Russo-Ukrainian war operations as of 25th of May 2023
Halt of russian offensive; inevitable Ukrainian counter-offensive; situation near Bakhmut; russian losses race towards 1 million; seeds of russian Civir War.
Disclaimer
All information in the text was taken from public sources. I have no access to the direct military information, thus any claims below must be taken with care. However, as usual, I try to only publish the proved statements.
Strategic Overview
Full 3 months passed since my latest report as of February 27th. A lot of things has happened on the battlefield since that time, but one thing remains the same: a stalemate on the entire 1'000 km wide frontline.
Look at it from this perspective: a person who can notice a difference on the front lines below deserves a medal. Trust me, they are different.
So, one can clearly see that the huge russian offensive really took place for the past 4 months. As expected, it primarily impacted the size of russian population, nothing else of strategic importance.
At the same time, the Ukrainian Army Forces finally received promised tanks and other heavy armor from the EU and USA allies plus another round of ammunition. This does not mean that Ukraine immediately got an upper hand in the war, or that a counter-offensive will start tomorrow. It rather helped to restore a parity in fire power, which was gradually shifting towards russian terrorists for the past half year due to the Iranian supplies. Hopefully, if western military supplies to Ukraine remain at least at the same rate, the fire power of Ukrainian Army might exceed that of russian terrorists by mid-summer. So, do not expect any major counter-offensive before that time; Ukraine is still in the middle of a military build-up.
The other fact of high importance is that at least a western part of the city of Kyiv is now properly protected by the anti-air and anti-missile defence systems (also thanks to western allies). This allows to partially eliminate a drastic effect of the russian terrorists drone and missile attacks against civil infrastructure. At some days during May 100% of invading targets were shot down by the anti-air & anti-missile defences. The russian terrorists will certainly continue their drone & missile strikes until the end of war, but now they are not nearly as dangerous as they were last autumn and winter.
Detailed Frontline Analysis
There was a lot of maneuverable warfare ongoing across the entire front line. No single spot could be claimed as the most hot, despite journalist attemps to make emphasis on the city of Bakhmut. In fact, Bakhmut has got less of shelling from the russian side than a few other spots. Still, if you paid close attention to maps above, you might notice a small fluctuation of the frontline near Bakhmut. It was the only change of any significance for the past 3 months. More on that in below paragraphs.
Situation in Kherson Oblast
The was little warfare in Kherson Oblast. It continues to primarily consist of Ukrainian precision strikes against russian logistics and russian terrorist artillery strikes against civilians in Kherson and nearby villages. However, the lesser known side of it is the non-stop war for small islands and islets in the Dnipro river delta, which continues since November 2022. Somewhere in February 2023 the first messages of the successful Ukrainian liberation of islands south of the Kherson city started to appear, most of them being fake news. However, since the end of April an evidence started to appear that Ukrainian Special Operaiton Forces secured control of several islands fully or partially. The most notable examples are islands Karantynnyi, Velykyi, Velykyi Potomkin, the northern parts of islands Kruhlyi and Kardashyn (called Dachi in media). There are no signs that Ukrainians plan to cross the Dnipro river to the southern bank in the nearby future. However, securing those islands allow to better protect Kherson city from terrorist strikes, and also make the full-scale river crossing at a later time.
The other hot place for the past 6 months (since November 2023) is the Kinburn Spit — a far reaching peninsula south of the Dnipro Lyman. It looks like media has already forgot about it, but groups of the Ukrainian Special Operation Forces still operate on its vast territory. The primary goal of this activity is to deny russian terrorists an ability to strike the Mykolayiv city using regular artillery. Still, there is always a chance that russians decide to abandone the unsafe penunsula, allowing the Ukrainian Army to use it as a convenient base for further advances.
Situation in Zaporizhzhia Oblast
The situation in Zaporizhzhia Oblast continues to be tense, but it witnesses visually almost no moves of the frontline. There were several frontline fixations, so it now looks more smooth than ever. The root cause of that is a plain terrain and the air superiority of the russian air force in the region. The russian terrorist regime has no other plans for this region than defend their temporary occupied acquisitions. They have no capability to conduct offensive campaign further north either. Therefore, their current goals on this part of a frontline are: (1) preserve a land bridge to Crimea and (2) cover the flanks of their military contingent at the west of Donetsk Oblast near Nova Novosilka and Vuhledar.
The Ukrainian Army commandment is clearly aiming to challenge the status quo in the region as Ukraine needs to liberate temporarily occupied territories, better sooner than later. The ultimate goal here is to make a decisive strike towards Melitopol and/or Berdiansk in order to cut the land russian bridge to Crimea. The required and enough condition for that is to first liberate either Polohy or Tokmak, so that the only railroad connecting the entire land bridge east-to-west is effectively cut off. That task is indeed feasible due to the proximity of both sites to the frontline. But, it is easier said than done. The Ukrainian Army already attempted a couple of small-size strikes in between the two towns for the past few months, all proven to be hard to conduct. Since September 2022 russian terrorists were doing nothing else in this region than building defensive structures. By now they have at least 3–4 lines of defense, the last one always being the most skilled troops. That looks like an unpenetrable wall. Nevertheless, the Ukrainian Army proved to be creative during offense, so this evil wall will fall too.
Situation Near Vuhledar and Maryinka
Despite almost no reparting from Velyka Novosilka, it is one of the hottest parts of the frontline for the past 8 months, similar to other rarely reported places like Orikhiv, Polohy, and Huliaypole in Zaporizhzhia Oblast. Conter-intuitively, the result of a highly maneuverable warfare around Vekyka Novosilka will have a decisive impact onto the frontline east and west of it. The reason is: both sides make endless attempts to break through there. The russian terrorist army did not give up an idea to flank Ukrainian Army Forces based in Kurakhove by striking via Velyka Novosilka towards Novopavlivka, a host to one of the biggest Coal Plants in Ukraine. Contrary, every plan of the Ukrainian Army to break through towards the Azov sea coastline includes a liberation of the territory south of Velyka Novosilka. Otherwise, such a breakthrough would be vulnerable to flanking attacks.
Further east at the Ukrainian Army fortress in the destroyed ghost town of Vuhledar things seems to calm down. Compared to the blood rivers of russian conscripts who died in packs of hundreds per day during the November-March russian offensive campaign, things are now back to a regular positional war. The russian commandment did not give up their plans to besiege Vuhledar. It however lacks any kind of resources to continue that siege. Thus, over the course of May, the Ukrainian Army succeeded to repell all (more modest) russian attacks and even reclaim a few fields in the area.
A similar situation remains in yet another ghost town to the north-east — Maryinka. Out there, despite endless russian attempts to fully occupy the city since 24th of February 2022, the Ukrainian Army still controls the west outskirts of the town as well as its flanks. By now, it looks like the total fatal losses of russian terrorists in the battle for this town outnumber the former population of the town before the war. Yet another sign of the extreme dulliness, stubborness and immorality of the russian terrorist regime.
Situation near Avdiyivka
The small town of Avdiyivka north of the Donetsk megapolis is the hottest part of the frontline since February 2023. Together with the battle for Maryinka, the battle for Avdiyivka is the longest lasting battle of the war, both started on 24th of February 2022. If one could imagine the hell on Earth, it is Avdiyivka. A non-stop shelling by russian terrorists continues, including all types of artillery and infantry weapons, as well as missile strikes and air strikes from all calibers. There are several rounds of 3-ton bombs delivered per day, resulting into 40-meters high detonations. And guess what: the town is still being held firmly by the Ukrainian defenders. What is even more wondrous is that a few civilian citizens still live in Avdiyivka, continuing to voluntarily maintain remaining infrastructure.
Over the past few months defenders of Avdiyivka sustained bitter losses, inluding the passing of Da Vinci — a veteran hero of the Ukrainian Volunteer Army who participated in the war since February 2014, and was a key commander in many operations. Constant pursuit of elite russian terrorist troops allowed them to make flanking gains at south-west and north-east of the town. The largest russian breakthrough happened at the north where they crossed the H20 highway and occupied a few important village outposts during February and March. Unlike near Bakhmut, this area is a responsibility of the russian terrorist army, and not private military companies. So, there is no wonder they continue to push hard, after seeing at least some gains in this direction versus no wins elsewhere.
However, despite an ongoing hell on Earth, the situation relatively stabilized during May. Synchronized flanking counter-attacks by Ukrainian Army from Pervomaiske to Pisky at the south and from Oleksandropil towards Novoselivka at the north allowed to soften the russian pressure. During the course of these attacks one village at the north was liberated by the middle of May. Furthermore, it looks like the Ukrainian Army was able to gain momentum near Avdiyivka recently, so more counter-attacks may be expected soon.
Situation near Bakhmut
Also see the analysis about the importance of the battle for Bakhmut.
Legend for the map above of the Siege of Bakhmut by russian terrorists during February 2023 —May 2023:
- Red line: frontline by February 1 after previous russian advances.
- Orange line: frontline by March 1.
- Brown line: frontline by April 1.
- Dark-red line: frontline by May 1.
- Violet line: frontline by May 25.
- Red arrows: russian terrorist advances between February 1 and May 25.
- Blue arrows: Ukrainian flanking counter-offensive in May.
After the russian terrorist army breakthrough near Soledar, the Ukrainian defence of Bakhmut was complicated. To make matters worse, western allies military supplies during winter times were rather sparse. So much so that sometimes Ukrainian platoons defending Bakhmut were running out of machine gun magazins and hand grenades. Spending thousands of convicts and conscripts russian terrorists of Wagner group and VDV were gradually gaining foothold at the northeast flank of Bakhmut (were the Soledar breakthrough happened).
By the end of March the Ukrainian Army was able to stabilize the north part of a front in the vicinity of Bakhmut. That allowed to prevent further russian advances towards the other important towns (to the north of Bakhmut): Siversk and Slovyansk. However, at the south flank of Bakhmut Ukrainians were forced to abandone an important hill north of the village of Klishchiyivka. Being unable to defend all directions at once, Ukrainian Army commandment made a decision to gradually withdraw troops from Bakhmut while giving a fight for every street and building in it.
By April 1 russians controlled roughly 40% of Bakhmut, when it became clear that eventually they will take the whole of the town. Thus far, by May 1 russian terrorists were controlling around 70% of the town, and they control approximately 95% of it by May 25. Only the westernmost outskirts of Bakhmut still remain in full control of the Ukrainian Army. The price of it is around 100'000 russian terrorists killed in and around Bakhmut by some estimates, that is almost 1.5 times the former population of the town.
However, despite all claims, russians did not yet succeed to occupy Bakhmut. First, the Ukrainian Special Operation Forces operate throughout the city. Second, starting mid-May the Ukrainian Army accummulated enough ammunition to start the flanking counter-offensive around Bakhmut. Thus far, withing the past 2 weeks Ukrainians were able to liberate a huge swath of land along the canal south-west of Bakhmut, including the well-known hill above Klishchiyivka. A simultaneous attack at the north flank secured yet another important hill above Khromove. Together these two attacks allow the Ukrainian Army to turn the destroyed ghost town into a meat grinder similar to the town of Maryinka.
So, formally russians can claim a hard victory in the Battle of Bakhmut. However, it is a Pyrrhic Victory at best, as already speculated by many westerns experts and media. In fact, the battle did not yet end; or the second Battle of Bakhmut started with the Ukrainian Army counter-attacking weakened russian forces; whatever is more to your taste. A definite proof of that statement is the Wagner group withdrawal from Bakhmut fanfared by its chief terrorist Evgeniy Prigozhin. Indeed, what could be a better achievement in idiocratic russian tyrrany than this: occupy 95% of the ghost town, and withdraw your private army so that regular russian army can be blamed for the Ukrainian liberation of the town in the following months. Well, Prigozhin had no other option: losing tens of thousands of soldiers and exhausting the source of convicts means he now faces bigger problems than the Battle for Bakhmut: he needs his gangsters back in russia to protect his political power.
Situation near Siversk and Kreminna
Onslaught from Kreminna towards Zarichne and beyond was yet another dream of the russian terrorist army “big offensive” that happened between January and April this year. Apparently, it resulted into nothing else than more russian conscripts buried in the vast fields separating the two settlements. The same result was achieved in the attacks from Lysychansk towards Bilohorivka. The Ukrainian Army firmly withstood all of that.
Beginning in late April the Ukrainian Army started to recover those narrow strings of temporarily occupied crop fields and trees. In particular, the territory controlled by the outpost in Bilohorivka was widened, as well as the width of the Ukrainian controlled forest south of Kreminna. Finally, the russian spearhead towards Zarichne (the only relative “success” of the russian offensive towards the village) is being flanked by persistent Ukrainian attacks from both sides. There is nothing large happening yet; it is still limited to “this field here, that tree there”. But, there are clear signs that the russian terrorists are no longer capable to attack in this area, and regrouped to a dug-in type of the defence. The initiative fully shifted to the Ukrainian Army; which can attack when and where it wants. This is still an extremely hard work, but it is much better than during winter months.
Situation near Svatove, Kupyansk, and Dvorichna
This direction was relatively calm compared to other places. It does not mean that nothing happens, just that the pace of warfare is slower than elsewhere. Expect for the russian attacks near the town of Dvorichna to improve their positions, the frontline is completely frozen. This is not an offensive, rather an active defence to better prepare for the foreseen Ukrainian offensive towards Svatove. Still, the proximity of the russian border with convenient supply routes makes it a hard task for the Ukrainian Army to break through this defence.
Situation in Belgorod Oblast
On 22nd of May 2023 Russian Volunteer Corps (RVC) made a successful raid into russian territory, temporarily liberating a few settlements, including a border crossing in Kozynka, a regional town center Grayvoron, and a few small villages in between. During the raid RVC infantrymen (using 1 trophy tank and 4 other vehicles) won a short battle against the russian border guards platoon and infantry squadron. An attack further east towards Golovchyno was interrupted in the view of incoming russian army reinforcements. After that the raiders left back to Ukrainian territory, losing just one soldier killed and a couple of small injuries.
This is not the first such raid by RVC. The organisation was originally created to liberate russian federation from the so-called occupation by Putin’s criminal regime. Specialized in diversion operations, previously RVC groups were infiltrating Kursk and Belgorod Oblasts since autumn 2022, and took part in a few sabotage and partisan actions since then. An incident of May 22nd is the first action at a scale of local conventional warfare.
Although it is currently affiliated with the Ukrainian Army commandment and receives light infantry supplies; it has its own goals, and uses trophy armor they got in battle from russians. By definition, it can be viewed as a contemporary rebels army, partially supported by the Ukrainian military commandment due to mutually benefitial goals.
Although this incident spread chaos and panic among russian elites and citizens alike, it had little impact from purely military perspective. The RVC group is still too small to compete even with average russian criminal gangs. However, the psychological effect cannot be underestimated. It has clearly shown a few things:
- Russia does not control its borders anymore. If a relatively small group of infantrymen can cross a “well-protected” border with Ukraine uncontested, a Chinese Liberation Army is capable of occupying the whole of Siberia “within 3 days” (using Putin’s own words).
- What is more important, RVC rebels were short of reaching the russian tactical nuclear missiles site near Golovchyno (marked as cross-circle on a map above). That done while there were at least 3 active russian army squadrons located in the vicinity (marked with pentagons), not counting the police forces. Russian Army reportedly evacuated their Iskander complexes from that base.
- The above emphasizes that the current russian government is not competent enough to possess nuclear weapons, as they kept nuclear weapons less than 30 kilometers away from a military conflict in hot phase. In other words: Putin in power is as bad as anarchy, and that in nuclear state. So, Putin regime should be removed from power as soon as possible by all means, before his rule turns into a global catastrophy.
- Finally, it shows that Ukraine political elites at last understood that the war can only be won on the enemy territory; and that it is best done by supporting motivated rebels who are residents of the enemy state.
- And the last, but not least, the way how RVC executed the raid clearly shows that Ukrainian commandment is true to humanist ideals: no single russian civilian was injured during the course of the raid, only military servicemen and equipment were damaged.
One way or another, this incident is reminiscent of the first part of my Trilogy describing the imminent russian Civil War in foreseeable future. I predicted that Civil War to start between 2023–2026, and as one can see the first signs of it are encroaching just in time.
Russian Terrorist Army Losses
Using the same methodology as in the previous report, the official statistics can be extrapolated to real losses. However, I need to make a notable correction to that methodology:
- A wounded-to-killed ratio decreased from 5.5 to 4.5. Over the course of autumn and winter campaigns russian terrorist army was practicing a no return policy to its convicts and conscripts. What it means is that soldiers who were severely wounded in battle are usually left to die in the field, no attempt to rescue them is made.
- Sadly, russian terrorist army commandment improved their grasp over their soldiers (despite the claims of Ukrainian officials of the opposite), decreasing the maximum deserter rate from 15% to 7%. The russian army morale is at a record low nevertheless, but those demotivated soldiers have nowhere to run and hide.
So, final numbers are below:
- initially appointed to the attack on Ukraine: 190'000;
- initial donbass militant bandits affiliated with Russia: ~30'000;
- approx. number of mobilized reserves by Sep 1, 2022: up to 190'000;
- additionally mobilized by martial law by Feb 1, 2023: up to 640'000;
- additionally mobilized since Feb 1 2023: up to 120'000;
- total involved personnel: up to 1'170'000;
- lost in battle (calculated by UAF evidence): 205'260;
- missing in action (1:5): ~41'000;
- injured in battle (4.5:1): ~923'000, of them:
- dead during evacuation or in hospital (15%): ~138'000;
- disabled for a long term (55%): ~508'000;
- returned to service (30%): ~277'000;
- prisoners of war: ~2'000 (the number remains stable due to regular exchanges of the POWs);
- non-battle losses & deserters: unknown, up to 7% (~82'000);
Total personnel losses (estimated):
- total fatal losses (dead & missing): around 384'000;
- total sanitary losses (injured and captured): over 510'000, up to ~592'000 (including non-battle losses and deserters, a kind of speculation);
- remain in service: 190'000–280'000.
As one can see, despite all losses russian conscription machine is able to replenish those losses with fresh cannon fodder, keeping the total numebr of the russian terrorist army in Ukraine well over 200'000 servicemen throughout the war campaign. It is still a huge army; albeit a badly equiped one due to permanent losses of the heavy armor.
As the Iranian military supplies to russia increase over time, the problem of equipment can be partially solved. Yes, russian terrorist has nowhere to take modern tanks, but they can still get enough of heavy infantry, artillery, drones, and potentially missiles. Thus, if the western countries bet on ending the war this year — they are ought to increase their heavy infantry and artillery supplies (especially ammunition). The ultimate goal of those supplies should be to not only outweight the Iranian supplies to russian terrorists, but even more so to grind the russian cannon fodder at a faster pace than russian conscription machine can add to it. For the faster russia collapses, the closer is the world peace, at least temporarily.
Trust the Ukrainian Army! Slava Ukraini!
