How ISIS is like the Bloods street gang?

Back in the late 1990s and early aughts I was assigned as an analyst working street gangs in the Northeast US. It was an interesting time as the big national gangs (like the Bloods, Crips, MS-13, etc.) were spreading beyond their California (or Chicago) base.

Some of that spread was intentional. Opportunities to enter new illicit (usually narcotics) markets as an organized group with established distribution channels, and competitors (both criminal organizations and law enforcement) not used to dealing with such a threat was a good move from a business perspective.

A good deal of that spread, however, was unintentional. As the reputation of the Bloods for being ruthless and successful criminals on the West Coast spread through news channels and popular culture the label gained value by itself. As a result, neighborhood street gangs that had never been west of the Appalachians began claiming affiliation with the Bloods of Los Angeles. Just like chieftains of the ancient world would trace their lineage back to a god to legitimize their rule, the leaders of these gangs would concoct stories of connections to the West Coast in order to bolster their reputation.

This was also the time when the internet was getting wide appeal. Every 15 year old could now log on to his AOL dial-up account and download gang codes, rule books and other paraphernalia in order to make the transition to bloods seem more convincing.

In some ways this was good for the Bloods ‘brand’. New gang sets sprouting up all over the country gave the impression of a hidden army of criminals, all reporting up a hierarchy to some sort of Los Angeles headquarters. This caused a great deal of concern in towns large and small, even if all that happened was that the local retail drug dealers changed their name. As gang sets sprouted up everywhere it only reinforced the notion that the Bloods were unstoppable.

In other ways this was problematic for the Bloods. As everyone began assuming the name, the actions of all these ‘wannabes’ would stick to the larger organization. Criminal organizations like the Bloods — with a major visible component on the street — have to thread a tough needle. They need enough of a reputation to maintain turf, scare away rivals and attract new recruits. They can’t let their reputation get too big, however, lest the full weight of the judicial system come down on them. And regardless of what their public personas are, criminal organizations are in the business of making money. Too much attention from law enforcement cuts into profits.

Over time, we saw the Bloods attempt to establish some control over those who claimed the name. In some places gangs were told to assimilate (essentially pay tribute) or give up the Bloods name. Where profit potential was good, there were some hostile takeovers and when the whole thing got too big to manage the Bloods began to fracture and split. In some cases agreeing on turf and criminal markets and others devolving into open (and sometimes bloody) competition.

All of that came to mind as I was reading this article from AFP about ISIS and the impact their brand is having among militants around the world. The momentum of ISIS on the ground, coupled with their aggressive marketing strategy has led to a situation in which ISIS is in a similar organizational situation (albeit on a much grander scale).

The parallels are (at least to me) striking. Exchange the word ‘Bloods’ for ISIS and ‘gang members’ for militants and I could have written this sentence 15 years ago.

“What you have here are disillusioned, alienated militants, who have been fighting with a different organization, who are interested in identifying themselves with a more dynamic cause. And they see ISIS as a very dynamic cause — they are in the media all the time and commit spectacularly brutal attacks,” he said further.

For now, this spread of the ISIS brand globally is good for the group. It functions as a distraction from the news that it’s been losing territory and propagates the message that the Caliphate is inevitable.

But at some point, assuming ISIS manages to remain in existence, it’s going to run into the same problem the Bloods had. Here are some reasons why from the article:

He said there was no evidence to suggest that the ISIS leadership had visited the groups in Pakistan and Afghanistan…

…the French militants who killed four Jews in a kosher supermarket in Paris in January 2015, pledged allegiance to ISIS, but the investigation has so far found no evidence that he had ever been in contact with the organization…

In Indonesia, I heard no indication before these attacks of any form of formal ISIS presence.

For Boko Haram in Nigeria, there is no clear evidence of operational contacts,

Right now, the ISIS label is good for these start ups. They get immediate street cred. Oaths of allegiance cost them nothing because there’s no (or at least not much) consequence for bending or breaking the rules that ISIS lays out. At the same time, it doesn’t appear that ISIS has been demanding much for use of the name (in some cases ISIS may not be in a position to demand much).

But imagine this scenario. ISIS gets pushed back in Iraq and Syria sufficiently that they have to shift their focus of operations to one of their many affiliates. Now, the local leadership that’s been running their own show for awhile may just hand over the keys to ISIS leadership when they show up. But you don’t need to be an expert in terrorism to know that nobody likes it when corporate shows up at the district office and tries to change things.*

Inertia. Morale problems. Resistance. Factions. Discord.

Or, let’s flip the scenario. ISIS becomes wildly successful and consolidates it’s proto-state. Maybe even makes some advances. At some point the guys in Raqqa are going to want to consolidate their gains and start making demands on the numerous groups that have tripped over themselves swearing bay’ah to ISIS.

Corporate still shows up. Makes changes without taking local considerations into account. Bad feelings abound. Risk of disruption.

Granted, this isn’t a short term problem for ISIS. But it will be one eventually. Al Qaeda tried to avoid this problem by keeping tight control of who it would recognize as an affiliate, what attacks it would sanction and who could join. While ISIS may have blown up the AQ business model they may find themselves having to resort to it before all this is over.