Hi, Ben
I agree with your point of view. Here is one section of a piece I posted previously of Linked IN and Facebook (and maybe here on Medium too), somewhat revised. I proposed three amendments: to allow for virtual states, to allow for non-contiguous geographical states, and to require proportional allocation of each state's Electoral College delegates.
RATIONALE FOR AN AMENDMENT TO RESTRICT STATE ELECTORAL VOTE ALLOCATION:
The Founders hoped to provide buffers against fickle public opinion, with this form of indirect election being the major one. It was expected that the range of opinion within each state would be delineated by its own particular set of geographical circumstances and social norms; each state’s electors were therefore expected to be experienced politicians chosen to exercise wise independent judgement on behalf of their white, male, propertied constituents. Later, it became the standard expectation that electors would abide by the statewide popular vote; electors who voted independently against the flow were called “faithless”. Today, while all politics may still indeed be local, regional geographies and local social norms have become less important than other overriding national, economic, and ideological factors.
As has become abundantly clear, the fundamental problem with the Electoral College is the “winner-take-all” system, employed by most states, which artificially magnifies the winner’s victory. This is the “tyranny of the majority” at its most primal: one vote more than the opponent gives the front-runner all the votes from that particular state. It’s great when your party is the beneficiary, but not so great when the vote goes against you.
The “tyranny of the plurality” is even worse: a strong third party candidate diverts votes from the more similar of the two major candidates, resulting in a skewed election, which, ironically, is likely to be tilted to the benefit of the less popular major candidate. In this way, “winner-take-all” vote allocation systematically and purposely nullifies the minor voices of third-party and independent candidates, which must certainly be a bad thing.
To have the Electoral College more accurately reflect the popular will, the system must more openly acknowledge the minor parties and other independent candidates. It therefore seems obvious that proportional distribution of the electors should be made the standard practice of all the states, not only of Nebraska and Maine. But in parliamentary democracies, where governing by coalition is the norm, the cacophony is often unproductive and the administrations unstable, flipping frequently. Despite the likelihood of improved response to the voters’ will, the two-party system is deeply entrenched in the United States, and great resistance to the idea of dismantling the winner-take-all system can easily be foreseen.
How is it possible to increase the diversity of campaign voices without creating chaos in governing?
Without having crunched any numbers or run any simulations, I surmise that a system of apportioning Electoral votes would result in tighter races and less predictable outcomes. Would the impasse created by two candidates being neck-and-neck in electoral votes mean that they are equally popular or equally unpopular? The result may be viewed from either perspective, considering that both front-runners have been rejected by as many voters as have approved them.
In this regard, it must be said that assigning the House of Representatives to decide a hung election is inherently biased and unfair. Before taking this regrettable path of last resort, I propose offering the tie-breaker role to the third-party candidates. Allowing each state’s most successful third-party candidate to restore the siphoned-off support to one or the other of the two front-runners would be an efficient way of ensuring fairness across a wide spectrum of states.
In the event that, even after the tie-breaking third party electors have had their say, the procedures described here still do not produce a clear winner, then the US House of Representatives, traditionally the final arbiter of hung elections, would be called upon as before, but this time with a new injunction: Section 4 of the proposed amendment suggests, but does not require, that the House consider eliminating both front-runners as being too polarizing, and that it unilaterally seek alternative candidates who would be acceptable across a wide spectrum of public opinion. To mitigate the shock of overturning the election and installing an “appointed” president, Section 4 requires a supermajority vote.
This proposed amendment is, above all, a plea for moderation in future election campaigns to provide a responsible, trustworthy president and, hopefully, less lurching between left and right every four or eight years.
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AMENDMENT XXVIII: Allocation of State Electoral Votes
Section 1: Ballots for all federal offices shall include conspicuous, appropriately located and appropriately sized spaces for write-in candidates.
Section 2: Each state shall assign its electoral votes in proportion to the statewide popular vote, not district by district. In the event of a close contest between two leading candidates in a state with an odd number of electors, no tie-breaking electoral delegate shall be allocated to either; in such a deadlocked situation, the remaining electoral delegate shall be assigned to the third-running candidate.
Section 3: In the event of a deadlocked national electoral vote, the votes for each state’s third-running candidates shall be reallocated. Each designated third-party elector shall individually, according to his or her own discretion, reassign his or her electoral vote to one of the two nationwide leaders.
Section 4: In the further event that this secondary voting procedure still does not produce an outright winner, the election shall pass to the House of Representatives for final resolution. The House shall remain mindful of the fact that as many voters have rejected the two leading candidates as have approved them; alternative candidates acceptable across a broad spectrum of public opinion may then be considered. The election of such an unexpected and unheralded ticket as President and Vice-President shall require a supermajority of the House’s votes.
Section 5: Congress shall have the power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
