At the Peacekeeping Leaders’ Summit in New York in 2015, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced that China would join the new UN peacekeeping capability readiness system, and take the lead in setting up a permanent peacekeeping police squad. By building a peacekeeping standby force of 8,000 troops, president Xi Jinxing also pledged a 10-year, $1 billion China-UN peace and development fund for peacekeeping purposes. As one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, China remains generally cautious towards the use of peacekeepers and the broader issue of international intervention. However, in recent years, China has made significant progress in contributing to UN peacekeeping operations. which includes not only active armed forces, but also equipment like helicopters, submarines, and destroyers. China is also taking continuous steps when it comes to Africa, where regional conflict exists simultaneously with the abundance of precious resources, for example, gold and oil. In August 2017, the first contingent of Chinese helicopters arrived in a war-torn region in western Sudan — Darfur; China registered a peacekeeping standby force of 8,000 troops that the UN can draw on in times of need in September. As the second-largest financial contributor, China also contributes more personnel to UN peacekeeping operations than any other permanent member of the UNSC.
The growing number of contributions to UN peacekeeping possibly indicates several things: the rising financial power and incentive, the stronger humanitarian ambition, and hidden insecurity in the homeland. China refused to participate in UN peacekeeping before 1989, and it used to condemn UN peacekeeping as a coercive Western tool to “suppress and stamp out the revolutionary struggles of the world’s people”. The shift in attitudes present in several ways, the high-quality equipment and troops, the achievable cooperation with other nations’ peacekeepers and the more improvements in mission capacities. This article aims to answer the key question: Why is China rapidly increasing contributions to UN peacekeeping? I will then analyze the different cases of developing countries, developed countries and underdeveloped countries, their various models of deployments in troops and contributions of money. By comparing the Chinese peace engagement strategy with other countries’ approaches, the paper tries to identify where does China fit in. Followed with case studies in China’s involvement especially in Africa, I would argue what’s hidden behind China’s ambition of increasing peacekeeping efforts, to use the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) as the ultimate cover for further investment in developing areas. My preliminary answers to the question include that, China wants to play a greater role to expand its influence, but does not want to face the backlash against its growing military personnel influence. There is greater legitimacy for troop deployments abroad (in Africa particularly), the ultimate goal of raising decisionmaking influence in the UN might be the reason for China to continuously contribute, both financially and in personnel.
Some relevant studies had discussed why China is so actively joining the UN peacekeeping operations. China’s attempts to identify more closely with the developing world, particularly in Africa where most of its peacekeepers are deployed, and to seek external confirmation of its status as a responsible, major power in the last two decades, have been important considerations behind the socialization process and more active engagement in peacekeeping. China intended to build more close ties with the countries that are relatively poor and sought for confirmation of its global power and legitimacy. It wants to act like a responsible stakeholder but at the same time, it is inevitably ambitious.
One of the leading voices in peacekeeping studies on China has attempted to analyze that Chinese behavior in UN Peacekeeping missions was “offensive realism,” where the voice discussed that, China’s pattern of contributions to the UN is generally congruent with self-interested power-seeking behavior. One apparent drawback of this type of voice is that it ignored the change in China’s attitude towards UN peacekeeping since this nation is not even involved in peacekeeping operations before the 1990s. Simply to picture China has an aggressive “contributor” that sometimes fail to deliver successful missions but used the operation as a tool to gain profits. It is not true as Chinese peacekeeping actions do not only include deployments of troops, but also significant investment in under-developed countries. According to Chinese foreign policy, non-interference plays a vital role in the political ideology where China was always found neutral in decision-making. The “offensive realism” seems to be an exaggerative judgment.
Another piece of leading opinion from the field has indicated that China has a very different perspective from the Western countries, thus fostered different behaviors towards UN peacekeeping While western countries would put a huge focus on good governance based on putting liberal democracy as the priority, China would put development (especially economic development) as a primary concern. On the contrary, China also emphasizes good government with a focus on top-down management and the creation of national identity. This type of argument further explained why China stresses sovereignty and the concept of non-intervention. One limitation of this analysis is that it generalized the Western countries, where, for example, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France all have different perspectives and behaviors. It is hard to draw a line for all the western countries as a standard for consent.
There are three basic models for analyzing the motivation for troops’ contributions. In this article, I classify the contributors into three categories: the underdeveloped (low-income), the developing (middle-income) and the developed (high-income) countries. They all have different perspectives on the number of personnel and money contribution. Further, I would use variables such as financial capacity, military capacity, language capacity, and international presence to examine where does China fit in the model, and does the country position itself under any of the categories.
Hypothesis 1: In the case of low-income (underdeveloped) countries
Soldiers from underdeveloped countries might appreciate the salary from the UN more than their Western counterparts. After the salary distributed form the UN was converted to the local currency, it can be a doubled or tripled equivalent of what could be earned in their home countries. For about US$1200 per soldier per month, the UN compensates countries that contribute troops, but national governments have the power to decide the salaries of their soldiers. Take some African countries Congo, Rwanda and Ethiopia for example, they contributed a great amount of troops and peacekeeping personnel, but there are critiques claiming that they are contributing peacekeeping troops because they make money off the U.N. When we examined the contributions of troops from Ethiopia, the nation has provided considerable amounts of personnel and forces since the 1990s. With over 8,400 uniformed personnel serving in UN missions, Ethiopia has become the top contributor to UN peacekeeping operations in recent years. The troops they sent to the U.N. has received way higher payments that their home countries paid them. Evidence also indicates that the troops these countries sent involve bad behaviors such as supporting various armed parties, selling weapons or extracting and profiting from natural resources. In all, the financial payoff is one of the main motivations, and the country gained military training and experience from the role it played.
Hypothesis 2: In the case of middle-income (developing) countries
India has consistently been among the largest contributors of UN peacekeepers, contributing approximately 163,000 personnel in 43 UN missions. When compared to Pakistan and South Korea for example, these countries contribute large amounts of personnel to the UN peacekeeping operations, part of the reason could be that the troops would gain training experience than staying in their home countries. The internal conflicts create insecurity, and UN peacekeeping would bring several other practical benefits for the country’s security forces. Training and operating alongside other countries’ forces provide invaluable experience that allows the personnel to improve their responsiveness, crowd control capabilities, coordination of emergency command systems and ability to carry out peace operations more effectively. Indian troops’ participation in UN peacekeeping provides them valuable experience that could be utilized for domestic conflict resolution in divided states such as Assam, the Punjab and Kashmir. It is also interesting to see that, one other driving factor for India’s involvement is that its aspiration to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council. On the contrary, Pakistan has focused heavily on the training of forces, where it has an inclusive system for peacekeeping, peace-building and stability and support operations. There are several reasons for the motivation for Pakistan to contribute to UN peacekeeping operations. First, Pakistan is actively reshaping its image, from a shattered state to a more favorable impression. To a very large extent, Pakistan’s international image has stated to a more favorable impression. To a very large extent, Pakistan’s international image has been tarnished by its own domestic problems and realities such as its weak political institutions, constantly changing leadership, constitutional crises, military coups and rule, and a poor and unproductive economy. Secondly, given that UNSC is an international platform, Pakistan would want to use the involvement in peace missions to establish a relationship with the U.S. Last but not least, due to the historical issue between India and Pakistan, it is also a key motivation for Pakistan to compete with India, whether in the contributions of personnel and finance.
Hypothesis 3: In the case of high-income (developed) countries
Countries that have good economic performance would contribute to the UN defense budget based on the GDP, take the U.K., the U.S. and Canada for example, but they do not necessarily send large amounts of their own soldiers. Developed country’s significant presence in UN peacekeeping operations in Africa is driven in part by its attempt to increase its strategic presence on a continent “whose resources may prove crucial for meeting the country’s energy needs.” Even though sometimes peacekeepers are sent to resource-rich countries in Africa (e.g.Sudan, DR Congo), it is not out of strategic imperative that the deployments would access those resources. Through activities such as restoring stability, minimizing risks and promoting peace, peacekeepers consider home country’s economic interests where state-owned corporations have made considerable investments. Without significant internal conflicts, developed countries also care about their decision-making influence in the UN and other international organizations. Considering these benefits, it is somewhat unsurprising that stable, powerful, and wealthy states are not common troop contributors, as they are not commonly so resource-strapped as to need the training and experience, nor do they require additional forward military deployments beyond what they have already established. How their peace engagement strategies could affect other countries’ approaches is a major concern as well.
So, where does China fit in?
China’s continuous peace engagement is associated with the perspective of the Chinese government who values the nations’ international standing in the world today. It is a three-dimensional framework to fit China into the motivation model as a rising power, a developing world, a non-western but rich nation. China’s appearance in a global stage, whether in summits and conferences, has sent a strong signal for its attitude as a “norm-creator”, a leader that would advocate for new rules and reject what has been offered by the western world. On the other hand, it is also a country as a “norm-taker” since China follows the pace of international peacekeeping, and encourages the policy of non-intervention, avoiding conflict with other major powers. Based on the missions that China deployed troops to, they do not create a significant influence on China’s sovereignty or security concern, but the country itself searches for political stability that built on economic development. In recent years, more arguments have been made on how China uses UN peacekeeping operations as the cover for national economy interest especially. In 2014, China announced that it was sending 700 military personnel to join the UN’s peacekeeping mission in South Sudan, an oil-rich east African state and site of an ongoing civil war. Four-fifths of China’s current deployments are supporting peacekeeping operations and playing a critical role in conflict resolution in Africa (more than 30,000 Chinese citizens and 75 Chinese firms in Libya). China also relies on Libyan oil for roughly three percent of its domestic energy consumption. The omnipresence in Africa could be a form of soft imperialism, but it is also more of accumulated pressures — lack of space, merciless business competition, pollution — of modern Chinese society. Opportunity and relative freedom that cannot be received at home is the key factor for many Chinese investors in Africa. The critiques could be strong a motivation for China to have better regulation for its aid contributions, whether to Africa or other countries. It is time for China to learn about how to cooperate with traditional Western donors. To shift the image of Chinese foreign aid domestically, the Chinese government should emphasize how the recipient country went through different challenges, that the help from China is critical and useful. This helps to strengthen the ties between China and the countries that are receiving the aid. Looking ahead, there is still plenty of room to increase the two-way exchanges between China and Africa, whether the exchange is non-official or cultural, for example, field studies in academies and think tanks to carry out plans for the plan of peacekeeping. It is also helpful for China to deepen its understanding of the current situation in Africa, its security, development issues, education, public health, and many other social activities.
When it comes to the final answer for where does China positions itself in the peacekeeping contribution model, I argue that its policy and practices go between those of developing and developed countries. This middle point of “fit” could be explained as followed.
First, China’s main focus on maintaining the principle of sovereignty has not been changed. This principle forms a tight connection with its foreign policy and peacekeeping discourse.
Second, most of the Chinese peacekeeping missions were carried out in developing countries, and China sets its successful experience of working with Africa as an example for other developing countries to learn from. Chinese peacekeepers primarily consist of engineering forces, but they are also capable of building infrastructure in the host country.
Third, there is a trend for developing countries to contribute more troops than developed countries. The economic rationales do not play a great role in China’s peacekeeping strategies, instead, the military training opportunities are more valued. However, the financial capacity and military capacity of China has proved that it is qualified to join the category of developed countries in peacekeeping operations. As of 2017, China is the second-largest contributor (after the United States) and provides 10.3% of the overall assessed peacekeeping contributions. Between 2006 and 2012, China committed US$6 million to the UN Peacebuilding Fund.
The language barrier might look minor, but China is pushing for even harder training to get the peacekeepers used to speaking English. Bai Haitao, 41 years old, who works as an engineering expert in the force said, “I feel tired as I am relatively old in the force. Besides, the requirement to learn the English language for peacekeeping work is highly demanding. I often do the homework until 1 a.m. and get up again at 5 a.m. to study.” Chinese peacekeepers’ capacity is evolving and improving. As the country continues to develop its global strength, it is just not decided which direction will it take in the future.
Looking Ahead: More China or less China?
Given that China is continuously increasing its contributions both financially and in personnel, many questioned what is the real intention for its future peace engagement. Most of the criticism over president Xi Jinping’s pledges originates from the question of whether China, as a developing country itself, should provide such large foreign aid packages. The balance between helping the nation itself first and giving aid to countries are more in need is hard to judge. Besides, China now has to face another balance, between the focus on state sovereignty and human rights ambition. The current model of China’s peace engagement model may belong to a transitional period, will China follow developed western’s countries’ path of contributing more money but less force, we need to wait and see how cautious China wants to be, consistently.
