Adapting to Change: Vajpayee’s Keynesian Shift in India’s Nuclear Policy
Politicians have gained considerable insight from the realms of economics and markets, especially from the teachings of John Maynard Keynes
John Maynard Keynes, a renowned British economist, famously responded to a criticism about changing his views with the remark: “When the facts change, I change my mind. What do you do, sir?”
This quote highlights Keynes’ flexibility and willingness to adapt his opinions in light of new evidence, a trait that is often seen as essential for critical thinking and intellectual honesty and a principle that underpinned his approach to economics.
In a scenario reminiscent of John Maynard Keynes’ philosophy of adaptability and pragmatic decision-making, Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s stance on ‘India’s Nuclear Policy’, presents a compelling narrative. Initially an advocate for peace in the 1950s, his stance evolved into a more assertive posture by 1964, only to embrace a pacifist approach again in 1979. Mirroring Keynes’ belief in changing one’s mind when faced with new facts, Vajpayee, in a significant historical shift, propelled India into the ranks of nuclear nations in 1998 during his tenure as Prime Minister. He defended this pivotal decision by advocating that nuclear armament was a critical deterrent to conflict. In Vajpayee’s view, aligning with Keynesian thought, the adoption of a robust nuclear strategy was crucial for India to maintain harmonious and secure relationships with its neighbors.
Author Neerja Chowdhury writes, ‘However, in one of those rare ironies that are ever present in politics, Vajpayee, a peacenik in the 1950s, a hawk by 1964, a nuclear dove again in 1979, was to make history two decades later. In 1998, as prime minister, he ushered India into the nuclear weapons club. He would justify it by saying that nuclear weapons prevented war. And that if India had to live in peace with its neighbours, it was necessary to have a credible nuclear deterrent.’
Neerja further writes, ‘Vajpayee had previously been perceived as a proponent of nuclear armament. This perception was reinforced when, shortly after China’s first nuclear test in 1964, Vajpayee, a member of the Jan Sangh party, emphatically stated in Parliament, “The only answer to an atom bomb is an atom bomb, nothing else.” China’s entry into the nuclear club, especially so soon after the Indo-China war of 1962, had caused significant alarm in India. Concerned about the potential threat to India’s security, the Jan Sangh, with Vajpayee as a prominent figure, introduced a motion in the Lok Sabha on November 27, 1964, advocating for India to develop nuclear weapons. The party was critical of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru for underestimating the threat posed by China.’
She further clarifies, ‘In 1979, as External Affairs minister, Vajpayee may have been conditioned by the need to stay on the right side of the prime minister. And to carve out a niche for himself, which was distinctly different from his party’s position. It was to help him shape his persona as a leader who was a moderate, not a hardliner.’
