Evaluating 30 Years of Environmental International Regimes: Why O-Zone Protection Succeeded and Climate Change Efforts Failed
In the last 30 years, international cooperation efforts have sought to mitigate human-induced environmental problems. These efforts take shape in the creation of international regimes which lay out binding and/or non-binding principles and rules designed to address specific environmental issue areas. Environmental issue areas that have required and continue to require profound international cooperation are o-zone depletion and climate change. International efforts to address these problems have produced strikingly contrasting results. The international regime created to mitigate o-zone depletion, the Montreal Protocol, has been a wildly acclaimed success and a testament to the benefits of international cooperation. Conversely, the Kyoto Protocol, the international regime intent on limiting climate change, largely failed — why? There are many factors, but several fundamentally stand out: the impact of cost-benefit analysis of cooperation, the effectiveness of compliance and enforcement mechanisms, and the extent of participation and burden sharing. Analysis illustrates that favorable cost/benefit ratios, consistently expanding participation, and a minimum participation threshold that ensured credible enforcement mechanisms were each necessary for the success of environmental international regimes. Furthermore, it shows the lack thereof breeds failure.
To evaluate the international cooperation efforts, one must first understand what international regimes are and why they are necessary to address certain environmental problems. International regimes are issue-specific sets of rules governing international policy. Regimes differ, then, from international organizations, which have actor-like qualities and can operate via organizational bodies. International regimes are especially necessary when their respective rules address global commons issues. Global commons are public goods or resources that are shared globally. When issues with global public goods arise, like in the case of o-zone depletion and climate change, aggregate efforts are needed.
Conceptual theories are paramount in analyzing these efforts in detail because they explain the causes, design, and effects of international institutions. Rationalist institutionalism, otherwise known as liberalism, assumes that institutions are created when states are interdependent among one another. International cooperation leads to mutual gains and creates a solution to enforcement and distribution problems. Liberalist theory suggests that international institutions solve cooperation problems by facilitating repeated interactions among states, defining and monitoring compliance, and adjudicating punishment for non-compliance. Realism, a second school of thought, suggests that international institutions only form when hegemonic powers solve distributive conflicts or thwart an external threat. There are key distinctions to be made. Realism understands that the role of international institutions are secondary to hegemonic powers. Gains from cooperation must be interpreted relative to another state: relative gains. In contrast, rationalist institutionalism promotes absolute gains, which implies a Pareto Optimum result. Finally, constructivist theory criticizes rationalist theory for focusing too much on the costs and benefits of international cooperation while ignoring the normative appeal of common behavioral identities and norms. While constructivism is an important theory in understanding international institutions, both rationalist schools are more fundamental in explaining the successes and failures of these two international regime types.
Although theories create the abstract context required to clarify complex phenomena, their rhetoric cannot stand alone. In this case, they must be used to analyze the creation and contrasting success of implicit environmental international regimes. To understand the regime must also mean one must understand the phenomena that caused regime creation. There are key differences between these two environmental issues that impact their respective regime success. O-zone depletion is a much simpler scientific phenomena, which makes it easier to understand and monitor. It is caused by the release of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) into the atmosphere. CFCs break down in high in the stratosphere due to ultraviolet radiation from the Sun. The released chlorine from these atoms breaks down the o-zone layer. A depleted o-zone layer harms biological systems, reduces immune system efficiency, and increases the risk of skin cancer. CFCs are a human creation, and do not occur naturally. This means o-zone depletion can be reversed by human efforts. However, although CFCs are released by individual states, they mix in the atmosphere, creating a global commons issue. Therefore, aggregate efforts from a large number of nations is necessary to limit total emissions, and it is in the self-interest of all states to cooperate.
In 1987, 189 states created the Montreal Protocol to prevent further o-zone depletion. This was a legally-binding agreement that limited the global consumption and production of CFCs. Through several amendments over the following years, states adopted tighter constraints and more immediate deadlines to curb CFC emissions. States that chose to accept the Montreal Protocol later that 1987 had to abide by the most recent amendment’s binding controls. This strict and dynamic regime worked. Almost 30 years later, o-zone depletion is healing, and reports from the European Commission state that the Montreal Protocol “has led to the phase out of 98% of production and consumption of ozone depleting substances.”
This strict and dynamic regime worked. Almost 30 years later, o-zone depletion is healing, and reports from the European Commission state that the Montreal Protocol “has led to the phase out of 98% of production and consumption of ozone depleting substances.”
The Montreal Protocol found success for several reasons. First, its benefits far outweighed its costs. Because the o-zone is a global public good, salvaging it through widespread international cooperation creates absolute benefits. Despite state variations in population, geographic location, and GDP, it is in the self-interest of all states to cooperate. The U.S. alone was positioned to gain from a benefit:cost ratio of 65:1, assuming unilateral implementation. However, that data does imply unilateral implementation, which means the incentives to cooperate and comply must be both credible and effective. To solve cooperation problem of uneven distribution, states created the Multilateral Fund that supplied financial support to developing countries to cover the “incremental costs” of implementation. This ensured that developing nations, whose benefit-cost ratio was not as favorable as in developed nations, would not be significantly worse off because of cooperation. Those states who still chose not to cooperate were threatened with trade restrictions on CFC consumption. Because the Protocol had a large enough initial membership, the threat of trade restrictions was credible enough to force states not participating to join. The compliance mechanism then relied not only in the legally binding nature of the regime. The Montreal Protocol’s mutual gains were also supported by large participation, compensation to ensure a more favorable Pareto Optimum, and credible enforcement mechanisms.
The science behind climate change, however, is more complex. It is caused by solar radiation that is absorbed by gases in the atmosphere. There are two root causes: natural and human-induced climate change. Natural climate change is in response to several cycles involving solar radiation and gravitational pulls, known collectively as the Milankovitch cycles. Human-induced climate change is the additional unnatural contribution of those atmospheric gases, known as greenhouse gases, through human activity such as agriculture or industrial production. Some greenhouse gases, like CFCs, are a human creation. Others, like carbon dioxide, are naturally occurring. Because of this, climate change is hard to monitor and harder to prove. The consequences are also subject to interpretation. The timeline has scaled from gradual to abrupt, and the impact moves from minimal to catastrophic.
The Kyoto Protocol, adopted in 1997, was the first international effort at producing a legally-binding commitment to reduce climate change. The complexity and uncertainty of the science supporting climate change immediately created consensus problems. This allowed states to flex their relative self interests, which compounded the Kyoto Protocol’s main failure: lack of participation. Production of greenhouse gases comes in large part from state-building capacities, such as agriculture and industry. Developing nations, like India and China, were not inclined to contribute at the cost of not developing. Large hegemonic states, particularly the United States, were equally not inclined to put their economy at greater risk than the rival Chinese economy. Lack of participation produced a common international regime issue: trade leakage. Emissions are not reduced, but rather they are shifted to another, more affordable location. Many political economists support the trade leakage theory, suggesting that “financial actors respond to investment opportunities…where environmental regulation is either non-existent, less developed, or poorly enforced.” Lack of participation also makes compliance and enforcement mechanisms less credible. Where the Montreal Protocol met the minimum participation standards necessary for credible enforcement, the Kyoto Protocol did not. It simply could not accomplish enough in realist terms because of its divisive and limited participation and the relative self interests that perpetuated from this lack of international involvement.
Lack of participation produced a common international regime issue: trade leakage. Emissions are not reduced, but rather they are shifted to another, more affordable location.
The 2015 Paris Agreement was the most recent environmental international regime poised to limit climate change. It avoided legally-binding limits on emissions in favor of a pledge-and-review system. States publicly pledged their commitments based on self interests. Furthermore, an agreement was reached to help poorer nations adopt favorable policies and prepare for climate change consequences that they would have otherwise been unable to do so. To its credit, the agreement had a large number of state participants, 195, and it was done through consensus, which admittedly is impressive. Optimists believe this new agreement is destined to be more successful because these nationally determined contributions will foster “deeper cooperation…over time.” However, there is no mechanism to reliably monitor compliance beyond self-reporting. Because the agreement is not legally-binding, there is no credible enforcement mechanism beyond publicly naming and shaming. Many critics believe the ambitious language of the agreement will still be unable to achieve its notably challenging goal of reducing temperature range to two degrees Celsius. Many scholars have gone as far to suggest that average global temperature is not an effective enough indicator of climate change regime impact. Other indicators such as carbon dioxide concentrations, high latitude temperature, and ocean heat content are all arguably better indicators of vital sign change.
Over the last 30 years, there has been a noticeable variation in the success of environmental regimes positioned to tackle the world’s leading environmental issues. The Montreal Protocol, a regime aimed at reducing o-zone depletion, has been an success story of international cooperation. The benefits clearly outweighed the costs for all states, which contributed to an absolute gain from participating. Participation was high because of this balance of absolute gains, which allowed enforcement mechanisms to be much more effective.Conversely, the Kyoto Protocol failed to mitigate climate change. Scientific uncertainty and complexity forced states to consider relative self interests, which split between developed and developing nations. This impacted participation severely and made compliance and impact otherwise unnoticeable due to trade leakage. A new international regime made in Paris in 2015 has become a promising hope to many, but questionable goals and an inability to monitor and enforce compliance make the Paris Agreement toothless unless measures can be taken to alleviate those underlying issues that plagued the Kyoto Protocol.
