The Price of Freedom: Comparing Indian and Chinese Constitutions
A certain Economist cover portrayed India and China as a Tiger and Dragon fighting for dominance. Both have experienced unprecedented economic development in recent history, each utilizing its own unique ideology which is nearly the opposite of the other. To understand the present and future world, Indian and China are essential topics of study for the modern global citizen. On one hand they are very similar. Both have colonial legacies; both were formed at similar times; both have constitutions at the foundation of their governments; both had strong ruling parties during their initial years of existence and both have rapidly growing economies. But for all these similarities, there exists a fundamental difference: China is an authoritarian state and India is a democracy. The constitutional foundations of each state hold the legal source of this fundamental difference. If politics is the search of the good life, then an interesting question arises. For all the shared circumstances, which country’s constitution has provided better lives for it’s citizens? While Indian and Chinese governance looked very similar in its early years, this paper will demonstrate that the Gandhian legacy in India’s constitution has since done a better job at fostering a democratic society based on human rights. However, macro indicators demonstrate that Chinese governance has been more successful than its Indian counterpart in providing a good quality of life to its citizens. To demonstrate this, a brief history of each nation’s constitution will be given. Next, the apparent dominance of single parties in both countries will be analyzed. Third, the powers of the judiciaries will be compared. Finally, macro social and economic outcomes will be discussed to see which constitutional system has created the best outcomes for their respective citizens.
History of Constitutions
Prior to World War II the Kuomintang of China (KMT), or Chinese Nationalist Party and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) led by Mao, were engaging in a civil war. The fighting stopped in 1936 in order to defend the country against a potential Japanese invasion. At the end of World War II the KMT emerged as the most powerful political organization within China. They began to draft a constitution which mirrored those of western liberal democracies. Civil war erupted again, this time in favour of the CCP. By 1949 the KMT had retreated to Taiwan, and the CCP began establishing a government.
The first constitution of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was adopted in 1954. This document was largely based on the 1936 Soviet constitution. Three more constitutions were written, with the last coming into effect in 1982. Brought in by Deng Xiaoping’s government, this constitution was made to resemble, but improve on the 1954 constitution. This document follows the four Cardinal Principals advocated for by Deng: The Socialist Path; Peoples Democratic Dictatorship; CCP Leadership and Marxist-Leninist-Moa Zedong thought. The authoritarian tradition which founded this constitution and the values it promotes govern China to this day.
The Indian constitution was written between 1946 and 1949 by the provisional parliament elected in 1946. This constitution had three forces influencing the norms and values instilled in its text. The first and most pressing was the influence of its former colonizer Great Britain. The representatives to the provisional parliament were elected by the state legislatures. These state legislators were elected in 1945 as per the suffrage granted by the British Parliament’s India Government Act 1935 (IGA). The IGA granted franchise to landowners and those meeting educational requirements, equating to 28.5% of the population. In the end, the Indian National Congress Party (INC) held 208 /292 seats on the provisional parliament. In other words, the constitution was written by a parliament elected by an elite minority whom the colonizer deemed worthy of granting input. The words of the constitution have a colonial legacy as well. Some 250 of the clauses of the IGA were directly incorporated into the constitution. The Directive Principles are the same as the Instruments of Instruction in the IGA. B.R. Ambedkar a principal draughtsman of the document said in his final speech to the provisional parliament: “I cannot see why the Constituent Assembly is necessary to incubate a constitution. So much of the constitution of India has already been written out in the Government of India Act of 1935”. The fundamental values of the constitution reflect those of the colonizer as well. In its preamble, the Indian constitution places justice as its first guiding principle. Making justice the Sovereign Legislative Principle, implied that freedom must operate within the limits of justice. Rather than justice being an outcome of the law, as promoted in the west, the law in India is derived from Justice. This means that whoever crafts the law, first decides what justice is, and writes the law within that definition. This conception of government resembles an authoritarian monarchy where the sovereign’s definition of justice supersedes their subject’s personal freedoms. As we will see, this monarchial tradition has had significant resonating effects on Indian politics.
The second force acting on the Indian constitution was the Gandhian legacy. No drafter could ignore the popularity of the Gandhian mass movement. The movement showed that “the power of democracy was too strong for the constitution makers to deny the people the right to universal adult franchise”. Despite the lessor emphasis on liberty, the constitution which was written granted absolute universal adult suffrage. Like the monarchial tradition, this Gandhian legacy has had resonating impacts on Indian politics.
The formational values of China and India’s constitution demonstrate a high degree of similarity. The CCP authorship of the Chinese constitution is mirrored in India by the INC making up an overwhelming majority of the drafting body of the constitution. India’s concept of Justice before Liberty is similar to the People’s Democratic Dictatorship. Just as the law comes before personal freedom in India, the rule of the dictator comes before the liberty of the individual in Deng’s Cardinal Principles. The similarities of construction set an interesting stage for what is to come. The rest of this paper will address how these constitutions have shaped political culture and succeeded or failed at meeting the needs of their citizens.
Chen Duanhong, professor of public law and legal philosophy at Peking University, in an analyses of the Chinese constitution saw 5 fundamental laws governing the document. Ranking these laws in order of priority he said the most important value held in the constitution was “the Chinese people are under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party”. The Party has internalized this mission as well. The Leninist theory which governs the party states that the “party consists of the vanguard of the proletariat and shall exercise leadership on behalf of the proletariat in building a socialist society”. This has also been reflected in the laws the Party has created. Under Chinese law it is a crime to protest the party’s leadership or advocate for multiparty democracy.
The forces of a growing middle class and a flourishing civil society have challenged the CCP influence in recent years. Nonetheless, the CCP has not been shy to use its powers to protect its dominance. This year, the party enacted laws criminalizing Christians who do not pledge allegiance to the state. In the past two years, the officials have taken down nearly 2000 crosses in the Southern Province of Zhejiang. In order to combat external threats to its power the Party is presently considering a law which will expand the powers of police to arrest foreign NGO and advocacy workers. Because the constitution effectively equates the Party’s word as law, the CCP is able to impose these domestic controls, securing against any threat to its leadership.
In its early years as an independent state the governance of India looked very similar to China. The Indian National Congress (INC) ruled for all except two years from 1947–1989. The INC used a Faction Model to perpetuate its leadership. Under the faction model, the dominant party is composed of various factions each representing different views and groups. By allowing the factions to compete internally, the party never became too centralized and was flexible to the needs of the electorate. When confronted with opposition groups the INC could just absorb them into the party as one of the factions. By absorbing parties who fell just to the left or right of center, Congress isolated the remaining parties on opposite fringes of the political spectrum.
Despite INC’s early success, it has been losing support in recent years. There has been a slow but consistent pattern of worsening electoral results since 1989. It was in this year the Congress earned less than 40% of the popular vote for the first time other than its two years out of power in 1977. The party has never won more than 30% of the vote since 1998 when its share of votes fell to 25.8%. This trend continued with INC earning less than 20% of the popular vote in the 2014 election. Two explanations have been put forward for the decline of the party. The first is organizational decay. The faction model allowed for flexibility initially, but over the long term muddled the clarity of the Congress’s vision. Furthering this issue was a lack of meaningful democracy within the party making it difficult for the factions to cooperate and approach the nation as a unified body. The second, is the greater autonomy of states actors. The 1991 economic liberalization led to the states having greater fiscal autonomy. This emboldened local state parties, who have in turn had success as coalitions on the federal level. The faction system used by Congress to facilitate cooperation in the 20th century has been replaced by a culture of coalition and power sharing.
For the 1950’s, 60’s and 70’s the sovereign in China and India shared similar characteristics. The CCP and INC were both key players in the way of nation building and both went on to dominate the political sphere. Certain powers granted in the Indian constitution only made the INC look even more like the CCP. For example, until 1994, using Article 356 the President could dismiss a state legislature and instill ‘President’s rule’, a practice which occurred 91 times until it was challenged by the Supreme Court. Moreover, the constitution did not allow for forms of direct democracy such as referendum, recall or initiative, further engraining the party’s dominance of the legislature.
But now the CCP continues to dominate and the INC is losing significance in Indian politics. The longevity of the CCP stems from the guarantee of its power within the Chinese constitution. The calling for Communist Party leadership in its preamble instilled the culture of CCP rule. On the other hand, despite legal strategies used to perpetuate the INC’s power, such as Article 356 and withholding referendum, the INC has stopped being the sole relevant actor in Indian Politics. While the monarchial tradition allowed for single party rule in India for a few decades, the Gandhian legacy of democracy is proving to have stronger resonating effects.
According to Jerome A. Cohen no judiciary is completely independent. Rather, they exist on a spectrum between completely unfettered and completely subservient. Cohen found that the Chinese judiciary was in fact dominated by the party because neither the political nor economic costs were seen “as remotely approaching the very substantial benefits it could yield”. Cohen saw judicial control in China as a by-product of the recent revolution but was optimistic for a future involving judicial independence. Four decades later, Zhu Suli of Peking Law School argued that Chinese courts cannot be measured against Western standards. Rather, Zhu saw the domination of the party over the courts as “inescapable” and any attempts to separate the two “impossible and unnecessary”.
Article 126 of the Chinese constitution says: “The people’s courts exercise judicial power independently, in accordance with the provisions of law, and not subject to interference by any administrative organ, public organization or individual.” Thus, in theory, the judiciary is supposed to be independent from other organizations. The real outcomes are far different though. Through the structural organization of the Chinese government the CCP has created what Ling Li describes as a system of “Judicial dependence”. The CCP has built a strict hierarchy in which an institution has the power to subject other institutions below them, but not those ranked equal or above. Thus, even the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) cannot legally challenge those organizations equal to it in the hierarchy. To further ensure control over the judiciary, the CCP created the Central Party Political Legal Committee (CPPLC). The CPPLC acts as the CCP’s consultant for law related issues, and an “organization agent” for fostering consistent judicial outcomes and an administrative body to the needs of the CCP. The CPPLC governs by using macro judicial policies and micro case investigations. Macro judicial policies are used to encourage courts to alter their rulings. These policies also have significant influence on other branches of government. For example, the CCPLC issued two policy documents in 2013 and 2014 which led to the SPC, Supreme People’s Procuratorate and the Ministry of Public Security creating new operating procedures corresponding to the policy. The micro approach is carried out by local Party Political Legal Committee’s (PPLC). The PPLC’s have the power to mark cases “for coordination”. A “Coordination meeting” is held were relevant parties are brought together to discuss the case. Once a consensus is reached, the PPLC goes onto release memos to the relevant institutions instructing them on their required course of action. This has raised significant controversy for the Party in recent years. During the 2000’s there were at least 5 known wrongful murder convictions. What is more startling is that the outcomes of these cases were all the result of local PPLC efforts. Public outcry led to new policies limiting the power of the PPLC’s. While these policies limited day to day interference within court proceedings, PPLC’s must still abide by instructions from Party authorities. Thus, the fundamental issue of judicial dependence still exists.
As the INC slowly lost power, the Indian judiciary has slowly gained it. Articles 32 and 226 of the constitution confers power to the courts to uphold and enforce the fundamental rights outlined in Part III of the constitution. Article 141 declares a Supreme Court’s ruling as binding for all other courts in the land. During the early years of statehood, these powers were undermined by constitutional amendments passed by a strong and united INC. Because the constitution can be amended by a 2/3 vote in both houses of Parliament, during the height of INC power, it was easy to make adjustments when deemed necessary. The outcome of this balance of power, as described by Nupur Chowdhury: “reduced role of the Court as a mere applier, rather than an interpreter, of black letter law”. Yet, as the culture of democracy spread throughout Indian politics a culture of judicial supremacy blossomed as well. In 1978, during the INC’s two years out of power, the judiciary redefined its role in Indian politics through the case Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India. As it occurred, Maneka Gandhi was publishing anti-government articles in a magazine. In 1977 she received notice that her passport was being impounded under Section 10(3)©of the Passport Act 1967. When she asked for reasons why, the Ministry of External Affairs wrote her a letter saying the decision was made in the general interest of the public and that there were orders to not give her a Statement of Reasons. When brought to the Supreme Court, it was determined that the power of arbitrary impoundment allowed by the Passport Act negated Article 14 of the constitution: equality before the law, Article 19: freedom of speech and Article 21: none shall be deprived of liberty except according to procedure established by law. This case is significant as it represents the first time “due process” was used in Indian Courts. Prior to this, the monarchial tradition which vested significant power in parliament had made the courts passive in their protection of fundamental rights. In creating these precedents, the Supreme Court slowly built an “expansive infrastructure of fundamental rights”. This boldness continued in the 1994 Bommai Judgement when the Supreme Court struck down Article 356 of the constitution which allowed for the President to dissolve a state legislature without court or federal government approval. After his state government was dissolved, Chief Minister S.R. Bommai brought Article 356 to the Supreme Court for question. The Supreme Court decided that “the assessment of the strength of the Ministry [State Cabinet] is not a matter of private opinion of any individual be he the Governor or the President”. Rather, the Supreme Court created a floor test procedure which could only be avoided when there was “all-pervasive violence where […] a free vote is not possible”. This ruling represented a significant cultural shift in Indian politics. It was the monarchial tradition which allowed for provisions such as Article 356 to be used by the central government to wield power over the states. The abolishment of this power was a step towards greater federalism and a stronger democratic culture. Both the Maneka Gandhi and Bommai cases were major steps in establishing a culture of judicial independence and supremacy in India. These rulings led to the Indian Supreme Court becoming a major political figure and an active interpreter of legislation.
The Indian and Chinese courts both played subservient roles during their early years of existence. As with its multiparty system, the Indian Judiciary became more democratic as the nation aged. Again, the Gandhian legacy had more enduring power than the monarchial tradition. In recent history China’s judiciary has gained a small degree of independence through policies created by the CPPLC. Nonetheless, the strict hierarchy which places the CCP above the courts still fosters “judicial dependence”. The authoritarian tradition has successfully maintained its presence in the Chinese Judiciary.
In this regard, it is clear that upon their founding, the PRC and the Republic of India looked very similar in terms of their governance. Both had strong ruling parties who wrote constitutions which granted the law greater importance than individual liberties. In China “the law” was the rule of the CCP, while in India, the law was an outcome of justice, therefore allowing the ruling party to choose what justice was. Both of these sources of law stemmed from authoritarian legacies — China’s being the legacy of the revolution and India’s being the tradition of monarchial rule. Until 1977 India’s judiciary was a passive administrator of parliament’s law. Similarly, China’s hierarchy of power makes the courts accountable to the CCP.
Yet, now we see two very different countries. India has emerged as a multiparty democracy based on cooperation and coalition. Its judiciary actively reviews and critiques the law and the actions of the government. In China, on the other hand, the CCP is still the dominating figure in the political sphere. The system of hierarchy forces the courts to answer to the word of the CCP when necessary. This has led to the trial and punishment of innocent citizens. The cause of these differences is the Gandhian legacy which existed in the Indian constitution in the form of universal suffrage. Despite INC attempts to mitigate democracy, through means such as Article 356 and withholding referendum powers, universal suffrage meant that eventually an election would occur in which they would have to face their citizens. As seen in 1977 it only took one election to start a domino chain approaching liberalism. The moment the dominating party lost power, the Supreme Court began practicing judicial activism. In 1994, the courts redefined the far reaching presidential power offered in Article 356. In 1998, the INC earned less than 30% of the vote. By 2014 that figure was less than 20%. Outcomes such as these demonstrate India’s guarantee of the people’s rule and a commitment to upholding human rights. Chinese leaders have often said that democracy is a long term goal for their country. It would appear that while the two nations had similar founding histories, India was where “democracy came sooner”. Even with a strong monarchial tradition, the Gandhian values of democracy and human rights, like a seed waiting for the winter snow to melt, began to flourish when the conditions were just right.
Democracy and human rights are important ideals to strive towards but in reality the goal of politics is to create the best lives for the members of a group. While India has had greater success fostering democracy and respect for human rights, these ideals have not resulted in the Indian people having better quality of life than the Chinese people. First and foremost, the Human Development Index ranked China 90th in the world in 2014 where as India was ranked 130th. Chinese GDP per capita, in international $, is 2.33 times greater than that of India. Health care expenditures per capita were $420 in China while it was only $75 in India, leading to 2.5 hospital beds per capita compared to 0.9 respectively. Life expectancy is 8 years higher in China. For their freedoms, Indians live shorter lives, with less access to health care when they need it. 30% of Chinese post-secondary aged students are enrolled opposed to 24% in India. Females make up 43.9% of the Chinese workforce but only 24.2% in India. Despite a political system committed to human rights, India still has a male-dominated workforce. In the private sector, democracy has made it difficult for business to thrive. India ranked 130th on the Ease of Doing Business ranking whereas China was ranked 84. 50% of the Chinese population utilizes the internet, opposed to 26% in India. While the Chinese people must endure censorship, internet access creates extraordinary new opportunities for economic transactions and entertainment. Similarly, 93% of Chinese citizens own a mobile phone where only 79% own one in India. China has been more innovative in fostering productivity as well. Chinese cereal farms harvest 97% more kg per hector. China’s ports see 15 time the container traffic every year. Metrics such as these demonstrate more effective integration of science and technology.
China has clearly been more successful when comparing social outcomes. Yet India has clearly been more successful at honouring democracy and human rights. The utilitarian would support China’s model of development since it has provided greater good for a greater number of people. While an individual has greater personal freedom in India, take this from a standpoint of probabilities. Drawing on the veil of ignorance proposed by John Rawl’s in his Theory of Justice, if you had to choose to live in India or China and you knew nothing about who you were or what you would have, where would you choose to live? If you were solely concerned with your quality of life you would choose China. People are quick to judge China for the apparent lack of freedom in the country but if politics is about providing the best lives possible for a group of people, then as this case study has shown, the Chinese authoritarian model has served that goal better than the Indian democratic model.
This paper looked at the founding of the Indian and Chinese constitutions. It found that both of them had authoritarian traditions which significantly influenced the philosophies and structure of their respective polities. Both nations had strong ruling parties for their first 30 years of existence. India broke from the authoritarian culture in the 1980’s because of the Gandhian influence which allowed for universal suffrage. This allowed for slow but compounding changes to occur, eventually leading India to be the flourishing democracy it is today. This contrasts China where the CCP maintains a firm grip of control over all aspects of political life. This has led to human rights abuses and lack of individual freedom. In this respect it was concluded that India’s constitution did a better job of mitigating the authoritarian tradition and upholding the human rights of the people it governs. Nonetheless, an analyses of key indicators of quality of life and economic development showed that the authoritarian tradition in China has provided better tangible outcomes for the Chinese people.
 Chen, Albert H. Y. The Discourse of Political Constitutionalism in Contemporary China: Gao Quanxi’s Studies on China’s Political Constitution, (The China Review, 14, №2, 2014), 184.
 Ibid, 185
 Ibid, 186
 Ibid, 187
 Ibid, 187
 Ibid, 187
 Ibid, 187
 Ibid, 187
 Mukherjee, Mithi. India in the Shadows of an Empire. (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2010), 181
 Ibid, 205
 Majeed, Akhtar, Douglas M. Brown, and Ronald L. Watts. Distribution of Powers and Responsibilities in Federal Countries, (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2014), 159
 Mukherjee, Mithi. India in the Shadows of an Empire, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2010), 205
 Bajpa, Arunoday. Making of the Constitution, (Pratiyogita Darpan, 2, №15, 2007), 438
 Ibid, 185
 Ibid, 188
 Ibid, 214
 Ibid, 214
 Charlton, Sue Ellen M. Comparing Asian Politics, (Boulder: Westview Press, 2015), 173
 Chen, Albert H. Y. The Discourse of Political Constitutionalism in Contemporary China: Gao Quanxi’s Studies on China’s Political Constitution, (The China Review, 14, №2, 2014), 192.
 Ibid, 188
 Ibid, 202
 Carney, Matthew, Chinese Communist Party Readies Crackdown on Christianity, (ABC News: 2016) http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-10-08/chinese-communist-partys-crackdown-on-religion/7912140
 Campbell, Charlie, China’s New Foreign NGO Law Is Threatening Vital Advocacy Work, (Times Magazine: 2016) http://time.com/4307516/china-ngo-law-foreign-human-rights/?iid=sr-link1
 Farooqui, Adnan & Sridharan, E. Can umbrella parties survive? The decline of the Indian National Congress, (Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, 54, №3, 2016), 333
 Reddy, Thiven. The Congress Party Model: South Africa’s African National Congress (ANC) and India’s Indian National Congress (INC) as Dominant Parties, (African and Asian Studies, 4, №3 2005), 282
 Ibid 284
 Farooqui, Adnan & Sridharan, E. Can umbrella parties survive? The decline of the Indian National Congress, (Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, 54, №3, 2016), 337
 Ibid 354
 Ibid 351
 Ibid 351
 Ibid 351
 Ibid 351
 Dubbudu, Rakesh. How many times was the Presidents Rule Imposed so far? (Factly, May 16 2016), https://factly.in/how-many-times-presidents-rule-imposed-so-far-india/
 Mukherjee, Mithi. India in the Shadows of an Empire, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2010), 215
 Li, Ling. The Chinese Communist Party and People’s Courts: Judicial Dependence in China, (The American Journal of Comparative Law, 64, №1 2016), 40
 Jerome Alan Cohen. The Chinese Communist Party and “Judicial Independence”: 1949–1959, (Harvard Law Review, 967, 1969), 156
 Li, Ling. The Chinese Communist Party and People’s Courts: Judicial Dependence in China, (The American Journal of Comparative Law, 64, №1 2016), 41
 Ibid 42
 Constitution of the PRC, 1982
 Li, Ling. The Chinese Communist Party and People’s Courts: Judicial Dependence in China, (The American Journal of Comparative Law, 64, №1 2016), 51
 Ibid, 50
 Ibid, 54
 Ibid, 60
 Ibid, 62
 Ibid, 67
 Ibid, 68
 Lewis, Margaret K. Controlling Abuse to Maintain Control: The Exclusionary Rule in China, (International Law and Politics, 43, 2011), 668
 Li, Ling. The Chinese Communist Party and People’s Courts: Judicial Dependence in China, (The American Journal of Comparative Law, 64, №1, 2016), 70
 Ibid, 71
 Tushar, Kumar Biswas. Introduction to Arbitration in India: The Role of the Judiciary, (Kluwer Law International, 2013) pp. 1–18
 Mukherjee, Mithi. India in the Shadows of an Empire. (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2010), 197
 Chowdgury, Napur. From Judicial Activism to Adventurism — The Godavarman Case in the Supreme Court of India, (Asia Pacific Journal of Environmental Law, 17, 2014), 180
 Shaakshi, Sharma. A Case Analysis: Of the Maneka Gandhi Case, (Lawfarm, 2016), http://lawfarm.in/blogs/a-case-analysis-of-the-maneka-gandhi-case
 Mate, Manoj. Globalization, Rights, and Judicial Review in India, (Washington International Law Journal, 25 №3, 2016), 647
 Ibid, 648
 Dubbudu, Rakesh. How many times was the Presidents Rule Imposed so far? (Factly, May 16 2016), https://factly.in/how-many-times-presidents-rule-imposed-so-far-india/
 Swami, Praveen. Protecting Secularism and Federal Fair Play, (Frontline, 14, №2, 1997), http://www.frontline.in/static/html/fl1422/14220170.htm
 World Bank Group. GDP per Capita PPP (current international $), (World Bank, 2015), http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD?view=chart
 World Bank Group. Health Care Expenditures per Capita (current US$), (World Bank, 2014), http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.XPD.PCAP?view=chart
 World Bank Group. Hospital Beds (per 1000 people), (World Bank, 2005), http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.MED.BEDS.ZS?view=chart
 World Bank Group. Life Expectancy, total (years), (World Bank, 2014), http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.LE00.IN?view=chart
 World Bank Group. Gross enrolment ratio, tertiary (%), (World Bank, 2013), http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.TER.ENRR?view=chart
 World Bank Group. Labor Force, Female (% of total labor force), (World Bank, 2014), http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TLF.TOTL.FE.ZS?view=chart
 World Bank Group. Ease of Doing Business Index (1 = Most Business Friendly Regulations), (World Bank, 2015), http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IC.BUS.EASE.XQ?view=chart
 World Bank Group. Internet Users (per 100 People), (World Bank, 2015), http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.NET.USER.P2?view=chart
 World Bank Group. Mobile Cellular Subscriptions (per 100 People), (World Bank, 2015), http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.CEL.SETS.P2?view=chart
 World Bank Group. Cereal Yield (Kg per Hectare), (World Bank, 2014), http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/AG.YLD.CREL.KG?view=chart
 World Bank Group. Container Port Traffic (TEU: 20 Foot Equivalent Units), (World Bank, 2014), http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IS.SHP.GOOD.TU?view=chart