounding the central reservoir and terminating with an outlet into that retainer, constant pumping of water is the only way to counteract the force of gravity and keep the troughs full enough to carry rafts.

In its Safety White Paper, IAAPA recommends that this system and its “intended effect on water movement" be tested. In the event of an emergency stop, the water’s “intended movement" is into the reservoir, which is designed to hold enough water that the ride’s troughs can be completely drained for maintenance or rescue.

Powered by gravity, it shouldn’t take much longer for water to finish the course than a raft does to navigate it. Draining the water from the trough not only eliminates the drowning hazard that is most prevalent when a raft has capsized and guests are trapped by their restraints, but allows the efficienct and orderly search of the trough for victims who may have been caught on ride elements and would be difficult for rescuers to spot under the water. It also reveals the weirs (timbers, metal poles or similar obstacles used to create the eponymous rapids) and any other underwater elements which may pose a hazard to first responders during rescue efforts.

Water used for rapids rides is often darkened to obscure the bottom of the ride trough and elevate ride immersion, as the water on Raging River is.

While it’s almost certain the inspector’s report regarding the emergency stop being activated is accurate, firefighters arriving at the scene more than fifteen minutes later reported “the water was not moving and appeared to be about two feet deep.”

Adventureland had no comment to give about whether the “release valve" had been used:

Park officials declined to comment on whether staff attempted to use a quick release valve — a typical feature of similar rides designed by Raging River maker Intamin — to drain the ride. Firefighters reported finding two feet of water in the ride when they arrived.

Altoona Fire Department Deputy Chief Lance Routson, who was at the scene, said he did not know whether there was such a valve, but that the water appeared to be at its normal level.

Presumably, with that valve open, the ride could have drained fast enough to save the victims. The possibility that Adventureland personnel failed to use this potentially life-saving equipment isn’t likely but less disturbing than what may have happened: drainage not occurring as intended.

This satellite aerial, available on Google Earth, appears to have been taken in winter, given the bare trees and snow. The ride layout runs clockwise from the station in the lower left corner, and with the massive water pumps turned off it is easy to see the weirs along the bottom of the trough.

If you follow the layout along its course, as you get a little more than halfway through, toward the end of the pair of straight rapids sections, you will notice a sudden change: the brown concrete turns the same white as the snow-covered resevoir, and the exposed weirs disappear.

That uniform white obscures the bottom of the trough for the rest of the course- up until the very end, when the ride’s lift rises out of the cover and back into the station.

In winter, with the ride out of service and its rafts removed, about a third of the ride’s layout appears to remain submerged. Including the section where Michael drowned.

Intamin, Raging River’s manufacturer, designs their rapids with a reservoir large enough to be able to totally fill and drain the ride’s layout. Pumps are expensive, as is a million-plus gallons of water. At the end of the day when the ride shuts down, all that water that has been circulating for hours settles into the reservoir for storage until the next day.

The reservoir is as much a part of the ride system as the pumps, station and trough. As is the water it contains.

Raging River was one of the first Intamin Rapids rides, opening in 1983 and now approaching 40 years of operation. Not only can sediments and detritus settling into the reservoir’s bottom over time reduce its storage capacity, but rain can introduce excess water into the ride’s system. Conversely, drought conditions or leakage could cause the reservoir’s waterline to drop until operation is unsafe or outright impossible. For these reasons it’s important for the ride’s proper operation that the amount of water is monitored and regulated.

Too little and the ride will not be able to fill and operate properly.

Too much, and when the pumps stop the trough will drain only until its waterline becomes equal to that in the reservoir, potentially creating dangerous conditions in the trough for victims and first reponders during emergencies.

The waterline on the Raging River being high enough to flood into the ride’s trough is even more apparent in a side view, thanks to the park having been 3D modeled in Google Earth.

With Google Earth Pro, you are able to compare the differences between higher and lower waterlines. These two, taken in October and 2016 and 2017 respectively, show the ride with dramatically different waterlines in the reservoir. In the first, the section where the Jaramillos overturned seems totally drained. The next year, that same section is flooded.

If you’ll look closely at the end of the rapids section, you’ll see the rafts bunched up at the end. In the event this had been an actual emergency stop, most or all of the riders would have been stranded in one of the most inaccessible sections of the park.

Another aerial, from 2009, reveals another boat stranded at the section.

The possibility that a stoppage of the rides pumps would potentially result in rafts stranded in this section must have been evident to Adventureland maintenance and ownership.

A post to an unofficial Adventureland Facebook group dated June 26 confirms that one week before the accident Raging River was in this overfilled condition.

The pictures show a waterline in the area where the Jaramillos capsized approaching normal operating levels, and even a stranded raft that had not completed the course. Also like in the satellite aerials, water stretches as far as into the ride’s main rapids course. At least a third of the course remains covered in some level of water, getting only deeper as the trough drops further below the waterline.

(Poster’s name redacted for privacy.)

No mechanical or electical component of the ride whatsoever needs to fail in order for this condition to be created, which would make it difficult for inspections to reveal it as a potential hazard.

In this state, the only method of draining the ride trough further is to close the release valve and begin directly pumping the water from the ride layout, a process which could take hours.

Shortly following the accident many news reports, and the park itself, noted that Raging River had passed its annual safety inspection the day before, implying that all ride systems were in working order. In fact, it had passed inspections all of the last five years.

But an accident report written by the same person to perform the 2021 annual inspection reveals that the ride’s emergency stop system and its efficacy received no scrutiny. Nor did the condition of the reservoir. It also reveals that physical inspection of the rafts themselves occurred a month prior:

The ride completed the State of Iowa inspection on Friday July 2nd, 2021 conducted by myself. A comprehensive inspection of the newly installed control system was observed as well as the operation of the ride. A visual inspection of the boats were made at this time. The station and trough were inspected on 4/12/21 with no boats or water in the ride. A physical inspection of the boats was performed on 6/2/21 before being installed in the ride. The ride was functioning as normal on 7/2/21 and I passed the inspection.

Below is what the ride looks like in a totally drained state. Using Google Earth Pro, you see multiple occasions where the reservoir has been emptied, often in an April and most recently in a very blurry aerial from that month in 2020.

Without seeing the ride in a filled but inoperational state, or watching the ride perform an emergency stop, it would have been near impossible for inspectors to recognize the potential for rafts to strand on the far side of the course, in an area about 100 yards away from any path or emergency vehicle access.

The safety inspection awould have involved a section for “Emergency Procedures Reviewed,” but as a “review” it does not seem that a successful demonstration of the ride’s safety systems was required, only the existence of procedures.

Whatever those procedures may have been, when emergency responders arrived they reported a lack of easy access to the area by the trough where the Jaramillos' raft was overturned, as well as employees clueless to the emergency:

The police report shows that emergency responders didn’t have easy access to the overturned raft, calling it a “remote location.”

They had to run roughly the length of a football field on uneven terrain to get to the victims, put them on stretchers and carry them all the way back to the awaiting ambulances.

The first dispatched officer on the scene couldn’t access the park at first because the gate was “closed and appeared to be secured with a heavy chain and lock.”

As the officer was trying to figure out where the emergency was in the park, he encountered three Adventureland staff, but none of them knew about the accident. They also couldn’t even point the officer to a supervisor.

There are reasons to be concerned about the impartiality of the ongoing investigation led by Iowa Labor Commissioner and career politician Rod Roberts, a lifelong Republican appointed to the position by Gov. Kim Reynolds. Reynolds accepted $80,000 in campaign contributions from Adventureland CEO Michael Krantz, who is one of the state’s leading GOP donors.

That could be why the investigation has appeared to focus almost exclusively on one aspect of the potential failure, one which enables Adventureland to manufacture the most doubt about their culpability.

How can you conclusively state that a partially deflated bladder is the immediate cause of the capsizing?

How can you demonstrably prove that the deflation was caused by an issue Adventureland could have been able to foresee and prevent?

If it was just a freak occurrence, relevant to only one or two rafts, why subject the park to punitive measures?

But if a lack of basic maintenance on essential components of the ride system and disregard for recommended industry practices played a role, Adventureland would have to accept responsibility and face not only an expensive lawsuit from the family but potentially massive fines from state regulators. Or even permanently closing their freshly refurbished ride. Adventureland also stands to lose the trust of thousands of paying guests shortly ahead of the opening of a massive rival amusement park elsewhere in the state.

If the investigation is to be sufficiently comprehensive as to prevent another tragedy such as thia occurring it must expand beyond an examination of how a raft could capsize and begin questioning why improper maintenance on the ride system and lack of industry-recommended procedures for water rescue allowed the unfortunate event to escalate to such serious consequences for Michael Jaramillo and his family.