US and Middle-east: The `old’ normal and the importance of Saudi Arabia 

In volatile middle-east, policy about-turns are about as frequent as desert sandstorms. Friends can become enemies and enemies frequently find themselves embracing each other. The latest episode in this long-running saga is now happening between US and Egypt. On Monday, John Kerry, the US secretary of state stopped over in Cairo to meet the newly-crowned Egyptian president Abdel Fatah al-Sissi who was elected with 97% of the vote in May. Kerry’s visit followed a phone call from US President Barack Obama, a clear sign of the Americans currying favour with the new strongman.

Just last year, however, the two countries were at loggerheads. The sudden, abrupt dismissal of the Morsi government angered the Americans who froze military aid and lectured Sissi on democracy and human rights. National Security Advisor Susan Rice’s public chastisement of the Egyptian government’s crackdown on Muslim Brotherhood and the detention of former president Morsi only made matters worse. A lot of things have changed since then and the Americans are back at what they have been doing for many decades in the Middle-east since the 1950s. Currying favour with dictators in the hope of curbing the influence of undesirable elements and enemies. In the 1950s it was the Soviet Union and the communism. Today, it is ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and Levant) which is threatening to redraw the Middle-east map forever.

At one level, the US change of stance on Egypt is understandable. America is quickly losing control of the Maliki government in Iraq which is looking wobblier by the day and Saudi Arabia is no longer the kind of ally it was after the US about-turn on Syria and the Saudi sponsorship of the ISIL.

Israeli prime minister Binyamin Netanyahu has been put off by the administration’s aggressive attempts to stitch together an Israeli-Palestinian deal and what they see as America’s attempts to railroad them into a peace deal.

So, the US badly needs a few friends in the Middle-east and would have lost ability to influence key players if it had continued with its original strategy. On Monday, John Kerry announced that US released military aid worth $575 mln to Egypt and said that the Apache helicopters promised to the Egyptian government will soon be delivered. The helicopters are aimed at bolstering Egyptian military’s attempts to snuff out militants in the Sinai peninsula. Militants possibly allied to ISIL and the al-Qaeda.

Sissi may be a reliable partner and he may also be willing to support America’s efforts to combat the rising influence of a-Qaeda, ISIS and their affiliates in the region given his crackdown on Muslim Brotherhood and his attempts to model himself on former Egyptian strongman Hosni Mubarak.

But Kerry’s visit possibly underscored another growing anxiety, one that is unlikely to go away soon. That is the growing rift with Saudi Arabia, a key ally and considered by many to a silent backer of ISIL and the Sunni militants.

Saudi-US relations have cooled off considerably and Kerry’s decison on this week to visit Riyadh for talks with the Saudi king is possibly aimed at placating the roayls and winning them over.

The Saudi government has vehemantly denied Iraqi and Iranian accusations of funding ISIL and there is no credible evidence to show that the government is in anyway connected with its growth. ISIL has already been branded a terrorist organisation by the kingdom and private funding to the group has been banned. Many analysts have said that ISIL could be a Frankenstein monster that could destabilise Saudi if allowed to grow and expand its influence.

But the counter argument is also true. There is no reason to believe that wealthy Gulf individuals and businessmen are not supporting ISIL. More than anybody else, Saudis would have a lot to gain from supporting ISIL. Such a move weakens a Shiite-dominated, Iranian supported government in Iraq at a time when Iranian influence is said to be growing; prompts an unwilling USA to intervene and gives the Saudis enough leverage in any American-mediated efforts to resolve the issue.

The only risk to this strategy was a possible US-iranian joint effort to roll back ISISL advance but that looks a little difficult now after Ayatollah Ali-Khamenei’ outburst against US intervention.

The trouble for the US is that sans military intervention (which is impossible), efforts to solve the Iraqi stand-off must involve both Iran and Saudi Arabia, not to mention a weak Iraqi government. But with both the oil-rich Sunni kingdom and the Shia-dominated Iran refusing to look each other in the eye, that is looking increasingly difficult. The last thing America wants is to be caught in a intra-regional tussle for supremacy between two heavily armed rival religious factions.