Why the Battle of Lanzerath Ridge is so damn interesting

There are some obvious possible answers to this question: Because it’s a historical “David vs Goliath” story; Because it makes the US Army look very good; Because it had a significant effect on the outcome of the Battle of the Bulge. But I think there’s an even better answer. But first, let’s start somewhere else — though not at Bastogne, or at Stalingrad either.

Wiki does a good job of covering the plan for Unternehmen Wacht am Rhein (‘Operation Watch on the Rhine’): “The goal was to pierce the thinly held lines of the U.S. First Army between Monschau and Wasserbillig with Generalfeldmarschall Walter Model’s Army Group B by the end of the first day, get the armor through the Ardennes by the end of the second day, reach the Meuse between Liège and Dinant by the third day, and seize Antwerp and the western bank of the Scheldt estuary by the fourth day.” Germany would be unable to resupply the advancing panzer units with fuel, so they would have to use fuel they could capture from the Americans. They would have to move fast before the Allies could mobilize reinforcements to block them. To meet this ambitious schedule, they would have to quickly seize bridges so that their panzers could cross the many rivers in the area.

Another quote from Wiki: “The lead role in the attack was given to the 6th Panzer Army, commanded by SS Oberstgruppenführer Sepp Dietrich. It included the most experienced formation of the Waffen-SS: the 1st SS Panzer Division Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler. It also contained the 12th SS Panzer Division Hitlerjugend. They were given priority for supply and equipment and assigned the shortest route to the primary objective of the offensive, Antwerp, starting from the northernmost point on the intended battlefront, nearest the important road network hub of Monschau.” The spearhead of 6th Panzer Army was Kampfgruppe Peiper — elements of the 1st SS Panzer Division under SS-Standartenführer Joachim Peiper who had been hand picked by Hitler to lead what was their best chance of success. The 12th SS Panzer Division would be on Peiper’s right flank aiming to pass through Elsenborn toward Spa.

The ideal route for Peiper started at Lanzerath and followed roads through Bullingen to Malmedy then Spa and on to Liège. This was the advance anticipated with the ambitious timetable above. Now let’s see what actually happened.

Day 1. “…pierce the thinly held lines of the U.S. First Army… by the end of the first day…”

This was largely achieved except at Lanzerath where they didn’t advance through the American lines until the morning of day two, 16 hours behind schedule.

Day 2. “…get the armor through the Ardennes by the end of the second day…” Spa is considered to be within the Ardennes, so they would need to be through Bullingen and Elsenborn and Malmedy and NW of Spa.

Thanks to the delay at Lanzerath, the American 99th and 2nd Infantry Divisions were able to mostly withdraw into strong defensive positions around Elsenborn Ridge behind Bullingen. Peiper passed through Bullingen but was diverted west toward Stavelot — instead of going north or northwest toward Malmedy. The Battle of Elsenborn Ridge starts this day and continues for 10 days with the American’s continuing to block the 12th SS Panzer Division’s way north toward Liège.

Day 3. “…reach the Meuse between Liège and Dinant by the third day…”

Peiper is blocked west of Stavelot, nowhere near Liège, by blown bridges and fresh American reinforcements. He is unable to move further north toward Liège.

Day 4. “…seize Antwerp and the western bank of the Scheldt estuary by the fourth day.”

Peiper learns that Stavelot has been retaken by the Americans so he can neither progress nor retreat.

Day 7. Final day of intense fighting around Elsenborn Ridge. The American positions hold.

Day 8. The weather clears and Allied fighter-bombers join the battle reducing Peiper’s trapped forces. 800 survivors of Kampfgruppe Peiper return to German lines on foot, leaving vehicles and equipment behind.

Day 11. Final German attack against Elsenborn Ridge is wiped out by massed artillery fire.

Lanzerath Ridge

As hinted above, the event that delayed Peiper and gave the Americans — especially the 99th Infantry Division time to withdraw to strong defensive positions, was the action at Lanzerath Ridge on the first day of the operation.

It’s a stretch to even call this a “battle” as on the American side it only involved 18 men of the Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon, 394th Regiment, 99th Infantry Division. On the German side it involved approximately 500 men of the 1st Battalion, 9th Fallschirmjaeger Regiment, 3rd Fallschirmjaeger Division. The prolonged delay caused by this action also brought the 27th Fusilier Regiment, 12th Volksgrenadier Division onto the scene which turned the tide. (There are many good accounts of the actual engagement including in Wiki.)

If war was simple you could hire accountants to total up the human and material assets of the two sides and calculate the winner. The losing side could then review the math before surrendering or marching away. There would be no need for the actual fighting. War is nothing like that.

The 3rd Fallschirmjaeger Division (paratroopers) had distinguished themselves in the Normandy campaign earlier in 1944. They had also been nearly wiped out. The men leading the attack on the first day of the Battle of the Bulge had been Luftwaffe personnel until reassigned to this duty. They had no experience and minimal training.

The US 99th Infantry Division was equally green, but the I&R platoon had experience operating behind the German front line while taking prisoners (and capturing loot). But even with this experience, there’s no way such a small unit could have held up such a large unit — and all the divisions behind them — if not for one key factor: The American officer did everything right and the German officer did everything wrong. There’s no way this could have been anticipated.

As soon as the Volksgrenadier regiment arrived near the end of the day, an officer of that unit volunteered to do what the Fallschirmjaeger officer should have done after his initial attack was driven off, a small number of Volksgrenadiers attacked the American right flank and quickly took everyone captive. To be fair to both the American and Fallschirmjaeger officers, this would not have been as easy to do hours earlier before the Americans suffered casualties (14 out of 18 by the end of the day) and used up almost all of their ammunition. But it would have worked eventually if enough forces were employed. This had been basic infantry tactical doctrine in most armies since the later years of the Great War. How the Fallschirmjaeger officer didn’t learn this is a mystery and must have been confusing even for the American officer.

Would the outcome of the Battle of the Bulge have been different if a better trained German officer had led the attack on Lanzerath? It’s impossible to say for sure, but it’s not impossible. It’s known that Hitler hand picked the 1st and 12th SS Panzer Divisions to lead this attack. Did he also pick the previously stellar 3rd Fallschirmjaegers to clear the way for the SS divisions? Were his generals by that point too scared to point out that this was not the unit it had been only a few months before? Did this trivial decision doom what he viewed as his last chance to save his position? We will never know for sure but it is worthwhile to note what a difference two officers can make in an operation involving hundreds of thousands of men.