The Quad Summit amid the Bifurcation of the Global System

Velina Tchakarova
6 min readSep 24, 2021
The Quad

At the historic first QUAD Summit hosted by US President Joe Biden in Washington, the leaders of the four like-minded countries met face-to-face for the first time to discuss issues of common interest under the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue. Why is this summit so important? According to India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi, the QUAD “would act as a ‘force for global good’ and ensure peace and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific as well as the entire world.” According to US President Biden, the format consists of “democratic partners who share world views and have a common vision for the future.” Clearly, the QUAD cooperation is predominantly aimed at boosting security and defence ties between the four Indo-Pacific countries, while counterbalancing China’s rise in this region. Against this background, there is a wide range of topics to discuss — from Covid response and vaccine production, supply chains and infrastructure projects, technological cooperation and climate actions, maritime security and freedom of navigation in the Indo-Pacific, to 5G, space exploration and promotion of the rules-based order.

Currently, the world is witnessing a profound transformation in the geopolitical arena of international affairs. Following the COVID-19 virus outbreak, this year marks the obvious manifestation of an Indo-Pacific decade, with the US, China, and potentially India being the main protagonists in an emerging competition. This time, it is the unfolding of regional centres of power, which create the delusive impression of multipolarity, while in fact a new systemic bipolarity between the US and China comes to light — the Bifurcation of the Global System. With India being on its path to becoming the third largest-economic power by 2025 and as a natural long-term rival of China, the Indo-Pacific region is slowly but surely becoming the main arena for global power competition in the 21st century.

In this regard, the US is increasingly turning to the Indo-Pacific realm and will invest more in partnerships and allies’ formations linked to the Indo-Pacific region. Gurpreet Khurana describes this geopolitical space as stretching from the Indian and western Pacific Ocean to the littorals of West Africa and East Asia.

The US regards India as a significant and reliable partner in creating a counterweight to China’s overwhelming presence in South and South East Asia. Current developments, such as the emergence of AUKUS, QUAD, CPTPP negotiations, and other Anglosphere constellations, are increasingly seen as US-led counterbalancing efforts against China’s own geoeconomic projects such as BRI, China Pakistan Economic Corridor, and Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. Furthermore, new defence cooperation formats were also agreed on, such as the deal between Australia and India covering cooperation between their militaries and facilitating technology exchange. Obviously, the political elites in New Delhi are increasingly in favour of closer relations with Washington, but also continue to rely on friendly relations with Moscow amid the intensifying tensions with Beijing.

It is expected that a major geopolitical shift in the region will take place, caused by Washington’s efforts to establish a comprehensive strategic relationship with New Delhi, due to China’s rise in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond. Furthermore, China will continue extending its terrestrial connectivity to Europe through Central Asia, in order to bypass the US maritime dominance in the Indo-Pacific space. Given that China and India will be the two major powers of the Indo-Pacific region, their relationship will increasingly be shaped by economic competition, geostrategic rivalry and a certain readiness for confrontation in their quest for shaping this common geopolitical space.

There has been a profound shift in Chinese perceptions of India’s foreign and security policies following the re-election of Prime Minister Narendra Modi in 2019, which is now characterised by Chinese scholars as involving a ‘riskier’ approach. One of the major topics in current Chinese academic literature is India’s shift towards the US following the COVID-19 crisis. China endorses India’s objective of taking a leadership role in shaping global affairs towards ‘reformed multilateralism’. However, India’s rapprochement with the US in the Indo-Pacific region and enhanced security and defence cooperation with Japan and Australia within the QUAD is detrimental to Chinese geopolitical interests. Furthermore, Chinese experts carefully follow India’s growing economic self-reliance strategy and pursuit of a reconfiguration of global supply chains away from China as part of the systemic decoupling process between Washington and Beijing.

Repositioning the global supply chains away from China is already becoming a reality following the COVID-19 virus outbreak, and the Indo-Pacific region is about to become a forefront of this geoeconomic reconfiguration, due to the withdrawal of American and international capital from Beijing. Major geoeconomic opportunities and challenges will appear following the diversification of the global supply chains. A global disruption of supply chain, coupled with the imperilled rules-based global order caused by eroding international structures, as well as newly emerging organisations and institutions, will certainly not bypass the Indo-Pacific region. On the contrary, the reconfiguration will be initiated by the US to bring manufacturing and supply chains back home or to branch out to American allies and partners from the Anglosphere of influence such as UK, Australia, Japan, and increasingly India.

For India, the outcome of the systemic rivalry between Washington and Beijing will be decisive for its path towards becoming an established power in the Indo-Pacific region. If China emerges as the winner of the Fourth Industrial Revolution and manages to establish itself as a second global centre of power, this systemic process will have a negative impact on India’s geopolitical interests and goals. Thus, it is in New Delhi’s interest to build strong ties with as many regional actors as possible in Asia. Beyond that, India seeks to strengthen security and defence ties with various countries close to the US, particularly in the maritime domain, and to contribute to freedom of navigation in the Indo-Pacific. The quadrilateral (QUAD) cooperation between India, the US, Japan, and Australia is thus aimed at boosting security and defence ties between the four Indo-Pacific countries while counterbalancing China’s rise in this region.

The demand for a COVID-19 vaccine scenario has presented a new dimension to the ongoing battle of international vaccines, and will pose a new challenge for the West as China sought to establish a “Health Silk Road” at the beginning of the pandemic to support partner countries with medical supplies. Furthermore, Beijing aims to enhance its global image through its vaccine diplomacy. In response, the US and the three of its closest Indo-Pacific partners — India, Japan and Australia; together known as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) — committed to boosting COVID-19 vaccine supply at their first summit and pledged to cooperate in the maritime, security, and cyber domain to meet the challenges posed by China.

There are two plausible scenarios linked to the Indo-Pacific region in the short term: either the USA and India will unite to coordinate actions and measures against the growing influence of China in tandem with Russia (the Dragonbear) or the USA and China will engage in a process of approximation under Biden’s Administration, which seems increasingly unlikely, whereas India will need to carefully navigate between the two systems of power without aligning itself in a strategic manner. In the case of further escalations in South Asia, the USA would support New Delhi, while Russia would rather seek to remain officially unaligned.

India’s geopolitical choices are either joining the US-led bloc of predominantly Anglosphere allies and close partners such as UK, Japan and Australia against China, or, once again, building partnerships of non-aligned middle powers such as the EU that seek to navigate through the complex relationship between Washington and Beijing without taking sides. Obviously, New Delhi will have to make tough geopolitical choices and engage in multi-fora alliances.

Sources:

1. Covid and the Indo-Pacific Decade

2. India and China: Geopolitics in the Indo-Pacific Decade

3. India and China: Geopolitics in the Indo-Pacific Decade — Part II

4. Is a Cold War 2.o inevitable?

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Velina Tchakarova

Velina is Director of the Austrian Institute for European and Security Policy (AIES) in Vienna. www.velinatchakarova.com