Has Erdogan’s Attempt to Reshape Turkish Society Hit a Wall?
By William Armstrong
A new mosque in traditional Ottoman style is currently being built in Istanbul’s central Taksim Square. Due to be completed later this year, it is just one of thousands of new mosques going up across Turkey. But the construction in Taksim is particularly symbolic — an apparent sign of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s conquest of the political landscape and ability to reshape the Turkish nation in line with his wishes. He is currently campaigning for snap presidential and parliamentary elections on June 24 in which he could further cement his grip.
Despite a surprisingly energetic opposition campaign, Erdogan remains the odds-on favorite. But under the surface, things may not be so simple. Turkish society today is too sophisticated to be entirely reshaped by one man. While Erdogan and his party’s religious-nationalist program, combining modern Islamic conservatism with a populist streak heavy on Ottoman nostalgia, appears firmly in place today, there are growing signs that social tides in Turkey are not necessarily moving in the conservative direction that many assume.
Taksim offers a useful window into why. Ever since it became a kind of stage for the Ottoman Empire’s modernization in the 19th century, generations of different ideological persuasions have sought to change the square in line with their worldview. In 1928, five years after the founding of the modern Republic of Turkey, the Republic Monument was constructed in Taksim, symbolizing founder Mustafa Kemal Ataturk’s new nationalist order. The square was then subjected, in the 1930s and 1940s, to a comprehensive redesign by French urban planner Henri Prost, with large avenues, parks, promenades and modernist buildings encapsulating the secular spirit of the Kemalist cause. “Taksim is the representation of the liberal space and secularism,” Mucella Yapici, an architect at the Taksim Solidarity Platform, a coalition of interest groups, recently told a Turkish publication.
Taksim is also loaded with significance among religious conservatives. The Gezi Park protests in the summer of 2013 were sparked in opposition to an Erdogan-backed plan to bulldoze the park and rebuild the Ottoman-era barracks that once stood in its place. Those barracks were particularly symbolic as they were the site of a late-Ottoman mutiny in 1909 against the second constitutional era. In his book, “Architecture and the Turkish City: An Urban History of Istanbul since the Ottomans,” Murat Gul, a professor at Istanbul Technical University, also describes how religious circles have “worked tirelessly since the 1950s to have a mosque constructed in the square,” believing it “would be a stamp of Islamic identity on Taksim and provide a psychological victory for the political Islamist movement.” So the new mosque under construction today represents Erdogan’s fulfillment of a long-held desire for Turkish Islamists. On the opposite side of the square, the government is also overseeing the demolition and rebuilding of the Ataturk Culture Center, an iconic republican-era opera house. Through the two projects, Erdogan’s ruling Justice and Development Party, or AKP, is making a statement about where authority lies in Turkey’s largest city. A few days ago, the president himself made a midnight visit to observe the site of the under-construction mosque and the demolished culture center.
The vaunted social revolution ushered in by Turkey’s ruling party is not as deep as many observers inside and outside the country commonly assume.
And it isn’t just Istanbul; Erdogan towers over all areas of life in the country. State institutions, which throughout modern Turkish history have often been bitterly contested by different ideological factions, have gradually been subordinated to Erdogan’s will since he first came to office in 2003 as prime minister and especially since he became president in 2014. Erdogan is almost constantly on television, often delivering three pugnacious speeches in one day, all of which are broadcast live on every news channel. Under the ongoing state of emergency, declared after the attempted military coup in July 2016, he has been able to govern through decrees granted the full force of the law. His supporters refer to him as “reis,” or chief.
The government’s attempts to mold Turkish society according to the AKP’s ideals have in recent years moved into education, family and cultural policy. Money has poured into the Directorate of Religious Affairs, or Diyanet, which promotes an orthodox Sunni understanding across Turkey and now has an annual budget of over 4 billion Turkish liras (about $890 million), dwarfing most other ministries. Erdogan has famously declared his aim to “raise pious generations.” In classic, right-wing populist fashion, he frames this as a return to a more authentic and harmonious Turkish order, denouncing liberal and secular currents as alien and unwelcome impositions.
But despite the AKP being at the apogee of its power, longer-term trends suggest that Turkish society may not be heading inexorably down a homogenous Islamist path. Many in Turkey’s conservative media were recently preoccupied by intense debate about a rising number of young conservative Turks moving away from traditional Islamic beliefs. Their alarm focuses on a report in early April prepared by the local branch of the Education Ministry in the central Anatolian province of Konya. Conducted among students at state religious schools, known as imam-hatip schools, the survey warns that “youths are sliding to deism,” referring to belief in a God who does not intervene in worldly matters. Questioning their faith and troubled by “inconsistencies” in traditional Islamic beliefs, many young Turks are reported to be leaning toward a more personal and less institutional understanding of religion. Similar accounts from religious constituencies across Turkey since April have appeared, leading to a flurry of alarmed commentary in conservative media outlets.
The “deism” phenomenon may be exaggerated, but the fact it has stirred up such concern indicates a profound insecurity among Turkey’s Islamists. Despite generous funding and incentives, the newly opened religious schools are under-performing and under-enrolled compared to traditional, nonreligious schools. Encouraged by the gravitational force of urbanization, the birth rate in Turkey has been steadily falling despite Erdogan’s personal push for women to have “at least three children.” And divorce rates, while still very low compared to the European average, are rising every year. A recent survey conducted by the Center for American Progress and the Turkish pollster Metropoll found that younger Turks, including AKP supporters, are less likely to say Islam is central to their life and conception of “Turkishness.” And while the government constantly emphasizes the importance of “native and national” production, Turkey’s economy remains highly dependent on foreign capital inflows, resulting in a persistently high current account deficit. As throughout Turkish history, ideological ideals have hit the wall of reality under Erdogan and the AKP.
Erdogan remains immensely popular and seems on course to retain the presidency in the upcoming elections, even if the race is tighter than many expected. Backed by the full force of the state, his brand of religious-nationalist conservatism looks set to dominate Turkey’s politics for the foreseeable future. But the vaunted social revolution ushered in by the AKP is not as deep as many observers inside and outside the country reckon. Just as no government has ever been able to completely reshape Taksim Square as it wishes, state attempts to engineer Turkish society, going back to Ataturk, have typically had only a limited effect. It may take years to fully realize the limits of the current government’s conservative social project, but the signs are starting to appear.
William Armstrong is a writer and editor based in Istanbul at the Hürriyet Daily News. His work has been published in The Times Literary Supplement, The New York Times, Foreign Policy, Politico, Al Monitor and others. He also presents and produces the Turkey Book Talk podcast.
Originally published at www.worldpoliticsreview.com.
