You’re right; this is brilliant. Definitely worthy of the humble brag.
Thanks for the reference, Maarten.
I think my hesitation in using the term “objective” perhaps is a product of my postmodern experience and from the fluidity (not relativity) of truth — most apparent in contemporary quantum mechanics, (though I feel like there are a myriad of examples). The world as it appears to us, I think, becomes sufficient grounds for making truthful statements about reality as we experience it; however, part of me wants to invoke Cartesian skepticism (yuck) to claim it as objective.
I suppose I envision objective reality as “the world as it appears to God” and our access to reality as simply phenomenological, through our perceptions of primary and secondary qualities of objects themselves. Without venturing too far into philosophy of language, cognition (and language) allows us to speak on behalf of perceived objects, but I don’t believe we can speak for such objects (underlying objectivity).
I think that the one thing that threw me off was this claim: “To get beyond appearances we should ask what the world must be like from no point of view to appear to us as it does.”
Do you think this is possible? Maybe I am uncomfortable with the fact that this would be far too meta for me haha. Or maybe my concern is plainly semantics surrounding epistemology. Either way, I think I have been reading too much Husserl since our last discussion. I always appreciate your thoughtful and lucid responses, not to mention challenging.