Excerpt from Titan II — Accident at Launch Complex 374–7 in Damascus, Arkansas

Aerial view of Launch Complex 374–7 nearly directly overhead. In the upper left-hand corner of the photograph, the silo closure door can be seen where it came to a stop. This photo was taken several days after the explosion, as evidenced by the tank truck on the oxidizer hardstand and the crane located between the silo closure door wheel tracks. Courtesy of Bill Shaff.

An excerpt from Titan II: A History of a Cold War Missile Program by David K. Stumpf.

Launch Complex 374–7, 308th Strategic Missile Wing,
Little Rock AFB, Arkansas

The most highly publicized accident involving the Titan II program took place in September 1980, approximately one year prior to the deactivation decision. Earlier that year, the review of the Titan II program instigated by congressional concerns from the 1978 oxidizer spill near Rock, Kansas, had been released. The Titan II program was given a clean bill of health, with specific recommendations on upgrades and modifications. There was no call for dismantlement. Four months after the release of the report, the picture changed dramatically.

From 2 September to 14 September 1980, missile b-25 (62–006), installed at Complex 374–7, had undergone a Stage II oxidizer download to permit replacement of the Stage II oxidizer tank manhole cover seal. Stage II oxidizer was loaded on 12 September 1980. The complex was returned to alert status 14 September 1980.

Following the upload of oxidizer on 12 September, the Stage II oxidizer tank pressure began to decrease. This was expected as the liquid oxidizer absorbed the nitrogen pressurization gas until the liquid became saturated. On 16 September 1980, a propellant transfer system team was sent to the complex to repressurize the Stage II oxidizer tank. Following this repressurization, the Stage II oxidizer tank continued to lose pressure, and at 2345 the missile was declared “not ready” due to the tank pressure again decreasing to below acceptable limits.

On 18 September 1980, a highly experienced wing instructor crew was on duty at Launch Complex 374–7: Capt Michael T. Mazzaro, MCCC; 1Lt Allan Childers, DMCCC; SSgt Rodney L. Holder, BMAT; and SSgt Ronald O. Full, MFT. First Lt. Miguel A. Serrano was a student DMCCC. Originally assigned to Launch Complex 374–5, the crew had been reassigned to 374–7 due to major maintenance work that was going to be conducted at 374–5. With the delay of reassignment and a faulty alternator in the crew vehicle, the day had not started out on a particularly positive note.

On the morning of 18 September 1980, a pneudraulics team, a missile handling team, and a PTS team were dispatched to Launch Complex 374–7. The pneudraulics team was to fix the hs-2 equipment, the hydraulic system for the launch duct work platforms, which was suffering intermittent failures, while the missile handling and pts teams were moving the above-ground pts support equipment to Launch Complex 373–2. hs-2 repair was completed at 1640, and the PTS team, which had been waiting for several hours, was ready to repressurize the Stage II oxidizer tank. After a maintenance briefing in the launch control center, the eight-man pts team departed to begin the pressurization procedure. Two technicians in RFHCOS were on the surface at the oxidizer hardstand, with an environmental unit technician. The team chief and four technicians were underground on Level 2 of the launch control center with two technicians in RFHCOS, ready to proceed, and two partially suited and ready as backup.

At 1827 the suit environmental control units were activated and a two-man PTS team, composed of SrA David F. Powell and Airman Jeffery L. Plumb, departed down the cableway toward the launch duct. Recently updated technical orders required Powell and Plumb to use a torque wrench and socket to remove the oxidizer vent pressure cap from the Stage II oxidizer tank. The team had brought these tools with them from the base but had left them in the truck. The previous procedure had been to use a ratchet and socket that were stored in the equipment area on the silo side of Blast Door 9. Powell picked up the ratchet and socket, not checking to see if they were securely connected by the spring loaded retaining pin, from the decontamination area on the silo side of Blast Door 9. They reported to the launch control center when they reached the launch duct.

The team chief in the launch control center read the procedure checklist to Powell and Plumb over the radio. They completed the first three steps of the repressurization procedure. As the team chief read the caution statement prior to the next step, Powell picked up the ratchet with the socket seemingly securely attached. As he swung it up into operating position, the 8.75-pound socket separated from the ratchet at waist-high level, fell onto the Level 2 platform, bounced once onto the rubber boot between the platform edge and the missile airframe, and before either technician could grab it, pushed through the boot, and fell approximately 80 feet. The socket hit on the thrust mount ring, then bounced upward and toward the missile, puncturing the Stage I fuel tank skin. Both technicians watched as a stream of white liquid poured out of the missile. There was now quite obviously a fuel leak in Stage I. In 35 to 40 seconds, a noticeable cloud of Aerozine 50 vapor had reached Level 5 of the launch duct, approximately 30 feet below them.

At 1836 Powell notified the missile combat crew of a possible fuel leak, mentioning nothing about dropping the socket. Almost simultaneously, a warning klaxon sounded, and Mazzaro had the indications of a fuel leak on the Launch Control Complex Facilities Console (LCCFC). Mazzaro directed the pts team chief to instruct Powell and Plumb to return to the decontamination area only after they were sure they had not reconfigured any equipment. Mazzaro then turned to the Fuel Vapor in Silo checklist and began attacking the problem at hand. Powell and Plumb left the launch duct with their tools, less one socket, and locked the Launch Duct Level 2 access door. Mazzaro contacted the wing command post, informing them of a fuel leak and possible fire in the launch duct.

At 1800 on 18 September 1980, Col John T. Moser, 308th SMW commander, was at home getting ready for an evening out with the base commander and other unit commanders stationed at Little Rock afb. Before they left the house, Moser received a phone call from the wing command post that something had happened at Launch Complex 374–7.

Moser immediately canceled his plans for the evening. As he drove to the wing command post, he radioed ahead and activated the Disaster Preparedness Response Team that would set up the hazard corridors and start the evacuation process. Upon arrival at the wing command post, Moser initiated the checklists detailing the next sequence of actions. Headquarters SAC was immediately notified, but there was no plan in place to notify the local or state governments because of the “We will neither confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear weapons” mentality of the time. Moser assigned a staff member to record conversations and actions in the command post at the outset of the accident.

This view looking south shows that the box girder at the right side of the photograph over the launch duct Level 1 access door was the only one not blown free of the headworks. Courtesy of Mark Clark.

For more on the accident in Damascus, or on the Titan II missile program, see Titan II: A History of a Cold War Missile Program by David K. Stumpf. Order at uapress.com and use the code YOUOFA for 25% off.