Trump’s “military option” in Venezuela

Internal pressures likely supersede any external threat

Steven Spinello
Aug 25, 2017 · 11 min read

In a televised speech on Tuesday night, President Trump announced plans for a troop build-up in Afghanistan. The longest-running military engagement in American history refuses to die. Trump, who campaigned on a message of breaking the wheel of US foreign adventurism, has now moved decidedly in the opposite direction. Importantly, Trump’s announcement may signal a more hawkish approach when it comes to foreign policy and perhaps emanates from an administration which is stocked full of military men.

Just a few weeks ago, when discussing the political situation in Venezuela President Trump openly suggested that a “military option” was on the table. Whether or not Trump’s message was scripted (or even remotely deliberated with his Security Council) is difficult to say. The administration seemingly scrambled to play damage control with Vice President Pence suggesting a “peaceful” solution was preferred. Meanwhile, Trump’s chief diplomat, former oil executive Rex Tillerson, was noticeably silent on the issue. Tillerson seems to have deferred to official press releases trickling through State’s website. America’s key allies in the region, especially countries like Mexico, Brazil and Peru, were not particularly amused.

Venezuela is experiencing a massive economic emergency. Some might argue it was entirely self-inflicted. For well over a decade, the country benefitted from access to the world’s largest petroleum reserves. Under the rule of the late Hugo Chavez, Venezuela emerged as a Latin American heavyweight. With global oil prices hovering around $100/barrel, the Venezuelan economy hummed along. A steady flow of oil receipts were turned into massive social insurance schemes. Everyone, rich and poor, seemed to share in the spoils of the country’s “black gold”. However, all of this came to a grinding halt when the price of oil began to fall. It did not help that the country lost its political figurehead and consoler-in-chief with the death of Chavez in 2013.

Every day, like a steady drumbeat, there are reports of massive queues of Venezuelans waiting (hoping) to buy food. Three-fourths of Venezuelans have reported involuntary weight loss. People are literally starving. Street protests have become a fact of life in Caracas, Venezuela’s capital city and economic center. Now, there is a real possibility of a military coup. A more remote possibility is a low-level civil war which ends up in protracted urban warfare. In the event of a complete government breakdown, Venezuela could have a massive refugee crisis on its hands. Its Latin American neighbors, especially Colombia, would bear the brunt of this. One question which has gone mainly unanswered by mainstream media sources: Given the situation the ground, what is the real likelihood of US military intervention in Venezuela?

Venezuela: The Situation on the Ground

In Venezuela, the country of 31 million is in the midst of its worst economic downturn since the establishment of a two-party democratic system in 1958. Venezuela is experiencing inflation well over 700% on an annual basis (although verifiable statistics of any kind are a rarity) rendering the Venezuelan currency worthless. Basic necessities of life — bread, milk, toilet paper, OTC medicines — are extremely difficult to come by. There is a thriving black-market mostly run by street gangs which operate with impunity. Not surprisingly, people have taken to the streets to protest despite being violently repressed by Venezuela’s National Police and National Guard. Hundreds of people have died in the clashes while hundreds more have been jailed indefinitely as political prisoners. The country it would seem is nearing a breaking point.

The Maduro regime is fighting at all costs to maintain its grip on power. Maduro has slowly but surely chipped away at the last vestiges of democracy in Venezuela. The erosion of democratic norms began in proper under Hugo Chavez and shifted into overdrive on Maduro’s watch (Chavez’s hand-picked successor following his death in 2013). Not since 2015 when voters went to the polls to choose members of the National Assembly has the country held elections. It was also that year in which Chavez’s United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) finally succumbed to the opposition. However, since then the Maduro regime has done everything in its power to either circumvent or negate Venezuela’s legislative body. In particular, Maduro has relied heavily on the Supreme Court which is packed with government loyalists to muscle through his political agenda.

In the past three weeks, a new National Constituent Assembly (ANC) was hastily formed to replace the National Assembly. The Maduro government (using the Supreme Court as a conduit) justified this decision by pointing out how the National Assembly remains in contempt of court and therefore cannot carry out its duties. They did not mention, however, that the Supreme Court (operating on Maduro’s orders) has nullified three legislators’ election to office on the account of irregularities, stripped the legislative body of its budgetary authority and basically castrated the Assembly’s ability to pass anything that carries the rule of law.

The ANC vote was tainted from the start. The “election” took place despite depressed turnout, accusations of tampered votes and a lack of independent verification. Maduro and his associates fielded a hand-picked list of pro-government loyalists to serve as candidates. The ANC vote followed a constitutionally-ordained popular plebiscite where the people voted overwhelmingly to denounce the formation of the ANC. During that same plebiscite, the Venzuelan people voted in favor of the military upholding the constitution as well as maintaining the right to hold free elections. Despite local reports of more than 7 million voters turning out (also unverified), the popular consultation was completely ignored by the Maduro government.

Historical Framework: Operation Just Cause

America has a long history of engagement with its Latin American neighbors. If the Trump administration were to seriously consider the use of force in Venezuela, his military advisors would be hard-pressed not to at least brush up on their history lessons. In particular, they might turn to the year 1989 when the elder Bush held office. Then, the US elected to invade Panama to depose the dictator Manuel Noriega and help install a democratically-elected government. Known as “Operation Just Cause”, this was a comprehensive and widely coordinated military operation to capture (effectively arrest) Noriega and neutralize the Panama Defense Forces (“PDF”).

Despite a number of American casualties as well as diplomatic blowback from Latin American states, the invasion of Panama was widely viewed as a successful operation. The US armed forces had just gone through a complete reorg to streamline the chain of command. No one was quite sure how these changes would play out until put to the test; Just Cause put any doubts to rest. In a span of some 30 days with minimal American casualties, Noriega was successfully captured and extradited to US, the PDF forces were effectively neutralized, and a democratically-elected government took power.

The circumstances underlying the Panama invasion are similar if not exactly alike to Venezuela’s current situation. There was a dictator who refused to accept the democratic will of his people. Noriega had developed a reputation for harassing US citizens similar to how Maduro likes to rail against the “US imperialists”. At the same time, strategic assets with global implications were (are) in play. In Panama, this included access to the Panama Canal in addition to a large US military and civilian presence. In Venezuela, the US’s main rationale for cooperating with the Maduro government is enabling current and future development of that country’s oil reserves. One can begin to see the parallels. However, it’s important to point out the key differences of Just Cause with a hypothetical military intervention in Venezuela; these are mainly as follows:

Key Differentiator #1: US lives/assets at risk

THEN:

In 1989, the US had approximately 50,000 military and civilian personnel based in Panama. This included active military personnel stationed at various bases and ports in addition to civilians living in cities like Panama City. Additionally, the US maintained de facto control over the Panama Canal — a key access point for US and international commerce. Although the US had agreed to transfer complete control of the canal to Panama by the year 2000, there was an implicit understanding between the two governments that the US retained the ability to protect this strategic asset.

NOW:

With the exception of diplomatic personnel, the US does not maintain anything close to that headcount in Venezuela. There does remain a small yet non-trivial US presence. On July 27, the State Department ordered all family members of US embassy personnel in Caracas to leave the country. There have been several reports of US citizens being detained indefinitely sometimes without access to food or water. Some employees of State have elected to stay behind to support the deliberations of the National Assembly — the one remaining legitimate political body. Thus, there remains the potential for a hostage situation or even American casualties.

Indeed, several American corporations have an established presence in Venezuela; this includes companies like Coca-Cola, GM and of course oil and gas companies. However the brunt of these companies’ facilities have either closed down or suspended operations due to either government expropriation or the struggling economy. America’s foremost “strategic” asset remains Venezuela’s large and mostly untapped petroleum reserves. The US imports from Venezuela approximately 750,000 barrels per day. While the significance of maintaining access to these reserves has declined somewhat, Venezuela’s oil production capacity (~2% of global production output) remains the country’s key bargaining chip.

Key Differentiator #2: US military readiness and preparedness

THEN:

Leading up to the invasion of Panama, the US military went through several iterations of its plans to invade and/or capture Noriega. Over the course of 18 months, the US first under the Reagan administration and then during the Bush administration built up its military presence in Panama. Initially, the original plan was anticipated to take place over the span of three weeks relying on a force of approximately 22,000 troops. However, after Bush elected to replace one of his generals the plan evolved into a precision attack that was to be executed over the course of three to five days. By the time the final orders arrived at the president’s desk, the US military was prepared to field a total force of 27,000. This included US army, air force, navy, marines and special ops soldiers.

NOW:

Today, the US military presence in Latin America reflects political realities as well as policy priorities. The political reality is that there is little to no appetite for military engagements in America’s backyard. Over the past two decades, the US has succeeded in establishing closer ties to its Latin American neighbors, especially Mexico which accounts for significant cross-border trade. Currently, the full extent of the US military in all of Latin America numbers approximately 2,500; this includes countries like Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Nicaragua and Panama. (In Panama, as of June 2017 there were just 31 active personnel). The US has its largest presence in Cuba where ostensibly the Guantanamo Bay detention facilities account for the majority of that country’s US soldiers. Additionally, there are close to 1,000 troops spread between Honduras and El Salvador which are ostensibly assisting with humanitarian efforts to stem the flow of migrants across the US southern border. Effectively, there is no significant US military attachment situated near Venezuela’s borders.

Key Differentiator #3: A series of a catalytic events

THEN:

Leading up to the Panama invasion, there were several events which either directly or indirectly contributed to the Bush administration’s decision to use force. On December 15, the Panama National Assembly passed a resolution stating that “owing to US aggression”, a state of war existed with the United States. This would provide the Bush administration with additional political cover when weighing military options. However, two incidents in particular stand out in retrospect: the first was the death of a US serviceman who was shot in the back of the head while travelling with his fellow soldiers. Following this incident, a junior US naval officer along with his wife were brought to a local police station for questioning. While in custody, the officer was physically abused while his wife was sexually assaulted. Together, these incidents served as strong emotional triggers for the Bush administration to act decisively. The American public was made aware of the situation on the ground. American lives were in imminent danger.

NOW:

To date, nothing approaching the events described above have occurred in Venezuela. While Venezuela’s president Nicolas Maduro frequently rails against the US as waging an “economic war” on Venezuela and its people, there is no concrete evidence that supports this claim. (That is, not until Trump suggested a military option was in play.) The US remains a key trading partner with Venezuela, absorbing approximately 740,000 b/d of Venezuela’s oil exports. However, due to a general lack of maintenance and investment, Venezuela’s oil production capacity has waned considerably in recent years. Ostensibly, if this relationship were to terminate Venezuela has more at stake than its American counterpart. Maduro’s government relies heavily on oil receipts to pay for the generous subsidies it doles out to ordinary Venezuelans in addition to repaying its creditors (ex-US) as well as distributing rents among the bureaucracy.

The Most Likely Scenario: Insider Revolt

There are some parallels between Venezuela today and Panama in 1989. Both countries have suffered under authoritarian governments (some might argue outright dictatorship). The US maintains strategic assets in both countries; a major commercial access point in Panama and oil reserves in Venezuela. There is an element of criminality at play as well: prior to the US invasion, Noriega was indicted on drug trafficking charges in the US. This factored closely into the Bush team’s decision-making. In Venezuela, Maduro’s close confidante, Vice President Tarek El-Aissami, has been labeled by US Treasury as a co-participant in the cross-borders narcotics trade.

Furthermore, at least historically-speaking, the US was committed to upholding democratic values and human rights throughout Latin America. In Panama in 1989, Manuel Noriega threatened to trounce those democratic values by refusing to acknowledge the result of a democratic election. In Venezuela, the Maduro regime has run roughshod over the country’s National Assembly, the only democratically-elected body in Venezuela. However, the parallels mostly end there.

As it stands today, the US does not have a compelling or imminent reason to intervene militarily in Venezuela. Americans can rest assured that absent of a complete change of events, the US will not be para-trooping Special Ops teams into Caracas anytime soon. What seems more likely is that the Maduro regime will soon face its own reckoning. Venezuela relies almost entirely on the uninterrupted flow of receipts from its oil exports. Additionally, the government has received external financing from the likes of foreign investors like China and Russia in addition to others.

The US has already slapped a wave of sanctions on several individuals in the Maduro government. These sanctions were designed to pressure Maduro and his confidantes to refrain from further engaging in violent standoffs with its people. At the same time, they are targeted at individuals who are primarily responsible for managing key facets of the Maduro administration. They are what one would call financial “pressure points” which target the nucleus of Maduro’s golden circle. The sanctions list includes people like El-Aissami — the mastermind behind Maduro’s security and intelligence forces, influential members of the new Constituent Assembly as well as the president of the National Center for Foreign Commerce who controls foreign exchange rates and has enabled high-ranking officials to benefit from highly favorable FX rates (i.e. in Venezuela, not everyone is quoted the same rate).

While the intent of these sanctions is well-meaning, they are unlikely to significantly alter (let alone stop) Maduro’s actions. Maduro is fixated on retaining political power at all costs; his past actions have dispelled any notion of his maintaining a democratic veneer. Every political impediment he has either steamrolled (National Assembly) or de-legitimatized (Attorney General) that there remains zero institutional blockage. Thus, the only remaining realistic scenario in which there is a “changing of the guard” has to come from inside the government. To date, no members of the golden circle have publicly come out against Maduro. (Most are well-paid and lavished with ministry jobs of their choice.) However, when and if this does happen it may just be the tipping point.

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