Air Strikes by VKS (and, a lil’ bit, by SyAAF), 9 April 2017

The day could be described as one, ‘…when VKS attempted to replace Shayrat AB’.

There was no flying activity the entire night and early morning, i.e. for nearly 10 hours — until 08.05, when two Su-25s launched from Hmemmem AB, marking the start of a very busy day for the VKS. The first 7 air strikes went for Jishr ash-Shughour area, followed by attacks on Ma’arat an-Nauman, Khan Sheykhoun, and Kfar Zita (the latter was hit by up to 10 air strikes around 09.45). The air strikes ‘just kept on rolling’ through the morning, new aircraft launching every 5–10 minutes (Su-25s always in pairs; a total of 3 such take-offs were observed, indicating there are at least 6 of them at Hmemmem AB, meanwhile). By 10.25, the VKS thus flew at least 22 combat sorties.

The next wave commenced launching at 11.07 and primarily targeted the Khan Sheykhoun area. With few short interruptions, this lasted until 13.30hrs and included a total of 19 aircraft.

Through all of this time, the SyAAF managed to launch merely two Su-24s — both from Tiyas AB. All three bombed the Khan Sheykhoun area. Even the first Su-22-related take-off of the day took place only around 12.41, and then from Tiyas — not from Shayrat.

At 13.44, the VKS opened its next wave, first launching a pair of Su-25s. Seems, this is meanwhile something like ‘standard procedure’. Aircraft involved ranged wide and far over Syria, from Darat Azza and Ma’arat an-Nauman in the north, via Khan Touman in the north-east, to Eastern Ghouta and eastern Damascus, all the way to Dera’a in the south: i.e. the Russians attempted to replace the SyAAF. This wave seems to have lasted all the way to 18.00hrs, by when no less than 39 take-offs were registered.

BTW: mind: not one of air strikes in question — nor any of the last few days — can be put in any kind of relation to the usual Russian lie about ‘fighting IS’. They’re not doing anything of that kind since weeks.

During that time, the SyAAF added merely two additional Su-24s, both from Tiyas (one at 15.10, other at 15.13). Hama became active only around 15.30hrs, when two helicoptes were launched in northern direction. Another Su-22 launched from Tiyas at 16.34, followed by a Su-24 at 16.45, and two further Su-22s — both from Tiyas — at 17.56 and 18.10hrs.

The L-39s from Hama became active with two take-offs at 18.18hrs. At 18.37, the VKS initiated its next wave of air strikes. This targeted primarily the Sarkib area, lasted until 20.44, and included a total of 11 take-offs. Starting with 21.22, the VKS initiated its evening wave of air strikes, which lasted for the rest of the day.

Totals
VKS
fighter-bombers: 113
helicopters: 4
UAVs: 10
recce: 1

SyAAF
helicopters: 7
L-39s: 9
MiG-21s: 0
MiG-23s: 0
Su-22s: 3
Su-24s: 7
By now it’s clear: the three Su-22-sorties from Shayrat on 8 April were flown for nothing else but PR-purposes. It’s very likely that all three aircraft subsequently landed at Tiyas, i.e. didn’t even try to return to Shayrat. Reason should be obvious: it’s pointless to try operating combat aircraft from a ruined air base, where there is no fuel and very little ammo left, and where most of support installations are destroyed.

To further emphasise the massive drop in number of air strikes flown by the SyAAF since the US strike on Shayrat, here just a review of Su-22-sorties for the last week:

9 April: 3 (all from Tiyas)
8 April: 3 (all three from Shayrat)
7 April: 2 (all from Tiyas)
6 April: 25
5 April: 24
4 April: 11
3 April: 16

This is making it clear that anybody explaining the TLAM-strike on Shayrat ‘hit only a few aircraft’ or ‘caused only minimal damage’, and all the claims that this air strike ‘disturbed’ or ‘destroyed’ the regime’s (or Russian) efforts against the Daesh — is either lying or having no clue what happened there.