Ukraine War, 1 February 2023: Operational Level
Hello everybody!
Today, I’ll try to babble a bit about latest developments at the operational level.
For everybody’s orientation: in military sciences, the ‘operational level’ is sorted ‘in between’ of the tactical- and strategic levels. Essentially, that’s the level at which one stops talking about specific weapons systems, and their looks, for example, or about units below the level of brigade, and starts talking about major trends in combat operations, or discussing large-scale combat operations.
Arguably, I’m tending to discuss the operational level in most of my reports: but, I’m at least as often delving into the tactical level because ‘precision’ in data-collection is always crucial for major developments, not to talk about recognizing specific patterns, and thus understanding what’s going on in the war in general.
VDV & VSRF
For the start, an interesting ‘side-note’ on latest developments within the Airborne Forces of the Russian Federation (VDV) and the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (VSRF). Something like a week ago, military experts of the Rossiyskaya Gazeta discussed the importance of the capture of Soledar.
They have concluded something like, ‘it’s important’ because it’s the first ‘significant’ Russian success since July; because it’s tying down a large part of strategic reserve of the Ukrainian Armed Forces (ZSU); it’s (quote) ‘lessening (Ukrainian) arrogance’; and it ‘demonstrated a qualitative change’ in the VSRF…
That far, everything was OK. Sure, I’ve got no idea how influential that magazine might be or who exactly is the author and what are his connections. But, hand on heart: it doesn’t matter. That article is interesting because it is providing another bit of insight into how at least some segment of the VDV and/or the VSRF is understanding it’s/their own situation and their intentions. Along this feature, the purpose of the offensive on Bakhmut, in the Kremina- and Vuhledar areas is actually to tie down Ukrainian forces, and bleed them, and to bolster the morale of own troops by demonstrating they ‘still can’.
What really caught my attention is the expert in question stressing (even ‘cheering’) how the Russian forces are nowadays fighting ‘purely infantry’ battles, and this being ‘big news’.
OK. Still fine. After all the equipment losses of the last 11 months: no surprise. Rather a logical necessity. But then, and in one of his latest war-related statements, on 15 January, Putin specified, between others: ‘everything is developing according to plan of the Defence Ministry of the General Staff.’
Now combine these two statements and think about them: should they mean that it was always a plan of the Keystone Cops in Moscow (including the GenStab) to first invade all over Ukraine only to squander over a half of the regular VSRF — including the mass of best military units and equipment the VDV and the VSRF used to have — and to get forced to withdraw from Kyiv, Chernihiv, Sumy, Kharkiv and Kherson?
…and then it was a plan of the Keystone Cops in Moscow to convert the entire VDV and VSRF from completely mechanised forces centred on artillery, into infantry forces that (gauging by closing remarks in the same article in the Rossiyskaya Gazeta) can’t do the job due to lack of training, suitable communication gear and other modern equipment …? …indeed, it was a plan to debilitate the armed forces of the Russian Federation to the level where these are depending on Wagner PMC squandering over 30,000 convicts recruited from Russian prisons to run Zergh-Rush-style attacks to advance one or two kilometres and capture a few villages?
At this point I’m left without other solutions but to conclude: this must be some sort of logic understandable exclusively to Putin and hordes of Putler fans — at home and abroad. Tragically, it’s the same logic meanwhile dominating all the possible of Putin’s top propagandists, like Solovyev or Simonyan…
But, seriously now: by side Putin and his ‘everything’s developing along the plan’, and by side his propagandists. The latest Russian counteroffensives in the Kremina- and Vuhledar areas were both including sizeable concentrations of mechanised forces (or, to keep it in the Russian military parlance: ‘Tanks & Motor Rifle’ troops), well supported by artillery and air power, and thus represented combined arms operations. ‘Infantry alone’ kind of operations were run by Wagner and VDV in the Bakhmut area, only.
Of course, who am I to say… but still: despite impressions of something else, the VDV and the VSRF are very much seeking to return to their usual modus operandi — which is: mechanised forces with plentiful of artillery support. What is causing them immense problems is the inability of their artillery (and that is including their BM-27 and BM-30 multiple rocket launchers, which some tend to claim are ‘outmatching’ the Ukrainian-operated M142 HIMARS and M270 MLRS) to operate effectively in winter — primarily because of the lack of so-called ‘all weather’ UAVs for reconnaissance purposes: without plentiful of effective artillery support, the VDV and the VSRF have no chance of any kind of serious advances.
…which in turn is important for the following reason: after spending much of December and then most of January announcing a ‘biiiiiiiiiiig’ Russian offensive from southern Belarus on Kyiv or somewhere else in north-western Ukraine, much of Ukrainian and Western talking-heads are now announcing major Russian offensive/s ‘somewhere in the East’ or ‘from all possible directions’ — for February and March. I would say:
a) actually, the Russians have already tried the last few days (see Kremina and Vuhledar), but failed, and
b) under ‘best’ conditions (from Putin’s point of view), any such offensive is going to be heavily dependent on good weather.
ZSU
In the case of the ZSU, there are several issues to point out.
The first remains the issue of command and control, or, and better expressed: that of (massive?) disagreements in between different levels in the chain of command. I’ve already mentioned, several times, that there are lots of ‘mini-Napoleons’ within the ranks of the ZSU. The majority of people in question are lower-ranking officers, or non-commissioned officers (NCOs) — all of them with plentiful of combat experience from the fighting of 2014–2021. Up front: they do deserve our respect for their actions were crucial for the survival of the ZSU — and thus entire Ukraine — in the first few weeks of this war, too. That far: excellent.
However, this is meanwhile an entirely different war than the one of 2014–2021: it is a conflict that needs not only a de-centralised style of command at the tactical level, but also a highly centralised style of command at the operational- and strategic levels. Why that? Because — and despite all the possible apps helping improve this — some Sergeant, 1st Lieutenant, or Captain simply has neither the same situational awareness nor military education as a Colonel or a General has, nor has the authority to manoeuvre entire battalions or even brigades around the battlefield, and even less so have lower-ranking officers and NCOs the combination of situational awareness, knowledge and authority to order an entire artillery brigade where to shoot. Particularly not in coordinated fashion. Foremost: this is simply not their job, and it’s not on them to go discussing with their ‘faggot generals’ every time they disagree some ‘order from above’. Even less so is it their job to run insubordination.
This is why armed forces are armed forces: a body of people with perfectly clear, hierarchical system of responsibilities. Not a democratic system of rule dominated by the media that’s hyperventilating while distracting with superficial ‘news’ and ignoring the backgrounds and context.
With other words: the ZSU needs its generals, no matter who, why, or how much is considering these for ‘faggots’. Otherwise it’s going to continue experiencing plenty of additional ‘Soledars’ and ‘Blahodatnes’.
BTW, how things work when everybody is patiently sticking to the chain of command and listens to the ‘faggot Generals’ was nicely demonstrated by the ZSU’s group of forces in the Vuhledar area of the last few days, where (between others) the 1st Tank, 72nd Mech and the 55th Artillery tidily smashed forces of at least three Russian brigades, and up to five different regiments.
The second point is the issue not shown on photos and videos very often, but still worrisome enough: that of Ukrainian losses in heavy equipment. Gauging by the data collected by the Oryx team, accumulated, visually confirmed losses are meanwhile at 453 main battle tanks (MBTs), 260 other armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs), 470 infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), 225 armoured personnel carriers (APCs), 96 towed- and 109 self-propelled artillery pieces. Arguably, up to 40% of this was lost early during the war, when the Russians overrun several large depots of the ZSU; another 40% during desperate battles the ZSU fought in April-June 2022 period.
Meanwhile, and rather unsurprisingly considering the mass of ZSU’s equipment is still consisting of heavy weapons of Soviet origin manufactured 30–40 years ago, there’s a constantly increasing number of — at least: temporary — losses caused by the wear: intensive use is wearing out engines, tracks, guns, and other assemblies. Whenever another tank or artillery piece is rendered non-operational, it is requiring lengthy repairs. Sometimes these ‘repairs’ are outright ‘rebuilds’.
This is of particular importance because — at strategic level — Ukrainians are actually short on heavy equipment: they are short on it because the ZSU is expanding and thus in need of not only heavy weapons to replace losses of its existing units, but also in need of armament for additional units. Additional units are necessary to improve the firepower and mobility of the entire force, make it capable to better react to Russian attacks, even to run own counteroffensives, and to lessen the burden of already existing units, many of which are ‘in line’ (i.e. involved in fighting) already since the start of the war, and thus worn down: in need of rest, reorganisation, even of retraining.
Correspondingly, and as can be read on the Militaryland.net, the ZSU is in the process of working up at least five new brigades, including:
- 21st Mech
- 33rd Mech
- 47th Artillery
- 116th Mech
- 118th Mech
These five units alone are going to take at least some 150 each of MBTs, APCs/IFVs, and artillery pieces to equip properly.
The third and final point is related to the Ukrainian artillery — which is something like ‘enjoying better times than ever before’ on most of the frontlines, lately. The essence of its latest experiences can be read in the Twitter-thread here. Although the author focused on coverage of the US-supplied (and towed) M777A2s, it’s essence is something like follows:
- When the M777A2s arrived in Ukraine, in June last year, the Russian artillery was shooting ‘like mad’ and had little problems with targeting Ukrainian artillery (see ‘counter-battery’ operations). This necessitated frequent ‘survivability moves’ — quick re-deployment of Ukrainian artillery pieces, and the wide spread of their formations.
- Ukrainians took time to learn how to operate their artillery in mobile battles, to learn how to store their ammunition near their pieces, and to learn not to fuze their shells too early.
- Then the AGM-88 HARM anti-radar missiles arrived and these have been deployed not only to target the Russian air defences in support of M142 HIMARS and/or M270 MLRS operations, but also to target Russian artillery radars — the type of equipment that’s in short supply with the VDV and VSRF.
- Net result: the threat of the Russian counter-battery fire dropped dramatically.
- The Russians then reacted by deploying their Lancet UCAVs (that is: one Orlan-10 combined with 1–3 Lancets) to hit the Ukrainian artillery. You might recall that alone in August 2022 they’ve released about two dozens of related videos. Most of these taken in the southern Zaporizhzhya area. Well, it turned out these are unpleasant, but: causing much less damage than videos might indicate.
- Foremost, Ukrainians quickly learned to counter Lancets with help of camouflage nets ‘reinforced’ by mesh fences or screens.
Sure, establishing such positions decreased the mobility of Ukrainian artillery, but dramatically improved its survivability to UCAV strikes — while also increasing its rate of fire. So much so, that even the self-propelled artillery of the ZSU is meanwhile operating that way.
While certainly related to the inability of Orlan-10s to operate effectively in winter weather, too (because: without Orlans, the Russian artillery is largely ineffective), this is something like the ‘secret of success’ of the ZSU — at least in the Vuhledar area, probably in Kremina- and Bakhmut areas, too: although Ukrainians still have far less artillery tubes than the Russian, their artillery is much more precise. This combination of safe operations and precision is what’s enabling the ZSU to cause such massive damage to the latest Russian counteroffensives.
