Executive Summary

Over the past years and even decades Ukraine has been at the forefront of counteracting Russian information warfare. The country experienced the impact of Russian propaganda, disinformation and hybrid war earlier than many other European or American societies. This makes the Ukrainian experience so unique and so informative for those who have been facing the challenge of Russian propaganda only recently.

This book is a study of the Ukrainian experience of dealing with Russian information warfare. It is written by a group of Ukrainian authors based on their own research and on interviews with key Ukrainian civil society and media experts in information analysis, researching Russian propaganda, debunking fake news and information security.

The book contains the following key messages:

· Russian propaganda is not an invention of the recent past. It has deep roots, which can be traced back to at least Soviet times. “Post-truth” strategies are not the invention of the Putin era.

· However, today’s Russian propaganda not only resembles Soviet models but is also different from them. Its goal is not to provide its own narrative but also to weaken existing democratic narratives of Western societies. Being unable to suggest its own new grand narrative (post-democratic or post-capitalist), it tries to show that Western narratives are unsustainable.

· The problem of Russian propaganda is wider than that of “fake news”. Studying fakes is an important part of this book too; however, its argument is that Russian propaganda goes further than fake news, and that it uses a specific discourse which has a clear semi-militarist tonality and is aimed at winning a war.

The book has the following chapters:

Chapter One, “Made in Russia: Narratives and Methods of Russian Propaganda’s War on Ukraine” by Artem Babak, studies key narratives and methods of Russian propaganda in Ukraine. The major narratives include: the idea that Ukraine is a failed state; that Ukrainians need regime change and that there will be a “third Maidan” soon; that Ukraine is reviving fascist or Nazi practices and is essentially russophobic; that the Ukrainian Army is a bunch of criminals; that NATO soldiers are fighting on the Ukrainian side; that Russia is not involved in the “Ukrainian conflict”, that the West is trying to destroy Ukraine, and many others. The chapter also studies methods of Russian propaganda like focus on emotions, enemy construction, biased approach to information, invention of theories that “explain” a given event (like the downing of MH17) without genuine empirical basis, “whataboutism” (turning the West’s reproaches and arguments against itself), etc.

Chapter Two, “Octopus Tentacles: The Structure of the Kremlin’s Propaganda Influence on Ukrainian Information Space” by Tetyana Matychak, studies the structure of propaganda’s impact in Ukraine. The chapter analyses the role of Russian public and private TV channels (from Channel One and Russia-24 to LifeNews and Zvezda), Russian websites (such as ria.ru or tass.ru, search engine Yandex, etc.), but also of Ukrainian media outlets (often with oligarchic and/or non-transparent ownership such as Inter, 112, NewsOne, Vesti, strana.ua, etc.) which imitate truly Ukrainian or independent media but, in fact, bridge Russian messages to the Ukrainian audience. The chapter also studies the information platforms of Donbas separatists; Russian influence through social networks; propaganda through comedy infotainment or fake civil society initiatives. The chapter also analyses the brightest fakes of Russian propaganda (from “crucified boy” to “concentration camps for Russian speakers”) and numerous other information techniques, including those that are partially based on reality. In the last subsection the chapter looks at the most hidden and sophisticated tactics of Russian propaganda.

Chapter Three, “David against Goliath: How Ukraine Resists the Kremlin’s Information Attacks” by Tetyana Matychak, focuses on Ukrainian responses to Russian propaganda. It gives an overview of such initiatives as StopFake, Ukraine Crisis Media Centre, Information Resistance, UkraineWorld, Euromaidan Press, Detector Media, Verify and others. It also analyses Ukrainian state initiatives, as well as state sanctions against Russian information channels, from TV to social networks.

Chapter Four, “Networks of Illusion: how Russia acts through the Internet and social networks, and how to fight this” by Vitaliy Moroz, focuses on the major tactics used by Russian propaganda in the online world. It analyses how Russia controls the Internet at home, how major Russian services like LiveJournal, Vkontakte or others are watched by the Russian authorities, and how Moscow bans opposition websites or VPN services, which enable these bans to be circumvented. It also analyses the work of the Russian “troll army”, including in Ukraine, and shows how the work of these online commentators has been automatized. Besides, the article focuses on how the Russians are using international web platforms like Wikipedia to promote their narratives. Moreover, the author analyses steps taken by Ukraine to tackle Russian actions in these fields.

Chapter Five, “Architecture of Lies: How the Kremlin’s Propagandist Mechanism Works” by Martha Puhach, gives an overview of existing information about the architecture and mechanism of Russian propaganda: it will help you to understand how the whole system is built up.

Chapter Six, “Mapping the Territory: What Other Researchers of Russian Propaganda Say” by Ruslan Minich and Vitaliy Rybak, provides a (non-extensive) overview of existing research into the topic of Russian propaganda, both in Western research and in Ukraine, and the key messages and narratives put forward by this research. The chapter can be a good summary of further reading on the topic.

Chapter Seven, “More than Fake News: Lessons Learnt by Ukraine” by Volodymyr Yermolenko, analyses the discourse of Russian propaganda in Ukraine. It suggests looking at it as a wider phenomenon, which not only produces fake news but also invents fake democracy, fake civil society and fake criticism, trying to use democratic values against themselves. The chapter points at two major elements of Russian propagandist discourse: “cynical thinking” and “apocalyptic thinking”. Cynical thinking means that Russia tries to use the practices of democratic critical thinking for destructive purposes. “Apocalyptic thinking” means that Russian propaganda tries to show that its opponents are on the brink of collapse, and argues that it will be able to destroy Western democracies if it gets offended.

Finally, the book includes recommendations to both Ukraine and the international community. The full list of recommendations is available in the last section of the book. In particular, it recommends to:

- Acknowledge that the problem of propaganda and disinformation is a threat to security, both national and civilian.

· Open a debate among stakeholders on ways to respond to security threats without restricting genuine freedom of speech.

· Develop maps of dissemination of propaganda messages in each particular state.

· Develop anti-ratings of “media” that disseminate fakes most actively.

· Develop thorough fact-based and fact-checking journalism projects with international networks

· Develop alternative forms of response to propaganda, which include irony and infotainment but, at the same time, a solid fact basis.

· Develop civic initiatives on counteracting propaganda

· Introduce training sessions on media literacy in schools and universities

· Develop due diligence practices and financial/fiscal monitoring of information resources which were caught spreading propaganda.

· Better integrate Ukrainian and international reporting communities, through forums, meetings, informal networks. Create an international expert network.

· Monitor social networks and sanction accounts propagating hate speech or spreading fakes.

· Defend the values of democracy by showing where democracy works, and how society would look like if democracy fails (or looks like where democracy does fail)

· Study Russian soft power initiatives, including NGOs, think tanks, communities, religious organizations, which can prepare the ground for “active measures”. Study experiences in Donbas and Crimea in 2000–2013, prior to annexation and war.

· Compare the messages of Russian propaganda with the reality on the ground, including in the annexed/occupied territories of Crimea, Donbas, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, etc.

· Have more flexible tools for counteracting the flexibility of Russian propaganda.

· Remember that Russia often uses opportunities provided by democratic states in its fight against democracy; develop stricter legislative provisions which would make it harder, for example, to register propaganda channels in Europe or US as media.

· Recognize that workers of Russian propaganda outlets are not journalists, therefore avoid applying principles and practices to them that are applied to journalists (accreditation, etc.).

· Monitor support from Russia for specific political forces, especially during election campaigns (Front National, AfD, etc.).

· Introduce legal responsibility for sharing fake information.

· Introduce personal sanctions against key authors of Russian propaganda (many of them have assets in the West).

· Create a network of international experts dealing with propaganda.