The Big Strides Made by Cypriot Football in a European Context and their Consequences
There are few things more characteristically Cypriot then parking your car on a fenced off piece of land for an away game, driving through a well driven hole in the rusting metal fence and over the well dirtied sign that says “too let”. AEK Larnaca (hereafter AEK) were doing okay at the time and AEL Limassol away was a big game in the winter period. Rather unsurprisingly, considering the nature of the game, it was a physical, mundane, impressively mediocre 1–0. And if not to prove the point what I most remember was the cigarette smoke floating upwards from the cigarettes of the 50 odd middle aged, middle sized Cypriot men chaining their nerves away. The crowd that night was a great deal smaller the crowd a much changed AEK team walking out onto the pitch in the BayArena in Leverkusen some 10 years later on a bubbling European night. I’m not sure those same men made the trip, probably a little too far, a little too busy. Plus I’m not sure you are allowed to smoke inside German Stadiums.
To use a very roundabout way to make a simple point, Cypriot football has come a long way in recent years, especially in a European context with qualification not just a shock result but a legitimate goal. Even more so, once there, the sides from Cyprus have put on some excellent performances and managed some frankly preposterous results. It is not new to see at least one Cypriot team in Europe. APOEL Nicosia, the serial winners of the Cypriot League, have appeared many times in both European competitions, with their greatest achievement in 2012 reaching the quarter finals of the Champions league after topping their group. Yet now it is not just APOEL who have in recent years become regular features of European Competitions. In the last two years Apollon Limassol and AEK Larnaca have qualified for the tournament proper, Apollon were this year just one goal away from the knockout stages.
All these recent successes would be really quite something for a second tier football nation, yet when you consider that Cyprus as a country boasts a tiny population of 864,200[1] (42/51 in Europe), a respectable, yet still woefully tiny GDP (35th[2] in Europe), stumbling from the hefty blow of a major financial meltdown and still baring the open wounds of an active occupation which the UN cautiously admits to being the longest running Blue Helmet mission by some way, you can begin to see the rather frank and grandiose overachievement for these plucky little underdogs punching well above their weight. In the UEFA Country Coefficients — the UEFA ranking for national leagues — Cyprus rank at a staggering 18th in the company of Croatia (17th) above and Serbian below (19th)[3]. The countries that surround Cyprus in the ranks have generally far larger population and far larger GDPs, thus the Cypriot First Division is able to compete with relative success on a playing field not ordinarily viable for a nation of its size.
The reasons for this rise in status vary widely. Certainly through the qualification stages of European contests, Cypriot teams are certainly helped by the island’s balmy weather. Climatic conditions are an important factor in sports performance. It is irrefutable that in the extremities of conditions an athlete’s ability to perform strenuous exercise is reduced.[4] It is here that acclimatization holds some advantage, for it is a relatively logical assertion that those athletes who regularly play in these taxing conditions have a greater immunity to their effects, and thus hold an advantage on the field. When AEK played Dundalk in their qualification campaign this season on the 2nd of August for example, the temperature at kick off was an entirely unreasonable 35°C. Whilst this is by no means a conclusive argument, it is difficult to dispute the unique conditions Cypriot teams play in and their likely effect on their opposition. To this end, out of the 24 home matches played by Cypriot teams in the qualification for either the Champions League or the Europa League in 2017 and 2018, 22 were victories, 1 was a draw, and only 1 was a loss. Cyprus is undoubtedly a hard place for a team to play in the summer months.
There also exists in football the curious effect of the underdog. Namely, on certain occasions vastly inferior teams perform well above their projected ability to produce shock results or at least excellent competition for those who are theoretically their superiors. Generally this is characterised as a fearlessness; the knowledge that since everyone expects you to lose the perceived negatives of a loss are far less pertinent and is thus liberating. Teams play dynamically and with a great deal of energy. Coupled with this fearlessness is the excitement of the occasion, for a team such as Apollon, to play at Goodison Park in front of a packed out crowd under the lights is a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity and one best savoured, thus the lesser players can at times give a greater account of themselves, caught up in the moment. It is of course necessary to note that this is by no means common; for an underdog to remain an underdog, failure must be the norm.
Whilst undoubtedly factors in overall Cypriot improvement, it is important to understand that these sets of circumstances alone cannot suffice as a justification as they have always been. Cyprus has always been stifling in the summer, and underdog teams have always had the propensity to upset. The recent changes in Cypriot football are far less romantic with far greater repercussions.
First it is important to note that this is anything but a wholly a Cypriot endeavour. An analysis of foreign players in the First Division is quite staggering. Cyprus ranks comfortably first under the highest percentage of expatriates (or rather players who trained in other countries and moved to Cyprus for Football reasons) per league with a vast 66.2%. This means in your average 25 man squad, roughly 16 to 17 will be imports, or non-Cypriots. This is of course a league average and in many cases the number is higher. In an attempt to combat this clubs are expected to field a minimum of two Cyprus nationals in every starting eleven or face a fine of €1500 per missing player. Not that this bothers most clubs who simply field a foreign 11 and pay the fine. When asked AEK’s chairman Andreas Karapatakis admitted “We get fined most weeks.”[5] He among many other fans see the fine not as a disincentive but rather the second of two options.
It is not fair to rail too hard at the Cypriot establishment for this notion just yet, Cyprus is of course by no means the only country who uses a large amount of expatriates. Nine of the top European leagues have over 50% expatriate rate including the big 5 leagues. It does not take a statistician to see why. A quick browse of the Cypriot league will show that the highest performing clubs in the league have the highest percentages of expatriates. Pooling players from footballing nations with great population sizes and profound football pedigrees means a greater level of available players can be found, and in an ever shrinking world an international move is becoming more viable for the individual. It is not too farfetched to empathise with a fictitious second or third string player in a nameless lower tier of a big 5 country, taking a look around and being enticed by Cyprus. The wages are generally pretty favourable for foreign players for a start, plus considering Cyprus’s idyllic lifestyle, generally lower cost of living and legitimate shot at European and Domestic success, there are far worse places to live and play football for players not quite at the top level of their own nations. Former APOEL, now Alki Oroklinis’ Goalkeeper Urko Pardo perhaps sums it up best in a statement on the subject, he himself an ex-Barcelona Junior who never quite made it; “Cyprus is a land of opportunity for players like me who did not get in the first team at home … Twenty years ago, they would have had to drop into the third division, now they can come here and succeed.”[6]
There are however notable drawbacks to the current system being implemented in Cyprus. Despite the First Divisions heady heights, the Cyprus national team’s FIFA rankings is 86th in such illustrious company as Luxembourg who are equally ranked. Looking at these standings, it would be fair to suggest that this is probably about Cyprus’ level, though there are great examples of disparity. Wales for example rank 19th, Northern Ireland 35th, Iceland just behind in 36th but all have leagues that rank far below that of the Cypriot First Division. The reason quite simply is these leagues have a far higher rate of internally developed players and far lower rates of foreign players. The Belarusian (nation ranking 76th) league has just under double the amount of Club trained players still playing at their parent clubs (22.2% compared with 12.7%) and well under half the amount of expatriates playing in the league (27.9% compared with 66.2). In Iceland, the cereal overachievers of International football, the figure is also similarly high with 74.7% of players in the top division eligible for the national team. I am not of course suggesting that the key to international success is a league which wholly favours nationals, the situation is far more nuanced than that, I am however making the simple logical suggestion that a league whose teams offer real opportunities to its nationals to gain first team experience can only be beneficial for the growth of the nation’s football at large.
The age of the recruits brought into the Cypriot First Division is also worth note. Of all the top 31 European leagues, the Cyprus First Division has the highest average squad age (27.5 years compared with the European 25.9 years). There are a number of reasons for the high average age. Players with greater experience tend to be able to adapt quickly to stylistic and physical differences, are generally more matured in their playing style and manner, plus an experienced player requires less investment in both time and resources compared with a young player learning their trade. This is reflected in the statistic that Cyprus has a lowly average 12.7% of club trained players, present in first team squads, 4.2% lower than the European average and 24th out of 31 leagues. In a 2015 studied, CIES showed that Cyprus had the lowest average minutes played by under 22’s compared to any other top league with 6.2%. The European average was measured to be 14.6%.[7] Cypriot First Division teams have very little interest in bringing through local club trained talent. The Cypriot model therefore is one of bought experience over trained youth, and experience on the older end of the spectrum at that.
An emphasis on an aging squad is inherently short-termed given that most players will be in the twilight of their careers. The overall cycle of a squad is greatly reduced as players wind down rather than improve. Strategic planning must then by necessity focus solely on the following year’s recruitment which leads to a severe lack of long-term, or even medium-term, strategic planning. Older players are also far more affected by injuries, even relatively small injuries can lead to a significant depreciation in ability plus recovery times are longer. Squads are therefore far less malleable and responsive to the unpredictable threats of football. Even if not injured, training can take a lot out of older players meaning the amount and indeed manner of training is sacrificed. Older players tend to offer intellect and know-how over fitness and physicality. Whilst these are important traits, the ability to run at speed and maintain energy levels throughout a game is extremely important too and is traditionally a young man’s trait, something that aging squads lack. It is important to have a good balance of youth and experience, not just for results but for the development of younger players who can gain much from seasoned veterans. What is the point of experience if it cannot be passed on in some meaningful way? Experienced players are necessary alongside young players to maintain stability, without this, recruitment becomes vital, which in of itself breeds more instability.
It is not surprising given the relative age of Cypriot squads that Cyprus has the highest turnover of players in Europe. This season (2018/2019), 60.4% of players currently playing in the Cypriot First Division were not at their current club the previous year. This figure has continued to increase each season. High turnover of players is by no means a good thing. There is a notable correlation between high turnovers and negative performances. To quote directly from a 2014 CIES study; “Between 2009 and 2013, 34.3% of clubs having more than 15 new recruits did not take part in the first division championship of their country in the following year. Their probability of relegation is twice as high as for clubs having signed between 11 and 15 players (17%) and three times higher than teams with a maximum of ten new recruits (10.6%).”[8] Three Cypriot sides used in the study featured in the top 20 lowest average player tenure; Doxa Katokopia FC (5th with 1.32 years), Nea Salamis Famagusta FC (6th with 1.33 years) and Ayia Napa FC (14th with 1.39 years). All of these teams are traditionally relegation candidates.[9] To contrast, APOEL places in the top 50 teams for average player tenure (47th with 3.16 years) who are as we know the serial winners of the Division. However even with a sincere intention not to tamper too greatly with the makeup of a squad, due to the relative age of players, it is absolutely necessary in Cyprus.
This has led more and more to a short-termism not new to football as a concept. Most smaller leagues, Cyprus included, took pride in its rejection of this short-termism in favour of community, but in a modern footballing world even these leagues have been tested and many have ultimately succumbed. The damning concluding thoughts of this CIES report sum it up beautifully.
“More and more teams are geared towards the short-term. In an increasingly segmented and speculative context, owners and executives tend to optimise financial returns on the transfer market to the detriment of more eminently sporting considerations. … The increasing instability that results limits the sporting competitiveness of an ever greater number of teams, to the advantage of the wealthiest and better structured clubs, who increasingly dominate the proceedings.”[10]
This lurch toward fast cash through fast success has had several damning consequences in a Cypriot context outside of strictly footballing parameters. The financial precariousness of many clubs has left players vulnerable. A quite shocking article in 2014[11] revealed in an interview with a Senegalese ex-footballer, Gora Tall, how over the course of four years, having moved to Cyprus, he accrued €60,000 of overdue salary which he will likely never get back. His first year passed without incident, but by the end of his second season his club APOP Kinyras, since liquidated, owed Tall 6 months’ salary. He then moved onto a second club in Cyprus hoping for better. AEP were vying for promotion and Tall thought the ambition of the club made them a safer bet, yet again his salary was not forthcoming. By this time Tall was having to live hand to mouth, borrowing money off friends to quite literally keep the lights on, his experience was by no means the sunny picture painted by Pardo we saw earlier. This is not an isolated incident. FIFPro (the official representative over around 65,000 footballers) eventually acted, releasing a statement advising players to be particularly wary of the promises of Cypriot clubs, especially those not competing in European competitions. The strength of their statement outlines the severity of the problem:
“Cyprus has for years occupied the first position, by a wide margin, as regards the number of disputes submitted to FIFA’s dispute resolution chamber (DRC) …”
Since Tall’s story was published, European wide regulations came into force in 2014/2015 guaranteeing players minimum protections such as guaranteed pensions, 12 months of salary and 20 days holiday a year. This was greeted at the time with scepticism by the author, notably in the CFA’s implementation who he accused of an implicit leniency.
Cypriot football is also facing a notable crisis over double contracts or ‘black contracts’. These refer to a situation where a football club offers a player two contracts; one officially which the club is taxed on, the other an unofficially. This means a player is paid two wages whilst the clubs are taxed less. Such a system is obviously illegal but also, given the Cypriot club trait of treating wages as optional, such contracts only further tip the balance of power towards the clubs as disputes over wages are very difficult to enforce given the black contract’s unofficial nature. FIFPro has issued a warning to the Cypriot Football Governing body after it was estimated that no fewer than 49% of players playing in Cyprus were subject to Black Contracts, a simply astoundingly high number.[12]
A match fixing scandal had last season hit the headlines after UEFA issued a warning to the CFA over suspicious betting activities on a game between Ethnikos Achnas and Aris.[13] This is not an isolated incident. Cyprus has had, arguable still has, an endemic match fixing problem. A 2017 study by the Pancyprian footballers’ union (PASP) suggested that around 41% of players knew that match fixing was taking place and around 17% had been approached directly. They also suggested that 65% of those involved did so because of delayed or overdue payments, and their need for money. Despite the introduction of countermeasures which were laughably weak, UEFA continued to issue warnings on suspicious betting activity until eventually, no doubt exasperated, UEFA sent their head of integrity to Cyprus with plans to act. Since the introduction of far harsher measures against those suspected of match fixing, cases in the ordinary season have decreased, yet they are by no means gone.
It has been alleged by the European Investigation Collaborations (EIC) that in the closed seasons of 2016, 2017 and 2018 over 30 fixed matches occurred in Cyprus. This comes after two of the referees in these games have confessed to being involved. Their report suggests that 15 teams came to Cyprus in the summers of 2016, 2017, and 2018, all organised by a Famagusta based company which is strongly suspected to be connected to Eric Mao, a FIFA agent and club investor from China. An article in the Cyprus Mail quotes the International Center for Sports Security (ICSS) as calling Mao’s company, Anping, a “front for illegal match fixing operations” and the EIC who call Mao “a senior match fixing organiser and leader of a Singaporean match-fixing syndicate”.[14] In an interview with the Guardian in 2016 Spyros Neofytides, the head of the players’ football union in Cyprus, attempted to explain the reasons for the rise of match fixing in Cyprus. “After the financial crisis we had a big problem with money. A lot of businesses saw football as an opportunity to gain money through illegal betting. There are 350 players in the first division, another 280 in the second and for many clubs match-fixing became a way of boosting funds.”[15] Neofytides, is an interesting character, himself an ex-goalkeeper in the Cyprus First Division, and an extremely outspoken campaigner against CFA who he feels are at best wilfully negligent and at worst complicit, in a lot of the illicit activity in Cypriot football. For his troubles, he joins a list of individuals fined by the CFA under the rather obscenely vague charge of damaging the integrity of Cypriot Football. Something Neofytides feels the league uses to keep whistle blowers quiet and intimidate those who might wish to speak out. Cyprus, the hotspot for holiday makers, mezethes and match fixers.
Unsurprisingly this has led to a growing disillusionment with football in Cyprus and a degradation of fundamental values. As Professor Kartakoullis of the University of Nicosia and former chairman of the Cyprus Sports Organisation states “At the end of the day you feel stupid. Why would you spend €20 going to a game when you know it could be fixed? Football in Cyprus is at an alarming stage.” Clubs have reported a drop in attendance, some as by as much as half and for the top clubs who see European success as the goal, local games have lost their value. A recent scandal surrounding a US based private takeover of the notionally left wing Omonia outlines well the change in Cypriot football. A significant portion of Omonia fans firmly opposed the takeover on the grounds of the club’s traditionally socialist roots. These opinions were ignored and the sale went through.[16]
What all this means for the future of Cypriot football is unclear. The Cyprus First Division has followed a similar path to many other footballing nations with the increase of commercial opportunity displacing local football values, but for a such a small country such headlong marches forward are all the more risky. Now European success is viable, it has become not only the ultimate goal but often the only goal. Clubs fight not for prolonged domestic success but a fleeting European version. This is not just a moral objective, but a financial one. The rewards for a successful European run are immense, millions of Euros are up for grabs and a few positive results can increase a clubs annual profit unfathomably. Yet such rich rewards are blinding to their dependant qualities. Such money is not sustainable, such successes not always achievable, and for those who seek to rely on this income are by necessity unstable, and seek great reward at great risk. Such short term aims damage the sustainability of success, or at least only spiral the issues of short-termism: Local talent becomes increasingly underdeveloped leading to a decrease of quality players, but also profitable assets, coming through the system. This therefore leads to an overreliance on player turnover, and a club’s ability to sign quality replacements that can be successful with increasing immediacy. This increasing necessity for immediacy leads to the further aging of squads and thus further perpetuates a shortening turnover cycle. These are not forecasted trends, they have been happening for many years, and show no signs of slowing down. Aging squads only narrow channels of sustainable profitability. Older players have limited, or indeed no, resell value so these assets depreciate exponentially and are in of themselves a loss for the club. The increasing desperation for success as the only means of achieving profitability means that when a club fails they face further debts to revamp the aging squad using money they don’t have, then bankruptcy, or illicit money making schemes such tax avoidance, withholding salaries or match fixing. It is no surprise the teams most accused of match fixing are those in the most precarious financial positions, and that the majority of players that were compliant in such schemes did so due largely to their simple need for money, having had their salaries withheld. Such overall degradation leads to disillusionment.
The vision of European success tends coincides with the vision of sport as a vehicle for success, after all if you are not improving, what are you doing? The answer however can quite rationally be ‘well we are existing, and structure ourselves to continue to do so.’ What is success if not sustainability? There is no final season, football does not end. There is always a game next weekend, and the weekend after that, and on and on till the perception of times split into neatly structured weeks no longer persists. On this grand scale, is it not better to still be standing when the clock stops rather than to rise high before collapsing into the darkness? Thus those who laugh at AEK’s, and indeed many other teams’, flouting of two starting Cypriots rule would do well to appreciate that the rule is designed to help, not hinder, and further can help connect a team to its fan base. A team full of constant new arrivals only distances itself from its base, an alienation Cypriot teams can ill afford. Smaller clubs are after all far more fragile. It is far easier to cease to exist if you are a small Cypriot team rather than if you are a giant club from another nation due to the disparity of influence. Take Portsmouth or Rangers, clubs who were in immense financial difficulty revived by their loyal and ardent communities. The same cannot be said for Alki Larnaca. Formed in 1948, runners up in the Cyprus Cup 5 times then after 56 years dissolved, due to bankruptcy. These fans were no less militant, a community no less defined by their team, in fact likely proportionally more so, yet this was not enough. It is I imagine for most fans, simply inconceivable that their club might one day cease, their identity and community simply erased, tossed aside with a shrug and a faint apology. Thus smaller clubs ought to take more financial care, given the precarious nature of their financial existence, yet this seems not to be the case. Smaller clubs play hard and fast with their financial security and due to their smaller size are scrutinised far less. They are able to self-inflict major irreparable harm in the aim for a short-term power grab and do so completely in the dark, a supernova in a distance distant galaxy, most blind to such an enormous catastrophe far away. There are, unfortunately, countless examples. It seems apparent to this writer that generally fans stand the most to lose with the least to gain. And they are rewarded for this burden with weak words and a condescension that patiently though diligently ignores their interests.
In short, what this all means is that Cypriot football’s relative success in Europe whilst unquestionable is likely fleeting and at best unsustainable. The strategies for clubs have grown shorter and shorter opting for high risk and at times economically unsound purchases for immediate effects and fast results. These stratagems often don’t pay but always cost, whether financially, reputationally or socially.
[1] According to the latest census figures: http://www.mof.gov.cy/mof/cystat/statistics.nsf/All/0D46D46876AC1D2AC225834E003F4DB6/$file/Demographic_Report-2017-EL-301118.pdf?OpenElement
[2] Statistics from https://www.tradingeconomics.com/country-list/gdp?continent=europe
[3] All statistics pulled from the official UEFA site: https://www.uefa.com/memberassociations/uefarankings/country/about/
[4] MiHyun No and Hyo-Bum Kwak, ‘Effects of Environmental Temperature on Physiological Responses during Submaximal and Maximal Exercises in Soccer Players’ (2016) 5 Integrative Medicine Research.
[5] Steve Menary, Firebombs, fines and fixes — welcome to football in Cyprus, 2017 https://www.worldsoccer.com/features/firebombs-fines-and-fixes-welcome-to-football-in-cyprus-395410
[6] ibid
[7] Poli, Ravenel and Besson, The fielding of young footballers in Europe, Mar 2016 http://www.football-observatory.com/IMG/sites/mr/mr13/en/
[8] Poli, Ravenel and Besson, Club instability and its Consequences, CIES Football Observatory, Jan 2015 http://www.football-observatory.com/IMG/pdf/mr01_eng.pdf
[9] Ibid Figures pulled from Appendix 2
[10] fn 7
[11]Peter Stevenson, Play but no pay: how foreign players were cheated, 2014, https://cyprus-mail.com/2014/01/19/play-but-no-pay-how-foreign-players-were-cheated/
[12]Iacovos Constantinou , Double contracts for almost half of footballers in Cyprus — FIFPro, 2018, https://cyprus-mail.com/2018/01/10/double-contracts-almost-half-footballers-cyprus-fifpro/
[13] George Psyllides, UEFA says footie game was fixed, 2018, https://cyprus-mail.com/2018/02/06/uefa-says-footie-game-fixed/
[14] George Psyllides, Accusations of intricate match-fixing include Cyprus teams, 2018, https://cyprus-mail.com/2018/11/19/accusations-of-intricate-match-fixing-includes-cyprus-teams/
[15]Helena Smith, Cyprus match-fixing whistleblower faces €5,000 fine after Guardian exposé, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/football/2016/sep/13/cyprus-match-fixing-coach-guardian-fine
[16] George Psyllides, Historic turn as Omonia taken over by private company, 2018, https://cyprus-mail.com/2018/05/30/historic-turn-as-omonia-taken-over-by-private-company/?hilite=%27Omonia%27
