The Crash Override Chronicles

Scott J Roberts
Aug 8, 2017 · 3 min read

I’ve been lucky and had a really wide variety of experiences in information security throughout my career. Government & non-government. Vendor & practitioner. Finance & dotcom. I’ve seen a lot of stuff. It’s to the point that I get even more excited about the stuff I’ve never done. One of those moments happened a few weeks ago when the Dragos team released their Crash Override report.

Full Disclosure: I know a few of the folks over at Dragos and consider them friends but friends that value good, even critical, analysis.

Source: Crash Override Report by Dragos

The Crash Override report is an investigation into a campaign against an electric utility infrastructure in Ukraine. Now I don’t know a lot about Industrial Control System (ICS) security, so a report like this is fascinating to me. It’s a view into a whole different world, a different type of network & system infrastructure, a different set of response actions, new stakeholder needs, and an adversary with TTPs I don’t even know. While moving from finance network defense to dotcom network defense had a lot of overlap (both largely privacy focus) ICS networks are totally different (such as a bigger focus on availability).

Between self driving cars, the connected grid, IOT, robotics, etc I think industrial networks and attacks are a growing area of risk and I’m not alone (Kaspersky & HuffPo to start). Enough so that I feel like I need to know more. Thus the Crash Override Chronicles, my series digging into this report and likely a lot of secondary things that come out of it. I’m planning a structured approach digging into a few different aspects of Crash Override.

The Plan

I’m planning to break down my understanding based on the following five posts which I’m calling the Crash Override Chronicles:

  • Overall Report: A run through of the whole report calling out areas I need to focus on learning or investigating.
  • Victim — Domain Understanding: I know I don’t know much about the ICS domain and the power generation/transport world. I’m going to focus on gaining context.
  • Capability — Crash Override Malware: The report focused on the specific piece of malware the adversary used called Crash Override. Time for some malware analysis.
  • Infrastructure — Crash Override Infrastructure: Malware does not operate alone, even in the ICS world (nope, even the one you think worked by itself). There’s always infrastructure for delivery, command & control, and often actions over target.
  • Adversary — Electrum: Lastly I’d like to take all this and dig into the adversary behind the Crash Override campaign. There’s been a lot of speculation, and I don’t make any promises, but it makes a good conclusion.

For those of you playing at home you’ll notice that these four characteristics (Victim, Capability, Infrastructure, and Adversary) make up the 4 points of the Diamond Model. This was totally accidental as I laid this project out, but the model emerged, and so I’m making that a part of the plan.

Source: Giphy

I’ll be posting once a week on Tuesdays. See you on August 15th. 👋

Thanks to John D. Swanson.

Scott J Roberts

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Network Defender, developer, speaker, writer, author of O’Reilly’s Intelligence Driven Incident Response, & SANS instructor. Bad guy catcher.