Self-ownership is self-contradiction
Libertarians love the idea that people own themselves. For some, this is a foundational principle, from which other libertarian principles, including the legitimacy of appropriation and ownership of external things, arise. As with much other libertarian thought, the most straightforward implementation of this concept is self-contradictory. Basically, self-ownership means that a person always owns herself. But central to ownership is the ability to transfer ownership, resulting in non-ownership of oneself. An individual who sells herself therefore simultaneously owns and does not own herself.
Definitions: First pass
Let’s start with basic definitions.
The self-ownership axiom: Every person owns herself.
More formally:
For every x (x a person), x owns x.
Ownership can be defined as follows:
Ownership: x owns A if and only if x can exclude others from using A, and x can transfer ownership of A to any other person.
More formally:
For all A, x (A a thing, x a person), x owns A iff for all y (y a person), x may prevent y from using A, and for all y (y a person), x may transfer ownership of A to y.
Definitions: Second pass
Our first pair of definitions excludes time. We need to change this, because ownership is temporally bounded, and because the self-ownership axiom assumes that individuals own themselves across all times. Here are my second passes at these definitions.
Self-ownership: For all x , t (x a person, t a time), x owns x at time t.
Ownership: For all A, x, t (A a thing, x a person, t a time), x owns A at t iff for all y (y a person), x may prevent y from using A at t, and for all y (y a person), x may transfer ownership of A to y subsequent to t.
Self-ownership thus means that everyone always owns themselves. Ownership of something now means the right to prevent others from using it now, and the right to transfer ownership to another later.
Third pass: Necessity
Finally, self-ownership needs to be modified again to account for the fact that it is necessary that everyone always own themselves. This is so because self-ownership is a principle, and the principle would not be honoured if it was possible that some people did not own themselves, but by happy coincidence actually did own themselves in the real world. Let’s avoid a deep dive into the semantics of modals, and just say:
Self-ownership: For all x , t (x a person, t a time), it is necessary, as a matter of principle, that x owns x at time t.
The contradiction
For self-ownership to be self-contradictory, it needs to be assumed that at least two persons exist. This is a weakness in my argument, since by the standard Cartesian method, only one person can be safely assumed to exist. Nevertheless, people who believe in self-ownership usually assume the existence of at least two people, so I will proceed.
Assume:
- self-ownership, and
- The existence of a world containing at least two people, Rene and Bertrand.
By self-ownership, it follows that:
3. It is necessary, as a matter of principle, that at all times, Rene owns Rene and Bertrand owns Bertrand.
If Rene owns Rene, then Rene has the right to transfer Rene to Bertrand. That is:
4. As a matter of principle, it is consistent with Rene’s ownership of Rene at t, that Rene transfers Rene to Bertrand at some time t’ subsequent to t.
Or to restate it:
5. It is necessary, as a matter of principle, that it be possible for Rene, as the owner of Rene at time t, to transfer Rene to Bertrand subsequent to time t.
But this contradicts 3, which makes it impossible as a matter of principle for Rene to ever transfer ownership Rene to Bertrand.
Or to put it simply: if you own yourself, you can sell yourself, but then you don’t own yourself anymore.
Self-sale offends common sense
If you can sell yourself, then someone else can own you. If someone else owns you, they can enslave, torture or murder you at will. If you resist such enslavement, torture or murder, then you would be considered an aggressor. Those who promote the self-ownership principle often invoke ideals such as inherent human worth and dignity in support of it. But in fact, the principle enables complete dehumanization and humiliation, and makes human worth and dignity alienable and contingent.
What’s the alternative?
The alternative way of formulating principles that promote inherent human worth and dignity is to just state that humans have inherent worth and dignity that are universal and inalienable (or maybe alienable only in special circumstances, such as criminal punishment).
The libertarian obsession with self-ownership is presumably a result of their fetishization of property in external things, causing an unreflective attempt to apply the concept to a domain where it doesn’t fit. (Some non-libertarians like the concept of self-ownership too. I don’t know what they’re getting out of it.) I don’t think that abandoning self-ownership undermines libertarian philosophy in any way — the attempts to derive the legitimacy of property in external things from self-ownership are failures, anyway — so other than satisfying a fetish, it is not clear what purpose it serves.
