Octopus’ Tentacles: Structure of Kremlin Propaganda’s Influence on Ukrainian Information Area — Tetyana Matychak
While watching a favorite TV program, listening to the radio in the car, gossiping with a neighbor, visiting a concert of your favorite music band and even liking photos of kittens in social networks, you should never forget about critical thinking. After all, in any of these situations, the parties of the information-psychological warfare can bring you on their side. To steer clear of such influence and, for some people to retain common sense, it is worth knowing all the channels of propaganda dissemination.
The Labyrinth of the Minotaur
With the beginning of Russian annexation of Crimea in March 2014, Ukrainian experts began to investigate the influence of the Kremlin’s disinformation and propaganda on the internal information space. As of September 2017, they can say that with the beginning of Euromaidan in Kyiv on November 22, 2013, messages advantageous for the Kremlin were distributed through the following channels:
- Russian state and commercial television;
- Russian websites of various forms of ownership;
- Pro-Russian media in Ukraine, which include those who broadcast the viewpoint of leaders of the so-called “LNR” and “DNR” as well Ukrainian mass media, which are suspected of being financed by the Russian Federation;
- Social networks, including Russian services like Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube;
- Blogs, including LiveJournal;
- Experts from NGOs and think tanks;
- Pro-Russian Ukrainian politicians, and not only them;
- Private initiatives and public movements not registered as separate organizations;
- Personal communication;
- The cultural sphere that covers film production, book publishing and popular modern music.
NGO Internews Ukraine has interviewed 15 media experts, representing the most influential Ukrainian public and non-governmental organizations. Based on their research, conclusions, and their own experience in this field, we have managed to analyze the structure of the influence of the Kremlin’s information messages and to find examples of the most resonant fakes and disinformation circulating in the Ukrainian space over the last five years.
An attractive picture
Russian public and private TV channels were an important source in the propagation of pro-Kremlin messages in Ukraine in 2013–2014. For example, Channel One, Russia 1, Russia 24, NTV, Channel 5, LifeNews, TNT, Zvezda and others. According to an annual study undertaken by Internews, in 2014, 27% of Ukrainians watched Russian TV channels.
According to experts, Russian broadcasting is attractive, with its beautiful and quality picture, through a wide choice of entertainment programs and the emotionality of narrative, particular in talk shows. “Ukraine as a state did not set up its discourse. Therefore, people watched the Russian media — there was lots of entertainment, everything is fine there, there is a funny picture, entertainment shows,” Diana Dutsyk, executive director of the NGO Detector Media, explained to Internews Ukraine.
Russian media outlets are capable of doing this thanks to large budgets, including government grants. In 2015, 72 billion rubles ($ 1.2 billion at the average exchange rate in that year) were allocated to support media — primarily TV channels; in 2016–76 billion rubles ($ 1 billion at the average exchange rate); in 2017 — approximately 70 billion rubles (1.2 billion).
Ukrainian TV channels are losing in an unfair competition. In 2015, Volodymyr Borodyanskyi, head of StarLightMedia, a Ukrainian group of TV channels, said — “Our economy allows the production of a TV show priced at 20,000–30,000 dollars per hour, and the neighboring economy 300,000 dollars per hour. Under such conditions, it is impossible to compete.”
The influence of Russian channels on the Ukrainian information space during 2014–2017 was significantly reduced thanks to the restricted broadcasting of 77 out of 82 channels in Ukrainian cable networks. Now Ukrainians can watch these channels only on the Internet or via satellite. As a result of such actions, and due to the loss of confidence in the Russian media product as a whole (according to research by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology), in 2017, only 1% of Ukrainians admitted that they watch/read Russian media for obtaining information (according to a study by Internews).
Protégé of Roskomnadzor
Another channel for distributing the Kremlin’s information in Ukraine is a variety of Russian websites, including news agencies and print media: tass.ru, ria.ru, kommersant.ru and others. In 2014, 44% of Ukrainians read them. However, already in 2015, this part fell to 27% despite the fact that providers did not block any of these sites in Ukraine. Now, Ukrainians almost do not turn to this source of information.
Experts recall that some Ukrainian journalists still use such sites as the primary sources of information, undermining the credibility of their own media. In pursuit of speed, employees of Ukrainian news agencies can write news based on reports from the Kremlin’s press service, without waiting for an official press release from Ukrainian state authorities. As a result, they sacrifice the standards of balance between opinions and checking the accuracy of information.
“The Yandex search engine is also a powerful propaganda tool. They have changed the news selection algorithm — it is impossible to find anything disadvantageous for Russian authorities there. For example, news about rallies in support of Navalny could not be read on Yandex,” Serhiy Kostynskyi, a member of the National Television and Radio Broadcasting Council, told Internews Ukraine.
“Turncoats”
Some Ukrainian media, which on specific grounds are considered pro-Russian, play on the Kremlin’s “half of the field”. Currently, there is no direct proof that certain leading Ukrainian media receive funding from Russia. However, according to experts, messages and discourses broadcast through some TV channels, print media, and websites suggest that: either journalists receive direct payment from the Russian Federation for spreading such opinions, or media owners have a common standpoint with the Kremlin and provide free help to Russia on information warfare.
Among such media, the experts include the TV channels Inter (the main beneficiaries are businesspersons Dmytro Firtash and Serhiy Lyovochkin). Ukraine (belongs to businessperson Rinat Akhmetov, SCM Holdings). Channel 112 (owned by Andriy Podshchypkov). NewsOne (owned by businessperson Yevhen Murayev). The Vesti newspaper and the radio station bearing the same name (belongs to the Cyprus company Media Holding Vesti Ukraine). The website strana.ua (owned by Ihor Huzhva, former editor-in-chief of the Vesti newspaper, law-enforcement agencies now accuse him of extortion).
“The NewsOne channel broadcasts Russian messages. Channel 112 maintains all journalistic standards and is pro-Ukrainian. However, it provides a public speaking platform for pro-Russian experts and politicians and contributes to the dissemination of their messages,” Roman Shutov, Program Director of Detector Media said, providing an example to Internews Ukraine.
“In my opinion, Russia’s strategy in Ukraine in recent years has been to create media platforms, mimicking Ukrainian media platforms and Ukrainian opposition media platforms. But along with this, they carry out an agenda, resulting in the torpedoing of the Ukrainian state,” Pavlo Kazarin, popular blogger and TV presenter, columnist for Krym.Realiyi (Crimea. Realia), explains to Internews Ukraine.
Now that the war with Russia is still under way, the influence of such media is not decisive. “Ukrainian media owned by pro-Russian business people have their own audience. However, now this audience is not influencing the political agenda of the day. Civil society, anti-corruption organizations, young politicians — are not from the pro-Russian camp”, Denys Kazanskyi, a well-known blogger, journalist of The Ukrainian Week Magazine, explained to Internews Ukraine.
Stepsons and stepdaughters
Russia’s information war on the territory of Ukraine has generated a lot of new resources in the occupied territories. Television channels: First Republican, Novorossiya, Oplot and others. Print media: Novorossiya, Donetskoe vremya (Donetsk time), Golos respubliki (Voice of the republic), Donetsk republic and others, as well as many websites, broadcasting the messages of the leaders of the so-called “LNR” and “DNR.”
The peculiarity of these media outlets is that unlike the Ukrainian or Russian media, they do not even try to follow journalistic standards. That is why they often spread outright propaganda. According to the Donetsk Institute of Information, such television channels use language with signs of hostility in almost 20% of the evening news and nearly 26% of print media pages.
At the same time, 82% of reports about the self-proclaimed authorities of the so-called “DNR” and “LNR” in online media on the Donbas territories not controlled by the Ukrainian authorities are complimentary, 18% neutral, and there is no critical material at all. The Institute of Mass Information’s research confirmed this information. “The ‘DNR’” in its newspapers always puts the portraits of Zakharchenko on the front page,” Oleksiy Matsuka, editor-in-chief of the Donbass News site, said, giving an example to Internews Ukraine.
Not by kittens alone
Social networks and blogs, where there are almost no journalistic standards either, are extremely important elements in the Kremlin’s dissemination of propaganda. First of all the experts mention VK, or Vkontakte, and OK, or Odnoklassniki (currently these two resources are banned in Ukraine — see more details in Chapter 4). According to research carried out by Internews, in 2015, at the height of information war with Russia, 38% of users visited these websites to obtain information and 31% of Ukrainian Internet users, respectively. Facebook and Twitter are also popular. “In the DNR, there is an interest in LiveJournal”, said Olexander Nikonorov, expert of the Foreign Policy Research Center OPAD.
In social networks propaganda spreads through thematic groups and public groups, through bots and Internet trolls, and because of the uncritical approach of users to information. “40%-50% of the comments are made by trolls. Elections in the USA and France have shown that trolls can greatly influence the dissemination of information. Besides, in France, there was research done on dissemination of trolls’ information attacks in comparison with the usual information in the official media — trolls had more shares. “There are so many trolls now, because they are easy to create and it is an influential mechanism,” Roman Kulchynskyi, Editor-in-chief of Texty.org.ua, explained to Internews Ukraine.
Another important channel for conducting information warfare is the social network YouTube. Thanks to the “viral” video, any idea can be spread several times faster. Such videos include not only specially shot videos, but also “compilations” of news stories from propaganda programs that are full of enmity and unproven charges. In particular, clips from the “Evening with Vladimir Solovyev” program are disseminated in this way.
Anatoliy Shariy, a former Ukrainian journalist who may be deprived of political asylum in Lithuania for anti-Ukrainian propaganda, has also chosen this channel for the dissemination of manipulative messages. Shariy is a frequent guest of Russian newscasts. The Kremlin media repeatedly quoted his messages.
Double-dealing
Information warfare uses the statements of Ukrainian politicians, whose position is advantageous to the Kremlin. Thus, providing a media platform to its politicians, Ukrainian media create a “right image” for the Russian Federation. Russian media prefer to quote Yuriy Boyko, Yulia Tymoshenko, Vadym Rabinovych and others. All these politicians belong to the so-called populists’ wing. They aim to attract electorate by criticizing the current government. At the same time, Russian media do not criticize them.
The Kremlin information campaign also uses the statements of odious local politicians like Oleh Lyashko, Mikhail Saakashvili, Oleh Tyahnybok, and others to criticize the Ukrainian authorities. At the same time, they do not forget to conduct their own information campaign against them, damaging their reputation. The consumer of information cannot understand whether it is possible to trust such persons, and if it is so, then which aspects of them.
“Useful idiots”?
The statements of Ukrainian politicians are supplemented by reports of Ukrainian experts and the activities of pro-Russian NGOs. They help to distribute the Kremlin’s messages, receiving direct or indirect funding from the Russian Federation. These public organizations include various centers of Russian culture, Ukrainian Choice, Virne Kozatstvo (Faithful Cossacks), Slavic Committee of Ukraine, Public Council of Dnipropetrovsk, Social Zaporizhzhya, Odesa for Porto-Franco, Kharkiv Slobozhanschyna and others. In addition, all statements by Ukrainian analysts and political experts, which criticize the situation in the country without providing sufficient arguments, contribute to the Kremlin’s propaganda.
The initiative is welcomed
Another source used to disseminate the necessary information during the war are so-called “bottom-up initiatives.” For example, in 2017, the Ukrainian media actively disseminated “letters of trade unions” that demanded resumption of economic relations with Russia at the previous level in order to increase employment opportunities: from the workers of the Trade union of chemical and petrochemical industries of Ukraine and others.
This idea would not have been surprising if it had been advanced just by one group and published in one media. “But the mass nature of these letters and the speed of dissemination caused suspicion. Some editors and journalists admitted that they were offered money to publish these ‘“letters’”, Alya Shandra, editor-in-chief of Euromaidan Press, told Internews Ukraine.
“Nadiya Kuramshyna and Viktoriya Shylova are from the ‘Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers’. It is a Russian project, a pseudo-organization, which spreads discrediting information about the Ukrainian command. They imitated a Ukrainian patriotic organization, thanks to which they were invited to appear on television and people listened to them,” says Denis Kazanskyi.
Stand Up and show
Mass culture became an important weapon in the Russian information and psychological war. According to experts, the most influential were variety art, TV series, entertainment TV shows, stand-up comedy shows, movies, and books. “In general, the degree of cultural penetration is identical to the degree of ideological penetration,” explains Oksana Voloshenyuk, executive director of the Academy of Ukrainian Press.
“Ukraine and Crimea, Belarus and Moldova — This is my country! … Ruriks, Romanovs, Lenin and Stalin — This is my country!”, Russian pop singer Oleg Gazmanov tells her listeners. Russian-speaking performers, Ukrainians by origin, have been actively promoted in Ukraine, in order to oust the Ukrainian language from mass culture.
At the same time, leading Ukrainian TV channels have broadcast Russian TV series about law- enforcement bodies: Ulitsy razbitykh fonarey (Streets of broken lamps), Glukhar (Сold case), Maryina Roshcha (Marya’s grove), Chernye volki (Black Wolves), Legavyy (The Cop) and dozens of similar ones. Such films consistently create a picture of the world, where the country is divided exclusively in those who violate the law and those who establish justice on the part of the state. The dominance of such series on Ukrainian screens, and creation of channels (NTN), specializing in broadcasting similar worldviews has led to the sustainable popularization and glorification of the Russian police and the FSB by leading Ukrainian mass media.
Oksana Voloshenyuk gives an example of the Russian TV series Lesnik (The Forester) (2011), where there are many xenophobic motives, such as the impossible common future for the Armenian boy and Russian girl who love each other. In the 91st episode, a ragged crowd appears unexpectedly with checkered Chinese bags. “Who is this?” — asks the main character. Khokhols [T/N: pejorative term for ethnic Ukrainians). They build a cowshed just for food,” is the answer that is heard. At the end of the series, the same crowd is shown making its way through snowstorms. The phrase “Khokhols again. They have built the cowshed, so we sent them packing,” is heard. “As a result, an image was formed of Ukrainians as guest workers, working for a piece of bread, not able to earn it in their own country,” explains Oksana Voloshenyuk.
Spiashchie (“The Dreamers”), a new Russian TV series produced by Pervyi Kanal (Channel One) which glorifies the Russian FSB, is a vivid example of the Kremlin’s propaganda policy in culture. The main idea of the series is that there are no corrupted officials in Russian Government. Meanwhile, all the anti-corruption organizations are being financed by the United States in order to undermine Russian officials and create chaos in the country — like they did in Ukraine with the Revolution of Dignity.
BBC: A little bird told me.
Personal communication was and remains a very important channel for the dissemination of any information: relatives, neighbors, colleagues, taxi drivers, shop assistants, etc. It is worth remembering that people usually have a greater degree of trust in the words of family and friends than in the words of journalists. According to Research & Branding Group, 12% of Ukrainians consider relatives and friends as the most trustworthy information sources on political events, and 3% talk and rumors. That is why the most successful election campaigns were those where the element of personal communication of both the politician and campaigners was involved as much as possible.
Making a mountain of a molehill: step-by-step guide
Outright lying and propagandizing of ideas, bearing no relationship to reality, will not be viable. Instead, messages based on real examples may enjoy success. Therefore, for creating misinformation, the Kremlin’s communication experts in the main use real-life Ukrainian stories. Then they only need to generalize one or several examples for the whole country or enormously overestimate the meaning of a fact — and the “horror story” is ready.
Ukraine has been in a rather difficult economic situation for the last four years. At the same time, it has to protect its borders from military aggression. This is why Ukraine is a fruitful field for the growth of various fake news and misrepresentations (for more details see the chapter “Main narratives and trends, spread by Russian propaganda in Ukraine and the West”). “Russian media are very responsive to all events taking place in Ukraine,” Olena Holub, Head of the department for monitoring journalistic standards and paid journalism at the Institute of Mass Information, explained to Internews Ukraine.
“Our latest research shows that in July there were fewer pro-Russian messages, even on the ‘Inter ‘ TV channel. Perhaps this is due to the summer decline in activity. However, now there is a reverse process in action when Russian propaganda uses reports from the Ukrainian media to reinforce their theses,” says Diana Dutsyk.
The war in Donbas
Ukraine’s biggest unresolved issue remains the war in the Donbas region, also known as the anti-terrorist operation (ATO). It takes lives every day, destroys destinies and undermines the state’s economy. Petro Poroshenko made a promise during his election campaign in 2014 to end the war as soon as possible: “an anti-terrorist operation will last a few hours.” The bringing in of Russian troops into the Donbas region made it impossible to fulfill the promise. However, Kremlin media outlets ignore this fact, focusing on the mistakes and shortcomings of the Ukrainian command. They hyperbolize and summarize the possible consequences, accusing Poroshenko of not ending the war. In addition, the investigations of Ukrainian journalists about corruption in the Ukrainian Army are fertile ground for speculation.
The Russian information space is full of news, which presents the Ukrainian military in a grotesque style to ridicule the enemy. For example, after the Ukrainian news that the Ukrainian military gave shelter to two boars, the Russian media provided this information as a very serious part of the strategy of strengthening the defense potential of Ukrainian troops.
Inability to overcome corruption
All the presidents promised to overcome corruption in Ukraine. Petro Poroshenko was no exception. He has made the fight against corruption and the use of administrative resources a priority of his domestic policy. However, it has not produced fast and noticeable results: corruption has not been eradicated, and none of the high-profile criminal cases has been completed yet. In the World Corruption Perception Index (CPI) for 2016, Ukraine gained 29 points out of a possible 100 and ranked 131st out of 176 countries. This is just two points more than in 2015. Despite the fact that this position with 29 points was also shared by Kazakhstan, Russia, Nepal, and Iran, the Kremlin’s media has over the past four years persistently represented Ukraine as a highly corrupt state.
The stagnation of reforms
In January 2015, Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko signed the Decree “On the Strategy for Sustainable Development ‘Ukraine-2020’, which identified 62 necessary reforms for achieving European standards of living in the country. According to the analysis carried out by the analytical department of VoxUkraine, as of September 2017, the progress in reforms was very slow, and in early 2017, it was at zero level.
This situation disappoints many Ukrainians and plays into the hands of anti-Ukrainian propaganda. Exaggeration and distortion of facts allowed discussion about the complete absence of reforms in Ukraine. At the same time, Kremlin media push the opposite idea — that reforms in Ukraine do take place (read the “The battle against mind and hearts: Russian propaganda in Europe” chapter for more details on such propaganda techniques). For instance, the media report on the process of medical reform in Ukraine and call it a “disaster.”
Nationalist groups
The war in the East of Ukraine began when the Armed Forces were the least prepared for it since 1991. Volunteer battalions came to the aid. Some of them have chosen the nationalist movement as their ideology, which was part of patriotism for them. The most famous of them are the Right Sector and Azov. Chaotic and poorly controlled in 2014–2015, they later became part of the National Guard of Ukraine, and Right Sector has signed a cooperation agreement with the Armed Forces of Ukraine. However, they were demonized by anti-Ukrainian propaganda and were the embodiment of “fascists,” “Nazis” and “punishers.” Moreover, the actions of members of these battalions are imposed on the entire Ukrainian Army as a whole, and the actions of their supporters are extended to the entire population of Ukraine.
Violation of human rights
The situation in the field of human rights in Ukraine is still not at the highest level. Due to the war in the Donbas region and the occupation of Crimea, the level of violence and hatred has increased, and freedom of expression restricted — according to research by the Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group for 2016. According to Iryna Bekeshkina, the head of the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation, Ukrainians have not yet learned to protect their rights: “Most people who suffered from the violation of their rights have done nothing, and those who did something have not succeeded.”
This gives a broad field for Russian propaganda manipulations. “The quotes from the participants of our press conference on human rights after the Maidan were taken out of context and turned by the Russian media to their advantage,” Oleksandra Matviychuk, chairperson of the board of the Center for Civil Liberties, coordinator of EuroMaidan SOS, told Internews Ukraine. Similarly, the Kremlin’s media use UN reports on human rights in Ukraine in a selective manner: they quote out of context and report only on violations by the Armed Forces of Ukraine, ignoring all reports of violations by the “LNR” and “DNR” groups.
Social questions
The general standard of living in Ukraine remains very low. Despite the increase in the minimum wage from 1,147 UAH in 2013 to 3,200 UAH in 2017, the population does not feel an increase in social standards. After all, the inflation figure in 2014 was 24.9%, in 2015 it was 43.3% and in 2016 it was 12.4%. These indexes included rising prices for food items and necessities, travel costs and higher utility costs.
One of the reasons for this situation is reform of the energy sector. It reduces dependence on Russian gas and makes the parasitizing of Ukrainian oligarchs on gas subsidies impossible. The reform has led to a fourfold increase in the price of natural gas for the population over a three-year period. Before that, its value remained unchanged for almost four years. All this has drawn disfavor from Ukrainians and strengthened their protest sentiment, which became suitable material for exaggeration in the news of the Russian media. They were quick to say that Ukraine is in for a “new Maidan.” However, protests against increases in tariffs were small and gathered no more than a thousand people, as opposed to protests on the Maidan against arbitrary rule in 2014–2015 and 2013–2014, when about a million people took to the streets simultaneously.
Language issue
Ukraine is a multinational country. In particular, in 2016, 15% of its population described Russian as their native language, while 22% considered both the Ukrainian and Russian languages as native. This is proven in a survey carried out by the Center for Economic and Political Studies named after Olexander Razumkov. This situation provides a breeding ground for incitement to ethnic hatred. February 23, 2014 may serve as an example. The Ukrainian Parliament voted to amend the law on the principles of state language policy of July 3, 2012. Innovations abolished official bilingualism in the regions where the share of national minorities exceeded 10%.
The new law was never signed by the interim president of Ukraine, Oleksandr Turchynov, or by the elected President, Petro Poroshenko. That is, the law has not come into effect. Nevertheless, this did not stop Russian state channels from providing news on voting like as if this was the enactment of the provisions contained in the law.
Such manipulations and misrepresentation of information contributed to the spreading in Crimea of a message about the “Kyiv Nazis” who allegedly want to abolish the Russian language and root out Russian-speaking people throughout Ukraine. This helped the Kremlin to win over a large part of the Crimean population during the annexation and turned them against the Ukrainian authorities. Since then, Russian media outlets have raised and distorted Ukraine’s language issue dozens of times (For more information on the influence of Russian propaganda in the countries with Russian-speaking population, read the “Analysis of Russian propaganda: what do we already know?” section).
Humanitarian issues in the occupied territories
The Russian occupation of part of Donbas made it impossible for Ukraine to provide this region with all the necessary means of living. In addition, it has created conditions for smuggling and other forms of illicit enrichment in these territories. As a result, the Ukrainian authorities were forced to refuse to supply goods to the occupied region. This situation was actively used by the Russian media to whip up tension and to indict the Ukrainian authorities for leaving the citizens to fend for themselves. At the same time, the Russian authorities were described as the liberators of the region.
Pardon impossible to crucify — the most famous fakes about Ukraine over the past five years
Fakes and distorted information about Ukraine created in 2013–2017 are striking due to their absurdity and emotionality. According to experts, this is why they succeeded in acquiring such spread — first of all in Russia.
1. The crucified boy.
On July 12, 2014, a week after Ukrainian troops had liberated the city of Slavyansk in Donbas, Russian Channel One TV ran a story on the evening news about Halyna Pyshnyak, a woman who allegedly fled from this city after the arrival of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The story told by a woman was appalling: Ukrainian soldiers allegedly took a little boy who was dressed only in shorts and crucified him “like Jesus” on a bulletin board right in front of his grief-stricken mother. Then they took his mother, tied her to a tank and dragged her along the street.
Since the release of this report, not a single person has been found to confirm the words of Halyna Pyshnyak. Attempts by Russian journalists from other media outlets, like Novaya Gazeta, to find witnesses to the case were in vain. The manipulative capability of the report aired on Channel One consists of the complete absence of clarifying questions from the interviewer. Besides, the lack of photo and video evidence at a time when many people have smartphones on their person is extraordinary. Moreover, the story about the crucifixion repeats the plot in one of the episodes of the fourth season of the popular Game of Thrones series.
Channel One tried to clear themselves of this story later on. However, far fewer people saw this explanation than the report, which was widely disseminated.
2. Two slaves and a piece of land.
On November 2, 2014, Russia’s Channel One aired a news report about Ukraine, in which the self-proclaimed head of the village Stepanivka in Donbas region quotes the statement of a Ukrainian servicemen who were allegedly promised “a piece of land and two slaves” for participating in the military operation.
There was no evidence that these words were said. In Ukraine, there is no and there has never been a law or bill that could explain words about slaves or any kind of service staff for the military.
Presumably, this was a deliberately dreamt up propaganda message, which was designed to draw a parallel between the Ukrainian Army and the Nazi German Army during the Second World War. After all, the fake report was devoted to the 70th anniversary of Ukraine’s liberation from the Nazis.
The report contained many signs of both visual and verbal manipulations. For example, soldiers of the National Guard of Ukraine are called “militants,” although according to standards, this term commonly refers only to members of illegal military formations.
3. Rape of epileptic pensioner.
On November 21, 2014, Konstyantin Dolgov, who was forced to flee Ukraine after he made calls to violate territorial integrity, participated in the live program “Special Correspondent” on Russia’s Channel One. In order to persuade the audience of the Ukrainian Army’s inhumanity, Dolgov told the story about a Ukrainian serviceman who “raped a 47-year-old pensioner in front of bus passengers” in Kramatorsk, after which “she had an epileptic fit”.
There is no evidence regarding this story: there were no lawsuits or media publications or social network posts. Kostyantyn Dolgov often takes part in Russian talk shows, where he regularly broadcasts anti-Ukrainian disinformation messages about the “junta” and “Ukrainian occupation of the territory of Ukraine for 23 years” and uses force in communicating with opponents. One day he calls himself “co-chairman of the People’s Front of Novorossiya,” another day “the official representative of the DNR’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.”
4. Concentration camps for Russian speakers.
On October 3, 2014, the Russia 24 TV channel, on November 7, 2014, Channel One, and on April 24, 2015, Zvezda TV channel aired stories about the construction of “separatist concentration camps”, or “American secret prisons”, or “refugee screening and filtration camps” in Ukraine.
Actually, in all cases, the issue was facilities constructed with money allocated by the European Union in 2011 for the temporary retention of illegal migrants in accordance with the humanitarian standards of the Council of Europe.
5. Carlos the air traffic controller.
On July 17, 2014, the RT TV channel reported on the alleged involvement of Ukrainian troops in the downing of Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 (this report was later refuted). The channel referred to the Twitter post “of the Spanish air controller Carlos, who works at Boryspil Airport in Kyiv.”
There was no Carlos air controller at Kyiv Airport or at any other airport in Ukraine. “Carlos’s” Twitter account was deleted as soon as the topic became public. Despite that, many Russian media outlets still mention this “air controller” when they try to prove Ukraine’s involvement in the plane’s crash. At the same time, investigative journalists have proven Russia’s guilt in the downing of the Boeing. This information was also confirmed by the findings of the official investigation.
6. Organs for sale.
On July 6, 2014, the Russia 24 TV channel reported about organ trafficking involving wounded and dead soldiers in Ukraine and their delivery to Germany. Several other Russian media outlets, including the TV channel Russia 1, reported the same news.
The fictional story does not withstand any criticism. There was no evidence or verbal confirmation from Ukraine or Germany. If there was such a trade, a grievously wounded soldier should be brought immediately to a high-tech clinic for organ removal. Given the very short storage period of removed organs (up to eight hours), a doctor should be on constant standby for their receipt. A patient in Germany should be already prepared for surgery and lying on the operating table, although the organs may not match. Besides, the German transplant clinic in question should have all the necessary documents about the organ’s origin; otherwise, the insurance company would never pay for the surgery. The list of arguments against the claims made in this Kremlin fake can be continued for a long time.
7. “Train of friendship” to Crimea.
On February 24, 2014, the Crimean media, including Sevastopol News, as well as leading Russian media — Lenta.ru and others, published the biggest “horror story” for Crimean residents at that time. It was the massive dissemination of information about the so-called Right Sector’s “train of friendship” from Kyiv to Simferopol. The arrival of this train was originally scheduled for the end of February 2014. Then the date was changed several times, including March 28, 2014, but this is what people were dreading the most. The fear of “fascists from Kyiv” made many residents of Crimea come over to Russia’s side in the course of this information and psychological warfare.
The reason for this information attack was the statement made by Ihor Mosiychuk, an active member of the Right Sector, during a talk show on Channel 112: “Any attempt to violate Ukraine’s territorial integrity will be severely punished. If the Government is not able to do this, then the Right Sector will form a “train of friendship.” We, as UNSO did in the 1990s, will go to Crimea, at that time a public like this, ran away like rats when a column of UNSO people was entering Sevastopol… Unity is one of our greatest values.” This news has now been deleted from Channel 112, but it can be found in Google’s cache. This quotation can also be found on the Channel 112 website with Mosiychuk’s biography. It is worth noting that Ihor Mosiychuk is on the political fringe, and he could never speak on behalf of either the Ukrainian authorities or the people as a whole.
8. The Nazi Ukrainian Insurgent Army.
On March 24, 2014, the Russian news agency RIA Novosti, which is part of the Russia Today Holding, reported that “people dressed in the uniform of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army” are plundering Moscow trains in Ukraine. According to the Russian Federation’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, these people allegedly demanded money and gold jewelry from Russian citizens on Moscow-Chisinau train №65. No photo, video, or eyewitness evidence has been found either in the media or in social networks.
The press service of Ukraine’s Ministry of Internal Affairs of the South-west Railroad told BBC Ukraine that there were police officers present on March 21 in the train from Vinnytsya to Zhmerynka. The porter of one of the train carriages informed that a passenger complained of the theft of a handbag containing personal belongings. Employees called out a police group, but since the train makes a short stop in Vinnytsya, they did not have time to register the theft. That is why, a criminal investigator — a young woman — and a sergeant of the patrol and inspection service rode to Zhmerynka with the passenger. There were no other statements to the police that day.
Subsequently, the Russian media raised the topic of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) many times, and usually in conjunction with the name of Adolf Hitler or Nazi Germany. A reminder that the UPA ceased to exist in 1954.
9. The Exodus of Jews from Kyiv.
On March 15, 2014, Russian international TV channel RT showed a report about Ukrainian Jews who allegedly no longer feel safe after the change of power in Kyiv. The story was about Kyiv and “ultranationalists” who have occupied key positions in the Ukrainian Government and planned to beat up Jews. As proof of his words, an RT journalist provided an interview with Rabbi Misha Kapustin: “There is no law today. Everything is changing very quickly, and I do not think that anyone will defend the Jews if something happens. “
“But in fact, Misha Kapustin is the rabbi of the Simferopol synagogue. And his words were about the new occupation authorities in Crimea. Overlaying his words on Kyiv footage created the impression of danger for Jews in the capital of Ukraine. Since then, Russian media have continually exploited the topic of anti-Semitism. However, Ukrainian Jews have repeatedly stated that they do not receive threats and feel safe under the current authorities.
10. Eradication of bullfinches.
In December 2014, first on the website of the Novosibirsk city news.nsk.com, and then — during the talk show on the Russia 1 TV channel, information was widely distributed that Ukrainian teachers in the city of Zaporizhzhya supposedly taught students to feed titmice and kill bullfinches. This was explained by the fact that titmice are the color of the Ukrainian flag, while bullfinches are red, like the flag of the USSR.
There was no evidence to confirm this statement. A reminder that now bullfinches rarely migrate to Ukraine for winter, because in the northern regions of Russia the winters have become milder, so they do not need to migrate to warmer regions.
Zoryan and Shkiryak: The latest and the most famous examples of misinformation about Ukraine
Eventually, the fake news and manipulations of the Kremlin’s information machine have become more sophisticated and invisible, experts say. That is why during the last year in Ukraine there were no such blatant fakes and barefaced lies as observed during 2014–2015. Russia’s reorientation in foreign policy also played its role, with most of Russia’s news coverage dedicated to Syria and the elections in the US.
“In 2014, we recorded a very high flurry of Ukrainian themes in Russian mass media. Here is information as of March 2014: in Russian news 45 minutes out of 50 minutes, 10 reports were devoted to Ukraine and Crimea. And at the end of 2014 — only 10–15 minutes in the news. In the daily Russian newspaper Komsomolskaya Pravda in March 2014, the number of front pages with Ukrainian topics was 19 out of 30 issues, in April it was 11, in July 13, when the war in Donbas began. At the end of 2014, there was a decline,” says Diana Dutsyk.
Nevertheless, the flow of misrepresentation and misinformation continues to gush towards Ukraine. The same messages are used in the main as before, but in another “wrapper.”
1. Rocket engines for North Korea.
On August 14, American newspaper The New York Times published an article about North Korean missiles. Referring to expert Michael Ellemann, journalists assumed that the engines for these rockets could be supplied by Ukraine. Ukraine denied this information. Later, in an interview with Voice of America, Ellemann said that he was not entirely sure whether these engines came from Ukraine or Russia — it is just a probability. Therefore, the expert asked Ukraine to conduct its own investigation.
Few people learned of Elleman’s doubts. However, the information from the article in The New York Times was disseminated by both Russian and Ukrainian media. “The main change in Russia’s special information operations now is that the fakes about Ukraine have switched to the West. Ukraine has stopped importing Russian cases directly. Therefore, Russian intelligence services use Western media to deliver these messages to us. As we hold the Western media in high regard, these operations are especially painful for us,” Dmytro Zolotukhin, Deputy Minister of Information Policy of Ukraine, explained to Internews Ukraine.
2. Zoryan and Shkiryak.
On February 9, 2017, the Russia 24 television channel announced that “two representatives of the Ukrainian establishment” — Zoryan and Shkiryak — ordered the murder of a “DNR” terrorist, Mikhail Tolstykh, nicknamed Givi.
The investigation has not yet established who ordered and who carried out the murder. Besides, Zoryan Shkiryak is one person, a well-known Ukrainian politician and public figure.
3. Cancer Treatment in “LNR”
On June 7, 2017, the Kharkiv News Agency website published a news story that Ukrainians are travelling en masse to the “LDNR” for cancer treatment. According to the author of the article, this can be done for free within the framework of the “Humanitarian program for the reunification of the people of Donbas.” Several more sites disseminated the same information.
There is no evidence to prove these statements. Instead, there is a lot of evidence that residents of uncontrolled areas of Donbas leave their homes for treatment because there are no meds in the occupied territories or they are too expensive.
4. Bandershtadt.
On August 7, 2017, Kremlin media got back again to the demonization of the image of Ukrainians . The Russia 1 television channel showed a propaganda news story about the Bandershtadt rock music festival. “This year, the efforts of the Ukrainian authorities, Nazi groups and Western curators [have assembled] more than 12,000[people]”, said the author of the report.
Throughout this entire report, the author talks about the outburst of neo-Nazism at the festival in particular and in Ukraine in general, without providing any evidence to support her words. However, the name of Stepan Bandera is repeated in the report dozens of times without any need, including, in conjunction with Adolf Hitler, to escalate the situation.
Bandershtadt is a non-alcoholic Ukrainian art festival, which has been held annually since 2007 and brings together well-known Ukrainian creators: artists, musicians, opinion leaders.
5. Dangerous visa-free regime.
On June 11, 2017, when the visa-free regime with the European Union came into operation in Ukraine, the Russia 24 TV channel reported that this regime could be “taken away at any moment.” “The Soros Foundation has already warned Kyiv that the European Union will immediately cancel the visa-free regime if it finds out that too many Ukrainians have entered a EU country, but did not leave it within 90 days,” stated the makers of the piece.
The headline used for this news piece is manipulative and misleading. Besides, it remains unclear what the phrase “too many” means and why the Soros Foundation, and not the representatives of the EU, warns about the dangers of breaking the treaty with the European Union.
Other media have also spread negative news regarding Ukrainian visa-free travel. In particular, on June 13, 2017, Channel One reported on a scuffle on the Ukraine-Poland border, caused by the simultaneous crossing of the border by a large number of people. “This is exactly what neighboring EU countries were afraid of after adoption of the visa-free regime — mass migration”, said the makers of the report. It is totally incomprehensible as to what is the basis of the conclusions that all Ukrainians who cross the border into Schengen countries are going to resettle there.
Rabbit in a hat: when Russian propaganda acts covertly
However, primitive, crude fakes and distortion of the data of primary sources are not the most dangerous elements of this information and psychological warfare. If desired, even an average person who is not familiar with OSINT-technologies can analyze and disprove a fake. The most challenging thing is when information attacks are constructed so that their consumers do not even have a clue about the primary source and, accordingly, the real purpose of the messages.
“The most high-quality propaganda talks about the things people want to hear. The real propaganda is the one we do not notice, which speculates on our problems and experiences,” — explains Alya Shandra.
Experts were able to name a few newsbreaks, advantageous to the Kremlin’s propaganda machine, those that are spread in Ukraine invisibly, interwoven into the local context.
1. Shale gas.
Even before the Revolution of Dignity, one of the leading topics in Ukrainian media discourse was the extraction of shale gas in the East of Ukraine. In December 2013, the British-Dutch company Shell and America’s Chevron acquired the right to develop deposits on the Yuzovsk and Olesk gas-bearing shale rock. These two companies, jointly with local Nadra Ukrayiny, had to influence Ukraine’s gas dependence on Russia. It was expected to produce from 3.6 to 22 trillion cubic meters of shale gas in the Kharkiv, Donetsk, Lviv and Ivano-Frankivsk Regions. However, a powerful wave of news reports in the media, stating the high risk of such extraction for surrounding areas, caused massive protests by local residents. As a result, both companies left the Ukrainian market and gas production never began.
“One of these journalists recently wrote an article on shale gas in Slavyansk, stating that Russia had led this information campaign before the war. They chose a theme that could scare people and formed a network of experts, who then spread this topic afterwards”, says Roman Kulchynskyi.
2. “Dangerous” refugees.
The war in Syria has caused the massive resettlement of its citizens on the territories of other states. Ukraine was ready to accept these people. While social services were preparing shelters for such people, some Ukrainian journalists published reports about the alleged dangers of the refugees to local people. It stirred up hostility, created tension in society, and even draw protests. This situation was advantageous for the Kremlin in its information and psychological warfare.
Channel 112 was the first to report about such “dangers” in its news story. On the basis of this story, the Strana.ua website published an article worsening the situation further and forcing people to be wary of the refugees’ arrival. “It could have been a journalistic mistake, but the trained eye sees manipulation,” says Roman Shutov. After that, other Ukrainian media began to sort out the situation and prepared reports that were more balanced. Nevertheless, the fear of refugees was hard to overcome.
3. #Betrayed or #the_game_is_over
Finally, the most important, most popular and most fruitful topic for both Ukrainian and Russian media is criticism of the Ukrainian authorities. The criticism appears in important journalistic investigations, as well as in the form of baseless statements and accusations made by both politicians and various experts. That is why it is so difficult to distinguish between the work of journalists and propagandists.
“It’s difficult to tell from the content, where the criticism of the authorities is, and where the dissemination of Russian messages is. One should have insider information. It is necessary to know how much ‘cash’ is provided, by whom and where. This does not fall within our remit, this is a case for the special services,” emphasized Serhiy Kostynskyi.
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Any channel you could possibly imagine can be used to spread propaganda during information and psychological warfare. It can imitate the most authoritative sources of information: journalistic investigations, analytical programs, public initiatives, and others. Advantageous ideas can be “implanted” during leisure time — while reading an entertaining detective book or listening to your favorite radio station on the beach.
That is exactly what Russian propaganda has been doing in Ukraine since 1991. They have managed to penetrate into all spheres of life in Ukraine. Propaganda made Russian aggression towards Ukraine in 2014 possible. The rapid spread of the Kremlin’s propaganda in Ukraine during the current phase of the information and psychological warfare that began in 2013–2014 has once again demonstrated the vulnerability of the Ukrainian media environment and society as a whole.
The Kremlin’s propaganda took advantage of all, even the smallest, Ukrainian problems. So, do not forget that anything you say will be used against you. That is why do not talk without your lawyers — fact-checking and critical thinking. Try not to create problems for yourself and your state but solve them — it will enable the manipulators to be disarmed, at least for a while.
Does the situation seem hopeless? Maybe. However, Ukrainians have been able to manage the situation even in such a trap. In the next chapter, we will talk about successful state and public initiatives that are countering the aggressor during the current information warfare.