Real Madrid and La Dolce far niente — the art of doing nothing
The sharks are circling. City looks comfortable, poised, and resolute. Riyad Mahrez has emphatically whipped a strike into the top left corner, putting the noisy neighbours, the great disruptors on the cusp of a famous victory. The sharks are circling. Back-to-back finals are within their grasp, and beating Madrid — the kings of Europe — home and away is a monumental era-defining victory. It is seemingly written that they will meet their bitter foes Liverpool for the 4th time that season, with a chance at immortality at stake. The sharks are circling. Pep looks calm and composed, he knows the stature of this grand old club, its unforgiving nature, and its ability to swallow you up on nights like these, “a thousand, million passes” are all that are needed to see this one out. The sharks are circling.
Grealish, goes close, inches away, not once but twice. That was it, the ticket to Paris signed and sealed. Don’t sweat though, we in are the dying moments now, calm and composure are all that is needed. The sharks are circling. Oh no, oh no, oh no, they’ve struck back. Just shut up shop, 5 MINUTES OF SOLID DEFENDING IS ALL WE NEED!!! But wait, they’ve got another, it’s all square. Rodrgyo, the next name off the talent conveyer belt has written his first part of history with this club. City is frazzled and rattled, the aura of this mythical stadium is swallowing them up whole. Dispondent, they look to one another for answers. WHAT, HOW, BUT, they all cry. We had this game, it was right there, I mean right there!!! The game will go to extra time, but City and everyone around know that their fate has already been sealed. This intangible force can be so unrelenting, so powerful that it will destroy anything in its path when it must — even a side moulded by the greatest of them all.
Nothing had to be done, the powers at be had taken care of it themselves.
The title of this piece — some would say — is misleading and unjust from a certain perspective. To state that Ancelotti against City last year or Zidane against Juventus in big champions league knockouts‘ did nothing ‘, is just not right, it would dispel the notion of a manager being there in the first place as it casts their role as worthless. Where the attribution of “the art of doing nothing” that I have made stems from, is the perspective of the manager. The level of control exerted by successful Madrid managers when compared against other managers such as Guardiola or Simeone, is much less — or to the naked eye that is how it seems — they act as facilitators to their sides and the context of the club.
The art of doing nothing comes from the idea of not withholding the attributes or characteristics to conform to the manager’s ideal. Simply creating a harmonious dressing room and placing players in positions that are suitable and where they can cause a threat, can be enough at the highest level of the game. This idea is shown most pertinently through the periods of del Bosque (two European cups), Ancelotti x2 (two European cups), and Zidane ( three European cups). Why mould something into something it cannot be when you have an intangible force so strong that it just needs to be placed in the right direction?
del Bosque understood Madrid. He recognised it’s place in European football, it’s gargantuan feel, and the gravitational force it could exhume. He made over 400 appearances for the club in the 70s and 80s, as Madrid sort to redefine itself after the first wave of galacticos enjoyed unparalleled success throughout the late 50s and early 60s.
He was a part of that continued success, scooping up five league titles and four Copa del Reys in his 16 years at the club. However, the game’s greatest club prize still alluded him, it was part of the fabric of Madrid, and to win the European Cup was not a dream but a moral obligation. A moral obligation he would later fulfill.
del Bosque returned to the club in 87, working his way through the ranks at the Castilla, before becoming part of the coaching setup in 1994 and eventually taking over the reigns in 1999. Before del Bosque, Jupp Heynckes had broken the 30-year hoodoo of Champions League victory and brought back the European Cup to Madrid, but even that was not enough for a club becoming so ruthless in it’s pursuit of excellence. The great white shark wanted more and more and more.
“He didn’t say much, but he didn’t need to. We had a great group of players who knew what needed to be done and who were professional. The mindset was this was what have to do to be successful” Steve Mcmanaman
Although he did not officially take over as President until 2000, Florentino Perez was pulling a certain amount of strings in the background. President Carlos Sanz had remoulded the foundations of the club and was embarking on bringing in the second era of galatico superstars. Yet, he was missing the lynchpin holding it all together. Perez recognised the worth of del Bosque as an ex-player and his calming persona. He felt he could replicate the relationship that Santiago Bernabeau enjoyed with player come manager Miguel Munoz. del Bosque was the perfect foil to what Perez woud come to create on the pitch.
“With the Real superstars, del Bosque was extremely popular — partly because he was happier to let them get on with it. Cool as a cryogenically-frozen cucumber, he managed to avoid confrontations with his charges, despite the stellar egos in the squad, and never once lost his calm in front of the media.”
The Perez era began off the back of del Bosque’s first champions league triumph, a side built on collective unity with added individual brilliance. del Bosque created a template that allowed the players to express themselves, but to also work as one with a defensive system built off strong centre-backs Helguera and Hierro. But it was not enough for Perez and his aristocratic supporters, they wanted more flair, more exuberance, more entertainment. Coming to the Bernabeau was not an exercise of seeing your side win, it was an experience — comparable to the theatre or opera, you must be entertained by the brilliance on show.
Two years later and back in the final, del Bosque had managed to maintain the harmonious atmosphere for nearly three years at the helm. The system was still built off the strength of Hegluera and Hierro at the back, but the emphasis was far greater on the relationships between the players on the pitch. Previously del Bosque only had 1 or 2 true superstars on the side, he could build a collective around those two and let them configure the attacking solutions, but now he had Zidane, Figo, Raul, and Morientes all starting. The emphasis shifted somewhat for del Bosque, to not just allowing the individual to do whatever but allowing it in a way that fostered relationships with one another. It was a form of relationism as Zidane, and Figo played in a free-spirited way, born out of instinct, but in a way that was beneficial to the overall collective derived by del Bosque.
From the off, Del Bosque passively asserted his morals into the squad — that of calmness and poise. Simplicity was the motto for Del Bosque, and that led him to his second Champions League title in only his third season in senior management
del Bosque and Perez had created a template that had led them to league titles and European glory. They were the directors of the movie, with the stars flourishing taking center stage — Ronaldo was on his way to join the show. Nothing had to be done until something had to be done with a new impetus required.
The period from 2003 till Perez’s return in 2009 ( he lost the election in 2006) can be defined as a time of lusting for more combined with a lack of diligent progression planning. Perez understood that the characteristics of del Bosque were perfect for the makeup of Real Madrid. He reconsiged that del Bosque’s ability to create a system that allowed for various superstars to flourish, while also being built into a strong collective system, was his idyllic version of what he wanted Real Madrid to look like. Yet, his greed for superstars was not exclusive to the pitch, he wanted someone of a similar ilk in the dugout.
Upon re-election, Perez was aware that a ‘third wave’ of galacticos was needed to topple the Barcelona machine that Guardiola was building. Perez chose Pellegrini to do this and work with the raft of new signings, Ronaldo, Kaka, Alonso, and Benzema. Yet, it was a lacklustre choice, Pellegrini did not command the same gravitas or possess an aura that was acquitted to being the coach of the biggest club in the world. The club needed more.
Jose Mourinho was chosen, a manager that was the hottest property in world football and that had an aura replicable to the stars on the pitch. He was a great success, he cultivated the side and managed to get a team full of superstars to play collective over individualistic football, but something was missing. He had acquired record points totals and won leagues and cups over Barcelona but the European Cup still alluded him. More pertinently the collective, dogmatic nature of Mourinho was just not the perfect mix for the club.
Mourinho’s managerial traits and force of character had outweighed those problems initially, but by the end of the 12/13 season, the cracks were appearing. This club — although liked the attention and appreciated the success — did not need its manager to be the superstar, it needed a facilitator to the superstars. Perez was now aware of this point, a modern version of the languid del Bosque was needed. Carlo Ancelotti was the archetypal Madrid coach, the perfect candidate for the best version of Madrid to be shown.
“The greatness of this club is this. It does not allow you to lower your arms when it seems that everything is over, it gives you the strength to continue, to continue, to believe. And that is what we have done.” Carlo Ancelotti
When Ancelotti took over he was conscious of the fact that not a lot needed to be done to change how Madrid functioned as a team. The foundations that Mourinho had left both tactically and from a mentality perspective had created a side that just needed fine-tuning. More individualism in attack and greater adherence to the essence of Madrid, having as many superstars on the pitch at once no matter how much the balance of the side could be deturbed.
Ancelotti utilised the strong defensive solidity that Mourinho had created by setting his side up in a more expressive 4–3–3. This allowed Di Maria, to play as an attacking midfield 8 or as a mezzala, a player tasked with pushing forward and assisting the front line. Moving Di Maria into a more central position was due to the presence of a new galactico, Gareth Bale. Bale, was at the peak of his powers, an explosive and powerful attacking machine. At Spurs, Bale was used to being the fulcrum of the side, every attack was played through him, as he was often used down the middle such was the level he hit in his final Premier League season.
The task for Ancelotti was placing him in a front three with Ronaldo and Benzema, but in a way that each player was able to perform to their maximum. To do this, Ancelotti utilised the relational tendencies of Benzema — his ability to drop deep and link play with the midfielders, helping progress and circulate the ball forward. This left Ronaldo and Bale often in isolated positions one on one, either out wide or central to hurt opposition defences. Ancelotti did this in a way where he prioritised their attacking traits over any responsibility they might have defensively. Mourinho or a more heavily systemised coach might ask a player like Ronaldo or Bale to play in certain zones that would help the team attack as a collective better or be in a better position for the defensive transition. Yet, Ancelotti was solely focused on having a role-driven attack that maximised the individual qualities of his front three.
While creating a more reconsigable and typical Madrid side, Ancelotti also rekindled the mentality of the ‘great white shark’. The Copa del Rey triumph was a late winner by galactico Gareth Bale, barraging down the left-hand side past a helpless Marc Barta before poking it past Valdes in goal. Whilst, the European Cup was reclaimed by a last-minute Sergio Ramos equaliser which broke the spirit of Atletico. Extra time ensured but the damage had been done, the ‘great white shark’ would not be stopped.
Winning La Decima (the club’s tenth European cup) after over a decade was vindication for the essence of Madrid, it could only be done this way with this type of manager in charge. Perez was acutely aware that the same mistake he made with del Bosque could not be made again, the environment and system devised by del Bosque and Ancelotti was the perfect supplement to the all-encompassing ‘great white shark’.
The following season Perez added a further attacking galactico to the side, James Rodriguez to aid the departure of Angel Di Maria to Man United. Rodriguez, was an outstanding attacking midfielder, with a great ability to play between the lines, goal score, and link with attackers, but the role he would play for Ancelotti was not clear. Rodriguez was joined by the cultured Toni Kroos, who along with Modric helped evolve Madrid into a team that could dominate the ball, whilst also being a threat on the break with the pace of Bale and Ronaldo.
The 14/15 season was defined by narrow misses, losing the league by two points, losing on penalties in the Champions League, and missing out on the cup. The 4–3–3, was still used by Ancelotti but evolved at times into a 4–2–2–2 which allowed for Isco, Rodriguez, Ronaldo, and Bale/Benzema to all play in attack. They played attacking and blistering football for most of the season, as they scored over 118 goals in the league. It was the fragility and unbalance of the midfield that cost them in the big moments, for Perez this was not enough. He resorted to the alternative, something had to be done, a more methodical, systemised, and detail-heavy coach was needed to mould all of the midfield and attacking players into one side.
After Ancelotti’s and — later — Zidane’s departure, Perez searched for the same option on both occasions. A coach that placed greater emphasis on every facet of the game, a more structured approach that withheld individual liberty and personal expression much more than Zidane, Ancelotti, and del Bosque had ever done.
The Benitez appointment and subsequent episode encapsulated the art of doing nothing that symbolises what Madrid is about. A deeply thoughtful and structured coach, he could not garner the respect or attention of the superstar galaticos. This is not a slight on Benitez, but a slight on the image and perception that Perez and other presidents have created of the club. These players are built up and have their egos massaged to such a level, that can only be equated to gods or kings.
“Tell Benitez that I’ll send him a USB drive with all my goals on it for him to study.” Cristiano Ronaldo
The Madrid juggernaut can only be tamed by someone who the players see as their equal, in terms of their standing in the game and the success they have achieved. It can only be brought under your control by not attempting to bend it to your own will, your prerogative, you can only be a success by doing things in the Madrid way and acting as its facilitator.
A facilitator-like manager is the typical Madrid coach, but it is exclusive to them only. Every club has a certain type of coach that thrives in that environment. Liverpool and United rely on the force of character managers, people that hold great gravitas and possess such an aura that they can guide the whole club themselves (Busby and Ferguson, Shankly, Paisley, and Klopp). Barcelona thrives with coaches that espouse typical Cruyffian and possessional ideas ( Cruyff himself, Guardiola, Xavi). Chelsea — during the Abramovich era — rely on managers who can be a success while working in a constant flux of instability and uncertainty (Mourinho and Tuchel).
Ancelotti and Zidane were the perfect facilitators, while Lopetgui tried to impose his ideas on a side that had just one three champions league in a row. The trio of Champions League successes was epitomised by Zidane creating a template for his star players to flourish, while also summoning the spirit of the ‘great white shark’ to get them over the line (Bayern and Atletico in 2017, Bayern again in 2018). Zidane subtly tweaked the foundations of Ancelotti and his beloved 4–3–3, favouring a more narrow approach that incorporated playmakers Isco and Rodriguez in their typical positions, as Bale began to fade into the periphery.
The duo of Kroos and Modric grew stronger with the emergence of Casemiro as the destroyer that would hold the team together. Whilst the backline was held together by the imperious Ramos and now one of the finest defenders in the world, Raphael Varane. It was the perfect team with little flaws, but beyond the pitch, they had a mentality of trusting one another to deliver in the hardest moments and placed absolute faith that the ‘great white shark’ would prevail in the end.
Whilst Lopetgui tried to do too much, he did also have to tackle the departure of Ronaldo, the club’s greatest-ever goalscorer. The effect that Ronaldo’s departure had on the team cannot be overstated, from a tactical point of view he was the side’s main point of goal but just having his presence on the pitch was a reassurance for his teammates in the tough moments — just stay in the game, when the chances come he will finish them. Benzema would become that figure, but after many years in the sidecar, he would take time adapting to play centre stage. The bridge between the era of the three-peat side and the new wave of young players was far greater than Perez estimated. Vinicius, Rodrigo, and Valverde — who will go on to define the next era of Madrid — needed guidance and patience from a coach that was not going to coerce them into his tactical plans, but allow them to develop in a non-linear, organic way.
This was a key part of the thinking for Perez to re-hire Ancelotti in 2021, after the departure of Zidane for a second time. Zidane, during his second spell at the club, was seemingly more inclined to impose his ideas on the team, favouring a typical rigid, positional approach. This was a contrast to the success of his first spell and his more lassez fair approach. Perhaps he wanted to show more managerial acumen, to prove his worth and flex his ego. This was not all down to the players, his managerial credentials could stand up against the best. But, it was not what that squad needed, it was a mishmash group of players. The future had to be different and Ancelotti was the perfect man to usher forward a new period of success.
Ancelotti has created a template that has prioritised the abilities and tendencies of Rodrigo, Vinicius, and Benzema. He has favoured a heavily relational attacking approach, as the three of them move freely and rotate naturally to create chances across the pitch. It was hugely successful in his first season as the club won its 14th European Cup, yet this season many people have called for more structure and detail in the setup. The dismantling of Madrid at Man City, perhaps showcased that this was the time for something to be done, Kroos and Modric cannot always figure out the solutions for themselves. Vinicius and Rodrygo are brilliant players, but are they doing too much? Localising their play to certain areas of the pitch might make them far more effective players.
For the past two years, nothing had to be done, because the stars took control of the business themselves, the stature and vigour of the club guided it through its toughest moments. Perhaps we have reached the precipitous and an alternative approach is needed, a more tangible tactical direction. The intangibles, reputation, stature, and presence of the ‘great white shark’ can only take you so far !?!, right ?!?!
A year on. A year on from this spectacular demise, we still haven’t got our head around how it happened, how could it happen?? This year will surely be different, with the Viking upfront we have all our bases covered. We are a better team this year — perhaps the best of the Guardiola era. We can play the intricate game, we can defend deep and we can go long to Haaland, surely this time.
This is too easy, when is Madrid turning up? Clear and utter domination, it is only a matter of time before we take our lead. The sharks are circling. De Bruyne goes close, a wicked sighter for Courtois — they’ll be more of that later, he smirks. Rodri now test’s his luck, a man that can seemingly do it all has added powerful long shots to his ever-expanding repertoire. The sharks are circling. Patience, patience, patience, they will buckle I can assure you. The sharks are circling. HOW, HOW CAN IT HAPPEN AGAIN? Vinicius strikes with a devastating blow from around 30 yards out. WHAT ARE WE SUPPOSED TO DO? We dominate and they score, we don’t dominate and they score. You can see the mental blockage of Madrid start to reappear in the consciousness of the City players, the great white sharks are baying for blood. Composure is what is needed.
The second half begins, and Madrid looks confident and composed. They know City can dominate however much they like, they will still punish them. Haaland goes through, goal surely, he doesn’t miss these, no the Bernabeu is different, things are not normal here, a miraculous block from Alaba prevents him from equalising. The sharks are still circling. BOOM, what a hit, what a hit, what a hit!!! De Bruyne strikes, with an arrow to the bottom of the corner. Things will be different this time, parity at last. A draw is a great result, they will not be able to count on the power of this stadium next week when the pressure is on.
Domination. Complete and utter domination. The closest thing we have seen to 2011 in the 12 years that have preceded that footballing work of art. Guardiola had wrestled this footballing juggernaut into submission at the Etihad until they could do only but submit to his side’s unrelenting power. They had dispelled Madrid’s indubitable perception in this competition. 4–0 in a European semi-final against Real Madrid, unheard of.
The art of doing nothing is a beautiful notion, a romantic idea, and one that has proved to be the beating heart of all the success that Madrid has had over the years. Yet, like the world we live in, all beautiful things must come to an end at differing points. Nothing has to be done until something has to be done.
