Ukrainian Flag Above the Kremlin
Before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, President Zelensky, in a remote debate with Putin, whether jokingly or seriously, remarked that if Ukrainians and Russians were one people, the yellow-blue flag would be flying above the Kremlin.
And it did fly! In a spiritual and religious sense, which, as we emphasized at the time, defined what we later came to call national self-awareness.
But first, regarding whether Russians and Ukrainians were one people. Undoubtedly, both belong to the Slavic ethnic group, just as modern Germany, Sweden, Norway, and Denmark belong to the Germanic group. However, their way of life and political traditions differed greatly, more than the Germanic peoples.
Compare that with paintings depicting the way of life in Muscovite Russia, where a class aristocracy was forming. There were differences in everything: political structure, culture, and way of life.
By the first half of the 17th century, a distinct ethnic group had formed in the Right-Bank Ukraine, significantly different from the Lithuanian one, which consisted of present-day Belarusians, as well as from the Muscovite one. It differed in its way of life and traditions.
In the Ukrainian steppe, a unique form of military democracy was established. In some aspects, it resembled Sparta, where two archons or kings were elected annually to lead the army. In some aspects, it resembled Mongolia during the period of creating the empire, when the electors of the Great Khan gathered at the Kurultai, a congress of Mongolian and Tatar princes. The same principle was established in the Zaporozhian Sich — the hetmans were elected.
The “Wild Field” embraced a spirit of freedom and Cossack independence, which was completely alien to the stereotypes of behavior in Muscovy, which was being built as a centralized state with its hierarchy, based on service to the sovereign and the homeland.
The incorporation of the Zaporozhian Sich into Russia was not an easy decision, primarily for Muscovy itself.
Firstly, an ethnic group that was viewed in Moscow as rebellious was being accepted into Russia. By the way, such differences in the perception of the same events between Moscow and Kiev have persisted to this day. Just look at how differently the same event, the revolution on Maidan, is interpreted.
Secondly, Moscow did not want to demonstrate that it was willing to violate international traditions and rules. After all, the Cossacks were essentially breaking their oath of loyalty to the Polish crown.
Thirdly, and most importantly, this union practically required the abandonment of the national identity of Muscovy. It meant the incorporation of an ethnic group that practiced a different form of Orthodoxy, deemed incorrect by the Moscow Patriarchate. In the modern world, confessional affiliation does not play a significant role. However, religious consciousness was crucial for national identification at the time. Just remember how many people perished in Germany because of the Reformation.
The Muscovite form of Orthodoxy differed from the Ukrainian and Greek forms, and essentially determined their national self-awareness. Muscovites wrote “Isus” instead of “Jesus,” and made the sign of the cross with two fingers, representing God the Father and God the Son, while Ukrainians and Greeks crossed themselves with three fingers, symbolizing God the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.
Therefore, Orthodox migrants from the Grand Duchy of Lithuania who moved to Moscow were forced to “convert.” In the 1620s, a special document was even issued, ordering the burning of theological books published in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.
That is the reason the first two appeals of Hetman Khmelnytsky to join the Zaporozhian Cossacks to Russia received no response. From the perspective of contemporary Russian understanding, they should have immediately agreed, as it concerned territorial acquisitions. Only the third appeal of the Zaporozhian Cossacks was considered in Moscow. Moreover, it was seriously discussed at the Zemsky Sobor, although it could have been simply accepted and approved by the tsar’s decision.
After long and heated debates, a legal basis was found. Polish King Jan Casimir was accused of violating his oath of tolerance. The Ukrainian people were freed from their oath to the king, and therefore, the tsarist government took under its protection the “free people,” not rebels as they were seen by the Moscow tsar. This decision was confirmed by voting at the Zemsky Sobor. After that, a meeting of representatives of the Cossacks was held in the then capital of the Zaporozhian capital Pereyaslav, where a decision was unanimously made to unite the territory of Ukraine, which was under the rule of hetmans, with Russia. However, the document was more about the creation of a Russo-Ukrainian alliance rather than annexation.
According to the agreement, Ukrainians were allowed to keep the Magdeburg Law that was used in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. All the revenues from cities and villages remained in the hetman’s treasury. The Cossacks were allowed to choose their own ataman and hetman, “whomever they wanted,” with the information conveyed to Moscow. It was also permitted to accept foreign embassies. The political aspect, however, was the easiest part. The most difficult task for Russia was yet to come.
In the collective consciousness, Orthodoxy in Ukraine was considered “incorrect,” “corrupted,” or “inferior” (similar to how Putin considered the Ukrainian state). After all, if it had been correct, God would not have allowed the Ukrainians to fall under the rule of Catholic Poland.
The difficulties that Muscovy (Moscow) experienced characterized it completely differently from present-day Russia, a country that cannot offer any solid principles to any nation that it would follow itself, or values that would be considered as universal nowadays.
Moscow made very difficult spiritual decision to rebuild itself according to the Ukrainian cultural code, in other words to substitute to Ukraine in theological dogmas. Moscow Patriarch Nikon, who enjoyed enormous authority in the church, persuaded Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich to carry out a church reform, essentially adopting the “Zaporozhian,” Ukrainian variant of Orthodoxy. He did not succumb to public opinion, which opposed this move as it put Moscow below Ukraine (which was under the catholic Poles) and Greece (which appeared under the Ottoman Turks). He did not seek popularity, as would be said today, by speculating on the Russian self-esteem that Orthodoxy in Moscow remained the only Orthodox religion unoccupied by an adversary.
Many people resisted the religious reform. For example, the Solovetsky Monastery, which did not accept the reforms, was besieged for seven years until it was finally stormed and all the rebels were executed. As a result, under persuasion pressure Russians accepted the Ukrainian variant of Orthodoxy.
If Russia had not taken such an unprecedented step and tried to impose its culture and religion on Ukraine, the latter would have long ago separated from Moscow, and there would have been no talk of an empire.
This decision turned out to be a turning point, a pivotal moment in the history of Eurasia, and had as significant geopolitical importance as the emerging union of England and Scotland around the same time, which led to the creation of the British Empire. Of course, it often took place with conflicts, just remember Hetman Mazepa, who stood against Peter the Great. But although these events were notable in history, they could not have a substantial impact on its course.
Thanks to the alliance between Russia and Ukraine, the balance of power in Eurasia underwent significant changes. Moscow effectively gained a tremendous resource of warriors who knew how to successfully engage in combat both in the west against the Poles and in the south against the Turks and Crimean Tatars.
Thanks to the Russo-Ukrainian alliance, the Grand Duchy of Moscow gained the ability to engage in military actions against the Polish Kingdom and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. It was precisely through this alliance that the territory of modern-day Belarus was annexed, and victory over Sweden, that played a key role in European politics, became possible.
Without Ukraine, Moscow could not even dream of competing with the Ottoman Empire, a state that had already subjugated all Balkan countries, Danubian principalities, the Crimean Khanate, and effectively turned the Black Sea into its “inland sea.” The successful war against the Ottomans, involving over 10,000 Ukrainian Cossacks who fought in battles near Ochakov, stormed Perekop and Izmail, and the annexation of Crimea, became possible solely thanks to the alliance with Ukraine.
As the country’s demographic and military capabilities grew, joint exploration of Siberia became possible, followed by the conquest of the Caucasus and Central Asia.
Russia would never have become an empire without Ukraine! The Soviet Union would not have been able to exist without Ukraine either. And Russia could not even dream about the victory in the Second World War without Ukraine.
The policy of national egoism, which we see today in Putin’s Russia, is characteristic of nation-states, not empires. Nation-states define their identity in relation to others to clearly identify themselves along the “us-them” border. Many factors that characterize a nation-state shape national identity, such as the form of religious belief, which is cherished like the apple of one’s eye.
Long time ago, Russia chose not to assimilate another ethnic group but to submit to it. It did so in the most fundamental way possible at the time — in matters of faith! And that is why it became an empire. Russia, which preaches the concept of the “Russian World,” is doomed to become a nation-state once again.
